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IDENTIFIERS

ABSTRACT

The Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) demonstration, a national research and demonstration program, was designed to test the effectiveness of a youth employment program in various settings. Eight VICI programs, each of which enrolled up to 60 unemployed, out-of-school, economically disadvantaged youths between the ages of 16 and 19, were started at the following sites: Broward County, Florida: Chicago, Illinois: Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Newark, Jersey: New Haven, Connecticut: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: and the South Bronx in New York City. Program participants worked five days a week under supervision of union journeyman drawn from the construction and building trades. Although the work varied among the sites, it was aimed at making tangible community improvements through such activities as refurbishing public facilities or repairing homes occupied by poor or elderly people from the same neighborhoods as the youths enrolled in the program. The VICI model relied heavily on a set of linkages (including educational institutions, labor unions, and various local agencies) to tie the program to other institutions. Activities at each site were summarized and evaluated, and practical suggestions for prime sponsors seeking to implement VICI-type projects were made. (Other youth knowledge and development reports are available separately--see note.) (MN)

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
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**YOUTH KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT REPORT 7.5**

**ENHANCED WORK PROJECTS--**

**THE INTERIM FINDINGS FROM THE  
VENTURES IN COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT  
DEMONSTRATION**

**Corporation for Public/Private Ventures**

**For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402**

## OVERVIEW

Work projects have always been and will remain a fundamental component of youth programming. There is almost infinite diversity in the focus of such projects as well as in their scale, duration, organizational complexity, linkages, supervision and skill requirements. The most prevalent projects are short-term. They spend the preponderance of resources on the wages and salaries of participants. Materials, equipment and supervision are at a minimum. The work requires and transmits limited skills. Such projects are relatively easy to organize. There are few risks. On the other hand, the work experience rarely leads directly to career jobs and is less likely to hold the attention of youth participants than more demanding and rewarding projects. Productivity may also be limited; certainly there are not likely to be lasting community improvements because of the absence of capital investment as part of the projects.

"Enriched" projects are those with more ambitious objectives which usually require greater organization, planning and linkages. To accomplish their missions, they tend to use more skilled and higher cost supervisors, as well as a greater proportion of nonlabor inputs. With more interrelated components, "enriched" projects are "riskier" to mount although they may be more productive in their output as well as their lasting impacts on youth. To the extent they spend more for capital, supervision and management, they have reduced direct employment effects per dollar of outlay.

Clearly, there are a set of tradeoffs in choosing between basic and "enriched" projects. Successful "enriched" projects are likely to be very attractive in terms of their visible outputs, the quality of the work experience, the impact on enrollees and the cooperation in their design and operation. Yet the "success" rate with which enriched projects fulfill their objectives is less than that of projects which are more pedestrian in their goals. More youth are employed per dollar in the less ambitious projects. Productivity per dollar of youth wages may be different than productivity per dollar of program cost because of the high overhead costs related to enrichment.

A major knowledge development objective under the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act is to learn more about these tradeoffs, as well as to determine the conditions and approaches to maximize program "batting averages" and to identify the types of youth who can most benefit from the "enriched" and "nonenriched" approaches. There are several discrete demonstrations exploring these issues in multiple sites, with varying delivery agents and careful research designs.

The Ventures in Community Improvement or VICI program is an attempt to replicate a model "enriched" project in a number of different locations. It utilizes an intermediary, the Corporation for Public/Private Ventures as the replication and research agent, to assure that the fundamental enrichment elements are maintained in the projects. Fifteen local agents selected on the basis of need were initially invited to submit proposals. From these, nine were selected for funding, of which eight were to be mounted under the umbrella of CPPV.

The eight local projects share certain basic elements:

- o Scale - The projects all are budgeted for 60 participants. While they operate locally through a variety of worksites, this represents a large undertaking for a single local delivery agent. For instance, most projects mounted under YCCIP have less than ten participants. The VICI projects are larger than all the combined projects under formula-funded YCCIP in some smaller prime sponsors.
- o Continuity - Work projects are usually funded through annual grant applications. Most are limited in their period of operation to less than a year, after start-up and phase-down. VICI projects were initially scheduled for 18 months and have been extended.
- o Enriched Supervision - VICI projects are budgeted on the basis of a 1 to 6 supervisor/youth ratio. Adequate supervisory wage levels are provided to permit employment of journeymen.
- o Linkages - All of the projects draw on other sources of funding for materials and equipment; in some cases, these alternatives amount to a substantial share of total project costs. There is a heavy emphasis on linkages with labor unions and apprenticeship programs, both in a formal sense and in the hiring of journeymen as supervisors.
- o Planning and Oversight - Extensive planning and development was required for sites to be funded. Through the intermediate agency, each project receives an inordinate degree of oversight and technical as well as problem-solving assistance.
- o Research - Extensive research requirements are built into the grants in order to learn more about large-scale work experience efforts. These requirements are burdensome but also contribute to more disciplined management.

- o Cost - VICI projects are costly because of scale, but also generate less youth employment per dollar of expenditure because of the emphasis on supervision and the use of high cost journeymen.

The purpose of the VICI demonstration was to test whether "enriched" projects with these elements could be feasibly replicated in a variety of locations, and whether the activities would be more cost effective than traditional, nonenriched work projects as measured by comparative enrollee impacts and the productive output generated. This report contains a process study of implementation, the early results of the impact assessments, and a summary report on the VICI experience.

There is convincing evidence that the "enriched" project approach is both feasible and replicable. Site selection was based on need, yet at least six of the eight sites mounted under CPPV's auspices must be considered successfully meeting most major objectives. There were problems, as anticipated, which were related mostly to linkages in securing outside funding for materials and equipment, but these have generally been overcome.

There is convincing evidence that the "enriched" projects have a greater impact on job placement and entrance into apprenticeship than do less ambitious work projects mounted under YCCIP and other national demonstrations.

There is evidence that the projects produce valuable output and that the efficiency and effectiveness of the projects increase with time.

There is evidence concerning the types of youth who benefit most within the disadvantaged participant group. It would appear that VICI might best serve as an advanced component within a local CETA system which would draw on youth of demonstrated maturity who had decided on a career in construction related work. Given the higher cost per participant, it is important that those most needing and likely to benefit from this approach be directed to it.

Until the full participant impact studies are completed, as well as the cost and output analysis of other projects, it is difficult to make a judgment about relative cost-effectiveness of enrichment. However, there are clearly differential impacts resulting from enrichments and the approach is feasible, which would suggest that the more comprehensive findings will be positive.

This volume is one of the products of the "knowledge development" effort implemented under the mandate of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977. The knowledge development effort consists of hundreds of separate research, evaluation and demonstration activities which will result in literally thousands

of written products. The activities have been structured from the outset so that each is self-standing but also interrelated with a host of other activities. The framework is presented in A Knowledge Development Plan for the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977, A Knowledge Development Plan for the Youth Initiatives Fiscal 1979 and Completing the Youth Agenda: A Plan for Knowledge Development, Dissemination and Application for Fiscal 1980.

Information is available or will be coming available from these various knowledge development efforts to help resolve an almost limitless array of issues. However, policy and practical application will usually require integration and synthesis from a wide array of products, which, in turn, depends on knowledge and availability of these products. A major shortcoming of past research, evaluation and demonstration activities has been the failure to organize and disseminate the products adequately to assure the full exploitation of the findings. The magnitude and structure of the youth knowledge development effort puts a premium on structured analysis and wide dissemination.

As part of its knowledge development mandate, therefore, the Office of Youth Programs of the Department of Labor will organize, publish and disseminate the written products of all major research, evaluation and demonstration activities supported directly by or mounted in conjunction with OYP knowledge development efforts. Some of the same products may also be published and disseminated through other channels, but they will be included in the structured series of Youth Knowledge Development Reports in order to facilitate access and integration.

The Youth Knowledge Development Reports, of which this is one, are divided into twelve broad categories:

1. Knowledge Development Framework: The products in this category are concerned with the structure of knowledge development activities, the assessment methodologies which are employed, validation of measurement instruments, the translation of knowledge into policy, and the strategy for disseminating findings.

2. Research on Youth Employment and Employability Development: The products in this category represent analyses of existing data, presentation of findings from new data sources, special studies of dimensions of youth labor market problems and policy analyses.

3. Program Evaluations: The products in this category include impact, process and benefit-cost evaluations of youth programs including the Summer Youth Employment Program, Job Corps, the Youth Adult Conservation Corps, Youth Employment and Training Programs, Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects, and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit.

**4. Service and Participant Mix:** The evaluations and demonstrations summarized in this category concern the matching of different types of youth with different service combinations. This includes experiments with work vs. work plus remediation vs. straight remediation as treatment options. It also includes attempts to mix disadvantaged and more affluent participants, as well as youth with older workers.

**5. Education and Training Approaches:** The products in this category present the findings of structured experiments to test the impact and effectiveness of various education and vocational training approaches including specific education methodologies for the disadvantaged, alternative education approaches and advanced career training.

**6. Pre-Employment and Transition Services:** The products in this category present the findings of structured experiments to test the impact and effectiveness of school-to-work transition activities, vocational exploration, job-search assistance and other efforts to better prepare youth for labor market success.

**7. Youth Work Experience:** The products in this category address the organization of work activities, their output, productive roles for youth and the impacts of various employment approaches.

**8. Implementation Issues:** This category includes cross-cutting analyses of the practical lessons concerning "how-to-do-it." Issues such as learning curves, replication processes and programmatic "batting averages" will be addressed under this category, as well as the comparative advantages of alternative delivery agents.

**9. Design and Organizational Alternatives:** The products in this category represent assessments of demonstrations of alternative program and delivery arrangements such as consolidation, year-round preparation for summer programming, the use of incentives and multi-year tracking of individuals.

**10. Special Needs Groups:** The products in this category present findings on the special problems of and adaptations needed for significant segments including minorities, young mothers, troubled youth, Indochinese refugees and the handicapped.

**11. Innovative Approaches:** The products in this category present the findings of those activities designed to explore new approaches. The subjects covered include the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects, private sector initiatives, the national youth service experiment, and energy initiatives in weatherization, low-head hydroelectric dam restoration, windpower and the like.

12. Institutional Linkages: The products in this category will include studies of institutional arrangements and linkages as well as assessments of demonstration activities to encourage such linkages with education, volunteer groups, drug abuse and other youth serving agencies.

In each of these knowledge development categories, there will be a range of discrete demonstration, research and evaluation activities, focused on different policy, program and analytical issues. For instance, all experimental demonstration projects have both process and impact evaluations, frequently undertaken by different evaluation agents. Findings will be published as they become available so that there will usually be a series of reports as evidence accumulates. To organize these products, each publication is classified in one of the twelve broad knowledge development categories, described in terms of the more specific issue, activity or cluster of activities to which it is addressed, with an identifier of the product and what it represents relative to other products in the demonstration. Hence, the multiple products under a knowledge development activity are closely interrelated and the activities in each broad cluster have significant interconnections.

This volume on the Ventures in Community Improvement demonstration should be read in conjunction with the other reports in the "youth work experience" category. In particular, the work valuation methods applied in this study might be contrasted with the approach and its applications in Work Valuation--The Methods and Findings from Their Application. There are two other interim reports on enhanced work projects, An Analysis of Local Experience and Findings from the HUD/DOL Community Development Demonstration. Finally, practical lessons for prime sponsors seeking to implement VICI-type projects are contained in Jobs and Community Improvements, in the "implementation issues" category.

ROBERT TAGGART  
Administrator  
Office of Youth Programs

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**PART 1**  
**The Ventures in Community Improvement**  
**Program: A Demonstration**  
**of Program Replication**  
**Through the CETA System**

This report is part of an ongoing effort to record and analyze the forces that have shaped the first full year's development of the Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) demonstration. VICI is a national research and demonstration project which seeks to test the effectiveness of a model youth employment program in various settings. Several techniques and several groups of researchers, administrators, and analysts have been involved both in monitoring VICI and in the production of this report. The demonstration is financed by the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Youth Programs (OYP), while the Corporation for Public/Private Ventures (P/PV) has the responsibility for designing, managing, and analyzing the operation of the demonstration and for reporting findings to DOL. Research for Better Schools (RBS) subcontracted with P/PV to conduct a statistical analysis for the demonstration; RBS' findings are presented in Chapters IV through VIII of this report. To capture the non-quantifiable, historical and personal factors that have affected VICI, P/PV engaged two "process documentors," Harvey D. Shapiro and Hank Blakely, to visit sites, interview participants, administrations, and others associated with VICI, and report their findings to P/PV. Their work is presented in the first two chapters.

After the basic design elements of the VICI demonstration were settled, CETA prime sponsors in a number of cities were invited to submit proposals for operating a VICI program. In mid-1978, eight localities were selected for funding under the auspices of P/PV. The sites were Atlanta, Georgia; Broward County, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Newark, New Jersey; New Haven, Connecticut; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and the South Bronx in New York City. Each VICI program was to enroll up to 60 unemployed, out-of-school, economically disadvantaged youth between the ages of 16 and 19. They were to work five days a week under the supervision of union journeymen drawn from the construction and building trades. Although the work would vary among the sites, it was aimed at making tangible community improvements through such activities as refurbishing public facilities or repairing homes occupied by poor or elderly people from the same neighborhoods as the youth enrolled in the program.

Using program elements drawn from the Emergency Home Repair Program in Portland, Oregon, and from several other youth programs, the VICI model relied heavily on a set of linkages which tied the program to other institutions. Various local institutions were chosen to recruit and refer youth to VICI. Educational institutions agreed to provide certain educational services to VICI youths. Locals of unions in the building and construction trades agreed to provide union journeymen to serve as instructors in the program and to assist VICI youth to gain entrance to union apprenticeship programs and to job opportunities. Local organizations of various kinds agreed to identify or provide work projects to be undertaken by the youth. And the local CETA prime sponsor, or its designated local management agency, had overall responsibility for operating the program and coordinating its linkages. As shown in Table 1, a variety of local organizations agreed to serve as linkages. But while there were differences among the sites as to precisely which craft union or which youth referral agency would be involved with VICI,

**TABLE 1**  
**VICI LINKAGES AND PROGRAM FEATURES**

LINKAGES & FEATURES		ATLANTA	BIRMINGHAM	CHICAGO	MILWAUKEE	MINNEAPOLIS	NEW HAVEN	PHILADELPHIA	SOUTH BEND
LOCAL MANAGEMENT AGENCY	Atlanta Urban League	Bureau of Employment and Training Administration	Dept. of Human Services	OIC of Greater Milwaukee	Moyer's Office of Employment & Training (DOET)	New Haven Employment and Training Administration	Franklin Foundation	Operation Open City	
WORK PROVIDING AGENCY	Bureau of Buildings	Pt. Lauderdale Housing Authority	Chicago Dept. of Planning	Milwaukee Building City & Community Development	Inspection Department	Newark Housing & Redevelopment Auth.	Human Resources Admin.	Philadelphia Housing Dev. Corp.	Operation Open City
YOUTH REFERRAL AGENCY(S)	Atlanta Comprehensive Employment & Training Admin. (CETA)	Bureau Employment & Training Admin.	Dept. of Human Services	Wisconsin Job Ser. Social Dev. Commission	DIGSTOP/MED	Comprehensive Employment & Training Deliv. Ser. Recruitment & Training Program	Rich. Lee Sch./Bureau of Milwaukee W.S./ Wilber Cross HS/ Security Corp. #24/Painters 106/Conn. State Rep. Agency/OIC/Urban League	Alfred E. Smith RPP Operation Open City	
PARTICIPATING UNIONS	No. Co. Building & Constr. Trades Council, Atlanta Residential Carpenters Union	Pt. Lauderdale Building Council of Constr. Trades Council	Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Apprenticeship Training Program	Mil. Carpenters Dist. Conn. Mil. Painters Union	Intl. Bro. of Painters & Allied Trade Council	Central Conn. Carpenters Local #24 Painters Union #10	Phila. Bldg. Building Trades & Constr. Council Trades Council (Roof, Corp., Elec., Plast., & Painters Local)		
EDUCATIONAL LINKAGE	Atlanta Bd. of Education	Florida Intl. University	Chicago Bd. of Ed.--Ind. Skills Center	Mil. Public Sch. Mil. Area Tech. College	Intl. Bro. of Painters & Allied Trade Council #10	M. of Ed.--Tech. Div. Adult Ed. (GED) & Junta (Bilingual)	School Dist. of Phila. Nestor Jr. College		
COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENTS	Emergency Home Repairs	Repairs on Public Housing	Rehabilitating Emergency Housing	Emergency Home Repairs	Painting Public Housing	Emergency Home Repairs Painting	Emergency Home Repairs & Rehabilitation of Private Dwellings		
Budget:	\$ 996,737	\$ 994,067	\$ 996,738	\$ 1,024,446	\$ 996,737	\$ 1,003,734	\$ 649,132	\$497,432	
IND	20,000						517,306	100,000 GIA	
OTHER	100,000			522,496	125,395	100,000	577,997		
TOTAL	\$1,104,737	\$1,064,067	\$1,519,738	\$1,157,141	\$1,104,737	\$1,103,731	\$1,100,132	\$597,432	

#12-month budget

all sites shared the emphasis on linking the youth to other institutions so that this employment and training program would not operate in a vacuum. Rather, it would give the enrollee access to various services that might improve his or her employability and also employ the youth in activities that would improve the area in which he or she lived.

The VICI demonstration was scheduled to run for 18 months, however, the starting point differed from site to site due to prevailing local conditions relating to start-up. Broward, Chicago, Milwaukee, Newark and New Haven started in October 1978; Atlanta and Philadelphia in December 1978; and South Bronx in January 1979. Thus, by March 1979, while Atlanta Philadelphia and South Bronx were beginning to send youths out to work on repairing homes, Milwaukee, Newark and the other sites had begun seeking apprenticeships and jobs for youth deemed job ready due to their stay in the program. Six of the sites will have completed their 18 months' operations by June 1, 1980; however, Chicago, due to its interrupted history, and South Bronx, due to its late start, will complete their program operations in August 1980.

#### THE SITES

The following section was prepared by P/PV program staff who maintain regular and frequent contact with each site. A brief profile is given of the VICI program in each of the eight sites.

Atlanta. The prime sponsor, the Atlanta CETA office, has subcontracted with the Atlanta Urban League to manage the demonstration. This demonstration focuses solely on emergency home repair, with a maximum expenditure for materials and supplies of \$1,800 per home. The prime sponsor has selected the City of Atlanta's Bureau of Buildings as the work provider. The Bureau of Buildings refers properties cited for building code violations, after determining that the property owners are eligible for VICI services.

The Atlanta demonstration uses \$108,000 in HUD Community Development funds to provide materials and supplies to job sites where the VICI youth are working. The supplementing of DOL funds with HUD monies has resulted in a number of homes being renovated in an area where private contractors have been reluctant to work.

Participants rotate among four different skills: carpentry, electricity, plumbing and painting. Under the supervision of skilled journeymen from the North Georgia Building and Construction Trades Council, each participant works a four-day, thirty-five hour week: the fifth day is devoted to GED instruction. The journeymen provide all skills training, while the Atlanta Board of Education provides GED instruction. Pre-apprentice credit may be granted to VICI trainees recommended by journeymen.

Broward County. The Broward Employment and Training Administration (BETA), the prime sponsor, manages the demonstration. Until recently, the Fort Lauderdale Housing Authority acted as work provider. However, FLHA precipitously withdrew from the demonstration and has been replaced by the Broward County Community Development Division (BCCDD) which had ample worksites for VICI.

The VICI work crews concentrate on five skills: carpentry, electricity, plumbing, painting and masonry. Supervised by journeymen under the auspices of the Fort Lauderdale Building and Construction Trades Council work crews have built divider walls, walkways and barbecue pits. They have also rewired electrical systems, improved security lighting, scraped and painted apartments and improved existing plumbing services. Points toward apprentice and pre-apprentice credit may be gained by VICI participants.

The Advisory Council in Broward is comprised of local and state government representatives, organized labor and the prime sponsor, as well as the Housing Authority. This Advisory Board represents the commitment of a variety of different organizations in the Broward County area who have a common interest in the success of the VICI program.

Chicago. The Mayor's Office of Employment and Training has contracted directly with the 18th Street Development Corporation to operate the VICI Demonstration. GED and other support services are provided by the Industrial Skills Center of the Chicago School Board and the Department of Human Services.

Sixty participants are gutting and renovating a large six-apartment building in the Pilsen neighborhood, as well as several smaller dwellings. Additional vacant properties in this neighborhood will be secured from the Department of Planning, City and Community Development for renovation as these initial projects are completed.

Journeymen crew chiefs are provided by the Chicago District Council of Carpenters. They have received training in supervisory and instructional techniques from the Carpentry Apprentice Instructors at the Washburn Trade School. The journeymen have developed a highly structured skills progression for the VICI participants, and because of this, the Carpenters' Union will waive for VICI graduates the three-month classroom training requirement normally imposed on carpentry apprentices. The union has agreed to accept up to 100 percent of qualified VICI graduates for its apprenticeship program.

Milwaukee. The CETA Division of the Milwaukee County Executive Office is the prime sponsor and has contracted with the Opportunities Industrialization Center of Greater Milwaukee to operate this VICI demonstration.

The Milwaukee Building and Construction Joint Apprenticeship Council has agreed to place into apprenticeships VICI graduates who pass a rigorous entrance examination. VICI participants are tutored for these examinations by BIGSTEP, a minority apprentice preparation program. After 10 months of VICI enrollment, 10 participants have passed the examination and have been placed as apprentices.

The Milwaukee Carpenters' and Painters' Unions have provided journeymen crew chiefs who supervise participants in the correction of major building code violation in low-income, owner-occupied homes identified by the City Building Inspection Department. These corrective actions range from complete interior and exterior painting to gutting and structural rehabilitation. The VICI demonstration has been awarded a Home Improvement Contractor's License by the City of Milwaukee, the only community-based rehabilitation group to be so licensed in that city.

Newark. The prime sponsor, the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training, manages the demonstration. Work orders come from the Newark Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NHRA) and the Department of Public Works (DPW). The NHRA refers apartments from housing projects; the DPW refers multi-unit dwellings which were formerly privately owned but for which the city has assumed ownership responsibility.

The Newark VICI program teaches painting skills, and the painting union has made a serious commitment to the success of the VICI program. The participating union has required that the VICI participants attend evening classes (two hours on each of two nights per week) with union apprentices. The union has pledged that VICI graduates who demonstrate strong skills and excellent attitudes will be given strong consideration for available apprenticeship positions.

Not only do the NHRA and DPW provide worksites, they also provide funds, facilities and equipment. The NHRA provides all paint and materials necessary for services being performed on assigned public housing. It also provides for delivery services to worksites. Each worksite allows VICI staff to use existing storage facilities. The DPW provides office space and equipment for the VICI administrative staff. These services are made possible by a commitment by the city of \$108,000 in municipal funds.

New Haven. The New Haven Employment and Training Administration, the prime sponsor, has chosen to operate the project directly. The VICI demonstration enjoys the full support of the New Haven Carpenters' and Painters' Unions, which provide skilled journeymen crew supervisors and actively participate on the project's advisory board. The New Haven Public Schools provide educational support.

New Haven was one of the first VICI cities to become fully active. Its participants are engaged in major carpentry, rehabilitation and painting projects supplied by a consortium of city and community redevelopment agencies. Since VICI provides the essential labor, these agencies can apply their limited renovation funds solely to materials' costs.

A very active Advisory Board, consisting of representatives from the unions, work providers, school district and city government provides direction, technical assistance and problem-solving support to the project. Due perhaps to New Haven's small size, VICI occupies a central role in New Haven's own efforts to rehabilitate some of its faltering housing and some of its public facilities. It is anticipated that, by the end of the project, the VICI crews will have left a clear imprint on the entire city.

Philadelphia. This VICI demonstration is sponsored by the Area Manpower Planning Council, the Philadelphia Prime Sponsor, which has contracted with the non-profit Franklin Foundation to operate the project. Four neighborhood settlement houses work cooperatively to refer participants to the project and to provide counseling and other support services as needed. The Franklin Foundation has secured GED facilities and services from the School District of Philadelphia and the prime sponsor in order to ensure that participants are prepared for apprenticeships and other job opportunities as they become available.

The Carpenters, Electricians, Plasterers, Painters, Roofers and Skilled Laborers Unions all provide journeymen crew chiefs for the project. The participants are currently developing their skills by gutting and rehabilitating large two-family residences for the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation (PHDC). Commensurate with their growing skills, participants also now offer emergency home repairs to low-income homeowners identified by the Office of Housing and Community Development (OHCD). Both PHDC and OHCD utilize HUD block grant funds to support this project.

South Bronx. The prime sponsor is the Department of Employment of New York City's Human Resources Administration, which has contracted with a community-based organization, Operation Open City, to manage the demonstration. The demonstration targets the South Bronx for its participant recruitment and work order activities. The work orders are solely weatherization projects and emphasize energy conservation through proper insulation. Work activities include window caulking, weatherstripping, replacing window sashes and roofing and boiler system repair. The selected worksites are referred through other community-based organizations which also inspect the quality of the work product.

The South Bronx demonstration involves many linkages. The Department of Energy and the Community Services Administration have committed approximately \$250,000 to the demonstration for materials and supplies. The prime sponsor will also provide several Title I slots to the demonstration. These funds and staff will maximize the program's visibility and its impact upon the designated area.

Participant recruitment and referral are the responsibility of the Bronx Residents to Attain Scholarship in Housing (BRASH) and the Neighborhood Engage, Recruitment and Training Program (RTP). Twenty high school seniors will receive school credits from Smith High School for their participation in the VICI demonstration. BRASH and Neighborhood Engage also refer the work orders to the demonstration.

The journeymen instructors are referred by the New York Building and Construction Trades. The journeymen are responsible for in-house skill training and participant orientation, as well as for worksite training. Based on journeymen's evaluation of participants' performance, pre-apprentice credit may be gained by qualifying participants.

## I. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM START-UP AND OPERATIONS

The transitions from proposal to program implementation and from planning to operation were not inordinately difficult for most VICI sites. Although time was short, most sites began to identify potential staff and resources as soon as their proposals were submitted; and when they learned they were to be funded, they were able to act quickly. With the exception of New Haven, where the principal planners remained involved in the program, program implementation led to major staff changes, and as operating people were brought in to make good on the proposals and promises developed by others, they raised important questions about P/PV and the proposals it had approved. In Atlanta and Chicago, P/PV's role was rigorously questioned and even rejected. Thus, P/PV had to reestablish its legitimacy and its authority there. As the operating people tested the proposals, they encountered assorted start-up problems at each site, but no one argued that the proposals or major parts of them were inherently unworkable.

### A. REPLICATION

The only significant efforts to depart from the proposals centered on recruitment. A number of programs had difficulty in recruiting sufficient youths, particularly those from certain groups, such as Hispanics or females. In response to these problems, Atlanta, Broward County, and Newark proposed widening the recruitment target areas. This would broaden the pool of potential applicants, but it violated a fairly central principle of the program model. VICI sites were supposed to focus both recruitment and community improvement work on the same area, so that the youths would be making improvements in their own neighborhoods. Nonetheless, bending to realities, P/PV permitted Newark to expand its target area beyond the largely black Central Ward in order to recruit more Hispanic youth.

This kind of modification probably has no effect on the validity of the program, because, in fact, the target areas in most cities were already broader than the communities with which the youths identified themselves. Thus, participants interviewed in Newark considered their neighborhood to be the housing project in which they lived or a few blocks around their home, not the entire Central Ward. And in Newark and elsewhere, while the beneficiaries of the repair work commented favorably on the youth, they did not clearly identify them as neighborhood kids unless they were already personally acquainted with them.

Beyond the modification of the recruiting area, P/PV generally held firm in keeping sites to their proposals and thus replicating the program model. In Newark, for example, P/PV declined a request made by the Department of Public Works, one of the work providers, to undertake work outside the original target area.

### B. MAKING THE LINKAGES WORK

A major test of the proposals came when sites sought to implement the linkages established during the planning period. Generally, these

linkages existed to a significant degree, except in the South Bronx, where the linkages were weak and required the most bolstering. In all sites, the education linkage proved to be the weakest, and received the least emphasis. This had been predicted by P/PV staff members during planning.

The crucial linkage was the union linkage. It played a major role in making programs work, particularly in Newark, and it was closely tied to problems of other programs, for example, in the South Bronx. The union linkage had effects extending from the selection of journeymen for employment in the program, through the final placement of participants. A strong union linkage provided a variety of benefits, some of which were not anticipated in the planning stage, most notably the role played by union journeymen in the placement process.

Many of the linkages described in VICI proposals were already in existence and this could be a strengthening factor. For example, a large measure of Milwaukee's success in operationalizing its linkages resulted from the pre-existing relationships among several key organizations who were simply brought together again in the VICI project. Similarly, in Newark the close working relationship between the painters union and the prime sponsor was built upon a history of working together on other programs.

#### C. RECRUITMENT, INTAKE, AND ORIENTATION

Recruitment was an early and enduring concern at most sites. There were two kinds of problems: recruiting enough youth to operate the program, and recruiting enough youth to meet P/PV's research needs. (The latter problem--the issue of the major waiting list--is discussed later in this chapter.)

Many of those involved in the demonstration were surprised to find that initial recruitment efforts did not identify as many youth as anticipated. In some cases, there were barely enough youth to mount the program and maintain a small pool of replacements. Moreover, there were shortages in the recruitment of Hispanics and women at many sites. This problem has been attributed to everything from the state of the economy, to the nature of the program, to the methods used. It seems clear that recruitment methods used for VICI were fairly standard for CETA youth programs. VICI's recruitment drive was neither better nor worse than other CETA recruitment efforts. Why these methods did not produce large numbers of youth for VICI, however, remains largely unclear, though some reasons can be given.

The difficulty in recruiting Hispanics can be attributed to the lack of Hispanics in the original target area in Newark. When the target area was expanded and a Spanish-speaking staff member was added, this problem eased. The underenrollment of women, according to local VICI staff members, seemed to stem from the nature of the work VICI entailed. While there are significant numbers of women seeking entry into the building trades, most of these tend to be older than the VICI target group. For a young woman, the decision to enter training for an unconventional job is still decidedly unconventional, and VICI staff members believed this limited the number of women applicants.

Just as there was little deviation from CETA procedures in VICI's recruiting efforts, its intake and orientation efforts were also typical of CETA youth programs. Screening was fairly limited at some sites, and there seems to have been little attempt to "cream" applicants. Many journeymen professed amazement at recruits' deficiencies, such as inability to read a ruler or perform simple arithmetic computations.

There was not much uniformity in program orientation. Some programs, such as Broward County and Milwaukee, had very high dropout rates in the first few days. These were the sites which recruited widely and did not screen applicants intensively. So only after they entered the program did some youth discover that it entailed work they were not interested in doing.

#### D. VICI AT WORK: PROGRAM OPERATIONS

There was a curious disjunction between the inner workings of VICI and the program's external relationships. At many VICI sites, dealings with local government agencies, trade unions, and others, were often turbulent. Yet, surprisingly perhaps, the administrative crises and major convulsions at many sites did not prevent VICI youths from learning skills and carrying out useful tasks.

Of course, there were many problems with individual youths at every site. For example, Chicago experienced a job action by a number of disgruntled youth, while in the South Bronx a crackdown on behavior led to twelve dismissals in one month. Nonetheless, the basic fact is that at most sites, most of the time, most of the youth were actively employed and were producing tangible results as well as making visible improvements in their skills.

#### E. THE ROLE OF JOURNEYMAN

A key factor in the effective internal operations of VICI, and a surprisingly important element in many other aspects of the program, was the role played by union journeymen. They were the VICI staff members who supervised youth training and dealt with the youths on a day-to-day basis. They also dealt with property owners and with work providing agencies. Thus, the manner in which they did their jobs had an important effect on all aspects of the program. And they were a major positive force in VICI.

Their job turned out to be a very complex one. Indeed, many felt it was not one job but several, and the demands made on journeymen sometimes seemed contradictory. Journeymen saw no problems in expecting journeymen to act as teachers or trainers. While few of the journeymen had any formal training as teachers, teaching younger people is an integral part of the work in many trades. Apprentices receive most of their training on the job, at the elbows of journeymen. Thus, many journeymen had provided training as a matter of course in their jobs, and at least one VICI journeyman also had been a teacher in vocational schools. Moreover, those who became involved in VICI generally had an interest in teaching or in young people.

Having journeymen serve as instructors did not present any problems, but expecting journeymen to provide training in the context of completing community improvements raised some questions. The journeymen were uncertain whether their prime goal was to produce improvements or to provide training. Several journeymen said they were caught between two ideals, unsure of the extent to which they were to function as journeymen plying their trades in an improvement project or as instructors in a training program. Should they strive to finish a job on schedule or could they take additional time until everyone had mastered the task? Should they work with everybody or just with those who showed promise?

The conflict between what they saw as alternative and contradictory goals was a major one for most journeymen, and it had repercussions on the entire programs at some sites, particularly Newark, where the debate went beyond individuals. Here, the journeymen held strongly to the tradesman's ideals and emphasized production and "real world" working conditions, while the office staff pushed for a more pedagogical, training-oriented approach. The split remained because the Newark program director identified with the journeymen to the exclusion of other considerations.

There was no easy resolution to this conflict in Newark or elsewhere. However, at every site, a middle ground was eventually developed in which the journeymen could feel they were adhering to the standards of their trade, yet were tempering concerns for production and quality with a recognition of the needs of the youth. This balance was hard to define in principle and hard to find in practice, but at every site there was clear movement towards it.

After the first few weeks of the program, there were fewer and fewer instances of the journeymen doing all the work with two or three favored youth while the others just watched. The initial focus on production was diluted with a growing concern for the youth. The journeymen became increasingly interested in the individuals assigned to them and the youth responded well to this. At most sites a close bond grew up between work crews and their journeymen. The journeyman took a genuine interest in "his crew," and this led many of them to play an active, unanticipated, and very useful role in helping participants find jobs.

Thus, the role played by the journeymen turned out to be a critical and highly interesting part of the VICI demonstration. The initial problems they encountered could, in the future, be obviated by additional preparation and training. Milwaukee, for instance, developed workshops for journeymen to help them cope with these kinds of problems.

#### F. WOMEN IN VICI

An important aspect of VICI was its commitment to recruit females and train them for building and construction jobs not traditionally held by women. The program is making headway in this effort, but several sites remain short of their goals. However, the dropout rate for females is about the same as for males.

VICI's problems with women probably reflect the untraditional nature of the work it offers. A 16 to 19 year old woman has to be well motivated and fairly unconventional to be willing to enter the building trades. While a growing number of women have been entering the building trades, most have been in their mid to late 20's, and frequently they have children to support. These women have already experienced the kind of work and wages available to untrained females, and they tend to be highly committed to training that will lead to a relatively well-paid building trades job. By contrast, a 16 to 19 year old VICI enrollee has limited experience with low-wage jobs, and still has many illusions and unrealistic aspirations. Thus, she lacks the kind of experience that often provides older women with the strong motivation needed to enter the building trades.

Those who were recruited experienced several kinds of problems. One problem was kidding from the young men in the program. Much of this was the usual good natured banter that goes on among fellow workers or students of either sex, but some of it had an edge that bordered on harassment. Many of the young men were still too unsure of themselves to be comfortable with women entering what they considered to be a man's world and men's jobs. Some women handled the verbal play well, and some didn't.

A second problem was the way journeymen dealt with females. While they expressed support for women entering their trade, many journeymen questioned the depth of the women's commitment and wondered whether they merited the attention that could otherwise go to young men. Other journeymen had gentlemanly concerns about women doing the work. Some shied away from letting women climb ladders or lift heavy paint cans or do messy work. Instead, they tended to assign the women to more "artistic" jobs, like plastering or painting trimmings, while reserving the hard work for men. This treatment did not go unnoticed by the women.

A third problem was the primitive facilities at many work sites. Often, the crews would be working at isolated, abandoned buildings with no bathrooms or locker rooms. The women had to hope the work site was near a gas station or school or other place with a bathroom they could use, and often very makeshift changing rooms had to be created for them.

Finally, it appears that the kind of young woman attracted to VICI was also the kind likely to leave it. An 18 year old woman who was prepared to do the untraditional and enter VICI sometimes turned out to be the kind of woman who, upon being criticized, would walk off the program in a huff, journeymen said. All these problems were exacerbated by the lack of role models. Many women were employed in VICI, including secretaries, administrators and even program directors in New Haven and Philadelphia. But there were very few female journeymen.

Nonetheless, by the fall of 1979, there were fewer significant differences between males and females in their length of stay in VICI or their dropout rates. This suggests that the programs had begun to learn how to deal with the problems faced by female enrollees in a non-traditional training program.

Despite the problems of recruiting and retaining women, there was a widely shared pride in "our girls" at most VICI sites. On a number of occasions, those ranked as best workers or first placements were women, and even the most grizzled male chauvinist journeyman tended to express a peculiar pride in helping to produce what might be the first female carpenter in his locality.

#### G. PLACEMENT

Each site was required to develop a placement strategy for submission to P/PV, and by August 1979 all but Chicago and the South Bronx had completed and implemented their plans. The South Bronx's late start delayed the need for a placement plan somewhat, but the continued delays there and in Chicago essentially represented a managerial failing. Milwaukee, New Haven, and Newark, by contrast, were working hard on placement by mid-1979.

The placement campaign mounted by the VICI sites included many standard techniques: For example, VICI job developers made telephone calls to major employers and screened help-wanted notices to generate information about job possibilities for VICI youth. But P/PV field representatives estimate that only about 10 percent of placements came via this route. Most placements resulted from personal contacts made by VICI staff members. Staff members asked suppliers and vendors whether they needed workers or knew of any customers who did; they asked work providers and city agencies if they were aware of any job openings; and, above all, VICI's journeymen used their network of contacts to seek jobs for VICI participants.

The involvement of the journeymen in placement was not originally envisioned in the VICI program model, but it appeared to be a highly effective mechanism. By virtue of their work experience, they had a breadth of knowledge about local employment possibilities. And their efforts to place youth were well received; indeed the approval or recommendation of a journeyman carried a certain cachet that a job developer or program director couldn't muster. As one New Haven staff member said, "It's not some Vassar social work major saying 'Larry would make a good painter,' it's a painter saying 'I know one when I see one.'"

In Milwaukee and New Haven, journeymen were particularly deeply involved in placement. In Newark, the painters union's business agent and apprenticeship coordinator took a personal role in attempting to find jobs for VICI participants. In the South Bronx, where there was a weaker formal trade union linkage, the journeymen were still proving to be very helpful in placement. Indeed, in all sites, the involvement of journeymen in placement as well as in training was an unexpected but highly useful and instructive development.

#### H. RESEARCH

The research requirements of the VICI program were often a source of irritation at most VICI sites. Fundamentally, this reflected the classic

conflict found in demonstration programs between program operators who simply wish to provide services and researchers who need data to meet the research requirements which are an integral part of the demonstration. The grumbling that accompanied the VICI research was generally no more shrill or enduring than that encountered in other demonstrations.

Both program operators and P/PV staff agreed that P/PV required more forms and data than many other demonstrations. Moreover, the data were scanned with some care. If deficiencies were evident, P/PV required sites to improve their performance. Since several sites completed their forms accurately and on time without great difficulties, it was clearly feasible to meet P/PV's demands. Moreover, P/PV provided each VICI site with an additional allocation of \$9,000 to be used for data collection and research.

However, a major concern at the sites was that data gathering had no meaning or return for them. They felt, they said, like "data plantations," which produced data but never saw any results of the data gathering. Thus, there was no direct incentive to work on compiling data, except to avoid the wrath of P/PV. P/PV argued that if the forms were used properly, they would provide data that would be useful to the local management. Thus, the Journeyman's Weekly Progress Report, for example, could serve both as a management tool for the site and as a source of data for P/PV researchers. In fact, little of the data gathered for P/PV was put to use by local program staff. Thus, the range and depth of information sought by P/PV seemed doubly useless to local program managers for it provided no direct benefit to the sites and no research reports for the demonstration as a whole.

An issue that particularly troubled many sites was P/PV's efforts to produce a "major waiting list." For research purposes, P/PV sought to produce a large list of youths who would be compared with youths in the VICI program. New Haven was excused from this effort because of its small population base, and the seven other sites were told their participation was not mandatory. Nonetheless, these sites regarded involvement as a requirement, and they were strongly opposed to it, not only because it put an additional burden on them but also because they regarded it as harmful to the youths. Program operators viewed the waiting list as a confusing device which seemed to hold out a promise of services that would not be delivered, and they considered it a potential betrayal of youngsters who already had enough problems. P/PV staff required that youths have the opportunity to enter other training programs, but staff members at two sites said that the existence of the VICI waiting list acted as a disincentive for recruitment into other local CETA youth programs.

Ultimately, only Newark completed the major waiting list, although three other sites gathered enough names for the list to be used for research purposes. In the spring of 1979 P/PV told the sites to stop work on it. However, P/PV's willingness to abandon the effort only strengthened the conviction of many program operators that the device represented idle fiddling by researchers who had no sympathy for the psyches of youth or the problems of program operators.

P/PV had a research advisory committee which met once and then essentially broke into subcommittees. Sites were represented in discussions of various research plans, and P/PV provided training in form completion. Several forms were modified in response to suggestions or complaints from the sites. Nonetheless, P/PV could not allay the feeling at many sites that the research component of the program was too broad and wide-ranging, as well as useless to the program operators. The opposition to the research effort became muted over time, largely because the program operators became resigned to the researcher needs. Also, when P/PV's computer system was developed, and when research data began to be fed back to the sites, it seemed likely that views might change, because program operators displayed a strong competitive interest in developments at other sites.

## I. P/PV'S ROLE

P/PV's role during the VICI planning period was controversial and sometimes confusing because DOL was also directly involved in the process. By the time the VICI programs were being launched, however, DOL had largely disappeared, and P/PV was the lone source of direction and supervision. Because localities no longer encountered a variety of organizations claiming a role in monitoring VICI, they gave less thought to the precise nature and role of P/PV, even though they continued to be deeply involved with the organization. While DOL monitors might visit a training program only once a year and were often interested mainly in financial records, P/PV's field representatives were regular visitors at each site, sometimes coming weekly, and seldom less often than every six weeks. They delved into every aspect of the program and offered extensive advice.

At first, there was some resistance to P/PV's role, particularly in Atlanta and Chicago. But sites soon adapted to "the Philadelphians." Some did so with an air of resignation; others viewed P/PV in a more positive light. At several sites, VICI staff argued that P/PV was not functioning differently from a federal or state monitor; it was just more active. They did not see anything unique in the nature of CPPV other than its ability to invest more time and money in supervision. That, however, is a significant difference from other monitoring agencies.

P/PV played a major role in enabling most of the eight VICI sites to begin operations within a relatively short period of time, and P/PV's continuing involvement in overseeing VICI clearly improved the operations of the weaker programs. In sites such as New Haven, which generally experienced smooth sailing, P/PV staff members provided a source of dispassionate analysis and advice. In troubled sites, such as Chicago, the South Bronx, and Broward, P/PV helped resolve disputes that threatened the programs. P/PV could do this because it existed independent of competing local powers and interests, because it could threaten to withhold funding and close down a site, and, most important, because the advice its staff gave was generally perceived as wise; indeed, P/PV staff provided new and workable ideas at several sites.

Some sites turned this outside supervision to their own advantage. At several sites, program directors found it useful to tell other local organizations certain actions were required because "the Philadelphians are on our backs." And P/PV field representatives occasionally abetted such efforts: a field representative might provide a stern letter to a site knowing that it would be used by the local program director to urge another local agency to take action which VICI wanted. Such close involvement with the sites had some effect on P/PV's field staff. The P/PV VICI director believed there were at least occasional indications of field representatives becoming over-sympathetic to the plight of localities or identifying too closely with them.

In the early months of the program, several sites, most notably New Haven, believed that P/PV was not giving them enough information. There were complaints that P/PV should facilitate the exchange of ideas among sites so that each site wouldn't have to reinvent the wheel regularly, or wait for its field representative to bring them blueprints for it. Much of this concern was dispelled by P/PV's mid-term conference in Philadelphia in late June 1979. This event permitted all the sites to learn of one another's problems and achievements. Indeed, the value of the conference to P/PV seemed to lie equally in its morale-boosting effects and in the information gained by P/PV. While P/PV was already familiar with much of what was said, many new issues surfaced. Moreover, the sites took great delight in hearing what their counterparts elsewhere were doing. P/PV also responded to the communications gap by creating a VICI newsletter in September 1979.

#### J. OTHER EXOGENOUS FORCES

DOL and P/PV were occasionally at odds during the VICI planning period. Once the programs were operating, however, DOL and P/PV generally worked together harmoniously, and acted in tandem on major issues. Other outside forces exerted an effect on VICI, however.

In the South Bronx, the local management agency's contretemps with the city government delayed implementation of the program for months, and this may have caused irreparable damage to the rhythm of the program. Moreover, the U.S. Community Services Administration's long delay in forwarding \$250,000 for supplies created serious financial problems. In Broward, HUD raised questions about the Davis-Bacon Act which endangered operations, and in Chicago blizzards and election returns both affected VICI.

It is too early to determine how changes in local economies will affect VICI placements, but some effect can be expected. One thing that is clear after nearly a year of operation is that VICI's attempts to boost resources can cut two ways. Typically, P/PV may provide a million dollars to a site which then raises perhaps a further \$200,000 from HUD, or CSA, or other sources. But, while P/PV gets more than a million dollars worth of programming for its money, this kind of fund raising opens its programs to the influence of others. Thus, P/PV's control was sometimes challenged by others with a stake in VICI. The working out of that phenomenon differed from site to site, however, as did so many other aspects of the VICI program, and Chapter VIII examines developments as they occurred at each site.

## II. THE SITES

### A. ATLANTA

The Atlanta VICI project suffered from prolonged conflicts between its prime sponsor, the Atlanta CETA office, and its local management agency, the Atlanta Urban League. The failure of these agencies to work together seriously hampered program start-up and caused continued difficulties for program development. An additional problem lay in union conflicts, which further hindered program development. However, despite these grave weaknesses in Atlanta VICI's linkage system, the program was largely successful from the viewpoint of participants, who acquired skills and training, and who performed useful work in their community.

Misunderstandings between the prime sponsor and other VICI agencies began with the August 1978 resignation of the Atlanta CETA's senior planner, who had played a key role in planning the VICI project. With his departure, earlier understandings were rejected, and relationships among the Atlanta CETA, the Urban League, and P/PV deteriorated. Atlanta CETA strongly resisted P/PV's role and authority in VICI, and P/PV found Atlanta CETA's budget and staffing plans for VICI unacceptable. Until such conflicts were resolved, and money began to flow from CETA to the Atlanta Urban League, all program start-up activity--recruitment, staffing, work site provision, transportation leasing--was seriously hindered, if not entirely prevented. By December 1978, enrollment stood at 17 participants, and P/PV had reached the conclusion that most of the project's problems stemmed from Atlanta CETA's failure to carry out its responsibilities as prime sponsor, a failure due partly to the quite uncooperative attitudes of one or two key CETA staff members. Lending support to P/PV's conclusion is an incident which typifies events in Atlanta. The Urban League submitted a \$46,000 invoice to the Atlanta CETA, which refused all payment due to its questioning of a single, \$32 item.

In January, a new recruitment drive raised the participant roster to 52, and in February Atlanta CETA hired three people to help recruit waiting list members. At this time, the relationship between the prime sponsor and the Urban League improved--briefly--due to a visit made by DOL Secretary Ray Marshall and HUD Under Secretary Gino Baroni, only to worsen again shortly afterwards due to a dispute over cash advances. By March, the project was seriously behind schedule in waiting list recruitment and in completion of work orders. Also, a promised \$100,000 in community development funds was delayed by the city's complex laws for work provision and public funding.

All the program's start-up problems were continued throughout the stage of program development. Further conflicts between the prime sponsor, the local management agency, and the Atlanta Bureau of Buildings centered on the efficiency of the work crews, the accuracy and reasonableness of the work orders, and the number of houses scheduled to be completed during the life of the project. (In August 1979, P/PV succeeded in engineering a mutually acceptable work schedule for completion of 35-40 houses.)

However, a further difficulty arose in another area--union linkages. The primary union linkage in Atlanta is the Atlanta Residential Carpenters Union. However, in what appears to have been a coup on the part of the North Georgia Building and Construction Trades Council (BCTC), all the carpenters hired by VICI were from the Commercial Carpenters Union. The residential carpenters--who are not members of the BCTC--were furious, and threatened to withdraw from the project. This was doubly serious in view of the facts that all of the work sites were residential properties and that 70 percent of participants were being trained in carpentry. The dispute virtually paralyzed work progress and jeopardized future participant indenturing into the residential carpenters union. The issue was not resolved until early September 1979, following intervention by the National Carpenters Union and the somewhat reluctant involvement of the Atlanta CETA office.

Atlanta VICI's major problems are traceable to its key linkages. CETA, the Urban League, the Bureau of Buildings, and the union organizations had all struggled with one another on different issues long before this project. As a result, only a rather fragile entente cordiale existed among them when the VICI program began. That coalition could not sustain intense stress, and it frequently became contentious.

The prime sponsor's reluctance to respond adequately to the local management agency's funding needs clearly contributed to the latter's financial hardships. On the other hand, the Urban League wasn't as responsible as it might have been. It failed to document accurately verbal understandings with the prime sponsor, and, on at least one occasion, it issued checks merely on the assumption that CETA funding was on the way.

The complexity of the city's mechanisms for work provision and funding presented yet another problem. Laws and policies designed to protect public funds and to stimulate public representation in the expenditure of those funds introduced delays not encountered in other cities.

However, in Atlanta, as in other VICI sites, despite the problems and disputes, there were consistent signs of improvement in participant skills and work habits. The work completed by the project seemed to be of a high level, and the relationships that developed between the journeymen and the youth were highly beneficial for the youth.

Atlanta Urban League staff regarded VICI's problems, particularly the debate over indirect costs, as crises. In retrospect, however, P/PV staff members argue that the problems were not as potentially explosive as they appeared to VICI staff members. Indeed, some P/PV staff members argue that a certain level of tension between various actors may have helped sharpen and clarify goals and responsibilities, thus leading to a better program.

#### B. BROWARD COUNTY

The VICI program in Broward County, Florida, began auspiciously but deteriorated as time went on. Again, interagency conflicts scarred the program, and in this site VICI was seriously hampered by a threatened cut-off of funds.

The Broward Employment and Training Administration (BETA) serves both as prime sponsor for the project and as its local management agency. The Fort Lauderdale Housing Authority (FLHA) is the work providing agency. By late October 1978, VICI had selected 60 program participants, plus 33 reserves. Key administrative staff and journeymen were also hired, and the Florida International university had arranged to deliver 50 hours of instruction to each student.

Shortly after program start-up, however, several problems quickly emerged. First, the project's streetcorner recruitment strategy and limited screening policy resulted in a very high dropout rate--33 percent in the first 45 days. Second, the area HUD office claimed that the VICI project violated the Davis-Bacon Act, which required payment of local prevailing wages on federally-financed construction work. HUD threatened to cut off funding to the FLHA if it was not assured of compliance. Third, BETA found recruitment increasingly difficult and, in late November 1978, it requested an expansion of its target area. Fourth, staff turnover rates were unusually high. And, finally, before the year was out, the prime sponsor and the work provider began to express the first of a series of complaints regarding each other's intent, capability, and performance.

Some of the increasing strain between these two organizations was relieved through the institution of a revised scheme for assigning work orders. However, tensions continued, with FLHA raising increasingly serious complaints about the performance of VICI participants and staff. Worse still, in February 1979, the area HUD office cut off the flow of modernization funds (approximately \$800,000) to FLHA, forcing it to suspend partially its provision of work orders. This in turn forced BETA to begin a search for an auxiliary work provider, and to subsist temporarily on one-family residential repair.

In March 1979, FLHA withdrew completely from the project--a serious blow, and one matched by equally traumatic staff changes within VICI. Thus, by April the program had an almost entirely new staff, a broken link with a key organization, and no clear ideas regarding the ultimate implementation of its mission.

In April, BETA entered into discussions with the Seminole Indian tribe regarding transplanting VICI to perform on its Hollywood reservation. However, the FLHA suddenly changed its mind and decided that it wished to remain as work provider, and, in any case, the Broward County Board of Commissioners rejected the Seminole project. However, both the Office of Youth Programs and P/PV insisted that the Davis-Bacon issue and the availability of HUD funds be clarified and documented before FLHA's status as work provider could be officially reinstated.

The effect of these disruptions was exacerbated by further staff changes in May, but by June it seemed that the antagonism between BETA and FLHA had subsided, and the project was beginning to work rather well. However, HUD had not yet approved the allocation of modernization funds to FLHA, and work continued under FLHA's own funding.

In September 1979, inter-agency discord began afresh, and the FLHA Director again withdrew from participation in the project, citing a complete lack of funds, along with HUD's refusal to provide guarantees and what he regarded as unnecessary refinements in architectural drawings. Not surprisingly, BETA staff seem bitter about their relationship with FLHA, and VICI staffers have complained about the erratic and heavily political managerial styles displayed by the directors of both FLHA and BETA.

VICI staff also complained about the nature of the work provided, arguing that it varied in quality and did not always provide for suitable skills progression. VICI staff also said that FLHA chronically garbled orders for supplies, a problem rooted, perhaps, in that organization's lack of construction experience and in its serious understaffing. FLHA, on the other hand, cited its dissatisfaction--shared with HUD--with the slow progress and "rotten attitudes" of the participants. FLHA complaints extended to BETA's "mismanagement" and to the extremely high turnover rates among key VICI personnel and within the participant roster.

Certainly, FLHA was rightly concerned about the high turnover of VICI staff, but in any comparison of organizational effectiveness (at least in terms of VICI) between the prime sponsor and FLHA, BETA would appear a sure winner. For example, by the FLHA Director's own admission, certain accounting difficulties were traceable to FLHA's decision to obligate \$30,000 in non-VICI related funds in a manner that directly violated city purchasing directives, in a "calculated risk" that subsequent HUD funding would replace the money. Furthermore, several key VICI staff members claim that FLHA's sudden withdrawal was their first inkling that a fiscal problem of such magnitude existed.

Much of the conflict that was a characteristic of the VICI program in Broward County can be traced to the nature of the county government. Each of the agencies involved in VICI had separate agendas and needs, and there was no strong executive branch in the county government with the power needed to achieve unity. Thus, conflicting organizational goals and personalities often could not be harmonized unless P/PV or other outside forces intervened.

By early September 1979, the Broward VICI program, at P/PV's instigation, had identified a county community development organization as its new work providing agency. VICI staff were developing for P/PV's review a new proposal and a new timetable to reflect the changed relationships.

### C. CHICAGO

The Chicago VICI project is characterized both by an above-average record of achievement by participants, and by a somewhat complex administrative structure, which has given rise to an unusually high number of administrative problems and delays. At start-up, the program seemed efficiently planned and staffed, though even then, P/PV staff expressed concern about Chicago's ability to develop strong administrative techniques. However, within a few months, it became clear that Chicago's linkage system was too complex and fragile a coalition to sustain any meaningful

program development. Here as elsewhere, inter-agency tensions and changes in key staff members led to serious difficulties.

At start-up, most indications were auspicious: by mid-October, 18 participants had begun work, and between 20 and 30 more were ready to begin. Ten journeymen had been hired and trained, and interior demolition and cleaning had started at a six-unit apartment building. The Mayor's Office of Manpower (MOM) was the prime sponsor, with the City Department of Human Services (DHS) as the project's local management agency. A VICI steering committee was formed, consisting of representatives from the two VICI sites at Chicago (Pilsen and Lawndale) and from the DHS.

In November, the extensive and somewhat fragile management structure began to show signs of strain. And, beginning in December, Chicago's worst winter in memory had devastating effects. Work on the sites was greatly delayed, and supply and logistical problems began to emerge.

At this early point in the program's development, fundamental administrative weaknesses gave rise to a number of difficulties, beginning with a series of administrative delays. The testing and screening linkage--the Apprenticeship Information Center--proved unable to carry out its responsibilities; the VICI Project Coordinator resigned in mid-December and was not replaced till late January, despite P/PV's insistence that a new coordinator be appointed immediately; the process of collecting, processing, and transmitting data faltered; the development of the major waiting list reached a virtual standstill; and, finally, the project was very far behind in reaching its self-imposed quota of 30 percent female participants.

Next, a number of disputes over payment arose, most of them apparently rooted in DHS's time-consuming payment proceedings. A local architectural service refused to deliver its drawings before payment and, rather more serious, at the Pilsen site, financial and other disputes led to three separate "job actions," including strikes and picketings, on the part of participants, administrative staff, and journeymen. Chronically delayed payrolls, violation of work rules, and declining morale apparently sparked the incidents. DHS's reaction, a new policy of non-audited prepayment of vouchers, helped calm the situation but, clearly, carried some financial risk.

In addition to--and perhaps because of--these delays and disputes P/PV found it difficult if not impossible to gather good data from this site. Despite occasional staff efforts to bring data collection and reporting up to date, and despite P/PV's constant attention to the problems of this site, there was no consistent timeliness of reporting, and P/PV found serious inaccuracies and deficiencies in the reports that were made.

By June 1979, work site progress had slowed considerably due to new breakdowns in the supply, logistical, and funding processes administered by the Lawndale Peoples Planning and Action Conference (LPPAC), the primary project operator. As a result, P/PV and DOL began a formal review of the Chicago project's problems, and officially requested DHS to submit a revised management plan.

P/PV raised four major concerns. First, the research data were typically late, inaccurate, unusable, or all three; second, the project had not developed a comprehensive strategy for participant placement; third, recruitment for the waiting list was far behind schedule, and the female recruitment goal of one-third of participants was not being met; and, fourth, P/PV made a general complaint about project administration, organizational dysfunction, and overall uncooperativeness.

DHS responded by citing normal attrition and lack of continued candidate interest as factors in the waiting list recruitment problem. It rejected both the one-third female goal, and any ultimate responsibility for participant placement. Moreover, DHS stated its belief that P/PV was a functionary without real authority, and it refused to develop or submit a new management plan.

In August, LPPAC replaced its Project Director. The change was the result of steadily worsening management and morale and of an apparent \$50,000 discrepancy on LPPAC's books (an amount later estimated to be closer to \$3,000). The discrepancy clearly signaled the need for a radical restructuring of the project's administrative and management policies and hierarchies, and dramatically undercut any basis for DHS's refusal to consider radical reform.

The roots of the Chicago project's problems are reasonably clear. At a critical point in its development, the project endured a nearly total change in key personnel. The new people felt little responsibility for previous understandings or linkage networks. Moreover, they did not share their predecessors' sense of the project's purposes and goals, and they were tremendously confused by (and resentful of) P/PV's role in the process.

However, even without such staff changes, the project might well have encountered equally severe problems. The administrative structure was so complex that any deterioration--or improvement--was slow to manifest itself, and could be well underway before anyone could detect it. Moreover, communication within and among the various organizations involved was not of the highest quality, while, at the same time, the program was somewhat "over-linked." The ties between DHS and LPPAC were too extensive and too mutually reinforcing to allow for objective consideration of each other's strengths and weaknesses. For example, it appears that the Lawndale administrators did not exercise scrupulous regard for the required separation of VICI's financial and personnel resources from those of their other projects.

Chicago's powerful Mayor's Office of Manpower historically has had a close relationship with the regional and national offices of DOL. Thus, the VICI program was one of the first instances where MOM was facing outside pressure to make changes or risk losing certain federal funds. It was not clear, however, that MOM was any more responsive to outside pressures than LPPAC or other Chicago organizations. By September 1979, the continued existence of the Chicago VICI project was in doubt. Both DOL and P/PV had rejected DHS's revised management plan and insisted on a new one. Moreover, at that point, there were several indications that

Chicago's prime sponsor and the local management agency were becoming increasingly eager to drop the entire project.

#### D. MILWAUKEE

P/PV had high expectations for the Milwaukee proposal, and, true to its early promise, the Milwaukee VICI project has generally gone forward in a very smooth and straightforward manner. Disruptions have been minor, and shortfalls have been few. The key to the program's ease of implementation lies in the efficient management and monitoring procedures developed by VICI staff and in the usually strong and effective system of linkages. Where the program did encounter difficulties, they were the result of linkage weaknesses stemming from mutual misunderstanding regarding program goals and areas of responsibility.

At Milwaukee, VICI is sponsored by the CETA division of the Milwaukee County Executive Office; the local management agency is the Opportunities Industrialization Center of Greater Milwaukee (OIC). VICI's project director is a former site foreman, whose strong construction background is complemented by the administrative skills of his assistant, a management specialist.

By October 1978, 18 participants had begun work in the program, three journeymen had been hired, and three more were in reserve. The initial recruitment goal of 60 participants was achieved in the following month, and the project began with the renovation of the OIC building, a wise step since it avoided any possible delays in work provision.

In its first two months, the project developed a number of highly effective management and monitoring procedures, including specific processes for procurement, journeymen orientation and training, data collection and collation, and screening of applicants. The project also developed an effective mechanism for tracing the progress of each recruit through the recruitment and screening process. In January 1979 ten participants were enrolled in the apprenticeship tutorial and orientation program conducted by BIGSTEP, a minority apprentice-preparation program sponsored by the Milwaukee Building and Construction Joint Apprenticeship Council. In February, the project received the unique distinction of being licensed as a Home Improvement Contractor by the Milwaukee Building Inspection Department.

In this period, VICI staff turned their attention to rationalizing procedures for forming the major waiting list, the program's only shortfall to date. There was, however, a rather high rate of participant attrition--by mid-April, there had been 44 terminations. Nearly half of those negatively terminated had served less than ten working days in the program, and P/PV interpreted this to mean that the first two weeks served as a de facto screening process. By June, an improved screening process had some success in reducing negative terminations.

In May and June the project turned to the problem of placement, making an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to reconvene its Planning Task Force, the highly effective organization that had been instrumental in the

development of the original Milwaukee VICI concept. The next step included development of an assessment/preparation process for VICI graduates, and the institution of a mass campaign to alert employers to the program's output.

Milwaukee's only significant problem lay in the nature and quality of some of its linkages, which, in some cases, proved to be more apparent than real. For example, the relationship with the Milwaukee Area Technical College seems to have been based on several misunderstandings. With the appointment of a new college director, the initial, rather free and flexible, agreements gave way to talk of costs, quotas, and the like. Apparently, too much had been based on personal understandings rather than on organizational commitment, so that when the planners left the scene and were replaced by program operators, the latter had to make numerous adjustments. Further, according to VICI staff, OIC's initial intention to assume responsibility for intake recruitment and screening was never fully realized, and in time was turned back to VICI.

The relationship between VICI and BIGSTEP also underwent some deterioration. VICI staff neither appreciated nor welcomed BIGSTEP's role as a politically acceptable channel for the introduction of participants to the unions, and BIGSTEP's director resented this attitude. Despite such misunderstanding, however, the Milwaukee program has been characterized by a particularly strong and systematic development, due largely to each organization's willingness to attack and resolve problems as they have arisen.

#### E. NEWARK

The Newark program faced an inherent difficulty in the state of the local economy, and suffered from staff divisions and a partisan program director. But despite these hurdles, Newark VICI has had outstanding success in many regards, and its smooth development is a testimony to the efficacy of its linkages--particularly the union link--and to the beneficial influence of its prime sponsor, the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training (MOET).

Project start-up was surprisingly swift, with a program director, ten journeymen painters, and 93 eligible youths identified and work begun by October 1978. However, several problems emerged with equal speed, chiefly difficulties in recruiting Hispanics and in completing P/PV forms, and divisions of opinion among VICI staff.

MOET concluded that the target area included too few Hispanics, and in December the area was expanded. VICI also hired a Hispanic research coordinator to help complete P/PV forms and to provide translation and Hispanic recruitment services. As a result, Hispanic participation rose, but still the great majority of Newark participants were black, reflecting the Central Ward's population. Newark also worked at filling the major waiting list, and was the only VICI site to complete the list by P/PV's March 1979 deadline.

Despite this good start, however, a serious rift quickly developed among VICI staff regarding program objectives. The journeymen emphasized work and production as the primary goal, and insisted that youths needed to adapt to the realities of the working world. On the other hand, the counseling and administrative staff argued for counseling and compassion, for supportive services and understanding rather than a plunge into harsh realities. Unfortunately, the program director identified completely with the journeymen and made no attempt to heal the divisions. In January 1979, P/PV met with Newark VICI staff in an effort to close the breach. However, though improved communications channels were instituted, the split in the Newark staff was never fully closed.

Despite this, the program ran smoothly for two reasons. One was the involvement of MOET's director, who cared about the success of the program and used his position to clear obstacles in its path. His staff were always in close touch with the program. The second factor was the program's strong linkage to the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades (IBTAT), District Council No. 10. The union took its commitment seriously, and its business manager and apprentice coordinator worked closely with VICI. The union even provided special programs with its own funds, such as a seminar on safety in the painting trades. For several months, VICI youth attended biweekly classes sponsored by the union for its apprentices, and the union was also deeply involved in placing program graduates. Significantly, MOET and union personnel had worked together successfully on previous employment programs and therefore brought to VICI a history of mutual cooperation.

Newark VICI staff began to develop a placement strategy in the spring of 1979. Several difficulties confronted them, the most pernicious being the continuing decline of Newark's economy, particularly in its inner-city, where participants lived. Early in 1979, the city announced substantial layoffs in public employment areas which had been viewed as likely job sources for VICI graduates. At this time too, District Council No. 10 was experiencing a business slowdown. In any case, the Council's jurisdiction encompassed several counties and its placement efforts were likely to generate jobs mainly in suburban communities far from participants' homes and lacking in public transportation.

Consequently, VICI staff developed a drivers education program, and instruction began in September 1979. Not surprisingly, though, helping youths paid VICI wages to finance car purchases was beyond any program resources. Nonetheless, VICI staff moved aggressively on placement, initiating job development activities and pre-employment counseling, and making contacts with the business community. Over the summer of 1979, the Newark VICI program placed 34 youths, giving it the highest job placement rate among all VICI sites.

The Newark program validates the concept of linkages that characterizes the VICI program model. There were, to be sure, continuing problems in recruiting Hispanics and females, but the program's clear successes reflect the commitment and cooperation of its prime sponsor, MOET, and of the local union.

Few at P/PV expected much success in Newark after reading its original proposal. But intensive redrafting and rethinking by MOET, at the behest of P/PV, led to a more sound proposal, and the deep involvement of MOET and of the painters union made it work. The questions to be answered over the long term are whether this involvement will continue at its current high level, and whether it will be sufficient to overcome the problems presented by Newark's declining economy, the transportation difficulties, and the limited capacity of the area to absorb youth who are training in only one skill, painting.

#### F. NEW HAVEN

New Haven's VICI program is a tribute to the commitment of its staff and to the successful operation of its linkages. While several difficulties arose in the course of program development, most were due to external events, and VICI staff and linkage personnel made strong and usually effective efforts to overcome them.

The program experienced no abrupt transition as it moved from planning to implementation, because its central personnel did not change. The New Haven Employment and Training Administration (ETA) is the project's prime sponsor, and its two principal VICI planners became, respectively, director of the program and the prime sponsor's liaison with the program as well as an informal advisor. While this continuity minimized transitional problems, New Haven's VICI program encountered many of the start-up problems experienced elsewhere, most notably, difficulties in recruiting participants and orchestrating the flow of resources. The program reached its full complement of 60 participants only in December 1978, and enrollment of females fell short of expectations.

Recruitment remained a continuing problem, as did coordination of personnel and resources. During planning, P/PV was concerned over the complexities of New Haven's plan to rely on six work providing agencies. Problems quickly emerged, though not for the reasons expected. Trade unions launched a strike against the Housing Authority to protest the use of temporary CETA PSE workers, and this led to litigation. As a result of the strike, no work was provided by the Housing Authority, and VICI had to rely more heavily on smaller agencies. The program adjusted well, but in August 1979 the inventory of suitable work sites dropped to critical levels, and VICI staff put out an urgent call to the work providing agencies to help the program avoid running out of sites.

The large number of personnel and agencies involved in VICI also raised problems: subcontractors often failed to complete their work on schedule, disrupting plans for VICI crews; at two work sites, minority subcontractors were unable to obtain bonding until, at the intervention of ETA and the VICI advisory board in August 1979, bonding requirements were waived; ETA promised to provide the program with two vans, but only one was provided, leaving the program short of transportation, which, in turn, led to irregularities in the delivery of materials; work providers were also occasionally late in providing materials and supplies.

The program was able to surmount many of these problems and operate rather smoothly because of two factors: the cooperation of the linkages and the commitment of the staff. The trade unions helped screen and hire journeymen, and their involvement extended through the program into placement efforts. The work providing agencies also were quite helpful because VICI seemed to be serving them in precisely the mutually beneficial way that the program model envisioned. The only weak link was the education component. VICI staff did not see this as a serious lapse at first, but placement efforts made clear its importance as participants needed preparation for GED examinations.

The linkages formed an advisory board whose monthly meetings were well attended and well regarded. In general the linkages thought well of the program and of its staff: "The management is on top of everything," a trade union official noted, a conclusion endorsed by P/PV staff in their March 1979 report. However, the New Haven VICI staff had two significant concerns in their dealings with P/PV: they felt that research requirements were onerous, and they expressed a good deal of frustration at what they perceived as P/PV's failure to communicate developments among the sites. Much of this concern was assuaged by the June 1979 VICI conference convened by P/PV and by the launching of a VICI newsletter in September 1979.

While the VICI staff had some success in improving the orchestration of their disparate resources, they were unable to solve the continuing problem of recruitment (a problem shared by the New Haven CETA). In the spring of 1979, VICI staff undertook an extensive recruiting campaign, including radio and television announcements and a television discussion of VICI. Nonetheless, low enrollment, particularly of women, continued.

In June 1979, New Haven began moving on placement. Project staff contacted local contractors and, in July a formal plan was developed specifying in detail the activities, timeframes, and goals that were to guide the placement campaign. By August, ten participants had found jobs and one entered college. However, GATE testing policies hampered these efforts. In early 1979, eleven participants were eliminated from consideration for carpentry apprenticeship positions as a result of GATE examinations taken at intake. New Haven CETA officials met with the city's Department of Employment Services to resolve the problem, but though ETA received assurances from the state employment service in the spring that all eleven applicants would be retested, local job service staff seemed unwilling to accept this decision, and ETA's executive director continued to seek a solution at the state level.

After a year of operation, the New Haven VICI staff was bringing the same strong commitment to placement that had characterized their efforts at each previous stage of the program. The New Haven program was generally regarded by P/PV as one of the best VICI programs, and its quality is a reflection of its committed management as well as its firm linkages. In contrast to P/PV's deep involvement in the day-to-day operations of some VICI sites, in New Haven P/PV served largely as a sounding board. The New Haven VICI staff called P/PV's attention to problems they had perceived and proposed actions to deal with those problems. The question remaining to be answered is whether the relatively small local labor market can absorb significant numbers of VICI graduates.

## G. PHILADELPHIA

In Philadelphia, the VICI project made a rather shakey start, and program development was a period of encountering and resolving the problems and misunderstandings arising from the complexities of the program's linkages. Ultimately, the program here has emerged as a success, particularly in the area of participant-supervisor relationships.

The project began with a commitment to effective administrative, monitoring, and operational procedures. By October 1978, 20 participants had been recruited, and most journeymen and other staff were hired. The local management agency here acts through a delegate agency, the Franklin Foundation (FF), which represents fifteen neighborhood settlement houses; the prime sponsor is the Area Manpower Planning Council. The Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation (PHDC) provides architectural services to the project.

Initially, some delays arose due to minor conflicts between the local management agency and the PHDC regarding areas of responsibility and the quality of services PHDC was providing. However, by early 1979, operations began on four sites, and most aspects of the program--administration and management, logistics and supply, work crew relationships, and linkages--ran smoothly. However, each organization harbored some reservations regarding various aspects of the project.

FF chafed under the research requirements, and particularly resented and failed to comprehend the need for a waiting list. Also, being a constituent organization, it was subject to pressures from the settlement houses it represented. VICI was limited to a primarily black area containing only four settlement houses, and the excluded neighborhoods and whites felt considerable resentment.

FF was also concerned about the recruiting design. Its staff believed that too many applicants were rejected, and they doubted the validity and predictive usefulness of testing and screening. As a result, screening has not been as rigorous at Philadelphia as at other sites. Nonetheless, a comparison of average test scores recorded upon entry into the VICI program showed that youth in Philadelphia were at least as skilled as those in other sites. Indeed, Philadelphia enrollees had, on average, higher test scores than the youth at several other sites.

On the other hand, production-oriented organizations such as PHDC were concerned that the project emphasized training over improvements in housing. And, finally, a number of bureaucratic complications arose in working with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Employment. Due to all these factors, recruitment for the waiting list was several weeks behind by March 1979.

The unions were relatively tolerant of the project and of its goals, though they argued for a 3:1 (rather than a 6:1) supervisory ratio. After an initially rocky start, however, the relationship between supervisors and their work crews settled into one of close--sometimes alarmingly intense--mutual respect and identification with particular sites, journeymen, or teams.

Plans for a placement strategy were initiated in early November, 1979; but, despite P/PV's urgings, the strategy remained undeveloped. By this time, FF had developed a reasonably well-integrated network of support services, chiefly an educational needs assessment and delivery process, and expanded participant counseling.

Overall, Philadelphia's problems are much milder than might have been expected. Despite FF's status as a constituent organization, which imposed a very different political reality than that confronting other local management agencies, and despite some largely bureaucratic delays among its network of linkages and an initially negative attitude on the part of FF, the Philadelphia VICI project appears successful.

A major concern expressed by the Philadelphia VICI staff was what they saw as a special intensity with which their program was monitored by P/PV staff members located only blocks away. Although P/PV staff members do not perceive any special relationship with the VICI program located in the same city as P/PV's offices, FF felt they were "over-overseen." In fact, there did appear to be unique ties between P/PV and the Philadelphia VICI program, but they were encouraged by both sides. Proximity simply led to more frequent formal and informal communications: P/PV could easily bring visitors to the local VICI program, but the program could easily raise questions with P/PV staff. While contacts were more numerous, there does not appear to have been any detectable effect on VICI operations, nor any slowing of research.

Despite a great improvement in the Philadelphia VICI's attitude toward P/PV, there is still some residual resentment over the emphasis on research--though that resentment now extends to DOL as well. GPFS's board is, in a rather unfocused way, angry over the need for such items as the waiting list--a perspective which reduces the danger that they will be held responsible for a failure to meet the recruitment goals.

#### H. THE SOUTH BRONX

The South Bronx VICI program was the last program to get started, and it has remained a very troubled site throughout much of 1979. Its original problems can be traced to an external conflict that held up its starting data several months. And serious problems related to finances, linkages, and management continued long after the program began.

Soon after approval of the South Bronx proposal, the New York City Community Development Administration alleged fiscal irregularities at Operation Open City (OOC), VICI's proposed local management agency. The city suspended payments to OOC, pending results of an audit, and DOL also suspended its own payments to OOC. After lengthy negotiations and the resignation of several OOC officials, OOC was formally redesignated as VICI's local management agency, and late in December, it reassembled as many of the people, properties, and ideas as were still available. A number of staff members were hired, 36 youths were enrolled, and work sites were identified in the two target areas.

At this point, a new difficulty arose, concerning \$250,000 which the Community Services Administration (CSA) in Washington had pledged the program to pay for materials and supplies. In addition, in early 1979, the program's landlord sought to cancel the program's lease because of the delays in funding. Also, the chairman of the Apprenticeship and Manpower Committee of the New York Building and Construction Trades Council became ill, delaying referral of journeymen for jobs. Finally, the city failed to provide needed scaffolding and trucks, and OOC itself continued to move very cautiously, particularly on expenditures, because of its recent contretemps with the city government.

At this time, P/PV staff met with the prime sponsor (the Department of Employment of New York City's Human Resources Administration) and OOC to discuss the slow start-up process. The prime sponsor agreed to streamline the process of certifying youth for VICI. But, long after start-up, the program continued to experience problems related to its finances, linkages, and management.

The \$250,000 promised in writing by CSA was not forthcoming, and OOC was hard pressed because it had counted on these funds for supplies. Later, the city's Community Development Administration loaned \$100,000 to the program and agreed to provide more if necessary. Eventually, CSA and the U.S. Department of Energy funds were expected to provide the full \$250,000, but CSA's failure to honor its commitment was a financial burden which hampered early operations. In addition, the new city Commissioner of Employment refused to provide the seven CETA slots for VICI staff that his predecessor had pledged.

A second major problem was the failure of linkages to materialize. For example, early problems in recruitment reflected the failure of the referral mechanism involving the Alfred E. Smith Vocational High School. Counseling and education were to have been provided by Hostos Community College, but its counseling program failed to get funding for several months, and no counseling linkage emerged. The most crucial linkage failure, however, was the trade union connection. When the program sought to implement the linkages listed in the proposal, union officials denied that they had made any commitments. The New York Building and Construction Trades Council did little to help participants interested in apprenticeships. Later, the plasterers union took several apprentices, but this was the result of an agreement worked out well after the program began, rather than a part of the original proposal.

The third fundamental problem in the South Bronx was poor management. The drafting of the proposal and early VICI operations were directed by an OOC veteran who proved to be a generally disorganized administrator unable to set priorities, and in an effort to improve matters, a program coordinator was hired in May. However, this led only to further organizational difficulties and personal rivalries. Moreover, while the VICI program director's highly informal, unpremeditated manner led to disorganization, the coordinator's formal, textbook management style, in which he removed himself from day-to-day operations, had equally negative results.

A crucial question is how the South Bronx proposal passed P/PV's rigorous review with linkages that were never firm. P/PV staff believe that the six-month delay in starting the program caused commitments to be eroded as organizations found other calls on their resources. However, inefficient management must be held responsible for the Bronx program's innumerable difficulties at virtually every level. Participant regulations remained vague through the summer of 1979, then, in a sudden crackdown, twelve youths were dismissed in August for behavioral problems. Furthermore, OUC's fiscal report due on July 31 was not submitted until September; the program seemed unable to certify homes at the pace it projected due to staffing problems; the program was regularly deficient in meeting enrollment and work production goals, and in July had an insufficient number of certified work orders; and P/PV staff complained that the program had been forwarding incomplete and inaccurate information.

Surprisingly, however, despite the problems of management and linkages, program participants seemed to be busily and fruitfully engaged when sites were visited. They were idle more than at other sites because of logistical bottlenecks, but they seemed to regard the program as useful, and they seemed to be learning.

The recent departure of the VICI coordinator from the program raises the prospect of improved management, but the South Bronx will present any successor with major problems. New linkages must be forged with the New York labor movement; counseling facilities must be developed; and recruitment and referral mechanisms need to be strengthened. Moreover, the South Bronx VICI program will have to continue to endure an essentially insecure system of financing materials and supplies.

#### SUMMARY

VICI's transition from planning to program operation was characterized by a wide range of problems, some of which were common to most sites while others reflected particular local forces. By early 1979, all eight programs were operating and, although there were varied degrees of success, the internal workings of the programs--particularly the relationship between journeymen and youth--were proving to be interesting and effective. There was little new in VICI regarding recruitment or intake of youth. However, the programs were designed to make innovative use of union journeymen as trainers, and beyond this most useful planned innovation, the journeymen were also assuming a very important role in the programs' placement efforts.

P/PV exhibited flexibility and effectiveness as an intermediary unit in its management of the demonstration. The quality of its technical assistance seemed high, and it was perceived as useful by many local program managers. As the demonstration progressed, and as a second wave of participants began training, P/PV focused increasingly on placement and on improving the performance of the programs. P/PV has also begun to consider and plan for VICI's continuance beyond the period of research and demonstration.

### III. DEMOGRAPHIC AND TERMINATION PROFILE OF VICI PARTICIPANTS

The statistical description presented here provides a profile, based on key selected variables, of youth enrolled in the VICI program and on how youth fared at program termination.

The information obtained from the statistical description is useful in several ways. It serves P/PV in its role as a monitoring and technical assistance agency. It also provides a context within which to interpret program developments and final outcomes.

The information provided in this section covers the period from program start-up in the fall and winter of 1978-79 through February 1980. The reader will note some disparities in variable response rates. These stem from two sources. First, where possible the computerized MIS was updated by including recent data from P/PV's manual data control system. Secondly, over one hundred termination forms have not been entered onto the computer system because P/PV is in the process of rectifying data inconsistencies (e.g., varying participant identifier numbers).

The reader who is interested in examining a comprehensive item by item statistical description of VICI participant data through November, 1979, is referred to the companion appendix document. The appendix also reports results of descriptive analyses which point up possible relationships between selected demographic, economic, and termination status variables and selected indicators of program success. Table III.1 which follows the narrative presents a site by site breakdown of selected demographic variables.

Results. The results of the profile analysis are reported in a series of brief narrative highlights accompanied by the relevant statistical tables. The narrative presents a summary of the information derived from the statistical tables.

#### A. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

The descriptive statistics presented in this section are based on information obtained from participant intake records of 1125 VICI youths. This represents all available data from P/PV's computerized management information base and has been updated from P/PV's manual data control system to include information through February 1980.

Age: To be eligible for VICI, youths must be between 16 and 19 years at time of intake. The majority of participants (69%) were 18-19 years of age\*

Sex: Overall, 81% of all VICI participants are males, 19% are females.

\*P/PV's data monitoring system identified 5 "age-ineligible" (i.e., below 16 or above 19) youths. Programs were notified promptly of any errors.

There are four sites with approximately 25% female participants: South Bronx, Newark, Atlanta and Broward. Milwaukee has accepted the smallest percentage (12%) of females.

Ethnic Group: Of the total population, 80% of the VICI participants are Black, 14% Hispanic, 5% are White, and 1% are considered "Other." Atlanta, Broward, and Philadelphia are all more than 90% Black. Chicago and South Bronx have the highest concentration of Hispanic participants. New Haven has the largest percentage (22%) of White youth. All remaining sites are less than 8% White.

Education of the Participants: Approximately 73% of VICI participants were high school drop-out completing up through grades 9, 10, and 11. Another 4% had completed only eighth grade or less. Of the total population, 22% attained high school diplomas or GED's prior to entering the VICI program. South Bronx (12%) reported the lowest ratio of participants with GED's or diplomas which at the opposite pole, in Chicago and Atlanta (33%) had graduated high school or achieved GED's.

Fundamental Achievement Series - Verbal (FAS-V) Test: The FAS-V Test is a 100-item test of verbal ability. The test is administered to all VICI applicants for research purposes and not for screening. Individual VICI participant scores ranged from 7 to 99 with an overall mean of 65.1. This compares to an overall mean of 69.4 on a normal group of 1175 trainees in public anti-poverty programs. Chicago was the site with the highest mean FAS-V score, 76.1; and Newark reported the lowest mean FAS-V score, 58.8.

Previous Employment: At time of intake to VICI over 90% of youths were unemployed or not in the labor force. Twenty percent reported never having any previous job. Of the 80% youths who had worked prior to VICI, the mean hourly wage in their most recent jobs was \$2.87. Atlanta and Milwaukee youths earned the highest hourly rates, \$2.98 prior to VICI entry while South Bronx youth reported lowest average earnings at \$2.64 per hour. Half of the pre-VICI jobs were unsubsidized. The highest proportion of subsidized jobs is found in Philadelphia where 77% of youth reported that their most recent pre-VICI job was subsidized. The average hours worked per week on pre-VICI jobs was 33.4 hours. On a site specific basis, average hours per week ranged considerably, from 29.2 hours in New Haven to 37.7 hours in Broward County. Across all sites, 41% of VICI trainees were out of work for 6 months or more before making application to VICI.

TABLE III.1

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF VICI YOUTHS BY SITE

<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>SITE</u>	Atlanta N %	Broward N %	Chicago N %	Milwaukee N %	Newark N %	New Haven N %	Philadelphia N %	South Bronx N %	TOTAL N %
<u>AGE</u>										
15		0 0	1 1	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	1 *
16		11 8	36 21	3 4	2 1	5 3	19 15	2 2	11 9	89 8
17		20 14	48 28	4 5	44 22	54 33	33 26	17 14	37 30	257 23
18		46 33	48 28	35 41	73 37	55 34	40 31	63 52	40 33	400 36
19		60 43	37 22	42 49	79 40	49 30	36 28	38 31	32 26	373 33
20 or older		1 1	0 0	1 1	0 0	0 0	0 0	1 1	2 2	5 *
<u>SEX</u>										
Male		109 79	132 78	72 85	175 88	119 73	110 86	105 87	91 75	913 81
Female		29 21	38 22	13 15	23 12	44 27	18 14	16 13	31 25	212 19
<u>ETHNIC GROUP</u>										
White		4 3	5 3	2 2	15 8	0 0	28 22	3 2	1 1	58 5
Black		134 97	164 96	47 55	163 82	122 75	84 66	113 93	78 64	905 80
Hispanic		0 0	1 1	35 41	19 10	40 25	14 11	5 4	42 34	156 14
Other		0 0	0 0	1 1	1 1	1 1	2 2	0 0	1 1	6 1

\* Less than one-half of one percent.

TABLE III.1 - (cont'd)

## DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF VICI YOUTHS BY SITE

<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>SITE</u>	Atlanta	Broward	Chicago	Milwaukee	Newark	New Haven	Philadelphia	South Bronx	TOTAL	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF APPLICANT</u>											
Grade 8 or less		5	4	4	2	0	0	5	3	14	9
Grade 9, 10, 11		84	61	126	74	55	65	159	80	123	75
High School Diploma or GED		45	33	39	23	28	33	31	16	25	15
Post Secondary School		4	3	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	1
<u>FAS-V TEST</u>											
Mean		62.4		61.6		76.1		64.3		58.8	
N		135		169		83		194		163	
										128	
										117	
										121	
										1110	

TABLE III.2                    DESCRIPTION OF MOST RECENT  
PRE-VICI JOBS

ELEMENT	Atlanta		Broward		Chicago		Milwaukee		Newark		New Haven		Philadelphia		S. Bronx		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Subsidized/Unsubsidized</u>																		
Subsidized	58	50	52	40	24	53	65	46	72	56	43	40	70	77	31	42	415	50
Unsubsidized	58	50	77	60	21	47	75	54	56	44	64	60	21	23	43	58	415	50
<u>Mean Hourly Wage</u>																		
Mean		\$2.98		\$2.95		\$2.88		\$2.98		\$2.76		\$2.89		\$2.77		\$2.64		\$2.87
N		119		133		61		138		147		116		93		80		887
<u>Mean Hrs. Per Week</u>																		
Mean		34.3		37.7		31.6		32.5		33.9		29.2		35.0		31.8		33.4
N		119		133		61		141		151		116		93		80		894
<u>Mos. Since Last Job</u>																		
Still on Job	0	0	8	5	2	2	5	3	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	19	2
Never had Job	17	12	36	21	24	28	55	28	16	10	12	9	28	23	42	34	230	20
0-3 Months	67	49	63	37	37	44	87	44	72	44	54	42	46	38	36	30	462	41
4-6 Months	26	19	32	19	6	7	20	10	25	15	24	19	25	21	20	16	178	16
7-12 Months	16	12	23	14	11	13	16	8	18	11	15	12	10	8	10	8	119	11
13 Mos.-2 Years	10	7	5	3	4	5	10	5	20	12	16	13	9	7	8	7	82	7
25 Mos.-3 Years	0	0	2	1	0	0	3	2	7	4	3	2	2	2	3	2	20	2
37 Mos.-5 Years	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	5	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	15	1

## B. TERMINATION PROFILE

The following narrative description refers to the data presented in Table III.3.

### Termination Type

A total of 784 participants terminated from the VICI program through February 1980. Overall 42% were positive, 56% were non-positive and 3% were classified as "other." Positive terminations are those resulting in employment, further training, or return to school. Non-positive terminations include all involuntary terminations and such events as injury or health problems, dropping out of the program, looking for work, family responsibility and moving living quarters. "Other" terminations include those recorded as "unknown" and "other." Atlanta and New Haven reflected the highest percent of positive terminations with 49% and 48% respectively. Philadelphia reported the lowest rate (28%) of positive terminations.

Sixty percent of all terminations were voluntary with Broward County having the highest proportion (73%) and Philadelphia the lowest (40%).

### Reasons for Voluntary and Involuntary Terminations

Across all sites 57% of all voluntary terminations resulted from offers of employment. In three sites (Atlanta, Newark, and New York) over two-thirds or more of voluntary terminations were due to employment. Another 12% of terminations were the result of decisions to return to school or to attend other training offerings. Personal circumstances such as health, family responsibility, and changing place of residence resulted in another 9% of voluntary exits from VICI.

Unsatisfactory attendance was the reason for 50% of the involuntary terminations. Unsatisfactory work performance was connected to only 4% of involuntary terminations. Misconduct and end of the demonstration each accounted for 16% of involuntary terminations.

### Type of Employment After Demonstration

The majority (44%) of all VICI youths who terminated to accept jobs were employed in related trades. An additional 23% entered union apprenticeships. A quarter of terminees secured jobs in non-related trades and 9% entered the U.S. military.

### Jobs Requiring Construction Skills

In 70% of the cases where youths secured jobs, the use of construction skills learned in VICI were part of the required job duties.

### Types of Jobs

Thirteen percent of youths reported acquiring temporary jobs upon termination as opposed to 87% who secured permanent employment. Ninety-one percent of jobs were unsubsidized.

### Wages

The average hourly wage upon termination across all sites was \$4.59 per hour. This ranges considerably at local sites. Chicago, Milwaukee and Philadelphia all reported average starting wages for terminees that exceeded \$5.00 per hour. Only South Bronx reported average wages less than \$4.00 per hour; namely \$3.83.

### Length of Stay in VICI

On the average youngsters remained in VICI for 22.4 weeks. For most sites, in-program time closely approximated the mean but in Chicago, the 56 terminees averaged 31.8 weeks whereas in Milwaukee the mean length of stay was 16.3 weeks.

### Sex

Eighty-one percent of youths who terminated were male and 19% were female. This proportion is exactly that of the number of males and females who ever entered VICI.

TABLE III:3  
TERMINATION PROFILE FOR VICI PARTICIPANTS THROUGH FEBRUARY, 1980

ELEMENT	SITE	Atlanta		Broward		Chicago		Milwaukee		Newark		New Haven		Philadelphia		South Bronx		TOTAL	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>TERMINATION TYPE-A</u>																			
Voluntary		53	57	93	73	31	57	102	71	65	55	56	67	26	40	27	42	453	60
Involuntary		40	43	35	27	23	43	41	29	54	45	28	33	39	60	37	58	297	40
<u>TERMINATION TYPE-B</u>																			
Positive		44	49	54	44	22	39	60	41	56	46	46	48	23	28	22	32	326	42
Non-Positive		43	48	59	48	34	61	84	57	65	53	47	49	59	71	45	66	437	56
Other		3	3	9	7	0	0	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	21	3
<u>REASON FOR VOLUNTARY TERMINATIONS</u>																			
Employed <sup>1</sup>		47	67	44	48	19	61	45	42	54	78	44	70	16	52	16	53	275	57
Training <sup>2</sup>		6	9	4	4	0	0	8	7	3	4	0	0	1	3	3	10	25	5
School		4	6	7	8	3	10	10	9	2	3	2	3	5	16	3	10	36	7
Injury/Health		2	3	5	5	1	3	3	3	3	4	2	3	3	10	1	3	20	4
Family Respons.		2	3	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	6	1
Look for Work		1	1	5	5	1	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	2
Moved		1	1	1	1	2	6	7	7	1	1	3	5	3	10	3	10	21	4
Cannot locate		0	0	1	1	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	1
Lost Interest		0	0	9	10	3	10	10	9	2	3	8	13	0	0	3	10	35	7
Unhappy with Program		1	1	4	4	1	3	6	6	1	1	0	0	1	3	0	0	14	3
Other		2	3	3	3	0	0	6	6	3	4	2	3	1	3	1	3	18	4
Unknown		4	6	8	9	1	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	17	4

TABLE III.3 (contd.)

## TERMINATION PROFILE FOR VICI PARTICIPANTS THROUGH FEBRUARY, 1980

ELEMENT	SITE		Atlanta		Broward		Chicago		Milwaukee		Newark		New Haven		Philadelphia		South Bronx		TOTAL	
			N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Type of Employment after Termination</u>																				
Job in related trade	13	35	20	45	1	5	29	64	24	44	25	57	4	25	5	31	121	44		
Job in non-related trade	16	43	12	27	2	11	11	24	6	11	8	18	9	56	4	25	68	25		
Union Apprenticeship	4	11	9	20	15	79	2	4	22	41	6	14	1	6	3	19	62	23		
Military Serv.	4	11	3	7	1	5	3	7	2	4	5	11	2	13	4	25	24	9		
<u>Reasons for Involuntary Terminations</u>																				
Unsat. Attend.	20	50	5	15	16	70	30	71	28	52	13	46	18	46	17	46	147	50		
Unsat. Work Performance	0	0	1	3	2	9	2	5	2	4	4	14	0	0	2	5	13	4		
Misconduct	5	13	5	15	1	4	7	17	10	19	9	32	10	26	1	3	48	16		
End of Demo.	14	35	4	12	4	17	0	0	1	2	1	4	7	18	16	43	47	16		
Other	1	3	19	56	0	0	3	7	13	24	1	4	4	10	1	3	42	14		
<u>Sex of Terminations</u>																				
Males	107	77	128	77	74	81	163	89	120	73	124	86	130	91	85	70	931	81		
Females	32	23	38	23	17	19	20	11	44	27	20	14	13	9	36	30	220	19		

TABLE III.3 (contd.)  
TERMINATION PROFILE FOR VICI PARTICIPANTS THROUGH FEBRUARY, 1980

Element	SITE		Atlanta		Broward		Chicago		Milwaukee		Newark		New Haven		Philadelphia		South Bronx		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Number of weeks in the program</u>																				
Mean	25.45		20.28		31.80		16.34		22.63		23.66		21.73		26.43		22.42			
N	90		123		56		146		123		95		83		67		783			
<u>Job requires construction skills</u>																				
Yes	15	48	35	73	10	77	33	70	43	88	25	74	5	45	7	54	173	70		
No	16	52	13	27	3	23	14	30	6	12	9	26	6	55	6	46	73	30		
<u>Job Permanence</u>																				
Permanent	19	53	44	98	11	85	41	91	46	88	39	95	13	93	14	93	227	87		
Temporary	17	47	1	2	2	15	4	9	6	12	2	5	1	7	1	7	34	13		
<u>Job Subsidization</u>																				
Subsidized	7	19	1	2	0	0	0	0	4	8	3	7	6	37	2	13	23	9		
Unsubsidized	30	81	44	98	13	100	45	100	48	92	38	93	10	63	13	87	241	91		

TABLE III.3 (contd.)

## TERMINATION PROFILE FOR VICI PARTICIPANTS THROUGH FEBRUARY, 1980

ELEMENT \ SITE	Atlanta		Broward		Chicago		Milwaukee		Newark		New Haven		Philadelphia		South Bronx		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Hourly Wage</u>																		
Mean	\$4.04		\$4.33		\$5.93		\$5.12		\$4.59		\$4.26		\$5.39		\$3.83		\$4.59	
N	31		44		13		42		51		40		14		13		248	

61

60

#### IV AGGREGATE COMPARISON

The primary focus of this task is the comparison of VICI with two major formula-funded youth employment programs:

- o Youth Community Construction and Improvement Programs (YCCIP) which emphasize making tangible community improvements, but do not necessarily imply construction-related projects.
- o Youth Employment and Training Programs (YETP) which offer career employment experience, classroom training and work experience and can be applied in either an in-school or an out-of-school setting.

This comparison is intended to provide a summary profile of the types of youth participating in the three programs and some indications of what happens to participants upon termination.

The basic analytic approach for the aggregate comparison task is descriptive. Gross statistical comparisons on several variables of concern will be made between VICI, YCCIP, and YETP. Rigorous experimental analyses of outcomes are not appropriate, due to lack of comparability between program goals and features, participant background characteristics and existing data bases.

The selection of variables for study was dictated to some extent by the existing data bases for the different programs. Only existing data was used in the aggregate comparison task. Comparison data was drawn from prime sponsors' quarterly reports to DOL, including the Quarterly Summary of Participant Characteristics and the Youth Program Status Summary for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP. Prime sponsor reports were used as the source of data to preserve the comparability of data bases.\* For this Interim Report, data from the fourth fiscal quarter of FY 1979 were available for six of the eight VICI sites. Complete sets of reports were not available for the other two sites. The statistics presented here cover the period from October 1, 1978 through September 30, 1979 for the six reporting sites which submitted complete data.

Simple descriptive statistics, frequencies and percents, were used as the primary basis for analysis.

All comparisons were conducted using pooled data from the six reporting sites. It is recognized that on a site specific basic programs may at times differ markedly in terms of participant characteristics;\*\* however, pooled data will serve to point up generic trends and differences.

\*Slight differences are detectable between prime sponsor and P/PV data relative to VICI youths.

\*\*Site specific comparisons are included in the Appendix of this report which is issued under separate cover.

Eligibility criteria differ somewhat among the three programs. VICI and YCCIP youth must fall between ages sixteen and nineteen while YETP participants may range from sixteen through twenty-one years. Further, VICI youths must be out-of-school to qualify for the program while YCCIP and YETP can enroll in-school youngsters. While YCCIP and YETP strongly focus upon youths who are economically disadvantaged, in VICI this is an absolute criteria for program participation.

Furthermore, the program objectives also vary. VICI places highest priority upon placing a youngster who has gone through the program in an unsubsidized job. VICI youths are encouraged to complete GED requirements while in VICI through VICI's formal educational support services. YCCIP and especially YETP as part of their mission in working with in-school youth place strong emphasis upon a young person's remaining or returning to school. When examining the termination data one must keep in mind this differentiation among program goals.

#### Analysis

Table IV-1 presents selected descriptive statistics. As noted in the table, YETP programs are much larger than their VICI and YCCIP counterparts. During Fiscal Year 1979 YETP programs enrolled about ten times more youth than each of the other programs. YETP programs were the only ones that showed a majority of female participants. This is less surprising in lieu of the Chapter I documentation of problems that women encounter in construction oriented training programs.

All three programs enrolled over 90% economically disadvantaged youths with VICI reporting the highest percent (99%).

Black youths constituted 75% or more of the populations in all three programs with the YCCIP program enrolling the greatest proportion of Hispanic young persons (19%).

The majority of YETP youth (61%) were in-school at the time of enrollment. This contrasts to VICI reporting only 2% of in-school youths. Conversely VICI and YCCIP served the highest percentages of high-school drop outs, 71% and 65% respectively. Among the three groups, the highest proportion of high school graduates or GED attainers is found among VICI participants (26%).

In terms of program activities, VICI and YCCIP both reported a 100% activity rate for work experience. Over half of the YETP activity consisted of career employment experiences with work experience constituting another quarter.

**TABLE IV.1**  
**SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS**  
(OCTOBER 1978 through SEPTEMBER 1979)

CHARACTERISTICS	PROGRAM		
	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
<b>ENROLLMENT</b>			
Current	294	296	4407
Total to Date	728	1302	11,869
<b>SEX</b>			
Male	592 (81%)	843 (65%)	4997 (42%)
Female	136 (19%)	459 (35%)	6872 (58%)
<b>ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED</b>	<b>718 (99%)</b>	<b>1246 (96%)</b>	<b>10,979 (93%)</b>
<b>RACE/ETHNIC GROUP</b>			
White (not Hispanic)	40 ( 5%)	65 ( 5%)	1642 (14%)
Black (not Hispanic)	596 (82%)	983 (75%)	8857 (75%)
Hispanic	83 (11%)	246 (19%)	1244 (10%)
American Indian/Alaskan	1 -	6 -	71 ( 1%)
Asian/Pacific Islander	8 ( 1%)	2 -	55 -
<b>EDUCATIONAL STATUS</b>			
High School Student	11 ( 2%)	244 (19%)	7289 (61%)
High School Drop-Out	520 (71%)	843 (65%)	2130 (18%)
High School Graduate (Equiv.)	189 (26%)	202 (16%)	1765 (15%)
Post High School	8 ( 1%)	13 ( 1%)	685 ( 6%)
<b>PROGRAM ACTIVITIES</b>			
Career Employment Experience	-	-	6385 (53%)
Transition Services	-	-	865 ( 7%)
On-the-Job Training	-	-	14
Classroom Training	-	-	1632 (14%)
Work Experience	728 (100%)	1302 (100%)	3075 (26%)

\* Six sites reporting.

Percents do not always sum 100% due to rounding.

Table IV-2 provides a summary of termination information. As indicated on the table, YETP recorded a positive termination rate (64%) about one and a half times that of the other two programs. As predicted, YETP led all programs with 15% of youths who continued or enrolled in full-time secondary or post-secondary schools. Slightly fewer YCCIP participants (11%) returned or remained in school and very few VICI youths (5%) were reported in this category.

The DOL Program Status Summary includes an "Other" positive termination category. This includes participants who enroll in non-CETA employment and training programs or participants who have "completed program objectives not involving entry into unsubsidized employment." Examples of the latter are participants enrolled in the program for purposes of upgrading training, receiving supportive services, obtaining GED training, and so on. Since the major goal for VICI is unsubsidized employment, very few terminations (3%) were reported in this category. Percentages for YCCIP and YETP, however, are higher, with 17 percent and 27 percent, respectively, in this category.

"Job placements" indicates the percentage of youths who entered unsubsidized employment at the time of termination. Twice the amount of VICI terminees secured unsubsidized jobs when compared to the other two programs. Overall approximately 35% of VICI terminees entered employment as opposed to 14% for YCCIP and 18% for YETP.

In summary, in examining positive termination rates for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP, it is essential to keep programmatic goals in mind and to look at specific termination categories. VICI and YCCIP had similar overall positive termination rates while YETP was clearly higher. However, when examining differences in placement (i.e., unsubsidized employment) rates, VICI was considerably higher than both YCCIP and YETP. In terms of VICI's programmatic goal of placing participants in unsubsidized jobs, the program seems to be effective in relation to other major formula-funded efforts.

**TABLE IV.2**  
**TYPES OF TERMINATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1979**

PROGRAM TERMINATION TYPE	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
Total Number of Terminations	434	1006	7462
Percent Positive	44%	46%	64%
Percent Job Placements	35%	14%	18%
Percent "Other" Positive	3%	17%	27%
Percent Enrolled/Continued in School	5%	11%	15%

## V. INTERPROGRAM COMPARISON

The Interprogram Comparison involves a comparison of VICI programs with selected formula-funded DOL-YCCIP and HUD-YCCIP demonstration programs operating at VICI sites. Relevant variables fall into two major categories, descriptive comparisons, and possible indicators of comparative program effectiveness. Each category includes several specific variables:

### Descriptive Comparisons

1. Characteristics of entering youth
2. Characteristics of program staff (especially instructors)
3. Nature of work performed (i.e., the community improvements)
4. Linkages (with special references to funding sources and the amount of funds provided from sources other than those mandated by the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act)
5. Salaries and incentives/bonuses paid to youth and staff
6. Other budgetary items, including materials costs, administrative costs, supportive sources and other non-personnel costs
7. Intake and screening procedures
8. Disciplinary policies and procedures

### Possible Indicators of Comparative Program Effectiveness

1. Retention, turnover, and attendance in program
2. Ability of programs to gear up, achieve, and maintain projected service levels
3. Quantity and quality of community improvements
4. Positive outcomes, including type of post-program placements (e.g., apprenticeship program, occupational area, return to school, and post-program wages)
5. Cost per positive outcome

## A. GENERAL DESIGN

To ensure valid comparisons, the selected alternative programs should closely match VICI programs in several important respects, in particular, youth characteristics, type of work, location, program factors, size of participant groups, and data quality and availability.

Only three of the eight VICI sites--Chicago, Philadelphia, and the South Bronx--had sufficient numbers of DOL-YCCIP participants, or had DOL-YCCIP programs similar enough to VICI, to provide a basis for meaningful comparisons. A total of eleven YCCIP programs, four in Chicago, four in New York, and three in Philadelphia, were selected for comparison. HUD-YCCIP sites overlap with VICI in four cities: Atlanta, Chicago, Newark, and the South Bronx.

Both contextual and statistical data are needed for making interprogram comparisons. Contextual data are collected through site visits to comparison programs, and are most relevant to the descriptive comparison

variables. Interviews and program documentation are the primary sources of contextual data, and one round of site visits has been conducted by RBS and P/PV research staff. In addition, written materials on several of the comparison programs have been collected.

Statistical data are the best indicators of comparative program effectiveness. RBS has received statistical data on HUD-YCCIP programs and is currently obtaining comparable data on DOL-YCCIP programs in Chicago, Philadelphia, and the South Bronx. These data are currently being analyzed, and will be presented in a subsequent report.

## B. RESULTS

### 1. Atlanta

Only one comparison program was selected in Atlanta, Exodus, Inc., a HUD demonstration program. Information on the program was obtained through project documentation and a preliminary interview conducted by P/PV.

Exodus, Inc. Exodus, Inc., the recipient of the HUD-YCCIP grant in Atlanta, is a community organization offering minority youth non-traditional educational and social services since 1972. The agency had little experience in construction projects prior to receiving the HUD grant.

The Exodus project is designed to train participants in work habits and technical skills in home rehabilitation and energy conservation. The object is to help them obtain unsubsidized jobs in construction-related areas, upon termination. Projects include the rehabilitation of HUD-owned and private homes and the refurbishment of community facilities. Work includes painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry, landscaping, and weatherization. Participants may choose their work crew, and one participant in each crew is chosen as crew chief. Typically, there are 11 or 12 participants in each crew, and supervisory ratios are normally about 15 or 16:1. This has dropped to about 8:1 recently, since enrollment has declined. Participants are paid on a scale of \$2.50 to \$4.50 per hour; incentive raises and team bonuses are given.

Exodus offers counseling, placement, and educational services. Staffing for the project includes a three-person project management team and six field supervisors. All field supervisors have previous experience in housing/construction or community development, and most have extensive experience in working with minority youths and/or community organizations.

About 260 youths have participated in Exodus through Spring 1979. In May, there were 48 enrollees. The program is planning a gradual phase-out and will limit future enrollment to 36. Most participants were 18 or 19 years old, and almost all were black. All were economically disadvantaged. About one-fifth were females, and approximately a quarter were high school graduates or GED recipients. At least 7 percent were ex-offenders.

## 2. Chicago

Five training programs were selected for comparison with VICI, a HUD demonstration project and four formula-funded YCCIP programs. Information on the HUD project was obtained from program documentation and a P/PV site visit. Only limited information, based on a RBS site visit, is currently available on the YCCIP programs here.

The Woodlawn Organization (TWO). The Woodlawn Organization is a community-improvement "umbrella organization," with about 120 member agencies. The Woodlawn HUD program began in March 1978 with a HUD grant of \$1,180,000. The purpose of the project, known as the Urban Restoration and Conservation Corps, is to provide skills training to minority youths, and to improve and restore the Woodlawn community through minor home repairs and vacant land clearance.

Participants are trained in several skills, including carpentry, landscaping, painting, electrical, cement masonry, and plumbing. Work projects have included home repairs, energy conservation and weatherization, public works, (repair of parkway areas and snow removal) and refurbishment of community facilities (a state hospital and playlots). Youths are paid on incentive scales of \$2.90, \$3.18, and \$3.50 per hour, with work and education bonuses.

Participants work in crews, supervised by eleven "tradesmen," five of whom are union members. There are also three Public Service Employee (PSE) assistants and one youth crew chief per crew. Other administrative and support staff are provided to the project through TWO.

Participants spend four hours per week in a vocational shop. Group and individual counseling is available, as needed, and job development and placement services are currently being developed. In Spring 1979, approximately 165 youths were participating in the program. About one-third of them were in school, most were 17 or 18 years old; and all were black and economically disadvantaged. About 70 percent were males. The program tried to select those hardest to employ, such as high school dropouts or juvenile delinquents.

South Austin Realty Association Rehabilitation Project. This is a formula-funded YCCIP program emphasizing placement in the construction-related trades, and focusing on home repair and rehabilitation. Training is provided in painting, carpentry, plumbing, and electrical trades. The program started in January 1979. In December 1978, seven participants were anticipated, and were expected to be disadvantaged 18 or 19 years old, black, out of school, and male.

Kenwood Oakland Community Organization (KOCO). The code Enforcement/Deferred Maintenance and Weatherization program run by KOCO is a formula-funded YCCIP project, focusing on energy conservation and home maintenance. Work skills include painting, roofing, carpentry, and landscaping. The project started in January 1979, and had

openings for 30 youths. These were expected to be 19 years old, black, male, out of school, and economically disadvantaged.

Puerto Rican Congress Academy (PRC). The Rehabilitation and Beautification Project run by PRC is a formula-funded YCCIP program, begun in January 1979. The program emphasizes home repair and rehabilitation, and provides training in painting, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical skills, and landscaping.

The program has slots for 15 participants. Youths were expected to be 18 or 19 years old, black or Hispanic, male, economically disadvantaged, and out of school. A number of former drug abusers were expected.

Voice of the People (VOP). The Uptown Rehabilitation Training Project run by VOP began in January 1979. The program involves home repair and rehabilitation. Training is provided in painting, carpentry, and landscaping. The program has slots for 10 youths. These were expected to be 18 or 19 years old, white or Hispanic, economically disadvantaged, male, and out of school.

### 3. Newark

Only one comparison program was selected in Newark, a HUD demonstration project operated by the North Ward Education and Cultural Center (NWECC). Information was obtained through project documentation, staff interviews, and direct observation made during a site visit of CPPV and RBS research staff.

North Ward Educational and Cultural Center. The Center began operation in 1970. The agency operates in an Italian-American neighborhood, has a long history of community service, and appears to have very good political support. The program focuses on construction-related skills through work experience such as major home repair and rehabilitation, public works, and refurbishment of community facilities. All construction skills are taught, emphasized, including painting, roofing, carpentry, plumbing, electrical, and landscaping. Youths typically work in crews of 8 to 10, and may switch crews.

The program attempted to place participants in the Painters and Carpenters unions but, in contrast to VICI's experience, the unions were not very responsive. The NWECC program uses pay incentives, with pay levels of \$2.90, \$3.20, and \$3.60.

The program is staffed by non-union supervisors who have construction-related experience. Supervisors are PSE employees who must be replaced when their CETA time expires.

The New Jersey State Employment Service screens program applicants; those lacking commitment are screened out. As of April 1979, approximately 280 youths had been enrolled. About 100 were out-of-school youths, and many participated only during the summer. There were 31 current enrollments in April. About two-thirds of the youths were white; about one-fifth was Hispanic; and approximately

13 percent were black. About one-quarter were females. Youths were aged 16-19, and all were economically disadvantaged.

Although the NWECC program goals and its focus on community improvement resemble the VICI program in Newark, there are several important differences, notably the ethnic group composition and the enrollment of in-school youths.

#### 4. Philadelphia

Three comparison programs were selected in Philadelphia, all formula-funded YCCIP programs. Information was obtained through interviews and from RBS' site visit.

Simmons Youth Development Corporation. The Simmons Youth Development Guild is a non-profit agency operating educational, vocational, and social-cultural programs for disadvantaged youths, including construction-related training programs.

The Simmons YCCIP program began in January 1978 and seeks to place participants in construction-related trades. The program emphasizes carpentry and electrical work; plumbing is also taught. Projects include home repair and rehabilitation for senior citizens. Program staff include administrative personnel and four crew leaders. In addition to CETA funding, the project receives money from the Urban Coalition.

As of March 1979, there were 19 participants, 18 working in construction-related positions, the other in a clerical position. Participants were 17-19 years old, and only one (in the clerical job) was female. All were black and economically disadvantaged. All were high school dropouts, but about three-quarters of them planned to return to some form of schooling.

Community Action Group and Youth for Change. The Community Action Group formula-funded YCCIP program aims for placement in construction trades. Projects include building rehabilitation, and home repair for senior citizens. In addition to learning general construction skills, youth are taught how to use power tools, purchase materials, and salvage old materials. Staffing includes administrative personnel and three retired craftsmen who serve as supervisors and instructors. Participants are organized into three work teams. The agency also provides psychological and career counseling to participants.

In March 1979, there were 23 participants, and three positions were clerical. Youths were 16-19 years old, economically disadvantaged, and were either high school dropouts or had finished school. Participants were required to spend approximately three or four hours per week on an educational program.

Mantua Youth Painting Project. The Mantua project is a formula-funded YCCIP program which receives additional support from the United Way. The program began in January 1978, and focuses on

community improvement projects such as home repair and window box construction. The program teaches painting and carpentry and emphasizes placement in construction-related trades. As of December 1978, the program enrolled 16 youths, aged 16-19, black, out of school, and economically disadvantaged.

##### 5. The South Bronx

Five alternative training programs were selected in New York, a HUD demonstration project and four formula-funded YCCIP projects. Information on the HUD project was obtained from project documentation, staff interviews, and direct observation made during a site visit by CPPV staff. Information on the YCCIP program was obtained through interviews with the five New York City YCCIP contract offices and descriptions prepared by the prime sponsor. The four programs were selected among 43 YCCIP programs operating in New York City because of their similarity to VICI.

People's Development Corporation (PDC). The Youth Training and Incentive Program (YTIP) run by the PDC began in January 1978, funded by HUD (\$500,000) and the New York State Division for Youth. The program employs 60 neighborhood youths, age 16-19, to work on neighborhood improvement projects in the South Bronx. Projects include rehabilitation, public works, refurbishment of community facilities, and apartment repair in community-managed apartments. Skills taught include painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical skills, demolition, weatherization, landscaping, and community management. YTIP seeks to place participants in union apprenticeships or as helpers to construction workers, plumbers, and electricians.

YTIP also has counseling and education components, including basic adult education, pre-GED, and GED training for three hours per week or more. Job-related skills are emphasized here. An Audio-Visual Unit was established to document YTIP activities, and some participants study primarily photography. Project staff include a project director, an administrative assistant, a counselor, a job developer, and work supervisors (some union journeymen).

Youths are paid \$3.25 per hour (as of May 1979). The program originally utilized incentives, but later these were dropped due to budget problems. Participants receive bonuses for completing GEDs. Their average age is 18. About one third are females, 60 percent are black, 40 percent are Hispanic, and all are disadvantaged. About one third are graduates of the Alfred E. Smith Vocational High School. Another third were referrals from the New York Department of Youths (mostly court cases).

Banana Kelley Community Improvement Association. The Banana Kelley program is a formula-funded YCCIP project operating in the South Bronx, funded by the City for approximately \$137,000. The project began in April 1978. It focuses on home repair and rehabilitation, energy conservation and weatherization, and the refurbishment of

community facilities. Activities include painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical work, and landscaping. Participants pursue short-term projects, such as a community garden, block and apartment clean-ups, and apartment rehabilitation. The program seeks to place participants in construction-related trades, and is attempting to set up community businesses, such as a cabinet shop and home repair services. The program provides no support services, but makes referrals to other agencies.

Staff include a project director, a vocational coordinator, and a union and non-union supervisor. Banana Kelley enrolls 12 participants, aged 16-19. Ten are male, all are black or Hispanic, and all are disadvantaged. Participants are paid \$2.90 per hour. The program has close ties with the People's Development Corporation (HUD-YCCIP program).

Opportunities Industrialization Center of New York (OIC). The OIC program is a formula-funded YCCIP project operating in the Bushwick section of Brooklyn. The program attempts to train housing rehabilitation aides and to place them in construction-related trades. Participants receive theoretical and practical training in electrical maintenance, carpentry, painting, roofing maintenance, concrete and masonry, oil burner/heating, plumbing and pipe fitting, and reading blueprints. Work experience is acquired through rehabilitating and reconditioning run-down apartment buildings, low-income houses, and public structures, and through renovating vacant public lots. Participants are supervised by skilled, licensed technicians. The OIC program provides skill-related basic education instruction, designed to complement the vocational training component, give GED training, and prepare participants for the labor market. Participants are paid \$2.95 per hour.

The OIC YCCIP program has approximately 40 participants. Most are 18 or 19 years old. All but seven are males. About two-thirds are black, a quarter are Hispanic, and approximately ten percent are white. All are disadvantaged.

Prospect Heights Neighborhood Corporation. The Prospect Heights Program is a YCCIP project funded for approximately \$100,000. Goals are to train unemployed community youths as housing repair and maintenance aides and to refurbish an old school building. The program attempts to provide participants with good work habits and with a variety of skills, such as alternative energy technology, waste recycling, painting, weatherization, carpentry, plumbing, and electrical skills. The program provides placement services through the New York Urban Coalition and aims at placement in construction-related trades.

Twelve low-income youths, aged 16-19, are enrolled. Two are female; all are black. Participants are paid minimum wages.

University Settlement Society of New York. University Settlement is a formula-funded YCCIP program, funded for \$100,000 during the last fiscal year. The program goal is to train building repair and

maintenance aides through the renovation of the Society's seven-story building. Participants are trained in replastering and repainting, resurfacing of floors, weatherization, and plumbing repair. The project hopes to place youths in construction-related trades. Participants receive educational and vocational counseling from the US professional staff. The program enrolls 12 participants. No detailed information on participants is currently available. The prime sponsor indicated that a "careful selection" process was used to determine enrollment.

## VI. IMPACT ANALYSIS

The aim of the follow-up study is to determine the effects of the VICI demonstration on the post-program labor market and educational experiences of trainees. This involves several steps: (1) interviews at three points in time--approximately one month, three months, and eight months after program termination; (2) assessment of program effects, compared with those of other selected federally sponsored youth training programs; (3) assessment of effects on participants, compared with a similar group of non-trainees.

### A. STUDY GROUPS

The DOL's Knowledge Development Plan (1977) focuses on the relative effectiveness of the various YEDPA demonstration programs. Hence, plans for the VICI follow-up research call for making comparisons between outcomes of the VICI program and those of two other key efforts: (1) formula-funded DOL-YCCIP programs; and (2) HUD-YCCIP demonstration programs. A third group of VICI-eligible youths placed on waiting lists serves as a control group. Currently, ten DOL-YCCIP, four HUD-YCCIP programs and four control groups are participating in the follow-up study. Table VL1 shows the distribution of comparison programs and control groups among the eight VICI demonstration sites.

TABLE VL1  
DISTRIBUTION OF STUDY GROUPS ACROSS  
VICI DEMONSTRATION SITES

SITE	VICI	DOL-YCCIP	HUD-YCCIP	CONTROL	TOTAL
Atlanta	1		1	1	3
Broward	1				1
Chicago	1	4	1		6
Milwaukee	1			1	2
Newark	1		1	1	3
New Haven	1				1
Philadelphia	1	2		1	4
South Bronx	1	4	1		6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>26</b>

A waiting list is used to control by lottery, entrance to VICI. Each youth on the waiting list is assigned a "chance number" regardless of date of application. Thus, as soon as the attrition waiting list is depleted, youths on the major waiting list enter VICI according to the lottery number (lowest number first). Applicants with little chance of entering VICI are given job referrals. A selected applicant may refuse to enter VICI, may not be located, or may fail to meet eligibility criteria upon rescreening (for example, because he or she has turned 20). The major waiting list, therefore, consists of youth who are presumably similar to VICI trainees because they have been deemed program eligible on all basic criteria and have been screened in the same manner as actual participants. Four VICI sites recruited control groups.

A check of site procedures revealed that different programs have used different assessment methods and/or criteria for selecting VICI youths. However, no significant departures were made from the planned strategy. Thus, VICI youths and their counterparts on waiting lists should be "similar" on a wide range of important characteristics. Since comparability is such an important issue for the follow-up research, some preliminary comparisons between VICI and control group youths are described in Supplement A.

#### B. SAMPLING

Table VI2 shows the basic sampling plan, by site, and by the expected sample sizes and expected number of completed interviews in each interview wave.

TABLE VI.2  
SAMPLING PLAN FOR THE FOLLOW-UP RESEARCH

Group	Number of Sites	Sample per Site	<u>Expected Number of Completed Interviews</u>				TOTAL
			Target Sample	WAVE I (1 mo.)	WAVE II (3 mos.)	WAVE III (8 mos.)	
VICI	8	85	680	480	336	236	1,052
CONTROLS	4	45	180	126	88	62	276
DOL-YCCIP	3	85	340	240	168	118	526
HUD-YCCIP	4	120	480	336	235	165	736
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>1,680</b>	<b>1,182</b>	<b>827</b>	<b>581</b>	<b>2,590</b>

Assuming a sample of 1,680 youths and a 70 percent capture rate for each wave of interviews, the follow-up study would yield 1182, 827, and 581 interviews of Wave I-III, for a total of 2,590 interviews, giving 581 respondents with complete sets of interviews.

Guidelines were established by DOL, P/PV, and RBS to determine sample eligibility and timing for the sampling process. These are:

1. Tenure

To be eligible for the target sample, a youth must have been enrolled in a program for at least 30 calendar days.

2. Out-of-School Status

All target sample youths must be out of school (a dropout or graduate) at the time of intake. All VICI and DOL-YCCIP youths are automatically eligible on this criterion. However, HUD-YCCIP program participants may be enrolled in school; those who are in school are screened out of the sample.

3. Timing

Several factors influenced the timing for selecting the Wave I sample and commencing interviews: date of program start-up, sample size, ease of implementation, and readiness to begin field interviews. All these factors suggested March 15, 1979, as an optimal cut-off date for sample inclusion. Therefore, all terminations from all participating programs occurring on or after March 15, would potentially constitute the target interview sample. This cut-off date allowed VICI programs from approximately three to six months to reach their full enrollment capacity of 60 and to stabilize their program operations.

The March 15th termination rule also applies to the VICI control group. Controls are selected for interviews in proportion to the number of terminations from the VICI program. Specific proportions for individual programs are set according to the size of the waiting list. For example, if the waiting list contains 120 names or twice the VICI enrollment, then two controls would be selected for each VICI termination. The most likely control subject to be selected would come from those with the highest lottery numbers, since lowest numbers are selected first.

C. STUDY DESIGN

The research design for the impact analysis calls for observations prior to termination, at termination, and after termination (see Table VI.3). Intake and progress records provide before-termination data. The former give basic information on demographic characteristics and pre-program employment and education. Weekly progress records provide information on work hours, attendance, work tasks, and performance ratings. At-termination data are derived from termination records that typically describe the type of termination and the terminee's employment and educational status. Post-termination information is derived from the three sets of interviews administered to all study groups, according to the sampling rules described above.

TABLE VI. 3  
RESEARCH DESIGN FOR THE IMPACT ANALYSIS

Study Group	<u>Before Termination</u>			<u>After Termination</u>		
	Intake	Progress	At Termination	Wave: I	II	III
VICI	X	X	X	X	X	X
CONTROL	X			X	X	X
DOL-YCCIP	X		X	X	X	X
HUD-YCCIP	X		X	X	X	X

The VICI demonstration has developed its own Participant Intake Form, Weekly Participant Progress Report, and Termination Form (described in P/PV's March 1979 Interim Report). HUD and DOL-YCCIP programs use a different set of forms for intake and termination, and do not maintain participant progress data on a weekly basis. As Table VI.3 shows, intake information is available for all study groups, termination data for all comparison programs (except controls), and weekly progress data for VICI programs only. A more detailed assessment of the availability and quality of progress-type information from comparison programs will be made in forthcoming site visits by RBS research staff.

#### D. INSTRUMENTATION

The primary data for the follow-up study are derived from interviews designed by RBS. Instrument content is largely based on questionnaires developed by the Educational Testing Service in connection with the Assessment of Youth Alternatives Project. Additional questions were included to address research concerns specific to the VICI demonstration. A further data source is the standardized test of verbal ability, called the Fundamental Achievement Series - Verbal Form (FAS-V), administered to all VICI-eligible youths at the time of intake.

#### E. DATA COLLECTION

Since March 1979, a ten-person field interview staff has been hired and trained. Nine interviewers are male, eight are black, and one is Hispanic. Most have post-high school education, and several have college or graduate degrees. Many have had direct professional working experience with disadvantaged, minority youths. An administrative control system organizes and channels interview cases to field interviewers and monitors interview activities and results.

Interviewing began in early June 1979. Table VI.4 reports the total number of Wave I and Wave II interviews completed in the follow-up study, by site and by study group, based on field records available up to January 15, 1980. A total of 578 interviews, 321 Wave I and 257 Wave II, have been conducted. Interviews are progressing at a slower rate than was expected, but the pace is accelerating. Two general problems should be noted. One

**TABLE V1.4 - CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS  
COMPLETED BY GROUP, BY SITE AND BY WAVE  
THROUGH JANUARY 15, 1980**

GROUP	VICI		CONTROL		HUD		YCCIP		TOTAL		GRAND TOTAL N	% 	
	WAVE	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2		
SITE													
Atlanta		9	1	5	0	2	18	-	-	16	19	35	6
Broward		30	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	16	46	8
Chicago		7	5	-	-	9	39	7	11	23	55	78	13
Milwaukee		30	12	13	0	-	-	-	-	43	12	55	10
Newark		25	10	26	0	60	35	-	-	111	45	156	27
New Haven		32	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	24	56	10
Philadelphia		7	7	17	0	-	-	2	2	26	9	35	6
South Bronx		20	12	-	-	19	14	1	51	40	77	117	20
Total		160	87 <sup>1</sup>	61	0	90	106 <sup>2</sup>	10	64 <sup>3</sup>	321	257	578	100
Wave (%)		65	35	100	0	46	54	13	87	55	45	-	
Group (%)		43		10		34		13		-		100	

<sup>1</sup>Of 87, regular Wave 2 Interviews (i.e., Wave 2 - 2nd interview) numbered 57.

<sup>2</sup>Of 106, regular Wave 2 Interviews (i.e., Wave 2 - 2nd interview) numbered 46.

<sup>3</sup>Of 64, regular Wave 2 Interviews (i.e., Wave 2 - 2nd interview) numbered 6.

concerns establishing initial liaison with DOL-YCCIP programs to start interviews; the other is related to interview activities.

Originally, eleven DOL-YCCIP programs agreed to participate in the follow-up research. One Philadelphia-based program is being phased out, and may be dropped from the study. The four South Bronx programs only recently reported their termination information to RBS; interviews will begin there as soon as possible. RBS has been unable to establish satisfactory liaison with two Chicago-based programs; one of these programs apparently has been terminated, and we are considering dropping it from the study. A further problem is that DOL-YCCIP programs have relatively low enrollment, and few terminations occur at any one time. The second major problem that appears to account for a relatively slow interview completion rate is that a significant number of respondents fail to attend interview appointments. After a no-show, the interviewer must re-contact the respondent and schedule another interview, employing the tracking procedures that were followed in making the initial contact. This process is time-consuming and tedious, and partially accounts for lagging completion rates.

#### F. THE INTERVIEW SAMPLE

As Table VI.4 indicates almost half (43 percent) of the total number of interviews were conducted with VICI participants; approximately one-third (34 percent) were conducted with HUD participants; the remaining interviews were evenly divided between VICI controls (10 percent) and YCCIP youth (13 percent). Overall, approximately half (55 percent) were first-wave interviews; the rest (45 percent) were Wave 2 interviews.

Two types of Wave 2 interviews exist, a regular Wave 2 and a special Wave 2. A regular Wave 2 is one conducted with a respondent who has been previously interviewed at Wave 1. A special Wave 2 interview is one administered with the same instrument as that used for a regular Wave 2 interview, but it is the first interview conducted with that respondent. There are a substantial number of special Wave 2 interviews (148), representing 58 percent of the total number of Wave 2 interviews. This number is large because, in order to build a sufficiently large pool of eligible respondents for the study, it was necessary to include youngsters whose program terminations occurred after the target period for Wave 1 interviews (i.e., one month after termination).

The interview sample is described in Table VI.5 in terms of sex, age, and race. As is apparent from this data, some notable differences exist across study groups. For example, HUD youngsters tend to be younger and have a larger percent of whites than other groups. The latter seems to be attributable to the fact that substantial HUD interviews have occurred in Newark where the majority of participants are white.

#### G. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

This section presents frequencies of certain consequential variables selected from the follow-up instruments\*. Factors such as study group heterogeneity,

\*A comprehensive item by item analysis of follow-up data is found in the companion appendix document.

TABLE VI.5 - SEX, AGE AND RACE CHARACTERISTICS  
OF INTERVIEW SAMPLE

VARIABLE	GROUP	VICI		VICI Control		HUD-YCCIP		DOL-YCCIP		TOTAL	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
SEX	Male	194	78	40	66	146	74	63	85	443	77
	Female	53	22	21	34	50	26	11	15	135	23
AGE	16	6	2	0	0	51	26	1	1	58	10
	17	30	12	7	11	47	24	6	8	90	16
	18	78	32	15	25	46	23	23	31	162	28
	19	87	35	28	46	30	15	28	38	173	30
	Above 19	46	19	11	18	21	11	16	22	94	16
RACE	Black	199	81	57	93	118	61	57	77	368	64
	White	13	5	3	5	59	30	0	0	138	24
	Hispanic	34	14	1	2	18	9	17	23	70	12
	Other	1	<1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	<1

undersized samples, and the lack of local contextual (e.g., labor market) information preclude drawing firm inferences at this time. Formal statistical testing is therefore inappropriate at this time and findings noted here are tentative.

Two areas are considered here:

- o participants' ratings of their respective programs and their satisfaction with program offerings
- o participant employment and wage status

Participant Ratings showed no substantial differences in terms of general satisfaction with programs.

The responses to specific learning outcomes or changes revealed some differences among the groups; these were related to learning on-the-job skills and further education. On both questions, VICI youths responded "more favorably." Seventy-four percent of VICI youths said their program helped them a lot in learning on-the-job skills, whereas only 44 percent of HUD youths felt this way. Eighty-two percent of VICI youths said that participants in their program increased their desire to get further education, whereas 52 percent of HUD youths responded this way.

Responses to questions on Program Policies/Procedures indicated that a larger percentage (70 percent) of VICI youths considered their supervisors "very helpful" as opposed to HUD youths (58 percent). Generally, most respondents in each of the groups felt that the strictness of the rules was "just about right."

Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of satisfaction with several different program components in which they participated. No apparent systematic differences among groups were found.

The VICI group were consistently more satisfied with program components (except for job referral) than the HUD complement in terms of: personal counseling, reading/math classroom training, and actual work experience. Table VI.6 displays these response percentages. Because of the very small respondent rate (between 1 and 10 youth per item) YCCIP data has not been included here.

Employment and Wages - Companion Table VI.7 A and B display Wave 1 and 2 employment information. At Wave 1, 25% of the 57 control subjects were employed as opposed to 35% of the VICI youth and 32% of the HUD youth.

A substantially larger proportion of VICI youth who had gained work held full-time jobs and commanded a markedly higher hourly wage (\$4.51). VICI youths also tended to be employed at jobs that were more similar to the training they had received. VICI controls did not fare as well as either VICI or HUD youth regarding wages, getting permanent unsubsidized employment, becoming a member of a union, or enrolling in a union apprenticeship program.

At Wave 2, a larger percentage of VICI youths were currently employed than of HUD or YCCIP youths. Unfortunately, no control group data are yet ready at Wave 2 for purposes of comparison. VICI youths tended to be more successful in getting full-time jobs, enrolling in union apprenticeship programs, or becoming union members. The average hourly wage (\$3.95) was much higher among VICI youths also.

The Wave 1 interview included a small set of questions concerning jobs held prior to entry into training programs. Inspection of the limited number of responses in hand revealed that VICI youths reported that they were making over \$.60 more per hour than their HUD counterparts in these earlier jobs. Interestingly this difference was basically maintained through Wave 1 and Wave 2. The durability of this early pattern will be assessed as the sample increases to determine the extent and possible effect. A second phenomenon which raises a series of questions is the fact that both the HUD and VICI average hourly wages fell by over \$.50 from Wave 1 to Wave 2. Again this early finding will be closely tracked to determine if it is an artifact of the currently limited sample size.

TABLE VI.6 - SELECTED PARTICIPANT RATINGS OF PROGRAM  
IMPACT: WAVE I

QUESTION	RESPONSE	X VICI N	X HUD N
<b>LEARNING/OUTCOMES/ CHANGES</b>			
<b>ITEM 4</b>			
In the program, how much did you learn in the way of important skills that you can actually use on a job?	A lot A little Not too much	74 21 5	44 35 21
<b>ITEM 7</b>			
Did participating in the program make you:	Want to get further education Not want to get further education Did not make any difference	47 2 11	52 0 48
<b>PROGRAM POLICIES/ PROCEDURES</b>			
<b>ITEM 2</b>			
In general, how helpful were the program supervisors in your program?	Very helpful Somewhat helpful Not helpful	50 25 5	56 54 8
<b>ITEM 13</b>			
In general, how satisfied were you with the part you took in?			
Personal counseling	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Not satisfied	45 43 7	39 54 7
Job counseling	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Not satisfied	45 38 17	31 61 8
Classroom training (where you learned specific job skills)	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Not satisfied	50 37 13	50 37 13
Classroom training (where you learned to improve your reading, writing or math)	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Not satisfied	57 36 7	39 50 11
Classroom training (where you studied for a GED)	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Not satisfied	47 44 6	20 60 20
Actual work on a job	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Not satisfied	60 35 5	49 54 6
A referral to a full-time job	Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied Not satisfied	52 26 22	73 0 27

TABLE VI.7.A - WAVE I COMPARISONS ON  
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES

GROUP VARIABLE	VICI		VICI CONTROL		HUD		YCCIP	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Presently working	35	55	25	14	32	28	0	0
If not working, ever worked since program	7	37	30	13	24	14	30	3
Job is/was full-time (30 or more hours per week)	90	78	70	19	57	19	67	2
Mean hourly earnings current/last job	\$4.51	77	\$3.16	29	\$3.93	19	\$2.80	2
Job was permanent	65	50	48	14	68	13	0	0
Job was unsubsidized	95	73	72	21	89	17	100	2
Job was similar to training	53	41	NA		32	6	0	0
Union apprenticeship program	24	18	4	2	18	3	0	0

TABLE VI.7.B - WAVE II COMPARISONS ON  
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES

GROUP VARIABLE	VICI		HUD		YCCIP	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Presently working	49	43	34	36	27	17
If not working, ever worked since program	34	15	33	23	40	18
Job is/was full-time (30 or more hours per week)	86	48	49	29	79	30
Mean hourly earnings current/last job	\$3.95	57	\$3.33	56	\$3.07	35
Job was permanent	74	42	59	35	67	26
Job was unsubsidized	88	50	93	55	74	28
Union apprenticeship program	17	10	2	1	3	1

## VII. WORK VALUATION

The purpose of the work valuation is to demonstrate that an employment training program, such as VICI, can and does create valuable tangible byproducts such as the improvements and repairs to housing occupied (generally) by low-income families in urban areas. These improvements and repairs have a "market" value, which can be represented as their cost if performed by a building contractor or other professional craftsmen. The work valuation assesses this market value and compares it with program expenditures.

This comparison permits us to make several quantitative statements about each VICI site. One such statement is the simple demonstration that one dollar of expenditure creates a tangible and measurable value in home improvements and repairs. This return can be called a program "benefit," and it can also be viewed as an offset to the cost of training, so that training costs are reduced by the amount of the "work value" created by the youths. Second, a set of statements can be made about the types of work skills taught and performed with respect to the amount of work value they create. For example, do some skills produce a higher market value than others in return for the cost of teaching them?

The methodology and data collection procedures used in this analysis are based on an ongoing, job-by-job accounting system. A job is defined as work, or activities, done at an individual location or address, such as a home or apartment. One site may be working on over one thousand such jobs, while other sites may work on one hundred or less. This system of evaluation differs from the usual procedure of periodic or end-of-the project sampling of results. The job-by-job accounting system provides a very satisfactory data set for economic and statistical analysis, and the evaluator can have substantial confidence in the analytical results. In addition, it allows some ongoing monitoring of activities at each site. At present, this monitoring capability is developed for use on a quarterly evaluation basis. Currently, P/PV is discussing with DOL the possibility of refining the management potential of this estimation method.

Thus, the results of the work valuation reported here are twofold. First, there are the quantitative statements that can be made about the value or return on training expenditures. The second result is the evolution of a monitoring and evaluation tool which can be replicated or adapted to other applications. The latter is quite distinct from the training objectives of the VICI demonstration.

This chapter updates and expands the work valuation data with information reported through mid-March, 1980. In addition, the formulas used for the work valuation procedures are revised and explained. The following sections discuss the nature and purpose of the work valuation task, and present the mathematical formulations and indicators for estimating work value. Section C reports and compares numerical results through June 30, 1979 and through December 31, 1979 or mid-March 1980, and a final section formulates a means of evaluating the performance of a VICI project.

## A. DATA COLLECTION

Table VII.1 lists the five types of forms used to collect data for the work valuation.\* These forms include: (1) A format for estimated large job costs and value, completed when the job is started (VICI Form VII); (2) two versions of a final job cost report, completed when a job is finished (VICI Form VIII for jobs initially reported on VICI Form VII, and VICI Form VI for "small" jobs, where this is the only reporting form used); (3) the VICI Quarterly Fiscal Report, which describes the overall project costs using a simple chart of accounts format; and (4) a report from the independent consultants on the job value, Crawford & Company.

The principal types of data collected are:

1. Expenditures (total and job-by-job) for youth labor, crew chiefs, materials and supplies, etc. (see Table VII.1, rows a-e).
2. Estimates of what a private contractor would charge for the job being done by the VICI crews (Table VII.1, row f).
3. Identifying data for each job (Table VII.1, row g-i).
4. An independent judgment about the quality of the VICI crews' work (Table VII.1, row j).

Items 1, 2, and 3 are prepared by each VICI site for each job, using VICI Form VI or VICI Forms VII and VIII. Crawford & Company provide an additional estimate for data item 2, on a sampling basis, and also give a second opinion on the quality of work performed (data item 4).

Table VII.2 shows how data collection and processing proceeds. Data collection originates at the project site, where one of two alternative forms is used to report on each job. For small jobs, demanding only a few working days, a simple reporting form (Form VI - VICI Job Reporting Form: Short Form) is filled out when the job is completed. It is sent to P/PV's Data Editing Unit, which reviews the form for accuracy, and forwards it to RBS, who process and analyze the data and prepare reports. Larger jobs require two data reports. The first report (Form VII - VICI Cost Estimate Form) provides some cost estimates for a job that is beginning. Upon completion of this job, a revised cost report (Form VIII - Materials and Equipment Cost Form) is completed and forwarded to P/PV. This two-form procedure provides data to anticipate and monitor work in progress and is useful for jobs lasting several months.

Forms VI, VII, and VII, each include some items estimating private contractor charges for a job in progress. The estimates are checked by Crawford & Company, who report directly to RBS.

The fifth data form is a quarterly fiscal report providing an overall total for expenditures for the project. This permits the estimation of expenditures which cannot be directly attributed to a particular job, so that a type of "overhead" expenditure can be calculated. Total expenditures given by the job-by-job reports are compared with the quarterly

\*All pertinent tables are included at the end of Chapter.

data. Expenditures not attributable to a job become an expense which must be allocated to the job cost estimates. The mathematical formulas described below illustrate how the five sets of data are used.

## B. FORMULATING WORK VALUE

A simple formulation of the work value is:

$$\frac{\text{Value of VICI work}}{\text{Total of estimated private contractor bids. Found on Forms VI, VII or VIII.}} = \frac{*}{\text{Adjustment (concordance) of VICI value estimates. Based on Crawford & Co. reports.}}$$

Here, value is equated with what a private contractor would bid (charge) for the job. This simple estimate of value can be used to make further evaluations of VICI work. For example, it can be used to estimate work value created by the project, per dollar of total expenditure on the project, thus:

$$\frac{\text{Work value created per dollar of expenditure}}{\text{Total of estimated private contractor bids. Found on Forms VI, VII or VIII.}} = \frac{*}{\text{Adjustment of VICI value estimates. Based on Crawford & Co reports (b)}}$$

---

$$= \frac{\text{Total expenditures to date. Found in Quarterly Fiscal Report}}{}$$

This second formula gives the ratio of the total "value of VICI work" to the total expenditures for the VICI project. As an example of how these equations are estimated, consider Atlanta through June 30, 1979, where the calculations are as follows:

Calculation of formula (a):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Total value of VICI work}}{\text{(13 jobs reported)}} &= \frac{\text{Total value on VICI Form VIII (13 jobs)}}{* \text{Adjustment factor from Crawford & Co. reports (5 jobs inspected)}} \\ &= (\$82,696) * 1.059 \\ &= \underline{\$87,575} \end{aligned}$$

Calculation of formula (b):

<u>Work value created</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>Value from formula (a)</u>
<u>per</u>		<u>Reported expenditure to date from</u>
<u>dollar of expenditure</u>		<u>Quarterly Report</u>
		<u>\$ 87,575</u>
		<u>\$366,842</u>
	<u>-</u>	<u>\$ 0.239</u>

The low "efficiency" indicators in the example is apparently due to substantial start-up costs in a period when no job-related work was performed. As the Atlanta project progresses, start-up costs could be allocated to all jobs completed, as in normal business accounting, which would automatically raise the efficiency indicator.<sup>1</sup> The alternative, followed in the present report, is to use "with and without" indicator ratios. A "with" indicator, that includes start-up costs and overhead items, is given in formula (b). The "without" indicator, which ignores start-up costs and overhead expenses, is:

<u>Work value created</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>Value from formula (a)</u>	<u>(c)</u>
<u>per</u>		<u>Total of estimated or actual</u>	
<u>dollar of direct</u>		<u>job-related expenses. Reported</u>	
<u>job expense</u>		<u>on VICI Forms VI, VII, and VIII</u>	

<sup>1</sup>Schemes to allocate "fixed" or "sunk" costs, such as start-up costs, are typically required for (a) regulated rate setting, such as public utility rate setting, and (b) for income tax calculations. A typical allocation scheme, applicable to VICI, would be (1) to project the total dollar volume of jobs that will be completed (using a cost basis); next, (2) to project the start-up and overhead costs for the entire period; then, (3) calculate the ratio of start-up and overhead costs to projected total job cost (put-in-place); and (4) apply this "pro-rated" ratio or allocation as an add-on to the cost of each job or the total of interim costs. For example, while the 9-month total of start-up and overhead costs may equal \$350,000 the projected total for 18 months are \$700,000, the ratio is 5 : 7 = \$.0.7143; this means that an interim actual total of direct cost and overhead costs added on, rather than the \$350,000 actual total of start-up and overhead costs accrued at the 9th month. The allocation technique would raise the numerical indicator in formula (b).

For example, using the Atlanta data through June 30, 1979,

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \text{Work value created} & = & \$ 87,575 \\ \text{per} & & \hline \\ \text{dollar of direct} & = & \$140,478 \\ \text{job expense} & = & \hline \\ & & \$ 0.623 \end{array}$$

In this case, every \$1.00 of direct, job-related costs (youth labor, crew-chief time, materials and supplies) results in the creation of \$0.623 in work value, where work value is equated with a private contractor's bid to do the same job.

The difference between the \$140,478 of direct, job-related expenses and the \$366,842 of total expenditure represents the sum of start-up costs and overhead expenditures -- \$226,364, based on data reported through June 30th. Each of these reported values is provisional, representing only estimates of the correct numbers. At the end of the project, and accurate accounting of all jobs and expenditures will be possible, and those numerical values will be the best basis for a work evaluation of the VICI demonstration.

The two ratio indicators of equations (b) and (c) are aggregate indicators of the work value. In the March 1979 Interim Report, value-added indicators were described. These show the amount of work value that remains if all non-youth labor costs are deducted. Value-added indicators are calculated thus:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \text{Value added by} & = & \text{Value created} - \text{All direct job-related} \\ \text{youth labor} & & \text{(formula a)} \quad \text{costs except youth labor} \quad (d) \end{array}$$

Using the Atlanta data:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \text{Value added by} & = & \$87,575 \quad \$62,549 \\ \text{youth labor} & & \hline \\ & & \$25,026 \end{array}$$

"Value added by youth labor" produces a comparison ratio when it is divided by the total of direct job-related youth labor expenditures (typically, excluding training time, sick leave, etc.), thus:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \text{Value added} & = & \text{formula (d)} \\ \text{per} & & \hline \\ \text{dollar of direct} & = & \text{Direct, job-related} \\ \text{youth labor} & & \text{youth labor costs} \quad (e) \end{array}$$

**Using the Atlanta data:**

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \frac{\text{Value added}}{\text{per}} & = & \$25,026 \\ \text{dollar of} & & \$77,929 \\ \underline{\text{youth labor}} & = & \underline{\$ 0.321} \end{array}$$

The numerical value from formula (e), a value-added indicator of \$0.321 per dollar of youth labor, does not include overhead and start-up costs. These costs can be used to formulate a further ratio indicator:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \frac{\text{Start-up and}}{\text{overhead costs}} & = & \frac{\text{Start-up and overhead costs}}{\text{Direct, job-related youth}} \quad (\text{f}) \\ \text{per} & & \text{labor costs} \\ \underline{\text{dollar of direct}} & & \\ \underline{\text{youth labor}} & & \end{array}$$

**Using the Atlanta data:**

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \frac{\text{Start-up and}}{\text{overhead costs}} & = & \$226,364 \\ & & \$ 77,929 \\ \text{per} & & \\ \underline{\text{dollar of direct}} & = & \underline{\$ 2,905} \\ \underline{\text{youth labor}} & & \end{array}$$

9j

The numerical value of \$2.905 per dollar of direct youth labor represents the penalty of allocating all start-up costs to a few jobs. It will decrease as more work is done.

The value-added indicator, formula (d), is useful for evaluating whether certain crafts or types of jobs seem to produce a better work value than others. Subtracting the formula (e) number causes the value-added indicator to fall to zero or less for four of the five sites (see Section C).

Two new formulas have been developed since the October, 1979 report. The first is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Ratio of direct job}}{\text{costs to total}} &= \frac{\text{Total of direct job costs reported to date}}{\text{Reported Total Expenditures to Date}} && (g) \\ \underline{\text{expenditures to date}} & \\ &= \frac{140,478}{366,842} \\ &= 0.383 \end{aligned}$$

This ratio is a measure of efficiency. It measures the amount of total expenditures that is directly operated to home repairs and construction. Since VICI emphasize on-the-job training, a substantial proportion of total expenditures should be directly job-related.

The second formula is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Ratio of start-up and}}{\text{overhead costs to}} &= \frac{\text{Difference between total expenditures}}{\text{direct job costs}} && (h) \\ \underline{\text{direct job costs}} & \\ &= \frac{366,842 - 140,478}{140,478} \\ &= 1.611 \end{aligned}$$

This formula is a variation of formula (g), and is also an efficiency measure. Optimally, this ratio should be less than 1.0 for a long-term work training program.

Table VII.3 summarizes the formulas given above. Results of calculations using these indicators discusses the numerical values found and are reported in Section C.

## 2. Development of the Work Valuation System

The numerical analysis described above is only part of the evaluation task. The second part is to develop and refine a system of work valuation monitoring and evaluation reporting which can be used by other youth employment programs. The system was outlined in Tables VII.1-VII.3. It consists of a set of data collection forms (Table VII.1), a process for data collection and handling (Table VII.2), and a set of analytical equations and indicators (Table VII.3). The system is currently working, and it provided the results described above. However, its principal use to date has been for making interim evaluations. Its potential for ongoing monitoring and management has not yet been developed, for two reasons:

1. Data collection, processing, and analysis is done on a quarterly basis and does not produce timely reports or quick feedback either to VICI project officers or to VICI site management. Converting the reporting to a monthly basis would increase the costs; but without timely reporting, much of the usefulness of these reports for quick identification and correction of problems may be lost.
2. The potential users of the analytical reports may not understand the concepts, equations, and indicators, and, hence, may not be able to use the reports for monitoring or management purposes. Some investment in training may be necessary if the system is to be extended to other projects.

The work valuation system is a good and useful evaluation tool; the methodology can be replicated; the procedures are straightforward; and the results are accurate and verifiable. However, the system does require some analytical sophistication and willingness to learn on the part of users. For large applications, a subcontractor would probably be needed to handle the computing, though small projects, consisting of, say, one hundred jobs or less, could use the system manually.

As the system has developed, a number of refinements have been made in it:

1. Items and formats of the data collection forms (Table VII.1) were changed frequently in the first months, due to certain ambiguities in the forms and the need to train users.
2. Data collection and handling seem to be working smoothly (Table VII.2), but some sites are very slow in forwarding completed forms, resulting in a lack of data. A possible improvement in this process could be more frequent reporting of the type of results shown in Table VII.3 and VII.5, but this would raise costs.

3. The data analysis formulas (Table VII.3) are still evolving. The following sections describes some refinements, and further improvements are possible.
4. Delays in data reporting from sites have led to the use of projection formulas which fill in the missing data. These formulas were used in this and in preceeding reports, and are still undergoing refinement.
5. Staff turnover at VICI sites results in a frequent need to train new staff in using the work value forms. This problem is handled by P/PV.

In summary, job performance, as measured in Table VII.4 and 5, is perhaps not exceptional, but, on the other hand, is providing a fair return on each dollar spent. As the program proceeds and matures, improvements can be expected in those sites with lower value ratios. However, not all sites should be expected to be outstanding; there will inevitably be variations in performance among sites, due to many factors. The work valuation system itself is an adequate and useful method for deriving the value of outputs. It appears to be a replicable procedure for use in similar programs.

## C. RESULTS

### 1. Numerical Results Through June 30, 1979 and through December 31, 1979

Table VII.4 includes data through December 31, 1979 for all eight sites. The inclusion of three additional sites since the last Interim Report has lowered the simple ratio of work value to total expenditure from 60 percent to 42 percent. The reason for this is that the formerly excluded sites were not completely exemplary in reporting and, apparently, were not efficient managers of their resources.

Table VII.5 presents the numerical values for the aggregate and value-added indicators, and reports the total number of jobs included in the calculations. The formula (c) ration indicator, "value created per dollar of direct job expenses," varies from 0.618 to 1.510. When overhead and start-up costs are included, using formula (b), the range drops to 0.178 to 0.756. Of course, these indicators take no account of program benefits such as the increased probability of employment and increased future earnings.

As part of their on-site assessments of job value, Crawford & Company evaluated the quality of the work done relative to local contractor norms. Crawford & Company's judgments for 42 jobs are listed in Table VII.6, which shows that 87 percent of the ratings are "average" or "above average." Moreover, favorable ratings appear to be increasing as the project matures.

Table VII.7 measures timeliness of job completion. Smaller jobs took less time to complete, as would be expected. Shortages in materials or weather problems accounted for most of the delays in what should have been brief jobs.

More detail evaluation can be made about the relative values produced by each site, each type of job, and each type of craft. The procedure used for this is a simple one-way analysis of variance, a technique was used on a sample of 275 jobs. Three tables of the formula (e) indicator value added per dollar of direct youth labor, were prepared (see Tables VII.8.A - VII.8.C). In each table, the value-added ratios differ significantly.

The numbers in the tables do not include the concordance adjustment, nor are any reports on Form VI included, (so Newark data are missing). These tables will be refined in future analyses, but the improvements have been deferred because of some still-unanswered questions about the usefulness of the formula (a) indicators vis-a-vis the formula (b) or formula (c) indicators.

Finally, Table VII.9 shows the numbers and types of jobs completed and in progress. Two versions of this table are given: The first shows the percentage of job types per site and throughout VICI (based on a sample of 791 jobs); the second includes all jobs reported through mid-March 1980.

#### D. CONCLUSION: HOW GOOD CAN A VICI PROJECT BE?

Evaluation of a VICI project should be based on realistic expectations and standards of performance. That is, a set of maximum values for performance indicators must first be established; a VICI program can then be measured against these standards. For instance, one might ask: What are realistic numerical values for the ratios shown in Table VII.5? What is the best value for each ratio? The comparative data shown in the updated Table VII.5 provide one estimate of the best value of each of five ratios. Another approach would be to establish, on empirical and/or theoretical grounds, the "best" values of the work value ratios (indicators). In this section, we discuss the question of efficiency, using comparative data from eight sites, and considering empirical and theoretical interpretations of the indicators' range of values.

##### 1. Reformulation the Efficiency Equation

In terms of work valuation, the overall economic efficiency of a project is defined in terms of a simple output-to-input ratio (see Table VII.3, formula (b)), thus:

$$\text{Project's overall economic efficiency indicator} = \frac{\text{Concorded work value created}}{\text{Total of direct and indirect expenditures for this project}}$$

This formula expresses the value of the work created during the VICI project; it does not include any other direct benefit (such as the employment effects on trainees) or secondary benefits (such as the effect of VICI expenditures on the local economy).

Based on this formula, estimates of work value ratio for the eight VICI projects range from a low of 0.178 to a high of 0.756 (see Table VII.5, update). This wide range from minimum to maximum value has prompted a reformulation of the overall efficiency equation, as follows:

$$\text{Overall economic efficiency indicator} = \boxed{\text{Job-related efficiency indicator}} \times \boxed{\text{Management/Allocation efficiency indicator}}$$

These three efficiency indicators can be expressed as:

$$\frac{\text{Concorded work value}}{\text{Total of expenditures}} = \boxed{\frac{\text{Concorded Work value}}{\text{Direct job costs}}} \times \boxed{\frac{\text{Direct job costs}}{\text{Total of expenditures}}}$$

These values are found in Table VII. 3 as:  $(\text{formula b}) = (\text{formula c}) \times (\text{formula h})$ .

As an example, consider the Atlanta data shown in Table VII.10. Data on number of jobs, concorded work value, direct job-related costs, and total VICI site expenditures are given for each quarter of 1979. The totals rise steadily over each quarter, as do the three efficiency indicators. This trend probably reflects the project's increasing maturity over time. Note, however, that the rate of increase differs for each indicator. Three reasons for this disparity are:

1. The job-related efficiency indicator rises from 0.583 to 0.673, a small change. This ratio measures the value of the work done against the actual cost of doing the work. Improvements over time would indicate increasing productivity of the youth crews. The reported information used here is based on estimates, however, and does not represent a final accounting, so these values are provisional. However, they may be representative for this project.

Two factors explain the changes in the job-related efficiency indicator. The first is the hypothesis of increasing productivity over time. The second may be stated thus: different types of jobs (carpentry, painting, small repairs, etc.) appear to have different job-related efficiency values for the youth crews:

- A youth crew, working primarily on painting public housing apartments (as in the Newark site) can be very productive compared with professional painters. This is because the youths use the same tools and techniques, and achieve nearly the same speed in painting, but their wages are much lower than those of professionals. In these cases, the job-related efficiency ratio may exceed 1.0; that is, the youth crews are more productive, per dollar spent, than the professionals.
- In contrast, where the work is particularly complex and requires knowledge and experience, it is unlikely that the youth crews' productivity will rival that of professionals. Some sites undertake the more complex jobs (e.g., larger home repair projects); hence, expectations of those sites' productivity and of the job-related economic efficiency indicators should be lowered. A ratio of 0.5 or less would perhaps be appropriate for such jobs, especially where inexperienced crews are involved.

These factors may, however, cancel out one another. A site may work on simple jobs until the crews are experienced and then tackle complex jobs in order to provide them with more

training. Thus, the effects described in the first example would be offset by those of the second example, and the job-related efficiency indicator will not increase dramatically.

2. The management/allocation efficiency indicator for Atlanta rises from 0.22 to 0.41 over the four quarters. The 0.41 ratio is about equal to the median value for the eight sites. Its ratio measures the direct, job-related costs versus total expenditures. A project should show an improving ratio over time, as startup costs are spread over a larger basis. This site already shows an improvement in this ratio, and the final ratio may be even better.
3. The overall economic efficiency ratio is the product of the two more specific indicators. This indicator more than doubles over the four quarters due to a small increase in job-related efficiency and a larger increase in management/allocation efficiency.

A preliminary indication of the overall efficiency of the VICI programs can be based on the equation of the three indicators. The overall economic efficiency is constrained, or limited, by the two specific efficiencies: the job-related efficiency and the management/allocation efficiency.

## 2. Comparative Efficiency Ratios for Eight Sites

Table VII.11 gives numerical values for the work value indicators for each site, using the most recent data available. The column showing job-related efficiency displays a range of 0.618 to 1.510 (reflecting program maturity and complexity factors). Possibly, some of the lower ratios could be improved, and some additional on-site evaluation will be performed. (The differences in concordance factors among sites are important here.) However, the range in numerical values found here seems reasonable, and the high values could be duplicated by other sites by changing the types of jobs.

The management/allocation efficiency column of Table VII.11 shows a range of 0.209 to 0.658. The lower values represent some start-up and reporting problems, but the highest value is found for a project which has been exemplary in reporting and attending to productivity. It would appear that a numerical value of 0.65 to perhaps 0.75 is optimal for this ratio in the VICI project. This means that between 65 and 75 percent of all expenses are directly related to jobs and can be identified as direct costs. A different type of project--perhaps one of a shorter duration, focusing only on training--would have a much lower efficiency ratio of this type.

The overall economic efficiency ratios shown in the extreme right-hand column of Table VII.11 is the product of the ratios discussed above. The numerical values range from 0.178 to 0.756. The lower values are due to

low management/allocation efficiency ratios. Optimal values for this ratio would result from a job-related efficiency ratio of 1.0 or greater and/or a management/allocation efficiency ratio of 0.65 or greater, for a combined product of 0.65 for the overall economic efficiency ratio. Only two VICI projects performed so well, Milwaukee and Newark. Overall efficiency may be improved at other sites through management efforts and a reconstruction of missing reports.

### 3. Answering the Basic Question


Possible and expected numerical values for the three indicators have been suggested in this section. Values for job-related efficiency of 1.0 or more, management/allocation efficiency of 0.65 or more, and overall economic efficiency of 0.65 are perhaps reasonable from an empirical and statistical perspective and can be actually attained, as is apparent from Table VII.11. Hence, some specific expectations about project performance can be established. However, further analysis of the reasons for variations among project sites will help establish whether these suggested indicator values represent reasonable expectations.

**TABLE VII.1**  
**TYPES OF DATA COLLECTED**  
**AND FORMS USED**

Types of Data	VICI SITE Prepared			Quarterly Fiscal Report	Crawford and Company Reports		
	Job-by-Job Accounting/Reporting Forms						
	Form VI (Final)	Form VII (Estimate)	Form VII (Final)				
<u>Expenditures:</u>							
a. Administrative Items Personnel, Office Space	-	-	-	Yes	-		
b. Services & Training Items	-	-	-	Yes	-		
c. Youth Labor	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-		
d. Crew Chiefs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-		
e. Job related, non- personnel items	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-		
<u>Bid Estimates:</u>							
f. Private Contractor Bid Estimates	Yes	Yes	Revised values	-	Yes		
<u>Identification:</u>							
g. Job Number	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes		
h. Job Description	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes		
i. Dates When Work was Done	Yes	-	Yes	-	-		
<u>Other Data:</u>							
j. Judgements About the Quality of Work	-	-	-	-	Yes		

Table VII.2

FLOW OF DATA



100

Table VII.3 Data, Formulas and Indicators

<u>Part I. Data</u>		
a. Total Value of Jobs in Progress or Completed, Forms VI, VII and VIII	=	\$ 82,696
b. Concordance ratio between VICI value estimates and Crawford Values	=	1.059
c. Total expenditure to date, Quarterly fiscal report	=	\$366,842
d. Total of Estimated or Actual Job related expenses, reported on Forms VI, VII and VIII	=	\$140,478
e. Total of Job Related expenses <u>less</u> Youth Labor Costs	=	\$ 62,549
f. Total of Job Related Youth Labor Costs	=	\$ 77,929
g. Startup and overhead Costs=		
difference between c and d.	=	\$226,364
<u>Part II. Formulas and Indicators</u>		
formula a: Value of VICI work	= a * b	= 82,696 * 1,059 = \$87,575
formula b: Value created per dollar of expenditures	= (a * b) ÷ c	= \$ 0.239
formula c: Value created per dollar of direct job expenses	= (a * b) ÷ d	= \$ 0.623
formula d: Value added by Youth Labor	= (a * b) - e	= \$25,026
formula e: Value added per dollar of direct youth labor	= (a * b) - e ÷ f	= \$ 0.321
formula f: Startup and overhead costs per dollar of direct youth labor	= g ÷ f	= \$ 2.905
formula g: Net value created by Youth Labor	= e - f	= \$ 2.584
formula h: Ratio of direct costs to total expenditure	= d ÷ c	= \$ 0.383
formula i: Ratio of startup and overhead costs to direct Job costs	= g ÷ d	= \$ 1.611

Table VII.4

The Aggregated Data Totals through December 31, 1979  
for Most Sites

Site and Reporting Period (1)	Reported Expenditures to End of Period (2)	Reported Jobs in Progress or Completed (3)	<u>Aggregated Job Data</u>		<u>Components of Expenditures</u>		
			Direct Cost of Jobs in Progress or Completed (Estimated) (4)	Concorded Value of Jobs (Estimated) (5)	Costs of Youth Labor in Jobs (6)	Other Job Related Costs (7)	Costs Not Charged to Jobs (8)
Atlanta (December 31, 1979)	\$ 777,556	31	\$ 315,221	\$ 212,127	\$ 154,076	\$ 161,145	\$ 162,335
Broward (December 31, 1979)	684,972	310	418,562	409,577	210,875	207,687	266,410
Chicago (Projected)	1,417,226	5	619,219	450,618	245,892	373,327	798,007
Milwaukee (December 31, 1979)	784,363	163	515,756	521,739	232,272	283,484	268,607
Newark (December 31, 1979)	783,114	426	392,264	592,136	187,379	204,885	390,850
New Haven (December 31, 1979)	792,374	86	326,803	251,305	151,215	175,588	465,571
Philadelphia (September 30, 1979)	702,528	40	147,122	155,271	27,894	119,228	555,406
South Bronx (September 30, 1979)	431,101	29	124,076	76,695	69,055	55,021	307,025
Totals	6,373,234	1,090	2,859,023	2,669,468	1,278,658	1,580,365	3,514,211

Table VII.5

Summary Table on Work Value Ratios, Indicators With  
and Without Overhead Included Through December 1979

Site and Reporting Period	Reported Jobs	Aggregate Indicators		Value Added Indicators		
		Ratio: (Concorded Value) to VICI Job Cost w/o O/H form c	Ratio: (Concorded Value) to Total of VICI Costs to Date form b	Dollar Value Added Per \$ of Youth Labor, No Overhead form e	Overhead Per \$ of Youth Labor in Jobs form f	Dollar Value Added with Overhead Included form 3-form f
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Atlanta (December 31, 1979)	31	0.673	0.273	\$0.331	\$3,000	\$-2.67
Broward (December 31, 1979)	310	0.979	0.598	\$0.957	\$1,263	\$-0.31
Chicago (Projected)	5	0.728	0.318	\$0.314	\$3,245	\$-2.93
Milwaukee (December 31, 1979)	163	1.012	0.665	\$1.025	\$1,156	\$-0.13
Newark (December 31, 1979)	426	1.510	0.756	\$2.128	\$2,09	\$+0.04
New Haven (December 31, 1979)	86	0.769	0.317	\$0.500	\$3,079	\$-2.58
Philadelphia (September 30, 1979)	40	1.055	0.221	\$1.292	\$19.91	\$-18.62
South Bronx (September 30, 1979)	29	0.618	0.178	\$0.314	\$4,446	\$-4.13
Totals (Weighted Averages)		0.934	0.419	\$0.852	\$2,748	\$-1.90

**Table VII.6 Independent Estimators Ratings of Job Quality  
Based on a Sample of 42 Jobs**

Judgement	Rating (Based on Average Work of a Professional Contractor)					Total Count on Ratings
	Far Below Average	Below Average	Average	Above Average	Far Above Average	
Appearance of the Final Product	1	4	16	11	0	32
Preparation of Work Surfaces and Cleanup	1	6	18	9	0	34
Quality of Materials Used	0	0	32	5	0	37
Quality of Workmanship of Job	2	14	16	10	0	42
Total	4	14	92	35	0	145
(%)	2.7%	9.7%	63.4%	24.1%	0%	99.9%

100

**Table VII.7 Completion Time by Job Type  
(sample of 586 jobs)**

Type of Job	Time to Complete						Total
	1 week or less	1-4 Weeks	5-8 Weeks	2-3 Mths.	4-5 Mths.	6 Mths. or Less	
Small Home Repairs	40	25	2	1	2	-	70
Large Home Repairs	4	17	9	5	3	1	39
Rehab/Major Repairs	-	10	1	4	-	-	15
Unoccupied Dwellings	-	2	-	-	-	-	14
Weatherization	12	2	-	-	-	-	424
Painting	321	99	4	-	-	-	1
Rehab pf Vacant Shell	-	-	-	1	-	-	3
Major Renovation Large Public Building	-	2	1	-	-	-	20
Maintainance/Other	10	10	-	-	-	-	586
Total	387	165	17	11	5	1	

**Key:** Small Home Repairs: Estimated materials cost less than \$500.00

Large Home Repairs: Estimated materials cost between 500 and 1000

Rehabilitation: Major repairs on occupied dwellings cost over 1000

Painting: Estimated (apartments in public housing, major large buildings)

Table VII 8.A Value Added Ratio by Site (Formula (e) Used)

Site	Count on Jobs	Mean Value of Ratios for each Job	Standard error of Mean Estimate
Atlanta	13	0.2632 **	0.0533
Broward	128	3.2817	0.1062
Chicago	3	0.7097	0.0181
Milwaukee	75	1.3953	0.1414
New Haven	52	0.7314	0.0981
Philadelphia	4	1.2006	0.1627
Total	275	2.0836*	0.0955

\* The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance is 61.468.

\*\* This numerical value of 0.2632 for Atlanta differs from the numerical value of 0.239 found in TableVII.5 These two values are not calculated, using the same, or even similar, formulas. Formula (b) was used in Table VII-5 whereas a variation of formula (e) is used in this table. The difference in formulas are these factors:

- (1) the concordance adjustment has not been included in this table,
- (2) overhead and startup costs have not been included in this table,
- (3) the values in this table are derived from an unweighted summation of the individual ratios, whereas the Table approach uses an implicit weighting of ratios.

The text comments that the use of formula (b) or (c) indicators should be used as alternatives to the formula (e) indicator. The formula (e) model was used in the March Interim Report.

Notes: (1) These means are based on formula (e) but the concordance adjustment has not been applied. Since the sites seem to overstate the private contractor bids, these value added ratios are an overstatement of the true value.

(2) Overhead and startup costs have not been included.

(3) As the text discusses, the use of the formula (b) or (c) indicators should be studied as an alternative to the formula (e) indicator. The formula (e) model was used in the March Interim Report.

(4) These are unweighted means, i.e. the overall mean is derived from the product of the mean by category multiplied by the number of jobs per category.

Table VII.8.B Value Added Ratio by Type of Job (Formula (e) Used)

Type of Job	Count on Jobs	Mean Value of Ratios for each job	Standard error of Mean Estimate
Small home repairs	57	2.4268	0.2609
Major home repairs	76	1.7378	0.1523
Rehabilitation	33	1.6323	0.2610
Weatherizing	13	0.8557	0.2416
Painting	75	2.5195	0.1698
Rehabilitation of Shells	5	0.8903	0.1781
Major-Public Buildings	11	2.8113	0.3905
Maintenance	4	3.1526	0.5006
Other	0	0.0	0
Total	274	2.0888*	0.0957

\* The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance is 4.595.

Notes: Same as for Table

Table VII.8.C Value Added Ratio by Craft (Formula (e) Used)

Type of Craft	Count on Jobs	Mean Value of Ratios for each job	Standard error of Mean Estimate
Carpentry	109	1.5453	0.1549
Masonry	24	3.0989	0.2021
Roofing	0	0	0
Painting	114	2.1131	0.1354
Plumbing	11	3.7270	0.5064
Electrical	16	2.9441	0.2803
Other	1	1.1818	0
Total	275	2.0836*	0.0955

\* The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance is 9.036.

Notes: Same as for Table

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**TABLE VII.9A PERCENTAGE AND TYPE OF JOBS COMPLETED AND IN PROGRESS**

SITE	ATLANTA	BROWARD	CHICAGO	MILWAUKEE	NEWARK	NEW HAVEN	PHILA.	
Date of Start-Up	1/79	10/78	10/78	10/78	10/78	10/78	10/78	Total
Type of Job								
Small Home Repair	-	22.6	-	37.0	-	-	-	11.3
Large Home Repair	20.0	19.3	-	58.3	-	15.1	75.0	19.9
Rehab/Major Repairs to Occupied Dwellings	80.0	11.5	-	1.9	-	15.1	-	6.7
Weatherization	-	-	-	-	-	29.7	-	29
Painting	-	41.5	-	1.9	84.4	40.9	-	53.5
Rehab: Vacant Shell	-	-	100.0	-	-	2.2	25.0	.9
Renovation: Public Bldgs.	-	6.9	-	.9	2.0	2.2	-	3.2
Maintenance	-	3.2	-	-	13.5	-	-	6.8
*Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.2	100.0	100.1
Total No. Jobs	15	217	3	108	397	93	8	841

CODE: Take from EST Form

Table VII.9.B (Update). Number of Jobs Completed or Started

<u>Site and Reporting Period</u>	<u>Job Reports in Hand</u>	<u>Projected Direct Job Costs</u>	<u>Projected (Concorded) Work Value</u>
Atlanta (mid-March 1980)	40	\$406,736	\$273,713
Broward (mid-March 1980)	318	429,363	420,146
Chicago	5	No change from Table	(Update)
Milwaukee (mid-March 1980)	198	635,580	655,119
Newark (mid-March 1980)	501	448,513	695,635
New Haven (mid-March 1980)	91	346,336	265,598
Philadelphia	40	No change from Table	(Update)
South Bronx	29	No change from Table	(Update)

Table VII.10 Illustration of the Reformulated Indicators for Atlanta

Period	Number of Jobs	Data			Indicators		
		Concorded Work Value	Direct Job Related Costs	Total VICI Site Expenditures	Job Related Efficiency	Management/ Allocation Efficiency	Overall Efficiency
		(a)	(b)	(c)	(a ÷ b)	(b ÷ c)	$\frac{(a \cdot b)}{b} = \frac{a}{c}$
March 30, 1979	7	24,818	42,579	193,829	0.583	0.220	0.128
June 30, 1979	14	94,318	151,284	391,516	0.623	0.386	0.241
Sept. 30, 1979	22	151,870	234,010	567,805	0.649	0.412	0.267
Dec. 31, 1979	31	212,127	315,221	777,556	0.673	0.405	0.273

Table VII.11 Reformulation of the Work Value Indicators

## VIII PROGRAM OFFICERS' OBSERVATIONS

Site	Data			Indicators		
	Concorded Work Value	Direct Job Related Costs	Total VICI SITE Expenditures	Job Related Efficiency	Management/ Allocation Efficiency	Overall Economic Efficiency
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a ÷ b)	(b ÷ c)	$\left( \frac{a}{b} \cdot \frac{b}{c} = \frac{a}{c} \right)$
Atlanta	212,127	315,221	777,556	0.673	0.405	0.273
Broward	409,577	418,562	684,972	0.979	0.611	0.598
Chicago	450,618	619,219	1,417,226	0.728	0.437	0.318
Milwaukee	521,739	515,756	784,363	1.012	0.658	0.665
Newark	592,136	392,264	783,114	1.510	0.501	0.756
New Haven	251,305	326,803	792,374	0.769	0.412	0.317
Philadelphia	155,271	147,122	702,528	1.055	0.209	0.221
South Bronx	76,695	124,076	431,101	0.618	0.288	0.178

Data Source      Table (Update)  
 Col. 5    Col. 4    Col. 2      Calculated using formulas, also found  
 in Table

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VICI is a rigorous program. Seeking to train participants in marketable skills, it sets exacting performance standards. However, its rigor is complemented and balanced by the low staff-participant ratios which permit a great deal of individual attention. The combination of professional standards and intensive training seems to be effective. Certainly, if the quality of work performed by VICI trainees, the increasing strength of VICI's local linkages, and the number of job placements are any measure of the program's quality, we have reason to believe that VICI's first nine months of operation have been successful.

CPPV's role in this success must be neither under-nor over-emphasized. Intermediaries like CPPV do not build buildings, supervise enrollees, place young persons in jobs, or get work done. What they can do--and what CPPV has striven to do--is to insist upon high standards for work quality and placement efforts; offer technical assistance; facilitate program operations; arbitrate disputes; and keep the program on track, to the betterment both of the communities where the work takes place and of the VICI participants themselves. These goals are more easily attained by an intermediary, with its ability to operate outside a city's bureaucratic structure.

Quality of Work

The quality of work produced by VICI trainees has far exceeded our expectations. The work valuation procedure (described in Chapter VII) estimates the market value of the VICI work, and compares it with program expenditures. The eight sites examined in this way indicated an average return on expenditures of 42¢ per dollar. The three highest sites yielded an average return of 68¢ per dollar. Moreover, "outside," professional estimators report that, of 42 VICI work projects rated in terms of quality, 87 percent were equal to or above the average work performed by private contractors. Thus, both the work valuation and the estimators' report have confirmed our judgement that the quality of VICI work is exceptional.

Linkages

The linkages have been both the most exciting and the most frustrating part of the VICI program. The linkages with labor unions have been very positive, notably in the informal area of journeymen seeking jobs, within their own unions, for graduating VICI enrollees. An informal network has evolved that we did not anticipate in the original design. Also, the use of journeymen as supervisors at the sites has proved, if anything, even more positive than indicated in our previous report. The journeymen are not only excellent instructors, but are also demanding taskmasters, determined that the trainees will get the work done. There was, and still is, in the program an inherent tension between productivity and training: journeymen want to complete the work, while trainees sometimes need simply to learn a skill, even if it means that a job takes longer to be completed. However, even though this tension exists, the work valuation data certainly support the conclusion that substantial production has gone on. Our numerous site observations, field visits,

and discussions with both journeymen and trainees have enabled us to affirm our original view that the 1:6 supervisor-trainees ratio has a significant influence on the high quality of work being done.

The work provider linkage has had somewhat mixed results so far. On the negative side, the Broward County program suffered a change in work providing agencies that severely hampered the program for two months. On the other hand, the New Haven work provider has spent an enormous amount of money on materials and supplies for VICI and has worked very harmoniously with the project. Overall, the linkages with work providing agencies have been salutary, and we have seen youngsters learning skills, buildings being rehabilitated, and both work provider and VICI reaping benefits from this relationship. Even in Broward County, the loss of one agency was quickly followed by the enlistment of another, more than willing to provide materials and supplies for VICI youngsters' work on community development projects throughout the county.

The use of advisory boards has also had mixed results. In some cities, such as the South Bronx, advisory boards have had difficulty in making themselves an effective force in the program, since they are a relatively new concept in employment training programs. In other cities, such as New Haven and Broward, the advisory board has operated strongly as a Board of Directors for the project, helping in diverse areas such as placement, GED training, and quality control.

The educational linkage has been somewhat problematic. This is a linkage that does not always benefit the linking agency (as is the case with the labor union and work providing linkages), and our data at this point indicate that it is a linkage very much dependent upon pre-existing relationships within the cities. We believe that future VICI programs would benefit from a much tighter set of arrangements between VICI and educational institutions than was at first envisioned.

#### City Size

In our first Interim Report, we noted the differences between large and small cities that might affect the VICI program. We felt that it was more difficult to launch VICI in the larger cities because of the many institutional obstacles that exist there. At this juncture, it appears that these differences, and their effects, still remain, but with some exceptions. In the large cities, payroll problems, the failure of equipment to arrive, contracts held up because of a backlog at city council meetings, and the like have all required that P/PV play a more active role. P/PV staff have had to act as facilitators and expeditors more than was necessary in the small cities. However, in some large cities, once the complex logistics were worked out, the quality of work performed did not differ substantially from those in small cities.

#### The Data

As part of its responsibility for monitoring VICI and providing sites with technical and managerial assistance, P/PV sends program officers to visit each site at least monthly, and usually more often. By means of such first-hand observations, P/PV staff have become thoroughly familiar with the day-to-day operations and problems of the sites.

We have therefore examined the data presented to see whether they reflect our own observations and judgements. In most cases, we have found that the data do support our judgement of the quality of the program. For example, in the case of union apprenticeships, we have noticed with increasing pleasure the informal networks being built between journeymen instructors and VICI youth. The data show that a sizeable percent of all VICI youths who have terminated to accept employment have become union apprentices; this confirms our own on-site observations that the VICI union link is an extremely effective one.

Another significant statistic is that the majority of youths who left VICI to accept jobs gained employment in related trades. Considering the limited opportunities for young people in the construction job market in most VICI cities, we feel this is notable.

However, the data gathered so far permit no easy generalizations. They must be interpreted against factors such as differences among sites in how a program is conducted or how smoothly its local linkages work together, or in terms of external phenomena such as the national or local construction job market. As VICI matures and as more data become available, it will be possible to make general statements about VICI based on sufficiently large samples and rigorous research design.

**SUPPLEMENT A**  
**PRELIMINARY COMPARISON BETWEEN VICI AND CONTROL GROUP YOUTHS**

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Preliminary statistical comparisons between VICI youths and controls have been made on a wide range of variables, including demographic characteristics, verbal ability, and pre-training educational and labor market experience. Data were derived from the VICI Participant Intake Form and the FAS-V test administered at intake. Data included in the analyses cover the period of time from program start-up through May 1979.

Table A.1 shows verbal ability scores for VICI trainees and control group subjects, for all control group sites combined, and for each site separately.

TABLE A.1  
FAS-V TEST SCORES OF VICI YOUTH AND CONTROL GROUPS

SITE	H	MEAN	S.D.	T-VALUE
<u>All Sites</u>				
VICI	337	64.13	13.92	2.16*
Control	491	61.93	14.98	
<u>Atlanta</u>				
VICI	71	65.63	12.07	1.63
Control	109	62.33	14.93	
<u>Milwaukee</u>				
VICI	110	64.28	13.11	0.66
Control	108	63.03	14.47	
<u>Newark</u>				
VICI	82	57.70	15.41	1.40
Control	194	60.57	15.60	
<u>Philadelphia</u>				
VICI	74	69.59	12.39	2.98*
Control	80	63.21	14.16	

\*p .05

\*\*p .01

On average, VICI youths scored significantly higher than control group youths on the FAS-V test of verbal ability across all sites. However, no statistically significant differences were found between the two groups in Atlanta, Milwaukee, or Newark. In Philadelphia, the average score for VICI youths was more than six points higher than control youths; this large difference appears to account for the significant difference in the combined data.

Chi-square analyses were performed on several demographic and pre-training experience variables to identify any important differences between VICI and control subjects. Analyses were performed with data for all control group sites

combined and for each site separately. Twenty-two variables were examined, and statistically significant differences were found only on five. No significant differences were found on the following 17 variables: age, sex, ethnicity, father's education, mother's education, family economic status, number of dependents, number of members in the household, U.S. citizenship, cash public assistance to family, English language as job obstacle, handicapped status, veteran status, offender status, migrant status, employment status, and most recent type of job (construction versus non-construction-related).

Table A.2 reports chi-square results for the remaining five variables that were associated with statistically significant differences between VICI versus control group youths:

TABLE A.2

CHI-SQUARE RESULTS OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN  
VICI AND CONTROL GROUP YOUTHS ON SELECTED VARIABLES

VARIABLE	ALL SITES	ATLANTA	MILW.	NEWARK	PHILA.
Applicant has Education Beyond High School	X				
UI Claimant	X				
Cash Public Assistance to Applicant	X	X		X	
Family Above Poverty Level	X			X	
Most Recent Job (subsidized or unsubsidized)	X	X	X	X	

Compared with controls, VICI youths have, on average, more education beyond high school ( $\chi^2 = 8.04$ ,  $p < .05$ ), were more likely to be UI claimants ( $\chi^2 = 5.10$ ,  $p < .05$ ), to receive cash public assistance ( $\chi^2 = 5.13$ ,  $p < .05$ ), and to have families above the poverty level ( $\chi^2 = 7.91$ ,  $p < .01$ ). They were less likely than controls to have previously worked in unsubsidized jobs ( $\chi^2 = 6.30$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VENTURES  
IN COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT DEMONSTRATION**

**A review an analysis of the process  
through which a demonstration project  
was mounted under the Youth Employment  
Demonstration Projects Act of 1977**

**Harvey Shapiro  
&  
Hank Blakely**

**PART 3.**

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VICI DEMONSTRATION**

**Harvey Shapiro  
&  
Hank Blakely**

**Part 2  
Research Report on  
VICI Impact and Effectiveness**

## INTRODUCTION

This report is part of an ongoing effort to record and analyze the forces that have shaped the first nine months' development of the Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) demonstration. VICI is a national research and demonstration project which seeks to test the effectiveness of a model youth employment program in various settings. Several techniques and several groups of researchers, administrators, and analysts have been involved both in monitoring VICI and in the production of this report. The demonstration is financed by the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Youth Programs (OYP), while the Corporation for Public/Private Ventures (CPPV) has the responsibility for designing, managing, and analyzing the operation of the demonstration and for reporting findings to DOL. Research for Better Schools (RBS) subcontracted with CPPV to conduct a statistical analysis of the demonstration; RBS' findings are presented in this report. To capture the non-quantifiable, historical and personal factors that have affected VICI, CPPV engaged two "process documentors," Harvey D. Shapiro and Hank Blakely, to visit sites, interview participants, administrators, and others associated with VICI, and report their findings to CPPV. Their work is presented in CPPV's Winter 1980 Interim Report.

## RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The primary objectives of the quantitative research currently being undertaken on VICI participants are:

To compare the post-program experiences of VICI participants with those of a comparable group of youths who have participated in other manpower training programs.

To develop a work valuation methodology for determining the economic value of the community improvements resulting from the VICI demonstration as well as from other formula-funded community improvement efforts.

To fulfill these objectives, five specific research tasks have been defined and undertaken. These are:

### Statistical Description of the VICI Demonstration

This task provides data on participant characteristics, progress in the program, and termination status. These data facilitate CPPV's role in monitoring the demonstration, and serve as important basic research data for identifying and interpreting the effects of the demonstration.

### Aggregate Comparison

This task compares VICI programs with alternative youth employment and training programs operating in each of the eight VICI sites. Using aggregated data from the formula-funded Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Programs (YCCIP) and the Youth Employment and Training Programs (YETP), a general statistical comparison is made of each program, in terms of participant characteristics and termination status.

### Interprogram Comparison

This task calls for a more detailed comparison of VICI with selected YCCIP programs similar to VICI in several key ways: nature of work, program size, participant characteristics. Selected programs include four HUD-sponsored YCCIP and ten formula-funded, prime sponsor YCCIP programs.

### Impact Analysis

The purpose of this task is to determine the effects of the VICI demonstration on the post-program employability of VICI trainees. This involves a follow-up study of participants and of control and comparison group youths up to eight months after program termination.

### Work Valuation

This task is to define the value and efficiency of the work done by VICI participants in order to provide a measure of program benefits above and beyond direct benefits to participants.

## PROGRAM DESIGN

After the basic design elements of the VICI demonstration were settled, CETA prime sponsors in a number of cities were invited to submit proposals for operating a VICI program. In mid-1978, eight localities were selected for funding under the auspices of CPPV. The sites were Atlanta, Georgia; Broward County, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Newark, New Jersey; New Haven, Connecticut; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and the South Bronx in New York City. Each VICI program was to enroll up to 60 unemployed, out-of-school, economically disadvantaged youth between the ages of 16 and 19. They were to work five days a week under the supervision of union journeymen drawn from the construction and building trades. Although the work would vary among the sites, it was aimed at making tangible community improvements through such activities as refurbishing public facilities or repairing homes occupied by poor or elderly people from the same neighborhoods as the youth enrolled in the programs.

Using program elements drawn from the Emergency Home Repair Program in Portland, Oregon, and from several other youth programs, the VICI model relied heavily on a set of linkages which tied the program to other institutions. Various local institutions were chosen to recruit and refer youth to VICI. Educational institutions agreed to provide certain educational services to VICI youth. Locals of unions in the building and construction trades agreed to provide union journeymen to serve as instructors in the program and to assist VICI youth to gain entrance to union apprenticeship programs and to job opportunities. Local organizations of various kinds agreed to identify or provide work projects to be undertaken by the youth. And the local CETA prime sponsor, or its designated local management agency, had overall responsibility for operating the program and coordinating its linkages. At each of the sites, a variety of local organizations agreed to serve as linkages. But while there were differences among the sites as to precisely which craft union or which youth referral agency would be involved with VICI, all sites shared the emphasis on linking the youth to other institutions so that this employment and training program would not operate in a vacuum. Rather, it would give the enrollee access to various services that might improve his or her employability and also employ the youth in activities that would improve the area in which he or she lived.

The VICI demonstration was scheduled to run for 18 months. However, the starting point differed from site to site because of different local conditions and start-up problems. Broward, Chicago, Milwaukee, Newark and New Haven all started in October 1978, while Philadelphia began in December, and Atlanta and South Bronx officially were launched in January 1979. Thus, by March 1979, while South Bronx and Atlanta were just beginning to send youths out to work on repairing homes, Milwaukee and Newark and other sites were beginning to seek jobs for youth who were nearing the end of their stay in the program.

#### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Observations of the VICI program during its implementation and early operating period are encouraging in terms of both major research objectives: program impact and the value of the work produced. However, all the evidence remains preliminary, as programs are still in progress and long-term effects on youth remain to be assessed.

Objective 1: To assess the impact of the VICI program upon youth employability, paying special attention to comparing VICI participants' post program experience with those of youths in other employment and training programs:

- Comparable programs have been selected in five of the eight VICI sites. These include both formula-funded YCCIP programs and programs sponsored by HUD via demonstration funds from DOL.

- Control groups have been assembled from VICI waiting lists in four sites.
- A narrative description of each comparison group is included in the report, as well as demographic information.
- Follow-up interviews are being conducted and program data are being assessed.

Three sets of interviews with youths from the VICI and HUD demonstration, and from formula-funded YCCIP programs have been planned; at one month, at three months, and at eight months after program termination. Interviews and data analysis (conducted by CPPV's subcontractor, Research for Better Schools, Inc. (RBS)) began in April, 1979. Full information on the effects of VICI will not be available until the Fall of 1981 when RBS completes the follow-up study.

**Findings to date include:**

- The demographic profile of VICI participants is quite similar to that of the average unemployed youth in America. The typical participant in the VICI program is a black male who is 18 years old and self-supporting, and who has a ninth, tenth or eleventh grade education.
- About one thousand youth have enrolled in the program since its beginning, in the Fall of 1978. All were economically disadvantaged, out of school and between 16 and 19 years of age. Nineteen percent were female; 81 percent were male; 81 percent were black; 13 percent Hispanic; 5 percent white; one percent American Indian and one percent Other. One-fifth of the group had no previous job experience. Those who had held jobs prior to VICI earned an average of \$2.84 per hour.
- A total of 577 terminations occurred through November, 1979 yielding a positive termination rate of 43 percent. (These were youth who either secured jobs, returned to school, or entered the military or other training programs.) Of the 248 positive terminations, 55 youths secured union apprenticeships and 86 youths began jobs in construction-related work. The average wage for VICI youth in both construction and non-construction related work is \$4.59 per hour. In almost all areas, jobs were permanent and unsubsidized.
- In a comparison of placements (i.e., unsubsidized employment), VICI placements were almost double those of either YETP or YCCIP. In terms of overall positive

termination rates, VICI and YCCIP are very similar, while YETP is clearly higher. However, approximately one-third of the YCCIP overall positive termination rate, and almost one-half of the YETP rate represent transfers to other CETA programs or return to school, not placements in jobs.

- Preliminary results from the follow-up study indicate that at approximately three months after participants have terminated from the program, relatively more VICI participants (49 percent of 87 youths) were employed, compared with HUD participants (34 percent of 105 youths) and YCCIP youths (27 percent of 63 participants). VICI youths were more successful in getting full-time jobs, enrolling in union apprenticeship programs, or becoming union members. VICI youths also earned a much higher average hourly wage (\$3.95 per hour) than other youths, and reported greater satisfaction with their program than did HUD or YCCIP participants.

#### Objective 2: To Develop and Implement a Work Valuation Methodology

A straightforward method for accurately determining the dollar value of the work products (i.e., community improvements) has been developed by CPPV and is operational in all eight sites. Work value is defined as the cost that a private contractor would charge for performing the jobs being done by VICI participants.

The methodology builds on the customary work of local estimators. Traditionally, community improvement programs have a person on staff (the local estimator) who visits each potential job site and estimates the costs of the materials and supplies needed to complete the job. The CPPV methodology calls for local program estimators to assess the price that a private contractor would charge to perform the same job. Local estimators were trained in computing private contractor bids. For each VICI job (over 3,000) the private contractor's price will be estimated on standardized forms. The forms are sent to CPPV for review and forwarded to RBS for processing and analysis.

It is apparent that the methodology is dependent upon the accuracy of local estimators' assessments of private contractor bids. To maximize the validity of estimates, a private estimating firm will visit all sites and conduct approximately 200 independent estimates. The results of 42 independent estimates have been included in this report. Concordance between local and independent estimates can be calculated and systematic errors identified and shared with local personnel. In this way, local estimates can be continually improved and, if necessary, corrected.

Findings to date include:

- Feedback from local staff indicates that this methodology is both practical and capable of being incorporated (given refinement) into other community improvement efforts.
- On average, VICI produces \$0.42 of value for every dollar spent in the program, and three sites returned \$0.67 on every dollar. This significantly offsets the cost of training and work experience for youth. This value has been adjusted in accordance with the results obtained by the private estimating firm.
- Independent professional estimators rated the quality of the work performed by VICI crews as equal to or superior to the average product which would be expected from a private contractor in 87 percent of the 42 projects assessed.

## I. STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE VICI DEMONSTRATION

The statistics presented here provide a comprehensive profile of youth enrolled in the VICI program. Participants are described in terms of: (1) demographic characteristics, (2) economic characteristics, (3) weekly progress in the program, and (4) termination status when they leave the program. The description includes intake and termination information through November 30, 1979 and weekly progress data through October 31, 1979. Analyses of the relationships between selected indicators of program success are also presented in this chapter.

Results are reported in a series of brief narratives accompanied by statistical tables. The tables give numerical and percentage information on each variable across the eight VICI sites, and report means and standard deviations for selected variables.

### A. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF VICI YOUTH: Table I.1

The statistics presented here are based on information obtained from the participant intake records of 944 VICI youths. These results represent all available data from CPPV's computerized management information system through November, 1979. Table I.1 presents the results of the demographic variables for VICI youths, by site.

Age. To be eligible for VICI, youths must be between 16 and 19 years old at intake. Ninety percent of participants were 17-19 years of age. CPPV's data monitoring system identified five "age-ineligible" (i.e., below 16 or above 19) youths. According to CPPV, sites were notified promptly of such occurrences.

Sex. Overall, 81 percent of all VICI participants are males, and 19 percent are females. Four sites have approximately 25 percent female participants--the South Bronx, Newark, Atlanta, and Broward. Philadelphia has the smallest percentage of females (11 percent).

Ethnic Group. Of the total population, 80 percent of VICI participants are black, 13 percent are Hispanic, 5 percent are white, 1 percent are American Indian, and 1 percent are considered Other. Atlanta, Broward, and Philadelphia are all more than 90 percent black. Chicago and the South Bronx have the highest concentration of Hispanic participants, and New Haven has the largest percentage (21 percent) of white youth. All remaining sites are less than 7 percent white.

Family Status. The majority of VICI participants (83 percent) consider themselves "family members." Of the remainder, 10 percent consider themselves members of a "family of one" and 7 percent consider themselves "heads of family."

Number in Household. Forty-nine percent of VICI participants live in households of 1-4 persons, and 43 percent live in households of 5-8 persons. In both Broward and Chicago 14 percent live in households of 9-12 people.

English Language. Across all eight sites, only one percent of participating youth report difficulty in communicating in English. Chicago has the largest percentage of youths (6 percent, or a total of five youths) who felt they were unable to communicate in English. These results are consistent with the ethnic composition of the Chicago site which is 42 percent Hispanic.

Handicapped. Of the total sample, only 2 percent of participants are handicapped. No site has more than two handicapped youths, and six of the eight sites have none or only one handicapped participant.

Veteran. Two percent of all VICI participants are veterans.

Citizenship. Overall, 99 percent of the VICI youths are U.S. citizens. Chicago reports the largest percentage of participants (5 percent, or four youths) who are not U.S. citizens.

Offender Status. Across all eight sites, 10 percent of participants were ex-offenders. New Haven (20 percent), Broward (17 percent) and Milwaukee (13 percent) reported the highest percentages of ex-offenders.

Migrant Status. Less than one percent of the total VICI population are members of migrant/seasonal farm families.

Education of Applicant. Approximately 72 percent of VICI participants completed school through grades 9, 10, or 11. Of the total VICI population, 23 percent received high school diplomas or GEDs before entering VICI. Atlanta (with 35 percent) and Chicago (33 percent) had the highest percentages of youths with high school diplomas or GEDs. The South Bronx reported the lowest percentage (11 percent) of participants with diplomas or GEDs. Only 4 percent or fewer participants at each site had attended post-secondary schools.

Education of Father. Overall, 20 percent of VICI participants reported that their fathers had received high school diplomas or GEDs, and 47 percent said they did not know the highest level of education attained by their fathers. Chicago fathers had the lowest level of educational attainment.

Education of Mother. Twenty-nine percent of participants reported that their mothers had received high school diplomas or GEDs, and 24 percent said they did not know the highest level of education attained by their mothers. Chicago mothers had the lowest level of educational attainment.

Fundamental Achievement Series-Verbal (FAS-V) Test. The FAS-V Test, a 100-item test of verbal ability is administered to all youths applying to the VICI program at the time of the intake interview. This test is not used for screening purposes. The mean FAS-V score for all enrolled VICI participants was 65.79 (compared with a mean score of 66.6 for comparable trainees in a Northeast anti-poverty program). Chicago had the highest mean FAS-V score, 76.06; and Newark reported the lowest score, 58.91. Individual scores on this test ranged from 7 to 99.

## Summary

The typical VICI participant is a black male who is 18 years old, self-supporting, and who has a 9th, 10th, or 11th grade education. Atlanta, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia tend to have younger participants (age 16-17). Elsewhere, participants tend to be 18-19 years old. Atlanta, Broward, Newark and the South Bronx have relatively large female enrollments (approximately 25 percent), and New Haven has the largest percentage of white youths. Chicago is distinctive in several ways. It has the highest percentage of Hispanic youths, the highest percentage of youths reporting as heads of family, has enrolled no ex-offenders, has the highest percentages of participant parents without a high school diploma or GED, and the highest average ability score among participants, as measured by the FAS-V test.

### B. ECONOMIC PROFILE OF VICI YOUTHS: Table I.2

The following economic analysis is based on available participant intake records of 944 youths through November, 1979. Table I.2 summarizes the results of this analysis for each VICI site.

Unemployment Insurance (US) Claimant. Only 2 percent of all VICI program participants are UI claimants.

Reasons for Disadvantaged Status. In order to qualify as eligible for enrollment in the VICI program, all participants must conform to CETA eligibility poverty standards; that is, either the participant's family receives cash public assistance (CPA), or the participant receives CPA, or the family income is below the poverty level. All VICI youths met these income eligibility criteria.

Employment Status. Of the total population of VICI youths, 93 percent were unemployed at intake, 3 percent were underemployed, and 4 percent were not in the labor force. The South Bronx and Chicago were the only sites in which the proportion of unemployed youths was less than 90 percent. These sites reported 84 percent and 89 percent unemployment rates, respectively.

Source of Referral to VICI. The four major sources of referral to the VICI program were friends, program staff, community organizations, and employment services. These sources accounted for three-fourths of all youths who enrolled in the VICI program. At some sites, such as Atlanta, Broward, and Milwaukee, "other CETA programs" served as a significant source of referrals to VICI.

Previous Job Training Programs. The minority (21 percent) of VICI enrollees did participate in other job training programs before entering VICI. The average length of time youths participated in job training programs prior to VICI was 6.31 months. More than two-thirds of those who participated in previous job training programs were enrolled in

programs which were not construction-related. Sixty-nine percent of all terminations from the various job training programs were non-positive. (Non-positive terminations are defined as due to the following: completed program but was not placed, program terminated, injury/health-problem/pregnancy, moved, did not like program, transportation problems, and family responsibilities.)

Previous Employment. About one-third of the VICI youths had some previous employment experience. On average, they worked a total of 8.02 months before beginning VICI. They reported that 55 percent of their previous jobs were unsubsidized, and 85 percent of these jobs were not construction-related. The average number of hours worked per week was 33.52. The average wages earned by youths prior to enrollment in VICI was \$2.84.

Months Since Last Job. Across all sites, 77 percent of VICI trainees had been out of work for between zero and six months when they applied to VICI.

Reason for Most Recent Job Termination. Job lay-off was the most frequently given reason for job termination. Across all sites, 18 percent cited this reason. Twelve percent reported that they terminated because they did not like the job. The largest percentage of trainees (38 percent) gave Other as the reason for termination.

### Summary

There appears to be considerable homogeneity among VICI sites in terms of participants' previous employment experience. Prior to entering VICI, participants were either unemployed (93 percent), underemployed (3 percent), or were not in the labor force (4 percent). They were referred to VICI primarily by friends, community organizations, program staff, and local employment services. Approximately one out of five youths had participated in a job training program for an average of about six months. Job training programs were, for most participants, not construction-related.

About one-third of VICI youths had some previous employment experience. On average, they were employed for about eight months. The majority of youths worked more than 30 hours at a minimum wage on unsubsidized jobs that were unrelated to construction.

### C. WEEKLY PROGRESS OF VICI PARTICIPANTS: Table I.3

A total of 944 VICI participants are included in this analysis. Weekly Progress Reports are filled out for each VICI youth for each week he or she participates in the program. A total of 18,477 individual weekly progress reports are summarized in the following results.

Attendance. Overall, 68 percent of the days VICI enrollees spend in the program are "full work days." Fifteen percent of the remaining days are considered "excused absences," which includes absences due to illness, holidays, and inclement weather. Only 6 percent of all absences are unexcused. VICI participants are recorded late 3 percent of the time. These figures are based on the daily attendance records kept for each participant.

Disciplinary Action. Across all eight sites, 56 percent of all VICI youths were involved in at least one incident requiring disciplinary action at some time. Atlanta, Chicago, and New Haven reported that more than two-thirds of their participants required disciplinary action at some time.

GED or Certificate: GEDs have been earned by 37 participants while enrolled in the VICI program. This represents 4 percent of the total sample. Chicago had the largest percentage--17 percent--of participants who completed GEDs.

Performance Ratings. Combined weekly performance ratings (i.e., subjective evaluations made by journeymen) on the three most advanced tasks performed by VICI youths yielded the following results. Across all sites, 53 percent of the performance ratings were "good" or "excellent;" 42 percent of all ratings were "adequate;" 4 percent were "poor;" and one percent was "inadequate."

Receipt of Pay Raise Incentive. Overall, 83 percent of pay raise incentives were received by VICI participants when due.

Reason for not Receiving Pay Raise. Among the reasons for participants' failure to earn pay raise incentives were absenteeism/lateness, and rarely poor work performance or misconduct.

#### Summary

There is considerable consistency in the weekly progress profiles of participants across VICI programs, though some programs are atypical in some respects. For example, South Bronx participants work longer hours, on average, than those in any other program. Chicago is distinctive in several ways: it reports the largest percentage of full work days for participants, the next-to-smallest number of participants receiving disciplinary action, and the largest percentage of GEDs attained.

#### D. PROFILE OF VICI TERMINATIONS: Table I.4

Termination Type. A total of 577 participants had terminated from VICI by November 30, 1979. Overall, 63 percent of these terminations were

voluntary and 37 percent were involuntary. Voluntary terminations are defined as those initiated by the participant; involuntary are those initiated by the program staff. Voluntary terminations can include terminations classified as either positive or negative; involuntary terminations are always negative. (Voluntary and involuntary terminations are discussed in more detail below.) Broward had the highest percentage (74 percent) of voluntary terminations; Philadelphia had the lowest (41 percent).

An analysis of reasons for terminations from VICI revealed that 53 percent of all terminations were non-positive, 43 percent were positive, and 4 percent were Other. Positive terminations are those due to employment, training, or school; non-positive terminations are those due to injury or health problems, family responsibilities, the need to find work, relocation, failure to locate participants, loss of interest or dissatisfaction with the program, and all involuntary terminations; Other terminations include those listed as Unknown and Other. Atlanta had the highest percentage (48 percent) and Philadelphia had the lowest percentage (25 percent) of positive terminations.

Reasons for Voluntary Terminations. Across all eight sites, 57 percent of all voluntary terminations were due to offers of employment. At four sites--Atlanta, Chicago, Newark, and New Haven--two-thirds or more of all terminations were due to employment. A further 13 percent of the terminations were the result of decisions to attend school, to enroll in other work training programs, or to look for work. Personal circumstances or problems such as health, family responsibilities, or relocation, accounted for 12 percent of all voluntary terminations and loss of interest and unhappiness with the program accounted for a further 12 percent. The remaining 6 percent were either Unknown or Other. Philadelphia has the lowest percentage (33 percent) of terminations due to employment and the highest percentage of those due to return to school (27 percent) and to injury or health problems (17 percent).

Type of Employment After Termination. Sixty-seven percent of all VICI youth who terminated to accept jobs were employed in related trades or entered union apprenticeships; 24 percent accepted jobs in non-related trades; and 9 percent went into military service. There was considerable variation among sites on this variable.

Job Requires VICI Construction Skills. Seventy-three percent of participants obtaining jobs reported that their jobs required the use of construction skills learned in VICI.

Type of Job. Four variables--Job Permanence, Job Subsidization, Hourly Wage, and Type of Job Placement--were used to evaluate post-program jobs. Most youths who accepted jobs after termination from VICI obtained permanent, unsubsidized positions at an average hourly wage of \$4.59. Sixty-one percent of the job placements of VICI youth were direct that is, the participant found employment as a result of the program's placement efforts, as opposed to finding his or her own job.

Reasons for Involuntary Terminations. As of November 31, 1979, 57 percent of all involuntary terminations were due to unsatisfactory attendance; 19 percent were due to misconduct; 16 percent were Other; and 6 percent were due to unsatisfactory work performance.

Program Completion Upon Termination. Program completion is defined as meeting the program's criteria for skill acquisition. This judgment is made subjectively by program staff and is not based on strict quantifiable criteria (e.g., mastery tests). Seventy-nine percent of all terminees--including those with positive terminations--left VICI before completing the program.

Number of Weeks in Program. The average amount of time participants are enrolled in VICI is about 20 weeks for the total sample. The average was highest in Chicago (34 weeks) and lowest in Philadelphia (13 weeks).

Apply for/Receive Public Assistance. Of the 577 terminees recorded through November, 1979, only 6 percent have either applied for or received public assistance. However, no information on this variable was available for 51 percent of the terminations. Philadelphia had the largest percentage (25 percent) of terminees applying for or receiving public assistance. Atlanta, Chicago, and New Haven reported no applicants for public assistance.

#### Summary

Over all sites, approximately two-thirds of terminations were voluntary, and nearly half (43 percent) were positive. About two out of five youths who became employed obtained a job in a related area, and about one fourth obtained union apprenticeship positions. Clearly, most youths got jobs that were permanent and unsubsidized, at an hourly wage substantially above federal minimum wage standards.

#### E. SELECTED CROSSTABULATION ANALYSES

This section presents an analysis of the relationships between selected demographic, economic, and termination status variables and indicators of program success. This analysis consists of the crosstabulation of 15 selected intake (demographic and economic) and termination variables with termination status variables.

The intake and termination variables are:

1. Sex
2. Ethnic Group
3. Age
4. Highest level of education of applicant
5. FAS-V score

6. Previous participation in job training program
7. Total months of participation in previous job training program
8. Job training--construction-related or not
9. Reason for termination from job training program
10. Total months of previous employment
11. Previous job--subsidized or unsubsidized
12. Previous job--construction-related or not
13. Reason for termination from previous job
14. Completion of VICI program
15. Number of weeks in VICI program

Each of the above variables was crosstabulated with four termination status variables:

1. Termination Type A: Voluntary or Involuntary
2. Termination Type B: Positive, Non-Positive, or Other
3. Type of Job at Termination: Related Trade, Non-Related Trade, or Union Apprenticeship
4. Wages at Termination

The information derived from these crosstabulations can be used to determine if any relationships exist between participant background and demographic characteristics and indicators of program success. Knowledge of these relationships may be useful both for monitoring the program and for suggesting further analyses to assess the effects of the demonstration on trainees.

The following narrative has four parts, corresponding to the four termination variables. Accompanying tables give frequency and percent data for each variable.

#### 1. Termination Type A (Voluntary or Involuntary)

Table I.5 presents the results of intake and termination variables cross-tabulated with termination status variable, termination type A.

Sex. More than 60 percent of both male and female terminations are voluntary.

Ethnic Group. A larger percentage (70 percent) of white participants terminate voluntarily than of black (64 percent) or Hispanic (60 percent) participants.

Age. At all ages, more than half of the participants terminate voluntarily.

Highest Level of Education of Applicant. The percentage of voluntary terminations steadily increases as the level of the applicant's education increases. Of the VICI participants who had attended post-secondary school, 89 percent were considered voluntary terminees, whereas only 50 percent of participants with less than a ninth grade education terminated voluntarily.

FAS-V Score. As participants' FAS-V scores increase, the percentage of voluntary terminations increases. The higher a participant's FAS-V Score, the more likely it is that the termination will be voluntary.

Previous Participation in Job Training Program. Previous program participation appeared to have little correlation with voluntary or involuntary termination status. However, the percentage of voluntary terminations was slightly higher among participants who had participated in prior job training programs.

Total Months of Participation in Previous Job Training Program. The largest proportion (75 percent) of voluntary terminations occurred in the group who had participated in previous job training programs for a period of 13 to 24 months.

Job Training--Construction-Related. A larger percentage (72 percent) of voluntary terminations was found for participants who participated in job training programs that were not construction-related than for those whose training programs were construction-related (52 percent).

Reason for Termination from Job Training Program. Positive terminees of previous job training programs had the largest percentage (71 percent) of voluntary terminations from VICI. Non-positive and Other terminees of previous programs had similar percentages of non-positive (66 percent) and Other (65 percent) terminations from VICI.

Total Months of Previous Employment. Participants who had been employed for more than 25 months before entering VICI were more likely to terminate voluntarily than those with less than 25 months of previous employment.

Previous Job--Subsidized or Unsubsidized. There is no apparent relationship between this variable and the proportions of voluntary and involuntary terminations.

Previous Job--Construction-Related. The percentage of voluntary terminations was slightly greater for those whose previous jobs were not construction-related (64 percent) than for those whose jobs were construction-related (57 percent).

Reason for Job Termination. Sixty-three percent of both positive and non-positive terminees of previous jobs had voluntary terminations from the VICI program.

Completion of the VICI Program. Ninety-three percent of those who completed the VICI program were considered voluntary terminees. Only 55 percent of those who did not complete the program terminated voluntarily.

Number of Weeks in Program. The largest percentages (71-83 percent) of voluntary terminations were found among those who participated in VICI for more than 25 weeks. Among those who participated for 25 weeks or less, only 52-60 percent of terminations were voluntary.

### Summary

The results of these crosstabulations reveal certain interesting relationships between variables. The likelihood of a voluntary termination increases as a function of an applicant's level of education and the number of weeks he or she spends in the program. Similarly, the likelihood of a voluntary termination increases as FAS-V scores rise and with completion of the VICI program. Voluntary terminees are less likely to have participated in construction-related job training programs than are involuntary terminees. No relationships were found between termination type and the remaining variables.

### 2. Termination Type B (Positive, Non-Positive, or Other)

The results of the crosstabulation of intake and termination variables with the termination status variable, termination type B, are presented in Table I.6.

Sex. More than 50 percent of both male and female terminations are non-positive.

Ethnic Group. The majority of all terminations, regardless of ethnic group, are non-positive.

Age. A slightly larger proportion (46 percent) of older youths (age 18-19) terminated positively than did youths 16-17 years old (36 percent). A larger percentage of younger youths terminated non-positively than of older youths.

Highest Level of Education of Applicant. The proportion of VICI participants with positive terminations increased as level of education rose.

FAS-V Score. As participants' FAS-V scores increase, the percentage of positive terminations also increases. Thus, the higher a participant's score, the more likely it is that the termination will be positive.

Previous Participation in Job Training Program. Previous participation in a job training program appears not to be related to positive/non-positive termination status. The percentages of both positive and non-positive terminations were the same among those who had participated in previous job training programs as among those who had not participated in previous job training programs.

Total Months of Participation in Previous Job Training Program. The percentage of positive terminations increased with the number of months of participation in previous job training programs. The largest percentage of positive terminations occurred among those with 25 or more months of participation in previous job training programs.

Job Training--Construction-Related. A larger percentage (46 percent) of positive terminations was reported for participants whose previous job training programs were not construction-related than for participants whose previous job training programs were construction-related (36 percent).

Reason for Termination from Job Training Program. Positive terminations from previous job training programs formed the largest proportion (64 percent) of positive terminations from the VICI program. Proportions of non-positive (41 percent) and Other (38 percent) terminations from VICI approximately reflected proportions of such terminations from other programs.

Total Months of Previous Employment. The proportion of positive terminations tended to increase with the total number of months of previous employment. The exception to this was a decrease in the percentage of positive terminations for those who had been previously employed for 13-24 months.

Previous Job--Subsidized or Unsubsidized. This variable bears little relation to the percentages of positive, non-positive, or Other terminations.

Previous Job--Construction-Related. This too has little effect on the percentages of positive, non-positive, and Other terminations.

Reason for Termination from Previous Job. A slightly higher percentage of positive terminations from VICI were reported for those who had terminated positively from previous jobs.

Completion of VICI Program. Ninety-one percent of those who completed the VICI program terminated positively, whereas only 30 percent of those who did not complete VICI did so.

Number of Weeks in Program. The percentage of positive terminations increases with length of time spent in the VICI program. The highest percentage of positive terminations (76 percent) was found among youths who participated in the VICI program for 36-45 weeks.

### Summary

The crosstabulations of termination status with intake and termination variables revealed no significant relationships between termination status and the following variables: sex, ethnic group, age, previous participation in job training programs, prior construction-related job training, reason for termination from previous job training program, whether a previous job was subsidized or unsubsidized, whether a previous job was construction-related, and reasons for termination from a previous job.

The results did, however, suggest relationships between certain variables. The proportion of positive terminations increased as a function of the applicant's level of education and his or her FAS-V score. The percentage of positive terminations also increased with the number of months of participation in previous job training programs and with the total number of months of previous employment. The likelihood of a positive termination also increased with completion of the VICI program and with the amount of time spent in VICI.

3. Type of Job at Termination: Related Trade, Non-Related Trade, or Union Apprenticeship

A crosstabulation of job type at termination with intake and termination variables appears in Table I.7.

Sex. A smaller percentage of females obtained jobs in related trades and union apprenticeships than did males. Far more females obtained jobs in non-related trades (55 percent) than did males (23 percent).

Ethnic Group. Blacks and Hispanics were much less likely to obtain jobs in related trades than were whites. A larger percentage of Hispanics (56 percent) obtained union apprenticeships than did blacks (25 percent), and blacks obtained a larger percentage of union apprenticeships than whites (10 percent).

Age. A smaller proportion of older youths (age 18-19) obtained jobs in related trades than of younger youths. For jobs in non-related trades and union apprenticeships, the pattern is fairly similar.

Highest Level of Education of Applicant. The likelihood of a VICI participant obtaining a job in a related trade decreased with the amount of his or her education. Participants who completed only the eighth grade or lower were the most likely to obtain jobs in related trades. Participants who attended post-secondary school obtained the largest percentage of jobs in non-related trades. Youths who completed only the eighth grade or lower and youths with high school diplomas or GEDs obtained the largest proportion of union apprenticeships.

FAS-V Scores. Test scores do not appear to be correlated with job type at termination.

Previous Participation in Job Training Program. Higher proportions of youths with prior experience in job training programs were found obtaining each type of job at termination, compared with youths with no prior job training program experience.

Total Months of Participation in Previous Job Training Programs. Youths whose total participation in a previous job training program was one year or more were more likely to obtain jobs in both related and non-related trades than youths with less job training experience. However, a plurality of union apprenticeship positions went to youths with previous training of one year or less.

Job Training--Construction-Related. Youths whose job training programs were construction-related were more likely to obtain jobs in both non-related trades and union apprenticeships than youths whose job training programs were not construction-related.

Reason for Termination from Job Training Program. Most jobs in related trades were obtained by youths whose terminations from previous job training programs were positive or Other.

Total Months of Previous Employment. This variable has little or no effect on type of job at termination.

Previous Job--Subsidized or Unsubsidized. Participants whose previous jobs were unsubsidized obtained a plurality of jobs in related trades, but most union apprenticeships were obtained by youths whose previous jobs were subsidized.

Previous Job--Construction-Related. Forty-eight percent of those whose previous jobs were not construction-related obtained jobs in related trades, whereas only 28 percent of those whose previous jobs were construction-related did so. However, participants whose previous jobs were construction-related obtained more union apprenticeships than did those whose previous jobs were not construction-related.

Reason for Termination from Previous Job. There was no discernable relationship between positive or non-positive termination from a previous job and type of job obtained at termination from VICI.

Completion of VICI Program. Participants who completed the VICI program were more likely to obtain jobs in related trades and union apprenticeships than those who did not complete the program.

Number of Weeks in Program. Trainees who spent a half year or more in the VICI program were more likely to obtain jobs in related trades and union apprenticeship programs than those who were enrolled for less than half a year.

### Summary

The crosstabulation analysis revealed no major correlation between job type at termination and the following variables: FAS-V score, previous participation in job training programs, total months of participation in previous job training program, total months of previous employment, previous job--subsidized or unsubsidized, and reason for termination from previous job.

However, the analysis did reveal a number of relationships between job type at termination and certain other variables. For example, a smaller percentage of females than of males obtained jobs in related trades and union apprenticeships. Blacks and Hispanics obtained relatively fewer jobs in related trades than did whites, while a plurality of union apprenticeship positions was obtained by Hispanics.

The proportion of VICI participants obtaining jobs in related trades decreased with the amount of education obtained. Surprisingly, youths whose job training programs were construction-related were more likely to accept jobs in non-related trades. However, the greatest percentage of jobs in related trades was obtained by those whose terminations from previous job training programs were positive or Other. Participants whose previous jobs were not construction-related were more likely to obtain jobs in related trades than those whose previous jobs were construction-related. However, completion of the VICI program was positively correlated with obtaining a job in a related trade or a union apprenticeship: participants who completed the VICI program were more likely to obtain these positions than those who did not complete the program. Furthermore, VICI trainees who were enrolled a half year or longer were more likely to obtain jobs in related trades and union apprenticeships than those enrolled for shorter periods of time.

#### 4. Wages at Termination

The results of intake and termination variables crosstabulated with wages are presented in Table I.8.

Sex. Twenty-six percent of males were offered jobs at \$4.01-\$5.00 per hour at termination, whereas 48 percent of females were offered jobs at \$3.00 per hour or less.

Ethnic Group. A plurality of whites (30 percent) took jobs at \$3.01-\$4.00 per hour. A plurality of blacks (26 percent) took jobs at \$4.01-\$5. Most Hispanics took jobs at either \$3.01-\$4.01 per hour or at \$6.01-\$7.00 per hour.

Age. Of all 16 year olds obtaining jobs at termination, the majority (64 percent) were paid \$3.01-\$4.00 per hour; a plurality of 17 year olds (37 percent) were paid \$4.01-\$5.00 per hour; a plurality of 18 year olds (48 percent) were paid \$4.01-\$6.00 per hour; and a plurality of 19 year olds (46 percent) were paid either \$3.00 or less, or \$5.01-\$6.00 per hour. These results suggest a trend towards increased pay as age increases.

Highest Level of Education of Applicant. Most participants (58 percent) whose last completed grade was 8 or lower are earning either \$3.00 or less per hour or \$5.01-\$6.00 per hour. Thirty percent of those whose last completed grade was 9-11 are earning \$3.01-\$4.00 per hour. The largest percentage of participants (29 percent) who obtained High School Diplomas or GEDs are earning \$4.01-\$5.00 per hour. Most participants (80 percent) who attended post secondary school are earning either \$3.00 or less per hour or \$4.01 to \$5.00 per hour.

FAS-V Score. A plurality of participants (28 percent) who scored 70 or below on the FAS-V test were offered jobs at \$3.01-\$4.00 per hour. A 26 percent plurality of those scoring 71 or above were offered jobs at \$4.01-\$5.00 per hour.

Previous Participation in Job Training Program. Seventy-three percent of those who had not participated in a previous job training program were paid \$3.01-\$4.00 per hour, while a plurality (33 percent) of those who had participated in a previous job training program were paid \$4.01-\$5.00 per hours.

Total Months of Participation in Previous Job Training. No relationship was found between number of months of participation in previous job training and wages at termination from VICI.

Job Training--Construction-Related. The greatest proportion (37 percent) of participants whose job training was construction-related were offered \$3.00 or less per hour. An equal proportion of participants whose job training was not construction-related were offered \$4.01-\$5.00 per hour.

Reason for Termination from Job Training Program. A 40 percent plurality of positive terminees from other job training programs were paid \$4.01-\$5.00 per hour. A 31 percent plurality of non-positive terminees were also paid \$4.01 to \$5.00 per hour.

Total Months of Previous Employment. There is no clear relationship between length of previous employment and wages at termination from VICI.

Previous Job: Subsidized or Unsubsidized. Of those participants whose previous jobs were subsidized, a 33 percent plurality were offered \$5.01-\$6.00 per hour at termination from VICI. A 29 percent plurality of participants whose previous jobs were not subsidized were offered \$4.01-\$5.00 per hour.

Previous Job: Construction-Related. Equal percentages (22 percent) of participants whose previous jobs were construction-related received \$3.01-\$4.00, \$4.01-\$5.00, \$5.01-\$6.00, and \$6.01-\$7.00 per hour. A plurality (26 percent) of participants whose previous jobs were not construction-related received \$4.01-\$5.00 per hour.

Reason for Termination from Previous Job. The largest proportions of both positive (32 percent) and non-positive (30 percent) terminees from previous jobs were offered \$4.01-\$5.00 per hour.

Completion of the VICI Program. A plurality (36 percent) of participants who completed the VICI program are earning \$4.01-\$5.00 per hour. A plurality (35 percent) of those who did not complete the VICI program are earning \$3.00 or less per hour.

Number of weeks in program. The results indicate a pattern of increasing wages as a function of weeks spent in the VICI program.

### Summary

For most variables under examination, no distinct relationships between variables could be determined. However the crosstabulations did indicate a trend towards increasing wages as a function of weeks spent in the VICI program. Surprisingly, there was no distinct difference in the wages of participants with a GED and those with only a grade 9-11 education.

### Concluding Remarks

The statistical description presented here provides a comprehensive profile of the participants enrolled in VICI from its beginning in late 1978 through November, 1979. It also supplies a context for determining and interpreting the final outcomes of the demonstration. The full value of the data presented here cannot be fully realized, however, until the follow-up study has neared completion. No firm conclusions or inferences, therefore, should be drawn from this statistical description at this time.

Table I.1 Demographic Profile of VICI Youths by Site

<u>SITE</u>	Atlanta N %	Broward N %	Chicago N %	Milwaukee N %	Newark N %	New Haven N %	Philadelphia N %	S. Bronx N %	Total N %
	0 0	1 1	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	1 1
	9 9	30 19	3 4	1 1	5 4	16 14	2 2	7 8	73 8
	16 15	39 27	4 5	34 21	50 36	30 26	16 16	28 31	217 23
	32 31	46 31	35 43	58 37	43 31	39 33	53 50	31 35	337 35
	47 46	32 22	40 47	64 41	41 29	32 27	32 31	24 26	312 32
or older	1 1	0 0	1 1	0 0	0 0	0 0	1 1	1 0	4 1
male	79 75	112 76	70 84	138 88	103 74	101 86	93 89	65 71	761 81
ale	26 25	36 24	13 16	19 12	36 26	16 14	11 11	26 29	183 19
<u>GROUP</u>									
te	2 2	5 3	2 2	11 7	0 0	25 21	1 1	1 1	47 5
ck	103 98	143 97	45 55	134 85	108 78	77 66	99 95	57 63	766 80
panic	0 0	0 0	35 42	11 7	30 21	13 11	4 4	32 35	125 13
African Indian	0 0	0 0	1 1	1 1	0 0	2 2	0 0	0 0	4 1
er	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	1 1	0 0	0 0	1 1	2 1
<u>STATUS</u>									
ad	7 7	10 7	15 18	10 6	10 7	4 3	1 1	4 4	61 7
ber	96 91	132 89	61 74	108 69	119 86	92 79	102 98	78 86	788 83
lly of One	2 2	6 4	7 8	39 25	10 7	21 18	1 1	9 10	95 10

Table I.1 Demographic Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

<u>SITE</u>	Atlanta N %	Broward N %	Chicago N %	Milwaukee N %	Newark N %	New Haven N %	Philadelphia N %	S. Bronx N %	Total N %
<u>NUMBER IN HOUSEHOLD</u>									
1-4	47 45	58 40	33 40	97 61	52 37	68 58	55 53	53 58	463 49
5-8	52 49	62 43	38 46	50 32	79 57	42 36	46 44	37 41	406 43
9-12	6 6	23 14	12 14	9 6	8 6	7 6	3 3	1 1	69 7
13-20	10 0	5 3	0 0	1 1	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	6 1
<u>NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS</u>									
0	83 79	119 81	73 88	128 82	98 71	110 94	75 72	55 60	741 79
1	17 16	24 16	6 7	22 14	35 25	6 5	25 24	28 31	163 17
2	2 2	5 3	4 5	6 3	4 3	0 0	4 4	6 7	31 3
3-8	3 3	0 0	0 0	1 1	2 1	1 1	0 0	2 2	9 1
<u>UNABLE TO COMMUNI-</u>									
<u>CATE IN ENGLISH</u>									
Yes	0 0	2 1	5 6	2 1	2 1	0 0	0 0	1 1	12 1
No	105 100	146 99	78 94	155 99	137 99	117 100	104 100	90 99	932 99
<u>HANDICAPPED</u>									
Yes	1 1	2 1	0 0	1 1	2 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	9 1
No	104 99	146 99	83 100	156 99	137 99	116 99	103 99	90 99	935 99
<u>VETERAN</u>									
Yes	3 3	1 1	2 2	7 5	0 0	2 2	1 1	2 2	18 2
No	102 97	147 99	81 98	150 95	139 100	115 98	103 99	89 98	926 98

Table I.1 Demographic Profile of VICI Youth by Site (Continued)

<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>SITE</u>	Atlanta N %	Broward N %	Chicago N %	Milwaukee N %	Newark N %	New Haven N %	Philadelphia N %	S. Bronx N %	Total N %
<u>CITIZENSHIP</u>										
Yes		105 100	147 99	79 95	157 100	139 100	117 100	104 100	89 98	937 99
No		0 0	1 1	4 5	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	2 2	7 1
<u>OFFENDER</u>										
Yes		8 8	25 17	0 0	21 13	12 9	24 20	3 3	4 4	97 10
No		97 92	123 83	83 100	136 87	127 91	93 80	101 97	87 96	847 90
<u>MIGRANT/SEASONAL FARM FAMILY</u>										
Yes		0 0	4 3	0 0	2 1	0 0	0 0	0 0	1 1	7 1
No		105 100	144 97	83 100	155 99	139 100	117 100	104 100	90 99	937 99
<u>HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF APPLICANT</u>										
Grade 8 or less		3 3	3 2	0 0	4 3	12 8	6 5	1 1	4 4	33 3
Grades 9-11		61 58	108 73	54 65	127 81	103 74	75 64	72 69	76 84	676 72
H.S. Diploma or GED		37 35	36 24	27 33	23 14	23 17	34 29	30 29	10 11	220 23
Post-secondary school		4 4	1 1	2 2	3 2	1 1	2 2	1 1	1 1	15 2

Table I.1. Demographic Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

<u>SITE ELEMENT</u>	Atlanta N 8	Broward N 8	Chicago N 8	Milwaukee N 8	Newark N 8	New Haven N 8	Philadelphia N 8	S. Bronx N 8	Total N 8
<u>HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF FATHER</u>									
Grade 8 or less	12 11	33 23	24 29	18 11	11 8	13 11	4 4	9 10	124 13
Grades 9-11	25 24	15 10	12 15	26 17	26 19	16 14	25 24	14 15	159 17
H.S. Diploma or GED	24 23	24 16	15 18	31 20	28 20	27 23	19 18	24 26	192 20
Post secondary school	3 3	3 2	1 1	2 1	3 2	9 8	1 1	6 7	28 3
Unknown	41 39	73 49	31 37	80 51	71 51	52 44	55 53	38 42	441 47
<u>HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF MOTHER</u>									
Grade 8 or less	10 9	27 18	31 37	24 15	8 6	11 9	5 5	13 14	129 14
Grade 9-11	40 38	46 31	15 18	34 22	33 23	27 23	40 38	25 28	260 28
H.S. Diploma or GED	31 30	28 19	13 16	49 31	48 35	38 32	37 36	26 29	270 29
Post secondary school	6 6	4 3	10 12	4 3	7 5	10 9	4 4	4 4	49 5
Unknown	18 17	43 29	14 17	46 29	43 31	31 2	18 17	23 25	236 24
<u>FAS-V TEST</u>									
Mean	62.99	62.05	76.06	64.00	58.91	70.02	68.11	71.14	65.79
S.D.	12.65	13.91	11.25	12.89	15.14	13.38	12.79	11.44	14.07
N	102	147	83	153	139	117	100	90	931

Table I.2 Economic Profile of VICI Youths by Site

<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>SITE</u>	Atlanta	Broward	Chicago	Milwaukee	Newark	New Haven	Philadelphia	S. Bronx	Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>UI CLAIMANT</u>											
Yes		0	0	1	1	2	2	9	6	1	1
No		105	100	147	99	81	98	148	94	138	99
<u>REASONS FOR DISADVANTAGED STATUS*</u>											
(1) Family receives cash public assistance											
Yes		29	27	36	24	23	27	65	41	39	28
(2) Applicant received cash public assistance											
Yes		7	7	11	7	14	17	37	24	15	11
(3) Below poverty level											
Yes		80	76	118	80	65	78	109	69	117	84
<u>EMPLOYMENT STATUS</u>											
Unemployed		103	98	135	91	74	89	144	92	136	98
Underemployed		1	1	5	3	4	5	9	6	1	1
Not in labor force		1	1	8	6	5	6	4	2	2	1

\*Percentages do not sum to 100%. These data are derived from three separate "yes-no" questions. Only "yes" responses are reported.

Table I.2, Economic Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

ELEMENT SITE	Atlanta	Broward	Chicago	Milwaukee	Newark	New Haven	Philadelphia	S. Bronx	Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>SOURCE OF REFERRAL</u>										
<u>VICI</u>										
Program staff	19	18	41	29	21	26	31	20	37	27
Employment Service	7	7	6	4	0	0	23	15	11	8
Friends	20	19	42	29	34	41	21	14	56	41
Other CETA Program	14	13	28	19	2	2	27	17	3	2
Community Organization	20	19	4	3	12	15	43	27	11	8
Church	1	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	1
School	4	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	9	8
Newspaper, TV, Radio	12	11	11	4	5	6	0	0	3	2
Probation, Parole Courts	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	2	2	1
Previous Employer	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	6	6	14	10	6	7	8	5	14	10
<u>PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION IN JOB TRAINING PROGRAM</u>										
No	67	64	122	82	74	89	79	50	127	91
Yes	38	36	26	18	9	11	78	50	12	9
									102	87
									89	86
									82	90
									742	79
									202	21

Table I.2. Economic Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

<u>SITE ELEMENT</u>	Atlanta	Broward	Chicago	Milwaukee	Newark	New Haven	Philadelphia	S. Bronx	Total
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
<u>TOTAL MONTHS OF PARTICIPATION IN PREVIOUS JOB TRAINING</u>									
Mean	4.42	4.73	9.33	6.58	3.33	5.67	14.67	5.56	6.31
S.D.	3.93	3.34	10.12	10.59	2.40	4.64	11.97	3.81	8.39
N	38	26	3	78	9	15	15	9	193
<u>JOB TRAINING-CONSTRUCTION RELATED</u>									
Yes	17	45	5	19	3	38	21	27	45
No	21	55	21	81	5	62	57	73	136
<u>REASON FOR TERMINATION FROM JOB TRAINING PROGRAM</u>									
Positive	0	0	3	12	1	11	13	17	25
Non-Positive	36	95	22	85	5	56	43	55	140
Other	2	5	1	3	3	33	22	28	37
<u>TOTAL MONTHS OF PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT</u>									
Mean	10.92	8.03	15.13	9.14	5.45	7.06	7.68	4.74	8.02
S.D.	7.06	9.39	14.93	9.12	5.94	9.00	5.99	3.24	8.64
N	36	37	23	63	58	54	25	39	335

Table I.2. Economic Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

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ELEMENT	SITE		Atlanta	Broward	Chicago	Milwaukee	Newark	New Haven	Philadelphia	S. Bronx	Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>MONTHS SINCE LAST JOB</u>												
Still on job	0	0	8	5	2	2	5	3	0	0	2	2
Never held job	13	12	28	19	22	27	33	21	12	9	26	25
0-3 months	53	51	57	38	37	45	75	48	64	45	38	36
4-6 months	20	19	25	17	6	7	17	11	22	16	20	17
7-12 months	9	8	22	15	11	13	14	9	14	10	15	10
13 months-2 years	9	9	5	4	4	5	8	5	16	12	9	9
25 months-3 years	0	0	2	1	0	0	3	2	6	4	2	2
37 months-5 years	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	5	4	1	1
<u>MOST RECENT JOB-TERMINATION REASON</u>												
Another job	3	3	3	3	3	5	5	4	2	2	3	3
School	10	11	9	7	17	28	5	4	2	2	3	3
Training program	12	13	9	7	1	2	11	9	2	2	7	7
Fired	2	2	8	6	3	5	13	11	6	5	11	10
Laid off	16	17	14	12	10	16	15	12	23	22	23	30
Injury/health prob., pregnancy	2	2	3	3	0	0	3	2	1	1	0	0
Moved	2	2	5	4	4	7	6	5	3	2	6	6
Didn't like job	6	7	23	19	2	3	19	15	11	8	14	13
Transportation problems	7	8	5	4	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2
Family responsibilities	0	0	2	2	2	3	4	3	0	0	1	1
Other	32	35	39	33	19	31	41	33	72	56	41	40
											36	46
											19	26
											299	308

Table I.2. Economic Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

ELEMENT \ SITE	Atlanta	Broward	Chicago	Milwaukee	Newark	New Haven	Philadelphia	S. Bronx	Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>PREVIOUS JOB-SUBSIDIZED/UNSUBSIDIZED</b>										
Subsidized	34	39	41	36	24	53	45	38	63	45
Unsubsidized	54	61	74	64	21	47	75	63	47	55
<b>PREVIOUS JOB-CONSTRUCTION RELATED</b>										
Related	17	21	18	18	8	16	14	12	7	8
Unrelated	66	79	80	82	41	84	107	88	77	85
<b>MOST RECENT JOB-MEAN HOURS PER WEEK</b>										
Mean	33.51	37.86	31.57	32.68	35.32	29.35	34.77	30.97	33.52	
S.D.	10.47	6.91	10.49	10.84	6.56	9.71	7.96	9.41	9.38	
N	90	119	61	122	127	106	78	71	774	
<b>MOST RECENT JOB-MEAN HOURLY WAGE</b>										
Mean	2.94	2.92	2.88	2.96	2.75	2.80	2.74	2.67	2.84	
S.D.	.71	.52	.68	.69	.47	.49	.57	.49	.59	
N	90	119	61	118	127	106	71	71	770	

Table I.3. Weekly Progress of VICI Youths by Site

ELEMENT \ SITE	Atlanta	Broward	Chicago	Milwaukee	Newark	New Haven	Philadelphia	S. Bronx	Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>ATTENDANCE</u>										
Full work day	5285	62	10,140	74	9295	81	6847	57	9560	62
Holiday, rain, snow	445	5	642	5	441	4	625	5	710	5
Illness	368	4	625	4	234	2	385	3	504	4
Other excused ab- sence	600	7	407	3	280	2	1530	13	662	5
Unexcused absence	719	8	905	7	486	4	1581	13	712	5
Late	385	4	501	4	196	2	327	3	457	3
Release time for educ. activities	161	2	83	1	164	1	174	1	246	2
Other	730	8	312	2	422	4	651	5	138	8
<u>DISCIPLINARY ACTION</u>										
Yes	71	68	56	38	59	71	93	59	70	56
No	34	32	92	62	24	29	64	41	61	44
<u>GED OR CERTIFICATE ATTAINED</u>										
Yes	2	2	0	0	14	17	1	1	5	4
No	103	98	148	100	69	83	156	99	134	96
									112	96
									100	96
									85	93
										907
										%

Table I.3. Weekly Progress of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

SITE ELEMENT	Atlanta N 8	Broward N 8	Chicago N 8	Milwaukee N 8	Newark N 8	New Haven N 8	Philadelphia N 8	S. Bronx N 8	Total N 8
<u>PERFORMANCE RATING</u>									
Excellent	32 1	106 2	878 30	381 10	91 2	390 7	264 9	97 10	2,239 8
Good	504 30	2441 64	1507 53	1916 49	2110 40	2354 43	979 31	626 61	12,917 45
Adequate	2054 61	1173 30	399 14	1298 33	2943 55	2575 47	1454 46	233 23	12,129 42
Poor	217 0	100 3	51 2	195 5	95 2	105 2	325 10	56 5	1,144 4
Inadequate	64 2	12 1	7 1	109 3	62 1	1 1	118 4	8 1	301 1
<u>RECEIPT OF PAY RAISE INCENTIVE WHEN DUE</u>									
Yes	144 96	211 91	109 92	104 96	335 86	84 62	157 95	35 28	1,179 83
No	6 4	22 9	9 8	4 4	53 14	52 38	5 5	88 72	239 17
<u>REASONS FOR NOT RECEIVING PAY RAISE INCENTIVE</u>									
Poor work performance	0 0	2 9	0 0	1 16	0 0	29 33	3 33	0 0	35 13
Absenteeism/lateness	3 50	8 36	2 22	4 68	0 0	46 51	3 33	0 0	64 23
Misconduct	0 0	5 23	0 0	1 16	0 0	10 11	2 22	0 0	18 6
Other	3 50	7 32	7 78	0 0	53 100	4 5	1 12	88 100	163 58

Table I.4. Termination Profile of VICI Youths by Site

SITE ELEMENT	Atlanta N %	Broward N %	Chicago N %	Milwaukee N %	Newark N %	New Haven N %	Philadelphia N %	S. Bronx N %	Total N %
<b>TERMINATION TYPE-A</b>									
Voluntary	35 63	77 74	29 60	86 71	52 53	45 66	18 41	23 61	365 63
Involuntary	21 37	27 26	19 40	35 29	46 47	23 34	26 59	15 39	212 47
<b>TERMINATION TYPE-B</b>									
Positive	27 48	46 44	22 46	49 40	46 47	32 47	11 25	15 39	248 43
Non-positive	26 46	49 47	26 54	69 57	50 51	34 50	32 73	22 58	308 53
Other	3 6	9 9	0 0	3 3	2 2	2 3	1 2	1 3	21 4
<b>REASONS FOR VOLUNTARY TERMINATIONS</b>									
Employed <sup>1</sup>	24 70	37 49	19 66	39 46	44 85	30 67	6 33	9 40	208 57
Training <sup>2</sup>	1 3	2 3	0 0	1 1	1 2	0 0	0 0	3 13	8 2
School	2 5	7 9	3 10	9 11	1 2	2 4	5 27	3 13	32 9
Look for work	1 3	5 6	1 3	3 3	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	10 2
Injury/Health	2 5	5 6	0 0	3 3	1 2	0 0	3 17	1 4	15 4
Family Resp.	1 3	1 1	0 0	1 1	0 0	2 4	0 0	0 0	5 1
Moved/cannot be located	0	1 1	2 7	11 13	0 0	3 7	2 11	3 13	22 6
Transportation problems	0	0 0	0 0	1 1	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	1 1
Lost interest/unhappy with prog.	1 3	10 13	4 14	15 18	3 5	6 14	1 6	3 13	43 12
Other	1 3	2 3	0 0	0 0	2 4	2 4	0 0	1 4	8 2
Unknown	2 5	7 9	0 0	3 3	0 0	0 0	1 6	0 0	13 4

1. Includes jobs in related and unrelated trades, union apprenticeships and military service.

2. Includes training programs in related and unrelated trades, and transfers to CETA programs.

Table I.4. Termination Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

SITE ELEMENT	Atlanta N %	Broward N %	Chicago N %	Milwaukee N %	Newark N %	New Haven N %	Philadelphia N %	S. Bronx N %	Total N %
<u>TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT AFTER TERMINATION</u>									
Job in related trade	7 29	17 46	1 5	25 64	16 36	17 58	1 17	2 22	86 41
Job in non-related trade	12 50	11 30	2 11	11 28	4 9	3 10	4 66	3 34	50 24
Union apprenticeship	2 8	7 19	15 79	2 5	22 50	5 16	0 0	2 22	55 26
Military service	3 13	2 5	1 5	1 3	2 5	5 16	1 17	2 22	17 9
<u>JOB REQUIRES VICI CONSTRUCTION SKILLS</u>									
Yes	10 45	29 74	10 77	30 73	38 90	22 81	1 20	5 50	145 73
No	12 55	10 26	3 23	11 27	4 10	5 19	4 80	5 50	54 27
<u>HOURLY WAGE</u>									
Mean	3.32	4.35	5.93	5.13	4.02	4.23	5.00	3.73	4.59
S.D.	1.14	1.13	1.39	1.64	.87	.87	1.42	.73	1.34
N	19	39	13	39	42	26	5	10	193
<u>JOB PERFORMANCE</u>									
Permanent	19 86	38 97	11 85	37 90	39 93	25 93	4 80	9 90	182 92
Temporary	3 14	1 3	2 15	4 10	3 7	2 7	1 20	1 10	17 8

Table I.4. Termination Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

ELEMENT	SITE		Atlanta	Broward	Chicago	Milwaukee	Newark	New Haven	Philadelphia	S. Bronx	Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>JOB SUBSIDIZATION</u>												
Subsidized	6	27	1	3	0	0	0	0	3	80	2	20
Unsubsidized	16	73	38	97	13	100	41	100	39	93	1	20
<u>TYPE OF JOB PLACE-MENT</u>												
Direct Placement	1	18	25	64	5	39	27	66	41	98	19	70
Self Placement	18	82	14	36	8	61	14	34	1	2	0	30
<u>REASONS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATIONS</u>												
Unsatisfactory attendance	16	76	5	19	12	63	25	71	24	52	11	48
Unsatisfactory work performance	0	0	1	3	2	11	2	6	2	5	4	18
Misconduct	5	24	5	19	1	5	6	17	7	15	7	30
End of demonstration	0	0	0	0	4	21	0	0	1	2	0	0
Other	0	0	16	59	0	0	2	6	12	26	1	4

Table I.4. Termination Profile of VICI Youths by Site (Continued)

<u>SITE</u>	Atlanta	Broward	Chicago	Milwaukee	Newark	New Haven	Philadelphia	S. Bronx	Total									
<u>ELEMENT</u>	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N									
<u>TERMINATING PARTICIPANTS COMPLETING THE PROGRAM</u>																		
Yes	0	0	25	24	21	44	14	12	44	45	16	24	0	0	3	8	123	21
No	56	100	80	76	27	56	106	88	54	55	52	76	44	100	35	92	454	79
<u>NUMBER OF WEEKS IN PROGRAM</u>																		
Mean	18.48		18.11		34.10		16.94		23.48		23.00		13.09		15.78		20.19	
S.D.	13.60		14.91		15.79		15.56		14.63		13.18		10.13		9.53		15.01	
N	56		105		48		120		98		60		44		37		576	
<u>APPLY FOR/RECEIVE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE</u>																		
Yes	0	0	15	14	0	0	4	4	1	1	0	0	11	25	1	3	32	6
No	44	79	16	15	19	40	50	48	17	17	53	70	25	57	18	47	250	43
Unknown	12	21	70	71	29	60	58	48	80	82	15	22	8	18	19	50	295	51

Table I.5. Termination Type A

Variable	Voluntary		Involuntary	
	N	%	N	%
<b>Sex</b>				
Male	301	63	174	37
Female	64	63	38	67
<b>Ethnic Group</b>				
White	21	70	9	30
Black	295	46	169	56
American Indian	0	0	1	1%
Hispanic	48	69	32	40
Other	1	50	1	50
<b>Age</b>				
15	1	100	0	0
16	29	57	22	43
17	78	58	56	42
18	126	64	72	36
19	129	68	61	32
20	1	50	1	50
23	1	100	0	0

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Table I 5. Termination Type A (continued)

Variable	Voluntary		Involuntary	
	N	%	N	%
<b>Highest Level of Education of Applicant</b>				
Grade 8 or less	9	50	9	50
Grades 9-11	25	59	169	41
High School Diploma or GED	103	76	33	24
Post Secondary School	8	89	1	11
<b>FAS-V Score</b>				
0-50	41	48	44	52
51-60	70	64	40	36
61-70	91	59	63	41
71-80	95	69	42	31
81-90	51	73	19	27
91-99	11	85	2	15
<b>Previous Participation in Job Training Program</b>				
No	272	62	165	38
Yes	93	66	47	34
<b>Total months of participation in previous job training program</b>				
0-6	63	66	33	34
7-12	18	67	9	33
13-24	6	75	2	25
25+	2	67	1	33

Table I.5. Termination Type A (continued)

Variable	Voluntary		Involuntary	
	N	%	N	%
<b>Job Training--Construction Related</b>				
Yes	22	52	20	48
No	71	72	27	28
<b>Reason for Termination from Job Training Program</b>				
Positive	10	71	4	29
Non-positive	66	66	34	34
Other	17	65	9	35
<b>Total Months of Previous Employment</b>				
0-6	100	65	55	35
7-12	21	66	11	34
13-24	14	58	10	42
25-36	11	85	2	15
37+	4	80	1	20
<b>Previous Job--Subsidized Unsubsidized</b>				
Subsidized	127	64	72	36
Unsubsidized	164	65	87	35
<b>Previous Job--Construction Related</b>				
Related	33	57	25	43
Not Related	223	64	123	36

Table I.5. Termination Type A (continued)

Variable	Voluntary		Involuntary	
	N	%	N	%
<b>Reason for Termination from Previous Job</b>				
Positive	50	63	30	37
Non-positive	129	63	76	37
Other	131	67	65	33
<b>Completion of VICE Program</b>				
Yes	115	93	8	7
No	250	55	204	45
<b>Number of Weeks in Program</b>				
1-5	62	60	41	40
6-15	99	54	83	46
16-25	43	52	40	48
26-35	57	71	23	29
36-45	71	83	15	17
46-52	32	76	10	24

**Table I.6. Termination Type B**

Variable	Positive		Non-Positive		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>Sex</b>						
Male	215	45	240	51	19	4
Female	33	32	67	66	2	2
<b>Ethnic Group</b>						
White	11	37	13	60	1	3
Black	204	44	240	52	19	4
American Indian	0	0	1	100	0	0
Hispanic	32	40	47	59	1	1
Other	1	50	1	50	0	0
<b>Age</b>						
15	0	0	0	0	1	100
16	14	28	32	64	4	8
17	52	39	77	57	5	4
18	92	46	103	52	3	2
19	88	46	94	49	8	5
Aböve 19	2	67	1	33	0	0

Table I.6. Termination Type B (continued)

Variable	Positive		Non-Positive		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>Highest Level of Education of Applicant</b>						
Grade 8 or less	8	44	10	56	0	0
Grades 9-11	149	36	246	60	18	4
High School Diploma or GED	84	62	49	36	3	2
Post Secondary School	7	78	2	22	0	0
<b>FAS-V Score</b>						
0-50	21	25	55	65	8	10
51-60	47	43	58	53	5	4
61-70	65	42	86	56	3	2
71-80	66	48	67	49	4	3
81-90	36	51	33	47	1	2
91-99	10	77	3	23	0	0
<b>Previous Participation in Job Training Program</b>						
No	188	43	233	53	15	4
Yes	60	43	74	53	6	4
<b>Total months of participation in previous job training program</b>						
0-6	39	41	54	56	3	3
7-12	11	41	14	52	2	7
13-24	4	50	3	37	1	13
25+	2	66	1	33	0	0

Table I.6. Termination Type B (continued)

Variable	Positive		Non-Positive		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>Job Training--Construction Related</b>						
Yes	15	36	27	64	0	0
No	45	46	47	48	6	6
<b>Reason for Termination from Job Training Program</b>						
Positive	9	64	5	35	0	0
Non-positive	41	41	54	54	5	5
Other	10	38	15	58	1	4
<b>Total Months of Previous Employment</b>						
0-6	73	47	80	52	2	1
7-12	16	50	15	47	1	3
13-24	9	38	14	58	1	4
25-36	7	54	5	38	1	8
37+	4	80	1	20	0	0
<b>Previous Job--Subsidized Unsubsidized</b>						
Subsidized	94	47	97	48	8	5
Unsubsidized	114	46	127	51	9	3
<b>Previous Job--Construction Related</b>						
Related	24	41	34	59	0	0
Not Related	156	45	177	51	13	4

Table I.6. Termination Type B (continued)

Variable	Positive		Non-Positive		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>Reason for Termination from Previous Job</b>						
Positive	39	49	38	48	3	3
Non-positive	85	41	113	55	7	4
Other	96	49	92	47	7	4
<b>Completion of VICI Program</b>						
Yes	112	51	11	9	0	0
No	136	30	296	65	21	5
<b>Number of Weeks in Program</b>						
1-5	20	20	75	73	7	7
6-15	56	31	116	64	10	5
16-25	25	30	56	67	2	3
26-35	52	65	27	34	1	1
36-45	65	76	21	24	0	0
46-52	29	69	12	29	1	2

Table I.7. Type of Job at Termination

Variable	Job In Related Trade		Job In Non-Related Trade		Union Apprenticeship	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>Sex</b>						
Male	79	46	39	23	53	31
Female	7	35	11	55	2	10
<b>Ethnic Group</b>						
White	6	60	3	30	1	10
Black	73	47	44	28	40	25
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	7	30	3	13	13	57
Other	0	0	0	0	1	100
<b>Age</b>						
16	4	40	4	40	2	20
17	22	56	7	18	10	26
18	29	40	21	30	21	30
19	31	45	17	25	21	30
20+	0	0	1	50	1	50

Table I.7. Type of Job at Termination (continued)

Variable	Job in Related Trade		Job in Non-Related Trade		Union Apprenticeship	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Highest Level of Education of Applicant						
Grade 8 or less	3	60	0	0	2	40
Grades 9-11	59	51	31	27	25	22
High School Diploma or GED	22	34	17	26	26	40
Post Secondary School	2	33	2	33	2	34
FAS-V Score						
0-50	13	62	6	29	2	10
51-60	17	47	7	19	12	34
61-70	19	38	15	31	15	31
71-80	28	57	8	16	13	27
81-90	6	25	8	33	10	42
91-99	2	22	4	44	3	34
Previous Participation in Job Training Program						
No	62	43	36	25	47	32
Yes	24	52	14	30	8	18
Total months of participation in previous job training program						
0-6	17	61	6	21	5	18
7-12	3	33	5	56	1	11
13-24	2	50	2	50	0	0
25+	1	100	0	0	0	0

Table I.7. Type of Job at Termination (continued)

Variable	Job in Related Trade		Job in Non-Related Trade		Union Apprenticeship	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>Job Training--Construction Related</b>						
Yes	4	33	5	42	3	25
No	20	59	9	26	5	15
<b>Reason for Termination from Job Training Program</b>						
Positive	3	60	0	0	2	40
Non-positive	16	48	12	37	5	15
Other	5	63	2	25	1	12
<b>Total Months of Previous Employment</b>						
0-6	23	44	8	15	21	41
7-12	5	42	3	25	4	33
13-24	4	50	1	13	3	37
25-36	3	42	2	29	2	29
37+	1	25	2	50	1	25
<b>Previous Job--Subsidized Unsubsidized</b>						
Subsidized	29	40	17	24	26	36
Unsubsidized	44	51	24	28	18	21
<b>Previous Job--Construction Related</b>						
Related	5	28	5	28	8	44
Not Related	58	48	34	28	28	24

Table I.7. Type of Job at Termination (continued)

Variable	Job in Related Trade		Job in Non-Related Trade		Union Apprenticeship	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>Reason for Termination from Previous Job</b>						
Positive	13	46	8	29	7	25
Non-positive	30	43	22	32	17	25
Other	35	49	13	18	24	33
<b>Completion of VOCI Program</b>						
Yes	56	51	5	5	49	44
No	30	37	45	56	6	7
<b>Number of Weeks in Program</b>						
1-5	2	17	10	83	0	0
6-15	10	31	21	66	1	3
16-25	10	56	4	22	4	22
26-35	26	59	3	7	15	34
36-45	21	37	11	19	25	44
46-52	17	61	1	4	10	35

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TABLE I.8. Wages at Termination

	\$0-\$3.00		\$3.01-\$4.00		\$4.01-\$5.00		\$5.01-\$6.00		\$6.01-\$7.00		\$7.01-\$9.00	
VARIABLE	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z	N	Z
Sex												
Male	26	15	41	24	44	26	39	23	16	9	6	3
Female	10	48	4	19	4	19	2	9	1	5	0	0
Ethnic Group												
White	2	20	3	30	2	20	1	10	1	10	1	10
Black	32	20	37	23	42	26	38	23	11	7	3	1
American Indian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hispanic	1	6	5	28	3	17	2	11	5	28	2	10
Other	1	50	0	0	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0
Age												
16	2	18	7	64	2	18	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	5	13	11	29	14	37	8	21	0	0	0	0
18	13	17	15	20	18	24	18	24	8	11	4	4
19	15	23	11	17	14	21	15	23	9	14	2	2
>19	1	50	1	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE I.8 Wages at Termination (cont.)

VARIABLE	\$0-\$3.00		\$3.01-\$4.00		\$4.01-\$5.00		\$5.01-\$6.00		\$6.01-\$7.00		\$7.01-\$9.00	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Highest Level of Education of Applicant												
Grade 8 or less	2	29	1	14	1	14	2	25	1	14	0	0
Grades 9-11	20	17	36	30	27	23	24	20	8	7	4	3
High School Diploma or GED	12	19	8	13	10	29	14	23	8	13	2	3
Post Secondary School	2	40	0	0	2	40	1	20	0	0	0	0
FAS-V Score												
0-50	6	27	5	23	7	32	2	9	2	9	0	0
51-60	3	7	15	38	8	21	11	28	1	3	1	3
61-70	15	31	11	22	12	24	8	16	2	4	1	3
71-80	4	8	8	17	12	25	15	31	7	15	2	3
81-90	8	33	3	13	6	25	3	13	2	8	2	8
91-99	0	0	1	12	3	38	1	12	3	38	0	0
Previous Participation in Job Training Program												
No	24	14	38	23	32	19	35	21	11	6	4	3
Yes	12	24	7	14	16	33	6	12	6	12	2	5
Total months of participation in previous job training program												
0-6	7	24	2	7	13	45	3	10	2	7	2	7
7-12	4	36	2	19	1	9	1	9	3	27	0	0
13-24	0	0	1	33	1	33	1	34	0	0	0	0
25+	1	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE I.8. Wages at Termination (cont.)

	\$0-\$3.00		\$3.01-\$4.00		\$4.01-\$5.00		\$5.01-\$6.00		\$6.01-\$7.00		\$7.01-\$9.00	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<b>VARIABLES</b>												
Job Training--Construction Related												
Related	5	37	3	21	3	21	1	7	1	7	1	7
Non-related	7	20	4	11	13	37	5	14	5	14	1	4
Reason for Termination From Job Training Program												
Positive	1	20	1	20	2	40	1	20	0	0	0	0
Non-positive	9	26	6	17	11	31	2	6	5	14	2	6
Other	2	22	0	0	3	35	3	35	1	12	0	0
Total Months of Previous Employment												
0-6	10	19	8	15	15	29	14	27	3	6	2	4
7-12	1	9	3	23	2	15	5	38	2	15	0	0
13-24	0	0	2	29	2	29	1	13	2	29	0	0
25-36	0	0	2	29	2	29	2	29	0	0	1	13
37+	1	25	1	25	0	0	0	0	2	50	0	0
Previous Job--Subsidized Unsubsidized												
Subsidized	8	12	17	25	13	19	23	33	7	10	1	1
Unsubsidized	22	24	20	22	27	29	13	14	7	8	3	3
Previous Job--Construction Related												
Related	2	12	4	22	4	22	4	22	4	22	0	0
Not Related	24	20	28	23	31	26	23	19	9	7	5	5

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TABLE I.8. Wages at Termination (cont.)

VARIABLES	\$0-\$3.00		\$3.01-\$4.00		\$4.01-\$5.00		\$5.01-\$6.00		\$6.01-\$7.00		\$7.01-\$9.00	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Reason for Termination from Previous Job												
Positive	4	15	4	15	8	32	5	19	5	19	0	0
Non-positive	17	23	19	25	22	30	9	12	4	5	4	5
Other	9	13	17	25	13	19	23	33	6	9	1	1
Completion of VICI Program												
Yes	4	4	19	19	37	36	29	28	11	11	2	2
No	32	35	26	29	11	12	12	13	6	7	4	4
Number of Weeks in Program												
1-5	7	44	5	31	2	13	1	6	0	0	1	6
6-15	17	49	10	29	3	9	4	11	0	0	1	2
16-25	3	14	7	33	4	19	5	24	1	5	1	5
26-35	2	5	11	26	13	30	11	26	5	12	1	1
36-45	5	9	7	12	16	28	19	33	8	14	2	4
46-52	1	5	5	25	10	50	1	5	3	15	0	0

## II. AGGREGATE COMPARISON

The purpose of the aggregate comparison task is to compare the VICI project with other youth employment and training programs. To make a general statistical comparison among these programs, we have used aggregated data from the formula-funded Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Programs (YCCIP) and from the Youth Employment and Training Programs (YETP) operating at each VICI site. This comparison provides a profile of the types of youths participating in the various employment and training demonstrations and gives some preliminary indications of what happens to participants upon termination.

The basic approach followed here is descriptive, and gross statistical comparisons on selected variables are made among VICI, YCCIP, and YETP. Rigorous experimental analyses of program effects are not appropriate, due to a lack of comparability among program goals and features, participant background characteristics, and the various data bases.

The selection of variables for study was dictated to some extent by the existing data bases for the different programs. The study variables to be analyzed here can be classified under the following categories:

### Participant Background

1. sex
2. educational status
3. economic disadvantagedness
4. race/ethnic groups
5. limited English speaking
6. handicapped
7. offender
8. labor force status

### Program Status

1. cumulative total of participants
2. current enrollment
3. program activities
4. terminations
5. turnover rate

Termination data must be interpreted cautiously since the demonstration programs have not yet been completed and comparisons may be misleading at this time. Also, differences among programs with respect to participant characteristics, program goals, and reporting procedures limit the comparability of the available data bases. For example, both YCCIP and YETP participants may be currently enrolled full-time in school, whereas VICI participants, by program design, may not attend high school. (The DOL Quarterly Reports state that small numbers of VICI participants attend high school. It's not clear at this time whether this represents a miscount or a misrepresentation of the data. CPPV is investigating this issue.)

The aggregate comparison task involves using data from each program site. To ensure comparability among data bases, the comparison data were drawn from prime sponsors' quarterly reports to DOL, including the Quarterly Summary of Participant Characteristics, the Youth Program Status Summary, and the Youth Financial Status Report for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP. Data are now available for the fourth fiscal quarter of FY 1979. Quarterly reports are available for six of the eight VICI sites. Complete sets of reports were not available for Philadelphia or the South Bronx. Hence, results are presented for six sites: Atlanta, Broward County, Newark, New Haven, Chicago, and Milwaukee.

Simple descriptive statistics--frequencies and percents--were used as the primary basis for analysis, and aggregate statistical profiles were prepared for each of the six sites. These profiles are presented in tabular and narrative form, by site, in the remainder of this chapter. They include summaries of two types of data: (1) participant characteristics; and (2) program status (including termination information). Results should be reviewed cautiously given the limitations and preliminary nature of the data. A brief discussion of terminations follows the site profiles.

#### A. ATLANTA: Tables II.1, II.2

To date, totals of 113, 164, and 1,798 youths have participated in VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs, respectively, in Atlanta. Though females were a minority (21 percent) of VICI participants, they were the majority in YETP, (65 percent) and constituted 42 percent of YCCIP youth. With regard to educational status, VICI was very similar to YCCIP, with approximately half the participants being high school dropouts and half high school graduates. YETP differed, with about 19 percent of its participants in school. Most youths in all programs were classified as economically disadvantaged, and all programs had a similar racial or ethnic composition (approximately 98 percent black). All participants were unemployed prior to program entry. YETP had a few participants (less than one percent) who were handicapped or ex-offenders, and 3 percent of VICI participants were ex-offenders. All VICI and YCCIP participants and 25 percent of YETP participants were involved in work experience activities. A majority of YETP youths (56 percent) were engaged in classroom training.

Turnover rates for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs were 1.04, 2.80, and 4.14, respectively. Hence, relative to program capacity (i.e., average quarterly enrollment), total turnover for YETP for the year occurred about four times, while VICI had the lowest turnover rate.

To date, YETP demonstrated the highest percentage of positive terminations (77 percent), with positive terminations outnumbering non-positives by more than three to one (ratio of 3.3). For VICI, 41 percent of the terminations were positive (ratio of 0.71), and for YCCIP, 45 percent were positive (ratio of 0.82). However, closer examination of termination categories shows that most YETP "positives" were actually in the Other category, whereas most VICI positives have "Obtained Employment."

In fact, almost one third of the VICI terminees have found jobs, while only 24 percent of YETP terminees have done so. In the YCCIP program, which has program goals similar to VICI, only 11 percent of the terminees have found jobs.

B. BROWARD COUNTY: Tables II.3, II.4

To date, totals of 146, 140, and 1,483 youths participated in VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs, respectively, in Broward County. While only a relatively small proportion of VICI participants was female (21 percent), YETP was 64 percent female and YCCIP was 41 percent female. With regard to educational status, VICI was similar to YCCIP, although VICI had slightly more high school graduates. YETP listed 42 percent of its enrollment as high school students. Most participants in all programs were classified as economically disadvantaged, and all programs had fairly similar ethnic compositions, with mostly black participants, though YETP had more white participants than either VICI or YCCIP. Each program had a number of ex-offenders, with YCCIP having a fairly large number (24 percent).

All VICI and YCCIP participants and 27 percent of YETP participants were involved in work experience activities. YETP youths were enrolled in a number of activities, and 48 percent of them were enrolled in career employment experiences. Turnover rates for all of the programs were similar, at 1.70, 2.41, and 1.90 for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP, respectively. The average stay for youths in all programs was about four months.

To date, YETP and YCCIP have had fairly high percentages of positive terminations (80 and 64 percent, respectively). Positive/negative termination ratios for these programs are 3.90 and 1.19. VICI had a smaller number of positive terminations (45 percent, a rate of 0.82), but 35 percent of these have been placements in employment. YETP had slightly fewer placements (28 percent of terminations), but YCCIP had far fewer (14 percent). Most VICI participants who obtained employment were indirect placements.

C. CHICAGO: Tables II.5, II.6

In Chicago to date, totals of 96, 546, and 4,614 youths have participated in VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs, respectively. Both YCCIP and YETP had large proportions of females (40 percent and 56 percent), while VICI had very few (14 percent). The groups also differed widely with regard to educational status. Most YCCIP participants (86 percent) were high school dropouts. VICI too had a large number of dropouts (68 percent), but also had several high school graduates (32 percent). All YETP participants were either current high school students (90 percent) or youths with some post-high school education (10 percent). All participants in each group were economically disadvantaged. Ethnic group composition was somewhat similar among groups, with a majority of blacks in each; VICI had a large Hispanic population (36 percent). YETP and YCCIP enrolled a few offenders and handicapped youths whereas VICI did not. All VICI and YCCIP participants were unemployed prior to program entry while all YETP participants were placed in the Other category.

All YCCIP and VICI participants were engaged in work experience activities. Most YETP youths (84 percent) were involved in career employment experiences, with the remainder (16 percent) receiving transition services.

Turnover rates for VICI, YCCIP and YETP were 0.92, 1.46, and 0.64, respectively. Turnover rates are very low, particularly for YETP. Positive/non-positive termination ratios were similar across projects, ranging from 0.64 to 0.91. Approximately 40 percent of YCCIP and YETP terminations were positive, while half of the VICI terminations were positive. However, VICI had a much higher placement rate (29 percent) than either YCCIP (8 percent) or YETP (15 percent).

#### D. MILWAUKEE: Tables II.7, II.8

To date, totals of 142, 227, and 2,128 youths have participated in VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs, respectively. In this city, there were wide differences in participant characteristics among the groups. YETP differed from both other programs in sex composition; YETP had a 51 percent female enrollment, while VICI and YCCIP each had only 14 percent. There were also substantial differences among programs with regard to educational status. VICI reported one participant as currently a high school student, whereas 71 percent of the YCCIP group and 43 percent of the YETP group were reported as being in school. Most VICI youths were school dropouts, while few participants in other groups were dropouts. Approximately 80 percent of the YCCIP and YETP groups were economically disadvantaged, compared with 96 percent of the VICI group. Differences among groups were also found with regard to ethnic composition. The VICI group was almost entirely black (85 percent). The YCCIP program, although about two-thirds black, also had sizable Hispanic representation (26 percent). YETP had a varied mixture of ethnic groups, with about a 43 percent white enrollment. YCCIP (at 9 percent) and YETP (at 12 percent) had a relatively large handicapped group, but VICI did not. About 11 percent of the VICI participants were ex-offenders. Most VICI and YCCIP participants were unemployed prior to enrollment, but about half the YETP group were in the Other category.

All VICI and YCCIP participants and about four-fifths of the YETP participants were enrolled in work experience activities. The remainder of the YETP group was enrolled in career employment experience activities. Turnover rates for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP were 1.95, 3.13, and 1.96, respectively. All YCCIP participants terminated by the end of the Third Quarter and no programs were operating. YETP terminated most participants by the end of the Third Quarter, but enrolled a new group during the Fourth Quarter.

Positive terminations outnumbered non-positive terminations for YETP and YCCIP (ratios of 2.14 and 1.08). The positive termination ratio for VICI was relatively low (.55), although VICI had a higher placement rate (26 percent, compared with 14 percent and 15 percent for the other groups). YETP and YCCIP had many terminations in the Other Positive category.

E. NEWARK: Tables II.9, II.10

To date, totals of 125, 188, and 1,162 youths participated in VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs in Newark, respectively. Fewer females participated in VICI (26 percent) than in YCCIP (42 percent) or YETP (60 percent). Both YCCIP (11 percent) and YETP (58 percent) reported large numbers of in-school youths, whereas VICI (with 8 percent) did not, but had a much higher total of high school dropouts (74 percent). All VICI and YCCIP participants were economically disadvantaged, while 19 percent of YETP participants were not. Ethnic group composition was similar for the three programs; about 80 percent of all participants were black and most of the remainder were Hispanic. Newark YCCIP accepts only handicapped youth, whereas few of the YETP participants and no VICI youths were handicapped. Each group had a small number of ex-offenders (between 2 and 7 percent). For the most part, participants were unemployed prior to enrollment.

All VICI and YCCIP participants and 48 percent of the YETP participants were engaged in work experience activities. The remainder of the YETP youths were engaged either in career employment experiences or classroom training activities.

Turnover rates of VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs were 1.49, 3.52, and 4.36, respectively. Thus, VICI's yearly turnover was lower than that of YCCIP or YETP, both of which had fairly high rates. To date, a high percentage of YETP terminations have been positive (positive/non-positive ratio of 1.96). A large majority of these have been school-related (i.e., a return to or continuation in school). YCCIP terminations (ratio of 0.83) showed a similar pattern, with slightly fewer positive terminations (45 percent). Approximately 51 percent of the VICI terminations (ratio of 1.05) have been positive. However, most of these have involved participants who entered employment. The placement rate for VICI (49 percent) is much higher than that of both YCCIP (19 percent) and YETP (13 percent).

F. NEW HAVEN: Tables II.11, II.12

In New Haven to date, totals of 106, 37, and 684 youths have participated in VICI, YCCIP, and YETP programs, respectively. Few females participated in VICI (15 percent) and YCCIP (5 percent), while a majority of females were enrolled in YETP (54 percent). Most YFFP participant's (85 percent) were in school; none of the YCCIP or VICI participants was in school and most were dropouts. Almost all participants were economically disadvantaged. Ethnic group composition was fairly similar for all groups; approximately 20-35 percent of participants were white, 50-60 percent black, and about 15 percent Hispanic. YCCIP had a higher percentage of white participants than VICI or YETP. A few YETP participants were limited English speaking (4 percent) or handicapped (6 percent). All groups had a number of ex-offenders. Most VICI and YCCIP participants were unemployed prior to program entry, while most YETP youths were classified in the Other category for labor force status. All VICI and YCCIP participants were engaged in work experience activities, and most YETP participants were engaged in career employment experience activities.

Turnover rates for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP were 1.17, 2.27, and 2.67, respectively. Participants tended to remain in VICI longer than in other programs. The positive/negative termination ratio for YETP is very high (2.67). A large majority (63 percent) of YETP terminations were categorized as Other Positive, but most (58 percent) were, in fact, in the Other category (see Table II.12). About 29 percent of total terminations were non-positive and 8 percent were placements. Most of the VICI positive terminations were placements (29 percent of all terminations), and almost half of all VICI terminations were positive. YCCIP had an extremely high number of positive terminations (79 percent of all terminations) and a high placement rate of 55 percent of all terminations.

#### G. AGGREGATED TERMINATIONS, FY 1979: Table II.13

The termination data described above give a preliminary picture of what happens to participants when they leave their respective programs. Table II.13 displays total group sizes for each site and program, and presents the percentages of participants in each termination category. Data were taken from the DOL Program Status Summary for the fourth quarter of 1979. The term, Placements, indicates the percentages of youths who entered unsubsidized employment at the time of termination. This includes youths placed directly without training, those placed through program efforts, and those who found their own jobs.

When examining the termination data, one must keep in mind that the major goal of VICI and YCCIP is unsubsidized employment, whereas this is often not the case for YETP. In general, a much higher percentage of VICI participants were placed in unsubsidized jobs than was the case for YCCIP and YETP participants. Between 26 percent and 49 percent of VICI terminations resulted in placements, and, over all sites, approximately 35 percent of VICI terminees entered employment--compared with 14 and 18 percent for the other two programs. Most sites display similar placement patterns, with the exception of New Haven, whose YCCIP program had an unusually high placement rate (although this is based on a very small group). The Newark VICI site is also noteworthy, since almost half the terminees entered unsubsidized employment. Overall, YETP placement rates are generally higher than those of YCCIP.

Few terminations involved the transfer of youths to other CETA programs. Overall, only 2 percent of the VICI group transferred to other CETA programs, while rates for YCCIP and YETP were slightly higher. A further positive termination category indicates the number of participants who enroll or continue in full-time, secondary or post-secondary schools. This is particularly appropriate for YETP, which enrolls a large number of disadvantaged, in-school youths. Overall, about 15 percent of YETP youths returned to school after completing their program, but there was considerable variation across sites. Two sites reported 40 to 50 percent of their terminations in this category, and two reported none. Overall, slightly fewer YCCIP participants (11 percent) returned to school, while very few VICI participants (5 percent) did so, and most of these were in Chicago.

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The DOL Program Status Summary includes an Other positive termination category. This includes participants who enroll in non-CETA employment and training programs and participants who have "completed program objectives not involving entry into unsubsidized employment." Examples of the latter are participants enrolled in the program for purposes of upgrading training, receiving supportive services, obtaining GED training, and so on. Since the major goal for VICI is unsubsidized employment, very few terminations (3 percent) were reported in this category. Percentages in this category for YCCIP and YETP, however, are very high, at 17 percent and 27 percent, respectively. At two YETP sites, more than 50 percent are listed as Other Positive.

With regard to overall positive terminations, VICI and YCCIP are very similar, having rates of 44 percent and 46 percent, respectively. YETP has a considerably higher rate of 64 percent. Note, however, that transfers, returns to school, and other positives account for about a third of the YCCIP overall positive rate and for almost half of the YETP rate, but for only one-tenth of the VICI rate. Most of the VICI positive terminations are placements.

In summary, in examining positive termination rates for VICI, YCCIP, and YETP, it is essential to keep program goals in mind and to look at specific termination categories. VICI and YCCIP had similar overall positive termination rates, while YETP was clearly higher. However, when differences in type of placements are noted, it is apparent that VICI had a considerably higher placement rate for unsubsidized jobs than either YCCIP or YETP. Very few VICI terminations were transfers, returns to school, or Other. In terms of VICI's program goal of placing participants in unsubsidized jobs, the program seems to be doing very well compared with major formula-funded youth employment and training programs.

Table II.1. Summary of Participant Characteristics

SITE: Atlanta		REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79		
CHARACTERISTICS		VICI	YCCIP	YETP
TOTAL #		113	164	1798
Sex				
- Male		89 (79%)	95 (58%)	627 (35%)
- Female		24 (21%)	69 (42%)	1171 (65%)
Education Status				
- H.S. Student		0 (0%)	1 (1%)	340 (19%)
- H.S. Dropout		64 (57%)	88 (54%)	611 (34%)
- H.S. Graduate (Equiv.)		47 (42%)	74 (45%)	825 (46%)
- Post H.S.		2 (2%)	1 (1%)	22 (1%)
Economically Disadvantaged		112 (99%)	155 (95%)	1684 (94%)
Race/Ethnic Group				
- White (not Hisp.)		1 (1%)	9 (5%)	20 (1%)
- Black (not Hisp.)		112 (99%)	155 (95%)	1772 (99%)
- Hispanic		0 (-)	0 (-)	2 (-)
- Amer. Indian/Alaskan		0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (-)
- Asian/Pacific Isl.		0 (-)	0 (-)	3 (-)
Limited English Speaking		0 (-)	0 (-)	0 (-)
Handicapped		0 (-)	0 (-)	6 (-)
Offender		3 (3%)	0 (-)	5 (-)
Labor Force Status				
- Underemployed		0 (-)	0 (-)	0 (-)
- Unemployed		113 (100%)	164 (100%)	1798 (100%)
- Other		0 (-)	0 (-)	0 (-)

Table II.2. Program Status Summary

SITE: Atlanta	REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79		
	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
TOTAL ENROLLMENT	113	164	1798
Current Enrollment	55 (49%)	0 (0%)	104 (6%)
<b>Activities</b>			
- Career Employ. Experience	- (-)	- (-)	323 (18%)
- Transition Services	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
- On-the-Job Training	- (-)	- (-)	14 (1%)
- Classroom Training	- (-)	- (-)	1009 (56%)
- Work Experience	113 (100%)	164 (100%)	452 (25%)
Total Terminations	58 (51%)	164 (100%)	1694 (94%)
- Entered Employment	18 (31%)	18 (11%)	410 (24%)
- Direct	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
- Indirect	3 (5%)	4 (2%)	308 (18%)
- Obtained Empl.	15 (26%)	14 (9%)	102 (6%)
- Other Positive	6 (10%)	56 (34%)	894 (53%)
- Transfers	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
- School	2 (3%)	5 (3%)	43 (3%)
- Other	4 (7%)	51 (31%)	851 (51%)
- Non-Positive	34 (59%)	90 (55%)	390 (23%)
Positive/Non-Positive Termination Ratio	0.71	0.82	3.34
Turnover Rate	1.04	2.80	4.14

Table II.3. Summary of Participant Characteristics

SITE: Broward County		REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78 - 9/30/79	
CHARACTERISTICS	VICI	YCCIP	TCTP
TOTAL #	146	140	1483
Sex			
- Male	116 (79%)	83 (59%)	539 (36%)
- Female	30 (21%)	57 (41%)	944 (64%)
Education Status			
- H.S. Student	0 (-)	4 (3%)	629 (42%)
- H.S. Dropout	109 (75%)	123 (88%)	440 (30%)
- H.S. Graduate (Equiv.)	37 (25%)	13 (9%)	375 (25%)
- Post H.S.	0 (-)	0	39 (3%)
Economically Disadvantaged	142 (97%)	138 (99%)	1328 (90%)
Race/Ethnic Group			
- White (not Hisp.)	5 (3%)	4 (3%)	262 (18%)
- Black (not Hisp.)	141 (97%)	136 (97%)	1194 (81%)
- Hispanic	0 (-)	0 (-)	22 (2%)
- Amer. Indian/Alaskan	0 (-)	0 (-)	4 (-)
- Asian/Pacific Isl.	0 (-)	0 (-)	1 (-)
Limited English Speaking	0 (-)	1 (1%)	4 (-)
Handicapped	3 (2%)	7 (5%)	54 (4%)
Offender	20 (14%)	33 (24%)	57 (4%)
Labor Force Status			
- Underemployed	2 (1%)	0 (-)	31 (2%)
- Unemployed	80 (55%)	84 (60%)	601 (41%)
- Other	64 (44%)	56 (40%)	851 (57%)

Table II.4. Program Status Summary

SITE: Broward County REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79			
	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
<b>TOTAL ENROLLMENT</b>	146	140	1483
Current Enrollment	55 (38%)	37 (26%)	582 (39%)
<b>Activities</b>			
- Career Employ. Experience	-	-	719 (48%)
- Transition Services	-	-	123 (8%)
- On-the-Job Training	-	-	-
- Classroom Training	-	-	316 (21%)
- Work Experience	146 (100%)	140 (100%)	394 (27%)
<b>Total Terminations</b>	91 (62%)	103 (74%)	901 (61%)
- Entered Employment	32 (35%)	20 (19%)	253 (28%)
- Direct	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
- Indirect	20 (22%)	7 (7%)	153 (16%)
- Obtained Empl.	12 (13%)	13 (13%)	100 (11%)
- Other Positive	9 (10%)	36 (35%)	464 (51%)
- Transfers	2 (2%)	7 (7%)	79 (9%)
- School	7 (8%)	3 (3%)	375 (42%)
- Other	0 (-)	26 (25%)	10 (1%)
- Non-Positive	50 (55%)	47 (46%)	184 (20%)
<b>Positive/Non-Positive Termination Ratio</b>	0.82	1.19	3.90
<b>Turnover Rate</b>	1.70	2.41	1.90

Table II.5. Summary of Participant Characteristics

SITE: Chicago	REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/80		
CHARACTERISTICS	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
<b>TOTAL #</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>4614</b>
<b>Sex</b>			
- Male	83 (86%)	326 (60%)	2012 (44%)
- Female	13 (14%)	220 (40%)	2602 (56%)
<b>Education Status</b>			
- H.S. Student	0 (-)	0 (-)	4152 (90%)
- H.S. Dropout	65 (68%)	469 (86%)	0 (-)
- H.S. Graduate (Equiv.)	31 (32%)	77 (14%)	0 (-)
- Post H.S.	0 (-)	0 (-)	462 (10%)
<b>Economically Disadvantaged</b>	<b>96 (100%)</b>	<b>546 (100%)</b>	<b>4614 (100%)</b>
<b>Race/Ethnic Group</b>			
- White (not Hisp.)	1 (1%)	20 (4%)	277 (6%)
- Black (not Hisp.)	52 (54%)	380 (70%)	3608 (78%)
- Hispanic	35 (36%)	146 (27%)	693 (15%)
- Amer. Indian/Alaskan	0 (-)	0 (-)	12 (-)
- Asian/Pacific Isl.	8 (8%)	0 (-)	24 (1%)
<b>Limited English Speaking</b>	<b>2 (2%)</b>	<b>4 (1%)</b>	<b>48 (1%)</b>
<b>Handicapped</b>	<b>0 (-)</b>	<b>9 (2%)</b>	<b>74 (2%)</b>
<b>Offender</b>	<b>0 (-)</b>	<b>10 (2%)</b>	<b>14 (-)</b>
<b>Labor Force Status</b>			
- Underemployed	0 (-)	0 (-)	0 (-)
- Unemployed	96 (100%)	546 (100%)	0 (-)
- Other	0 (-)	0 (-)	4614 (100%)

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Table II.6. Program Status Summary

SITE: Chicago	REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79		
	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
<b>TOTAL ENROLLMENT</b>	96	546	4614
<b>Current Enrollment</b>	47 (49%)	211 (39%)	2773 (60%)
<b>Activities</b>			
- Career Employ. Experience	- (-)	- (-)	3874 (84%)
- Transition Services	- (-)	- (-)	740 (16%)
- On-the-Job Training	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
- Classroom Training	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
- Work Experience	96 (100%)	546 (100%)	- (-)
<b>Total Terminations</b>	49 (51%)	335 (61%)	1841 (40%)
- Entered Employment	14 (29%)	27 (8%)	276 (15%)
- Direct	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
- Indirect	- (-)	11 (3%)	113 (6%)
- Obtained Empl.	14 (29%)	16 (5%)	163 (9%)
- Other Positive	10 (20%)	104 (31%)	466 (25%)
- Transfers	- (-)	5 (1%)	6 (-)
- School	9 (18%)	22 (7%)	204 (11%)
- Other	1 (2%)	77 (23%)	256 (14%)
- Non-Positive	25 (51%)	204 (61%)	1099 (60%)
<b>Positive/Non-Positive Termination Ratio</b>	0.96	0.64	0.68
<b>Turnover Rate</b>	0.92	1.46	0.64

Table II.7. Summary of Participant Characteristics

SITE: Milwaukee	REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
CHARACTERISTICS				
TOTAL #	142	227	2128	
Sex				
- Male	122 (86%)	195 (86%)	1046 (49%)	
- Female	20 (14%)	32 (14%)	1082 (51%)	
Education Status				
- H.S. Student	1 (1%)	161 (71%)	906 (43%)	
- H.S. Dropout	115 (81%)	36 (16%)	685 (32%)	
- H.S. Graduate (Equiv.)	25 (18%)	20 (9%)	406 (19%)	
- Post H.S.	1 (1%)	10 (4%)	131 (6%)	
Economically Disadvantaged	137 (96%)	182 (80%)	1758 (83%)	
Race/Ethnic Group				
- White (not Hisp.)	10 (7%)	16 (7%)	908 (43%)	
- Black (not Hisp.)	120 (85%)	145 (64%)	840 (39%)	
- Hispanic	11 (8%)	58 (26%)	302 (14%)	
- Amer. Indian/Alaskan	1 (1%)	6 (3%)	53 (2%)	
- Asian/Pacific Isl.	0 (-)	2 (1%)	25 (1%)	
Limited English Speaking	1 (1%)	3 (1%)	41 (2%)	
Handicapped	1 (1%)	21 (9%)	262 (12%)	
Offender	16 (11%)	3 (1%)	79 (4%)	
Labor Force Status				
- Underemployed	16 (11%)	11 (5%)	57 (3%)	
- Unemployed	119 (84%)	153 (67%)	1030 (48%)	
- Other	7 (5%)	63 (28%)	1041 (49%)	

Table II.8. Program Status Summary

SITE: Milwaukee	REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79		
	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
TOTAL ENROLLMENT	142	227	2128
Current Enrollment	46 (32%)	0 (0%)	703 (33%)
Activities			
- Career Employ. Experience	--	--	422 (20%)
- Transition Services	--	--	--
- On-the-Job Training	--	--	--
- Classroom Training	--	--	--
- Work Experience	142 (100%)	227 (100%)	1706 (80%)
Total Terminations	96 (68%)	227 (100%)	1425 (67%)
- Entered Employment	25 (26%)	31 (14%)	214 (15%)
- Direct	1 (1%)	0 (0%)	0 (--)
- Indirect	13 (14%)	18 (8%)	79 (6%)
- Obtained Empl.	11 (11%)	13 (6%)	135 (9%)
- Other Positive	9 (9%)	87 (38%)	757 (53%)
- Transfers	1 (1%)	20 (9%)	220 (15%)
- School	0 (--)	38 (17%)	4 (--)
- Other	8 (8%)	29 (13%)	533 (37%)
- Non-Positive	62 (65%)	109 (48%)	454 (32%)
Positive/Non-Positive Termination Ratio	0.55	1.08	2.14
Turnover Rate	1.95	3.13	1.96

Table II.9 Summary of Participant Characteristics

SITE: Newark		REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79	
CHARACTERISTICS	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
<b>TOTAL #</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>1162</b>
<b>Sex</b>			
- Male	92 (74%)	109 (58%)	460 (40%)
- Female	33 (26%)	79 (42%)	702 (60%)
<b>Education Status</b>			
- H.S. Student	10 (8%)	78 (41%)	678 (58%)
- H.S. Dropout	92 (74%)	96 (51%)	318 (27%)
- H.S. Graduate (Equiv.)	21 (17%)	12 (6%)	149 (13%)
- Post H.S.	2 (2%)	2 (1%)	17 (1%)
<b>Economically Disadvantaged</b>	<b>125 (100%)</b>	<b>188 (100%)</b>	<b>940 (81%)</b>
<b>Race/Ethnic Group</b>			
- White (not Hisp.)	0 (0%)	1 (1%)	26 (2%)
- Black (not Hisp.)	103 (82%)	149 (79%)	1013 (87%)
- Hispanic	22 (18%)	38 (20%)	122 (10%)
- Amer. Indian/Alaskan	0 (0%)	0 (--)	1 (--)
- Asian/Pacific Isl.	0 (0%)	0 (--)	0 (--)
<b>Limited English Speaking</b>	<b>0 (--)</b>	<b>0 (--)</b>	<b>1 (--)</b>
<b>Handicapped</b>	<b>0 (--)</b>	<b>188 (100%)</b>	<b>13 (1%)</b>
<b>Offender</b>	<b>6 (5%)</b>	<b>14 (7%)</b>	<b>29 (2%)</b>
<b>Labor Force Status</b>			
- Underemployed	3 (2%)	0 (--)	9 (1%)
- Unemployed	108 (86%)	188 (100%)	707 (61%)
- Other	14 (11%)	0 (--)	446 (38%)

Table II.10. Program Status Summary

SITE: Newark	REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79		
	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
<b>TOTAL ENROLLMENT</b>	125	188	1162
<b>Current Enrollment</b>	47 (38%)	40 (21%)	182 (16%)
<b>Activities</b>			
- Career Employ. Experience	-- (--)	-- (--)	436 (38%)
- Transition Services	-- (--)	-- (--)	-- (--)
- On-the-Job Training	-- (--)	-- (--)	-- (--)
- Classroom Training	-- (--)	-- (--)	279 (24%)
- Work Experience	125 (100%)	188 (100%)	447 (38%)
<b>Total Terminations</b>	78 (62%)	148 (79%)	980 (84%)
- Entered Employment	38 (49%)	28 (19%)	126 (13%)
- Direct	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
- Indirect	36 (46%)	10 (7%)	83 (8%)
- Obtained Empl.	2 (3%)	18 (12%)	43 (4%)
- Other Positive	2 (3%)	39 (26%)	523 (53%)
- Transfers	1 (1%)	2 (1%)	4 (--)
- School	1 (1%)	37 (25%)	519 (53%)
- Other	0 (0%)	0 (--)	0 (--)
- Non-Positive	38 (49%)	81 (55%)	331 (34%)
<b>Positive/Non-Positive Termination Ratio</b>	1.05	0.83	1.96
<b>Turnover Rate</b>	1.49	3.52	4.36

Table II.11. Summary of Participant Characteristics

SITE: New Haven		REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79		
CHARACTERISTICS	VICI	YCCIP	YETP	
TOTAL #	106	37	684	
Sex				
- Male	90 (85%)	35 (95%)	313 (46%)	
- Female	16 (15%)	2 (5%)	371 (54%)	
Education Status				
- H.S. Student	0 (--)	0 (--)	584 (85%)	
- H.S. Dropout	75 (71%)	31 (84%)	76 (11%)	
- H.S. Graduate (Equiv.)	28 (26%)	6 (16%)	10 (1%)	
- Post H.S.	3 (3%)	0 (--)	14 (2%)	
Economically Disadvantaged	106 (100%)	37 (100%)	655 (96%)	
Race/Ethnic Group				
- White (not Hisp.)	23 (22%)	15 (41%)	149 (22%)	
- Black (not Hisp.)	68 (64%)	18 (49%)	430 (63%)	
- Hispanic	15 (14%)	4 (11%)	103 (15%)	
- Amer. Indian/Alaskan	0 (--)	0 (--)	0 (--)	
- Asian/Pacific Isl.	0 (--)	0 (--)	2 (--)	
Limited English Speaking	-- (--)	-- (--)	29 (4%)	
Handicapped	1 (1%)	2 (5%)	40 (6%)	
Offender	19 (18%)	4 (11%)	30 (4%)	
Labor Force Status				
- Underemployed	3 (3%)	0 (--)	16 (2%)	
- Unemployed	99 (93%)	37 (100%)	186 (27%)	
- Other	4 (4%)	0 (--)	482 (70%)	

Table II.12. Program Status Summary

SITE: New Haven		REPORT PERIOD: 10/1/78-9/30/79	
	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
<b>TOTAL ENROLLMENT</b>	106	37	684
<b>Current Enrollment</b>	44 (42%)	8 (22%)	63 (9%)
<b>Activities</b>			
- Career Employ. Experience	-- (--)	-- (--)	611 (89%)
- Transition Services	-- (--)	-- (--)	2 (--)
- On-the-Job Training	-- (--)	-- (--)	-- (--)
- Classroom Training	-- (--)	-- (--)	28 (4%)
- Work Experience	106 (100%)	37 (100%)	76 (11%)
<b>Total Terminations</b>	62 (58%)	29 (78%)	621 (91%)
- Entered Employment	24 (39%)	16 (55%)	53 (9%)
- Direct	0 (--)	0 (--)	0 (--)
- Indirect	16 (26%)	5 (17%)	3 (--)
- Obtained Empl.	8 (13%)	11 (38%)	50 (8%)
- Other Positive	5 (8%)	7 (24%)	390 (63%)
- Transfers	3 (5%)	7 (24%)	29 (5%)
- School	1 (2%)	0 (--)	0 (--)
- Other	1 (2%)	0 (--)	361 (58%)
- Non-Positive	33 (53%)	6 (21%)	178 (29%)
<b>Positive/Non-Positive Termination Ratio</b>	0.88	3.83	2.49
<b>Turnover Rate</b>	1.17	2.27	2.67

Table II.13. Aggregated Terminations for FY 1979

	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
<u>Total # Terminations</u>			
Atlanta	58	164	1,694
Broward Co.	91	103	901
Chicago	49	335	1,841
Milwaukee	96	227	1,425
Newark	78	148	980
New Haven	62	29	621
OVERALL	434	1,006	7,462
<u>Placements</u>			
Atlanta	31%	11%	24%
Broward Co.	35%	19%	28%
Chicago	29%	8%	15%
Milwaukee	26%	14%	15%
Newark	49%	19%	13%
New Haven	39%	55%	9%
OVERALL	35%	14%	18%
<u>CETA Transfers</u>			
Atlanta	0%	0%	0%
Broward Co.	2%	7%	9%
Chicago	0%	1%	0%
Milwaukee	1%	9%	15%
Newark	1%	1%	0%
New Haven	5%	24%	5%
OVERALL	2%	4%	5%
<u>Return to School</u>			
Atlanta	3%	3%	3%
Broward Co.	8%	3%	42%
Chicago	18%	7%	11%
Milwaukee	0%	17%	0%
Newark	1%	25%	53%
New Haven	2%	0%	0%
OVERALL	4%	10%	15%

Table II.13. Aggregated Terminations for FY 1979  
(continued)

	VICI	YCCIP	YETP
<b><u>Other Positive</u></b>			
Atlanta	7%	31%	51%
Broward Co.	0%	25%	1%
Chicago	2%	23%	14%
Milwaukee	8%	13%	37%
Newark	0%	0%	0%
New Haven	2%	0%	58%
OVERALL	3%	18%	27%
<b><u>Positive Terminations, Excluding Placements</u></b>			
Atlanta	10%	34%	53%
Broward Co.	10%	35%	51%
Chicago	20%	31%	25%
Milwaukee	9%	39%	42%
Newark	3%	26%	53%
New Haven	8%	24%	63%
OVERALL	9%	33%	47%
<b><u>Total Positive Terminations</u></b>			
Atlanta	41%	45%	77%
Broward Co.	45%	54%	80%
Chicago	49%	39%	40%
Milwaukee	35%	52%	68%
Newark	51%	45%	66%
New Haven	47%	79%	71%
OVERALL	44%	47%	65%
<b><u>Total Nonpositive Termination</u></b>			
Atlanta	59%	55%	23%
Broward Co.	55%	46%	20%
Chicago	51%	61%	60%
Milwaukee	65%	48%	32%
Newark	49%	55%	34%
New Haven	53%	21%	29%
OVERALL	56%	53%	35%

### III. IMPACT ANALYSIS

The Fall Interim Report reported preliminary results on youths' post-program employment, wages, job training, and educational experience. These results were based on 52 first-wave interviews conducted with VICI, VICI control, and HUD youths. The results reported in this chapter are based on nearly 600 interviews, conducted at both the first and second interview waves conducted with all four major study groups of the follow-up study: VICI, VICI control, HUD, and YCCIP youths.

This chapter first describes the interview sample in terms of the overall data collection design and the demographic characteristics of respondents. Next, the interview data are analyzed and, as appropriate, the study groups are compared regarding their responses to interview questions about their perceptions of the training program, and their post-program employment, wages, job training and educational experiences.

#### A. THE INTERVIEW SAMPLE

Table III.1 shows the number of interviews completed and processed through January 15, 1980, by study group, by site, and by interview wave.

Almost half (43 percent) of the total number of interviews were conducted with VICI participants; approximately one-third (34 percent) were conducted with HUD participants; the remaining interviews were evenly divided between VICI controls (10 percent) and YCCIP youth (13 percent). Overall, approximately half (55 percent) were first-wave interviews; the rest 45 percent) were Wave 2 interviews. Wave 1 interviews were conducted using the Program Completion Questionnaire with VICI, HUD and YCCIP youths, and the Program Completion Questionnaire for controls with VICI controls. The Three-Month Follow-Up Survey was used for Wave 2 interviews with VICI, HUD, and YCCIP groups. No Wave 2 interviews were included in the analysis for VICI controls since the questionnaire for this group was not fully developed until mid-November, 1979. (Chapter V discusses this and other difficulties.)

As Table III.1 indicates, two types of Wave 2 interviews exist, a regular Wave 2 and a special Wave 2. A regular Wave 2 is one conducted with a respondent who has been previously interviewed at Wave 1. A special Wave 2 interview is one administered with the same instrument as that used for a regular Wave 2 interview, but it is the first interview conducted with that respondent. There are a substantial number of special Wave 2 interviews (148), representing 58 percent of the total number of Wave 2 interviews. This number is large because, in order to build a sufficiently large pool of eligible respondents for the study, it was necessary to include youngsters whose program terminations occurred after the target period for Wave 1 interviews (i.e., one month after termination).

The data collection design for Waves 1 and 2 called for interviews to be completed approximately at one month and at three months after a youth's termination from a program. Wave 1 interviews were conducted about six weeks after

program termination on average, and Wave 2 interviews (according to respondents) about four to five months afterward, on average.

Two factors were primarily responsible for the delay. First, in a substantial number of cases, RBS did not receive termination information from the programs in time for an interview to be completed within the specified one-month time frame. Second, it often takes some time for interviewers to make contact with a respondent, especially when the tracking information given to interviewers is inadequate. Then, when contact is made and an interview scheduled, many respondents miss their appointments, and the interviewer must then begin again. In such cases, an interview may not be conducted for several weeks after the initial contact. Consequently, many interviews were completed after the time limits of the data collection design. This situation poses little or no problem for data analysis since the integrity of the multi-wave structure of this study can be maintained by completing each wave of interviews in time periods that are non-overlapping.

The interview sample is described in Table III.2 in terms of sex, age, and race characteristics. The typical (modal) respondent is a 19 year old black male: males outnumber females in the sample by three to one; about 75 percent are 18 years old or above; and blacks make up about two-thirds of the sample. Across study groups, however, there are some notable differences. Compared with other groups, greater percentage of HUD youngsters are younger (16-17 years old), and a higher percentage of HUD respondents are white, compared with other groups. It is possible to compare the sex and race characteristics of interview respondents with those of VICI participants, based on VICI MIS intake forms (see Table I.1). For example, in the VICI population 81 percent are male, 31 percent are 16-17 years old, and 80 percent are black. These figures compare very closely with those of the interview sample: 78 percent male and 81 percent black.

#### B. ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW DATA

This section presents the analysis of the follow-up interview. Three major areas are considered: (1) Program Assessment; (2) Employment and Wages; (3) Job Training and Education.

• Program Assessment. There are at least two important sources of information for evaluating the VICI demonstration. One source is participants' own perceptions about the effects of the program. Another is objective evidence of job placement, wages, and other positive experiences, such as further job training or education.

The Program Completion Questionnaire (PCQ) used at Wave 1 contains a series of questions designed to assess the respondent's perceptions of or degree of satisfaction with different aspects of the training program. Simple descriptive comparisons, expressed in frequency and percent data, are made on responses to program assessment questions for VICI, HUD, and YCCIP programs. Since only a small number of interviews were conducted with YCCIP participants, the chief comparison is between VICI and HUD.

● Employment and Wages. The four major sample groups in this follow-up study--VICI, VICI controls, HUD, and YCCIP participants--are compared in terms of their responses to interview questions about the nature and number of their employment experiences, including wages. Comparisons are made at three points in time--before the program began, and at the time of the Wave 1 and Wave 2 interviews (approximately from July, 1979 to mid-January, 1980). Specific Wave 1 comparisons are made among all four study groups; Wave 2 comparisons are made among VICI, HUD, and YCCIP participants only, since the results of these interviews for controls are not yet available. Cross-wave comparisons are then made among VICI, HUD, and YCCIP groups.

● Job Training and Education. Findings on post-program job training and education, which are considered desirable outcomes of training programs, are presented in the same manner as data on employment and wages; Wave 1 data are reported first, followed by Wave 2 data.

All comparisons among programs are both statistical and descriptive in nature. They may suggest real and important differences among programs in their effects on post-program labor market and educational experiences (or, in the case of the VICI control group, differences may be apparent in the effects of training versus no training). However, since the interview sample is still quite small, and since no analyses have yet been performed on the data to estimate more precisely and comprehensively whether observed differences can be considered true effects, no final conclusions should be drawn about these issues.

### 1. Program Assessment

Table III.3 shows the responses of VICI, HUD, and YCCIP youths to a series of 15 questions from the PCQ pertaining to four areas of program assessment: (1) general satisfaction with the program; (2) perceptions about specific learning outcomes or changes; (3) perceptions of specific program policies and procedures; and (4) satisfaction with specific program components. (Questions are numbered in the table as they are on the PCQ.)

The data showed no clear differences among the groups regarding their responses to the two questions on general satisfaction. Perhaps YCCIP youths felt slightly more positive toward their programs than did either VICI or HUD youths, but there were only ten respondents in the YCCIP interview sample, far too few to be a reliable indicator. Generally, small percentages of respondents in any group felt unsatisfied with or disliked their programs.

The responses to two of the four questions on specific learning outcomes or changes revealed some differences among the groups; these were Question 4 on learning on-the-job skills and Question 7 on further education. On both questions, VICI youths responded "more favorably." Seventy-four percent of VICI youths said their program helped them a lot in learning on-the-job skills, whereas only 44 percent of HUD youths and 60 percent of YCCIP youths felt this way. Eighty-two percent of VICI youths said that participation in their program increased their desire to get further education, whereas 52 percent of HUD and 70 percent of YCCIP youths responded this way. Responses

to the two remaining questions on labor unions, showed that, regardless of program, most respondents whose feelings about labor unions had changed as a result of their being in the program felt more positive toward labor unions.

Responses to questions on Program Policies/Procedures indicated that a larger percentage (70 percent) of VICI youths considered their supervisors "very helpful" than of either HUD youths (58 percent) or of YCCIP youths (40 percent). Generally, most respondents in each of the groups felt that the strictness of the rules was "just about right."

Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of satisfaction with several different program components in which they participated. No apparent systematic differences among groups were found, but very few YCCIP respondents answered this group of questions. Comparisons between VICI and HUD youngsters show a general similarity of response to most questions when the "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied" categories are considered together. However, in the areas of personal counseling, job counseling, classroom training (reading, writing, math), classroom training (GED), and actual work on a job, a larger percentage of VICI than of HUD youths responded in the "very satisfied" category.

## 2. Employment and Wages

Responses to interview questions concerning post-program employment experiences and wages for participants in VICI, HUD, and YCCIP programs and for VICI controls are summarized in this section. Results are presented first for Wave 1 interview data, next for Wave 2 data (minus VICI controls), and, finally, for cross-wave data.

Wave 1 Results. Table III.4 shows the results of Wave 1 data gathered approximately six weeks after program termination. The table shows whether a youth was currently employed or had ever been employed since program termination, and if so, what kind of job it was and its hourly wage. For VICI, HUD, and YCCIP groups, these data reflect participants' experiences since program termination, whereas for VICI controls the data reflect experience since application to the VICI program. Consequently, the amounts of experience--even within the time period covered by interviews with program participants vs. controls--are not exactly comparable and will differ to the extent of how long and when participants were enrolled in their respective programs.

Termination data from VICI programs show that the average length of time spent in VICI is about 20 weeks. On average, therefore, VICI control data cover about five months more job-seeking experience than do the follow-up data for regular VICI participants. Further, results on nature and type of job for VICI controls refer to the most recent job held since application to VICI, not to any other previously held job.

Table III.4 indicates that approximately one-third of VICI youths, one-half of controls, about one-third of HUD youths, and no YCCIP youths were currently employed. Responses to the question on whether respondents ever worked revealed a similar pattern, at least for VICI youths and VICI controls. Only

about one in four HUD participants ever worked since leaving their program, while about 30 percent of YCCIP trainees ever worked. However, the sample size for YCCIP is very small (ten youths) for the general employment questions, and even smaller (two or three) for other questions. Therefore, this discussion focuses on comparisons between VICI participants, VICI controls, and HUD trainees.

A larger percentage of VICI participants than of controls or HUD youths reported that their jobs were full-time (more than 30 hours per week), unsubsidized, and similar to the type of training they received. VICI participants also earned a high average hourly wage--\$4.51--compared with \$3.16 and \$3.98 for controls and HUD youths, respectively. About two-thirds of VICI and HUD youths were employed in permanent jobs, compared to about a half of the controls. It appears that wages for trainees (VICI or HUD) are higher and that jobs are more likely to be permanent and unsubsidized than for non-trainees (controls); a comparison of VICI and HUD youths on these variables reveals a difference only in hourly wages, which are higher for VICI youths.

About one-half of VICI, one-tenth of controls, and one-third of HUD youths reported being enrolled in a union apprenticeship program or on a waiting list to get into such a program. Compared with HUD youths, a slightly larger (though still small) percentage of VICI youths were union members; but union membership was three to four times as frequent for VICI and HUD trainees as for controls.

It was possible to classify job descriptions for respondents who reported being currently employed. The classification system is based on the Alphabetical Index of Industries and Occupations which was developed to classify the industry and occupation returns of the 1970 Census of Population and other demographic surveys conducted by the Bureau of Census. Table III.5 shows the results of classifying jobs for VICI and HUD youths. (Only two jobs were available for classification among YCCIP respondents; they are, therefore, omitted from this part of the analysis.)

Categories 8-16 of Table III.5 are, perhaps, the most interesting. They represent types of jobs or crafts in the construction trade area. Of the total number of jobs classified for VICI respondents, 43 (57 percent) fall into the construction job area. The corresponding figures for HUD are 5 and 28 percent. From this small set of data, it appears that VICI youths are considerably more likely than their HUD counterparts to obtain construction-type jobs, many of which are specifically related to their training. Category 9--painting, paper hanging, and decorating--and category 12--carpentry--accounted for 81 percent of the construction-related jobs and 45 percent of all jobs for VICI youngsters.

Wave 2 Results. The results of Wave 2 interviews regarding employment and wages are reported here for VICI, HUD, and YCCIP participants. Wave 2 interviews were conducted about four to five months, on average, after program termination. Table III.1 shows that 257 Wave 2 interviews were completed, 109 (42 percent) of which were regular Wave 2 interviews (i.e., second interviews with respondents); the remainder were first interviews. This

distinction is important for the following reason: the Three Month Follow-Up Survey (FUS-3) used as the instrument for Wave 2 interviews was designed to obtain information covering the period since program termination, not since the last interview. Consequently, for regular Wave 2 respondents, information reported in this section from the FUS-3 will presumably include information obtained at Wave 1 with the PCQ. Wave 2 first interviews, on the other hand, provide, for the first time, a history of information on employment, wages, and so on. These interviews, therefore, provide substantively new information on new respondents in the follow-up study.

As a matter of convenience and prudence, we decided to present Wave 2 results on employment and wages for only the most recent job held by the respondent and to omit from the analysis data on any previous jobs held. This approach is taken for three reasons: (1) data on earlier jobs probably have already been reported in the previous section on Wave 1 results, at least for regular Wave 2 respondents; (2) out of several possible jobs to report, the most current job is probably the most important; and (3) in actuality, relatively few respondents have held more than one job since program termination, which minimizes the importance of reporting the results for all jobs.

Table III.6 contains response data for selected questions about general employment and nature of job. When the interview was given, 49 percent of VICI respondents reported being currently employed, compared with 34 percent of HUD and 27 percent of YCCIP respondents. About two out of three VICI and HUD respondents had never been employed since program termination, a higher percentage than for YCCIP (52 percent). A much higher percentage of VICI (38 percent) than of HUD (19 percent) or YCCIP (23 percent) respondents held more than one job since termination.

A larger percentage of VICI participants had full-time, permanent jobs than of HUD or YCCIP participants; the gap was wider between VICI and HUD participants than between VICI and YCCIP groups. About 90 percent of the jobs held by VICI and HUD youths, and about 75 percent of jobs held by YCCIP youths were unsubsidized. A much larger percentage of VICI participants were either enrolled in a union apprenticeship program or were members of a union than of HUD or YCCIP participants; however, more than three-fourths of all respondents were neither enrolled in an apprenticeship program nor members of a union. Finally, the average hourly VICI wage, \$3.95, was much higher than the HUD average (\$3.33) or the YCCIP average (\$3.07).

Jobs were classified according to an index of industries and occupations. Table III.7 presents these classifications by VICI, HUD, and YCCIP groups. The construction trade categories (8-16) include about 34 percent of the VICI jobs, and about 18 percent and 32 percent of HUD and YCCIP jobs, respectively.

Cross-Wave Comparisons. Results from Wave 1 and Wave 2 interview data are presented here in order to compare groups according to key employment and wage variables and to determine if there is any consistency in the data across time. The Wave 1 interview included a small number of questions about jobs held immediately prior to enrolling in the VICI, HUD, or YCCIP programs. By

including these pre-program job data in this cross-wave analysis, it is possible to assess the possible effects of training. The results of this analysis are reported in Table III.8.

The post-program (i.e., Wave 1 and 2) data reflect uniformly higher levels of employment and wages than the pre-program data for all groups. Before training, the percentage of employed youth was about 20 percent in each group; by Wave 2, this had increased to about 33 percent for VICI and HUD youths, and to 27 percent for YCCIP youths. (The sample size for YCCIP is quite small and the results should not be considered very reliable.) Average wages increased for each group, and for VICI and HUD about equally from pre-program to Wave 2. VICI youth received higher wages than HUD youth before training and this difference was maintained at Wave 2. The percentage of unsubsidized jobs for VICI youth increased from 71 percent to 88 percent, while little change was observed for the HUD group, whose percentage of unsubsidized jobs remained very high over time, and was even slightly higher (93 percent) than that of the VICI group at Wave 2. The percentage of VICI youth with full-time employment rose from 64 percent to 86 percent, whereas the corresponding figures for HUD youth were 25 percent to 49 percent. Higher percentages of both groups obtained full-time work over time, and at Wave 2 the initial differences between the two groups were maintained. However, since sample sizes for the pre-program data are generally quite small, the analysis must remain tentative.

### 3. Job Training and Education

In this section, we compare the groups with respect to post-program entry into other job training or education (school) programs. Results are reported for Wave 1 interviews conducted with VICI, VICI control, HUD, and YCCIP respondents, and for Wave 2 interviews conducted with all groups except VICI controls. As in the previous section on employment and wages, cross-wave comparative results are also presented.

Wave 1 Results. Interview data reported in Table III.9 indicate that, among program participants who were not employed at termination, a small percentage enrolled in another CFTA or job training program; only 8 percent of VICI trainees, 2 percent of HUD trainees, and none of the YCCIP group. However, a much larger percentage (33 percent) of VICI controls entered at least one job training program, after they applied to VICI. Additional interview data indicate that most controls enrolled in non-construction related training programs.

With respect to education, 14 percent of VICI, 50 percent of VICI controls, 69 percent of HUD, and 40 percent of YCCIP participants entered school after program termination. Perhaps the reason for such a large percentage of HUD participants entering school is the fact that a significant portion of the HUD interview sample probably includes youths who were enrolled in school when they entered the program: an estimated two-thirds of Newark trainees were in school at program intake, and the Newark HUD data constitute about two-thirds of all Wave 1 HUD data. Possibly, this group was simply returning

Table III.9. Wave 1 Comparisons Among Groups  
on Entry into Job Training or  
Education Programs

GROUP	CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN			
	Job Training Program		School	
	N	%	N	%
VICI	92	8	97	14
VICI Controls	60	33	18	50
HUD	54	2	59	69
YCCIP	10	0	10	40

to school. This fact might also account for the data on Wave 1 HUD job placements, reported in the previous section as small in comparison to VICI job placements.

Wave 2 Results. Participants in VICI, HUD, and YCCIP programs were asked at Wave 2 if they had ever enrolled or if they were currently enrolled in a job training program or in school since program termination. Their responses are summarized in Table III.10. A larger percentage of VICI trainees (29 percent) reported having ever enrolled in a job training program since termination than of HUD trainees (7 percent) or YCCIP trainees (21 percent). A much larger percentage (53 percent) of HUD respondents said they had ever entered school than of either VICI (25 percent) or YCCIP (30 percent) respondents. The same general pattern is evident in the data on current enrollment. One finding in particular stands out: a substantially higher percentage of HUD participants entered or returned to school after termination. This finding was also evident at Wave 1 (see Table III.9).

Cross-Wave Comparisons. Table III.11 shows numbers and percentages of HUD and YCCIP groups currently enrolled in a job training program and/or in school, for Wave 1 and Wave 2. The validity of the comparisons is limited by the small size of the Wave 2 sample, especially that of YCCIP youth. Generally, the results indicate a sharp rise from Wave 1 to Wave 2 in the percentage of participants enrolled in either a job training or an education program.

#### C. SUMMARY

The purpose of this analysis has been to describe the results of the follow-up interviews conducted with VICI, VICI controls, HUD, and YCCIP youths from June 1979 to mid-January 1980. This section summarizes the major findings within each area of this analysis.

Program Assessment. Generally, a large majority of respondents, regardless of program, expressed general satisfaction with their training experience; only a very small percentage was dissatisfied. Compared with HUD youths, VICI youths tended to report slightly higher levels of satisfaction (i.e., in the very satisfied category) with personal counseling, job counseling, classroom training for basic skills and for GED, and with actual work on the job, but these differences in most cases were not large. By larger margins, VICI participants said they learned a lot about important skills on the job and that the program made them want to get further education. The major comparison group in this analysis was the HUD group, since the sample size for YCCIP was very small.

Employment and Wages. At Wave 1, the VICI control group appeared to have the most success in getting employment, compared with VICI, HUD, and YCCIP youths. About half the respondents in the control group reported currently working or having worked since they applied to VICI. This finding, however, may be attributed to the fact that control youths had considerably more time than program participants to seek employment; while others were being trained, many control group youths were looking for and finding jobs. In addition, the program design called for referrals of control group youth to the prime sponsor for placement services. In short, this difference in favor of the control group may be an artifact of the study design.

VICI youth did not appear to fare appreciably better than HUD youth in overall job placement. However, a larger percentage of VICI youths than of either control group or HUD youth obtained full-time jobs, and at a much higher average hourly wage. VICI youths also tended to be employed at jobs that were more similar to the training they had received. VICI controls did not fare as well as either VICI or HUD youth regarding wages, getting permanent unsubsidized employment, becoming a member of a union, or enrolling in a union apprenticeship program. These findings would suggest the superiority of training over no training at least on these outcomes.

At Wave 2, a larger percentage of VICI youths were currently employed than of HUD or YCCIP youths. Unfortunately, no control group data were available at Wave 2 for purposes of comparison. VICI youths tended to be more successful in getting full-time jobs, enrolling in union apprenticeship programs, or becoming union members. The average hourly wage was much higher among VICI youths also. It is noteworthy, however, that VICI youngsters who were employed before entering the program were receiving a much higher hourly wage than their HUD counterparts. Generally, pre-program differences between VICI and HUD on selected employment variables and wages persisted across time from Wave 1 to Wave 2.

Job Training and Education. A relatively small percentage of youths in any group, including controls, entered job training programs, though at Wave 1 the percentage was much higher in the control group than in all other groups. A large difference was found among groups at both Wave 1 and Wave 2 with respect to education: a much larger percentage of HUD youths were enrolled in school than of either VICI or YCCIP youths. This finding may be explained by the fact that a significant portion of the HUD data was gathered from Newark where many youths who entered the program were enrolled in school at program intake.

The results of this analysis are still very preliminary and tentative. For example, further information about the specific objectives and operations of comparison programs is needed to help clarify and interpret the results. Also, many of the comparisons are based on very small samples, and so may prove unreliable. A further limitation is that other factors, such as local economic conditions and participant characteristics, have not been taken into account either in performing the analyses or in explaining the results. Hence, no conclusions can be drawn from these results about the potential success or lack of success of the VICI demonstration at this time.

**Table III.1. Cumulative Number of Follow-up Interviews  
Completed by Group, by Site and by Wave  
Through January 15, 1980**

GROUP WAVE SITE	VICI		Control		HUD		YCCIP		TOTAL		N	GRAND TOTAL %
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2		
Atlanta	9	1	5	0	2	18	-	-	16	19	35	6
Broward	30	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	16	46	8
Chicago	7	5	-	-	9	39	7	11	23	55	78	13
Milwaukee	30	12	13	0	-	-	-	-	43	12	55	10
Newark	25	10	26	0	60	35	-	-	111	45	156	27
New Haven	32	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	24	56	10
Philadelphia	7	7	17	0	-	-	2	2	26	9	35	6
South Bronx	20	12	-	-	19	14	1	51	40	77	117	20
Total	160	87 <sup>1</sup>	61	0	90	106 <sup>2</sup>	10	64 <sup>3</sup>	321	257	578	100
Wave (%)	65	35	100	0	46	54	13	87	55	45	-	-
Group (%)	43		10		34		13		-		100	

of 87, 57 were regular Wave 2 (i.e., Wave 2--2nd interview).

<sup>1</sup>Of 106, 46 were regular Wave 2 (i.e., Wave 2--2nd interview).

<sup>2</sup>Of 64, 6 were regular Wave 2 (i.e., Wave 2--2nd interview). 227

**Table III.2 Sex, Age and Race Characteristics of Interview Sample**

VARIABLE	GROUP	VICI		VICI Control		HUD-YCCIP		DOL-YCCIP		TOTAL	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
SEX	Male	194	78	40	66	146	74	63	85	443	77
	Female	53	22	21	34	50	26	11	15	135	23
AGE	16	6	2	0	0	51	26	1	1	58	10
	17	30	12	7	11	47	24	6	8	90	16
	18	78	32	15	25	46	23	23	31	162	28
	19	87	35	28	46	30	15	28	38	173	30
	Above 19	46	19	11	18	21	11	16	22	94	16
RACE	Black	199	81	57	93	118	61	57	77	368	64
	White	13	5	3	5	59	30	0	0	138	24
	Hispanic	34	14	1	2	18	9	17	23	70	12
	Other	1	<1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	<1

**Table III.3 Wave I Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Programs on Program Assessment**

QUESTION	RESPONSE	VICI (%)	N	HUD (%)	N	YCCIP (%)	N
<b>GENERAL SATISFACTION</b>							
3. How much do you like the program?	A lot	69		60		70	
	Only a little	27	160	39	87	30	10
	Not at all	4		1		0	
15. Thinking about the program as a whole, would you say you are:	Very satisfied	46		47		60	
	Somewhat satisfied	44	159	41	87	30	10
	Not satisfied	11		12		10	
<b>LEARNING OUTCOMES/ CHANGES</b>							
4. In the program, how much did you learn in the way of important skills that you can actually use on a job?	A lot	74		44		60	
	A little	21	160	35	88	30	10
	Not too much	5		21		10	

**Table III.3 Wave 1 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Programs on Program Assessment (continued)**

QUESTION	RESPONSE	VICI (%)	N	HUD (%)	N	YCCIP (%)	N
<b>LEARNING OUTCOMES/CHANGES (continued)</b>							
7. Did participating in the program make you:	Want to get further education	82		52		70	
	Not want to get further education	2	160	0	88	10	10
	Did not make any difference	16		48		20	
8. Do you think that your feelings about labor unions changed as a result of being in the program?	Yes	29		19		30	
	No	71	159	81	47	70	10
8A. (If Yes to Q. 8) Did your feelings become more positive or more negative?	More positive	75	44	78	9	100	2
	More negative	25		22		0	

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**Table III.3 Wave 1 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Programs on Program Assessment (continued)**

QUESTION	RESPONSE	VICI (%)	N	HUD (%)	N	YCCIP (%)	N
<b>PROGRAM POLICIES/ PROCEDURES</b>							
5. In general, how helpful were the program supervisors in your program?	Very helpful	70		58		40	
	Somewhat helpful	25	159	34	88	40	10
	Not helpful	5		8		20	
6. Generally, how strict would you say the rules were in your program?	Much too strict	23		11		10	
	Just about right	58	159	68	88	50	10
	Not strict enough	19		20		40	
<b>SATISFACTION WITH PROGRAM COMPONENTS</b>							
13. In general, how satisfied were you with the things you took part in?	Very satisfied	45		39		20	
Personal counseling	Somewhat satisfied	48	71	54	28	60	5
	Not satisfied	7		7		20	

Table III.3 Wave 1 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Programs on Program Assessment (continued)

QUESTION	RESPONSE	VICI (%)	N	HUD (%)	N	YCCIP (%)	N
<b>PROGRAM COMPONENTS (continued)</b>							
<b>3. Continued Job counseling</b>	Very satisfied	45		31		86	
	Somewhat satisfied	38	89	61	39	0	7
	Not satisfied	17		8		14	
<b>Classroom training (where you learned specific job skills)</b>	Very satisfied	50		50		67	
	Somewhat satisfied	37	92	37	16	33	3
	Not satisfied	13		13		0	
<b>Classroom training (where you learned to improve your reading, writing or math.)</b>	Very satisfied	57		39		100	
	Somewhat satisfied	36	50	50	18	0	1
	Not satisfied	7		11		0	
<b>Classroom training (where you studied for a GED)</b>	Very satisfied	47		20		0	
	Somewhat satisfied	44	34	60	20	0	0
	Not satisfied	9		20		0	
<b>Actual work on a job</b>	Very satisfied	60		49		78	
	Somewhat satisfied	35	138	45	80	11	9
	Not satisfied	5		6		11	

Table III.3 Wave 1 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Programs on Program Assessment (continued)

QUESTION	RESPONSE	VICI (%)	N	HUD (%)	N	YCCIP (%)	N
13. Continued PROGRAM COMPONENTS (continued)							
A referral to a full-time job	Very satisfied	52		73		100	
	Somewhat satisfied	26	61	0	11	0	2
	Not satisfied	22		27		0	

Table III.4 Wave I Comparisons between VICI, VICI Controls, HUD and YCCIP Respondents on Employment and Wages

QUESTION	Response	VICI (%)	N	VICI CONTROL (%)	N	HUD (%)	N	YCCIP (%)	N
<b>GENERAL EMPLOYMENT</b>									
17. Are you presently working?	Yes	35	55	25	14	32	28	0	0
	No	65	102	75	43	68	59	100	10
<hr/>									
19. Have you ever worked since leaving the program (since application to VICI)?	Yes	37	37	30	13	24	14	30	3
	No	63	64	70	30	76	45	70	7
<hr/>									
<b>NATURE OF JOB</b>									
20. Did you work 30 or more hours per week?	Yes	90	78	70	19	57	19	67	2
	No	10	9	30	8	43	13	33	1
<hr/>									
23. How much per hour did you earn at this job?	Mean (\$)	4.51	77	3.16	29	3.98	19	2.80	2

Table III.4 Wave 1 Comparisons between VICI, VICI Controls, HUD and YCCIP Respondents on Employment and Wages (continued)

QUESTION	Response	VICI (%)	N	VICI CONTROL (%)	N	HUD (%)	N	YCCIP (%)	N
<b>NATURE OF JOB (CONTINUED)</b>									
24. Was this a permanent or temporary job?	Permanent	65	59	48	14	68	13	0	0
	Temporary	35	18	52	15	32	6	100	2
-----									
25. Was this job subsidized ... or unsubsidized?	Subsidized	2	2	28	8	11	2	0	0
	Unsubsidized	95	73	72	21	89	17	100	2
	Not sure	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
-----									
26. Was this job similar to the kind of training you received from your program?	Similar	53	41	Question not relevant		32	6	0	0
	Not similar	46	36			68	13	100	2
-----									
28. Were you enrolled in a union apprenticeship program, or on a waiting list to get into an apprenticeship program?	Apprenticeship	24	18	4	1	18	3	0	0
	Waiting list	27	20	4	1	18	3	0	0
	Neither	49	37	92	25	65	11	100	2
-----									
29. Were you a member of a labor union?	Yes	15	11	4	1	11	2	0	0
	No	85	65	96	26	89	16	100	2

**Table III.5 Comparisons Between VICI and HUD Respondents  
on Most Recent Type of Job**

JOB TITLE	VICI	HUD
1. Agriculture		
2. Private household workers		
3. Professional, technical and kindred workers		
4. Managers, administrators (non-farm)	1	1
5. Sales workers		
6. Clerical and kindred workers	3	3
7. Other craftsmen and kindred workers (non-construction)	1	
8. Plumbing, heating and air conditioning workers	1	
9. Painting, paperhanging, and decorating	19	
10. Electrical work	1	5
11. Masonry, plastering, bricklaying	4	
12. Carpentry	15	
13. Roofing and sheetmetal	2	
14. Concrete work		
15. Well drilling		
16. Miscellaneous construction		
17. Operatives (except transport)	3	2
18. Transportation operatives (truck drivers, cab drivers)	1	
19. Non-construction, non-farm laborers (ditch diggers, truck loaders, unskilled laborers)	7	
20. Construction laborers (unskilled laborers/assistants)	1	1
21. Service workers (except private household)	17	6

**Table III.6 Wave 2 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Respondents on Employment and Wages**

QUESTION	Response	VICI (%)	N	HUD (%)	N	YCCIP (%)	N
<b>GENERAL EMPLOYMENT</b>							
2. Are you presently working?	Yes	49	43	34	36	27	17
	No	51	44	66	69	73	46
3. Have you ever worked since leaving the program?	Yes	34	15	33	23	48	22
	No	66	29	67	46	52	24
4. How many jobs, full-time or part-time, have you had since leaving the program?	One	62	35	81	47	77	30
	Two	27	15	10	6	15	6
	Three	11	6	9	5	8	3
<b>NATURE OF JOB</b>							
10. Was this job full-time (30 or more hours per week) or part-time (less than 30 hours per week)?	Full-time	86	48	49	29	79	30
	Part-time	14	8	51	30	21	8
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Table III.6 Wave 2 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP  
Respondents on Employment and Wages (continued)

QUESTION	Response	VICI (%)	N	HUD (%)	N	YCCIP (%)	N
11. Was this a temporary or permanent job?	Temporary	26	15	41	24	33	13
	Permanent	74	42	59	35	67	26
12. Was this job subsidized .... or unsubsidized?	Subsidized	12	7	7	4	26	10
	Unsubsidized	88	50	93	55	74	28
16. Were you enrolled in a union apprenticeship program or on a waiting list to get into an apprenticeship program?	Enrolled	17	10	2	1	3	1
	Waiting list	7	4	5	3	18	7
	Neither	76	44	93	56	79	30
18. Were you a member of a union?	Yes	16	9	9	5	0	0
	No	84	46	91	54	100	37
20. What was your starting hourly salary?	Mean (\$)	3.95	57	3.33	56	3.07	35

**Table III.7. Wave 2 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD, and YCCIP Respondents on Most Recent Type of Job**

JOB TITLE	VICI	HUD	YCCIP
1. Agriculture			
2. Private household workers		1	
3. Professional, technical and kindred workers			
4. Managers, administrators (non-farm)	1	1	4
5. Sales workers	1	5	2
6. Clerical and kindred workers	6	8	3
7. Other craftsmen and kindred workers (non-construction)			2
8. Plumbing, heating and air conditioning workers		1	
9. Painting, paper hanging, and decorating	9	2	
10. Electrical work			
11. Masonry, plastering, brick-laying	7		
12. Carpentry	9	4	1
13. Roofing and sheetmetal		2	
14. Concrete work			
15. Well drilling			
16. Miscellaneous construction	1		
17. Operatives (except transport)	6	4	4
18. Transportation operatives (truck drivers, cab drivers)		1	
19. Non-construction, non-farm laborers (ditch diggers, truck loaders, unskilled laborers)	1	2	3
20. Construction laborers (unskilled laborers/assistants)	2		1
21. Service workers (except private household)	19	21	17

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Table III.8. Cross-Wave Comparisons among VICI, HUD  
and YCCIP Groups on Employment and Wages

VARIABLE	GROUP	BEFORE PROGRAM		WAVE 1		WAVE 2	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
Employment Status at Three Time Intervals	VICI	74	19	55	35	43	49
	HUD	48	19	28	32	36	34
	YCCIP	5	20	0	0	17	27
Average Hourly Wage (Most Recent Job)	VICI	13	(3.41)	77	(4.51)	47	(3.95)
	HUD	9	(2.71)	19	(3.98)	56	(3.33)
	YCCIP	1	(2.90)	2	(2.80)	35	(3.07)
Most Recent Unsub- sidized Job	VICI	14	71	73	95	50	88
	HUD	8	100	17	89	55	93
	YCCIP	1	0	2	100	28	74
Most Recent Full- Time Job	VICI	9	64	78	90	48	86
	HUD	8	25	19	57	29	49
	YCCIP	1	100	2	67	30	79

NOTE: Numbers in parenthesis are dollar and not percentage figures.

Table III.10. Wave 2 Comparisons Among VICI, HUD, and YCCIP Groups on Entry to Job Training and Education Programs

GROUP	ENROLLED IN SINCE LEAVING THE PROGRAM:				CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN:			
	Job Training Program		School		Job Training Program		School	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
VICI	21	29	85	25	10	70	20	60
HUD	54	7	105	53	9	56	56	91
YCCIP	19	21	63	30	10	60	20	55

**Table III.11. Cross-Wave Comparisons Among VICI, HUD and YCCIP Group on Entry Into Job Training and Education Programs**

		CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN:			
GROUP	WAVE	Job Training Program		School	
		N	%	N	%
VICI	1	92	8	97	14
	2	10	70	20	60
HUD	1	54	2	59	69
	2	9	56	56	91
YCCIP	1	10	0	10	40
	2	10	60	20	55

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#### IV. INTERPROGRAM COMPARISON

The Interprogram Comparison involves a comparison of VICI programs with selected formula-funded DOL-YCCIP and HUD-YCCIP demonstration programs operating at VICI sites. Relevant variables fall into two major categories, descriptive comparisons, and possible indicators of comparative program effectiveness. Each category includes several specific variables:

##### Descriptive Comparisons

1. Characteristics of entering youth
- Characteristics of program staff (especially instructors)
- Nature of work performed (i.e., the community improvements)
- Linkages (with special references to funding sources and the amount of funds provided from sources other than those mandated by the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act)
- Salaries and incentives/bonuses paid to youth and staff
- Other budgetary items, including materials costs, administrative costs, supportive sources and other non-personnel costs
- Intake and screening procedures
- Disciplinary policies and procedures

##### Possible Indicators of Comparative Program Effectiveness

1. Retention, turnover, and attendance in program
- Ability of programs to gear up, achieve, and maintain projected service levels
- Quantity and quality of community improvements
- Positive outcomes, including type of post-program placements (e.g., apprenticeship program, occupational area, return to school, and post-program wages)
- Cost per positive outcome

#### A. GENERAL DESIGN

To ensure valid comparisons, the selected alternative programs should closely match VICI programs in several important respects, in particular, youth characteristics, type of work, location, program factors, size of participant groups, and data quality and availability.

Only three of the eight VICI sites--Chicago, Philadelphia, and the South Bronx--had sufficient numbers of DOL-YCCIP participants, or had DOL-YCCIP programs similar enough to VICI, to provide a basis for meaningful comparisons. A total of eleven YCCIP programs, four in Chicago, four in New York, and three in Philadelphia, were selected for comparison. HUD-YCCIP sites overlap with VICI in four cities: Atlanta, Chicago, Newark, and the South Bronx.

Both contextual and statistical data are needed for making interprogram comparisons. Contextual data are collected through site visits to comparison programs, and are most relevant to the descriptive comparison

variables. Interviews and program documentation are the primary sources of contextual data, and one round of site visits has been conducted by RBS and CPPV research staff. In addition, written materials on several of the comparison programs have been collected.

Statistical data are the best indicators of comparative program effectiveness. RBS has received statistical data on HUD-YCCIP programs and is currently obtaining comparable data on DOL-YCCIP programs in Chicago, Philadelphia, and the South Bronx. These data are currently being analyzed, and will be presented in a subsequent report.

## B. RESULTS

### 1. Atlanta

Only one comparison program was selected in Atlanta, Exodus, Inc., a HUD demonstration program. Information on the program was obtained through project documentation and a preliminary interview conducted by CPPV.

Exodus, Inc. Exodus, Inc., the recipient of the HUD-YCCIP grant in Atlanta, is a community organization offering minority youth non-traditional educational and social services since 1972. The agency had little experience in construction projects prior to receiving the HUD grant.

The Exodus project is designed to train participants in work habits and technical skills in home rehabilitation and energy conservation. The object is to help them obtain unsubsidized jobs in construction-related areas, upon termination. Projects include the rehabilitation of HUD-owned and private homes and the refurbishment of community facilities. Work includes painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry, landscaping, and weatherization. Participants may choose their work crew, and one participant in each crew is chosen as crew chief. Typically, there are 11 or 12 participants in each crew, and supervisory ratios are normally about 15 or 16:1. This has dropped to about 8:1 recently, since enrollment has declined. Participants are paid on a scale of \$2.50 to \$4.50 per hour; incentive raises and team bonuses are given.

Exodus offers counseling, placement, and educational services. Staffing for the project includes a three-person project management team and six field supervisors. All field supervisors have previous experience in housing/construction or community development, and most have extensive experience in working with minority youths and/or community organizations.

About 260 youths have participated in Exodus through Spring 1979. In May, there were 48 enrollees. The program is planning a gradual phase-out and will limit future enrollment to 36. Most participants were 18 or 19 years old, and almost all were black. All were economically disadvantaged. About one-fifth were females, and approximately a quarter were high school graduates or GED recipients. At least 7 percent were ex-offenders.

## 2. Chicago

Five training programs were selected for comparison with VICI, a HUD demonstration project and four formula-funded YCCIP programs. Information on the HUD project was obtained from program documentation and a CPPV site visit. Only limited information, based on a RBS site visit, is currently available on the YCCIP programs here.

The Woodlawn Organization (TWO). The Woodlawn Organization is a community-improvement "umbrella organization," with about 120 member agencies. The Woodlawn HUD program began in March 1978 with a HUD grant of \$1,180,000. The purpose of the project, known as the Urban Restoration and Conservation Corps, is to provide skills training to minority youths, and to improve and restore the Woodlawn community through minor home repairs and vacant land clearance.

Participants are trained in several skills, including carpentry, landscaping, painting, electrical, cement masonry, and plumbing. Work projects have included home repairs, energy conservation and weatherization, public works, (repair of parkway areas and snow removal) and refurbishment of community facilities (a state hospital and playlots). Youths are paid on incentive scales of \$2.90, \$3.18, and \$3.50 per hour, with work and education bonuses.

Participants work in crews, supervised by eleven "tradesmen," five of whom are union members. There are also three Public Service Employee (PSE) assistants and one youth crew chief per crew. Other administrative and support staff are provided to the project through TWO.

Participants spend four hours per week in a vocational shop. Group and individual counseling is available, as needed, and job development and placement services are currently being developed. In Spring 1979, approximately 165 youths were participating in the program. About one-third of them were in school; most were 17 or 18 years old; and all were black and economically disadvantaged. About 70 percent were males. The program tried to select those hardest to employ, such as high school dropouts or juvenile delinquents.

South Austin Realty Association Rehabilitation Project. This is a formula-funded YCCIP program emphasizing placement in the construction-related trades, and focusing on home repair and rehabilitation. Training is provided in painting, carpentry, plumbing, and electrical trades. The program started in January 1979. In December 1978, seven participants were anticipated, and were expected to be disadvantaged, 18 or 19 years old, black, out of school, and male.

Kenwood Oakland Community Organization (KOCO). The code Enforcement/Deferred Maintenance and Weatherization program run by KOCO is a formula-funded YCCIP project, focusing on energy conservation and home maintenance. Work skills include painting, roofing, carpentry, and landscaping. The project started in January 1979, and had

openings for 30 youths. These were expected to be 19 years old, black, male, out of school, and economically disadvantaged.

Puerto Rican Congress Academy (PRC). The Rehabilitation and Beautification Project run by PRC is a formula-funded YCCIP program, begun in January 1979. The program emphasizes home repair and rehabilitation, and provides training in painting, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical skills, and landscaping.

The program has slots for 15 participants. Youths were expected to be 18 or 19 years old, black or Hispanic, male, economically disadvantaged, and out of school. A number of former drug abusers were expected.

Voice of the People (VOP). The Uptown Rehabilitation Training Project run by VOP began in January 1979. The program involves home repair and rehabilitation. Training is provided in painting, carpentry, and landscaping. The program has slots for 10 youths. These were expected to be 18 or 19 years old, white or Hispanic, economically disadvantaged, male, and out of school.

### 3. Newark

Only one comparison program was selected in Newark, a HUD demonstration project operated by the North Ward Education and Cultural Center (NWECC). Information was obtained through project documentation, staff interviews, and direct observation made during a site visit of PPV and RBS research staff.

North Ward Educational and Cultural Center. The Center began operation in 1970. The agency operates in an Italian-American neighborhood, has a long history of community service, and appears to have very good political support. The program focuses on construction-related skills through work experience such as major home repair and rehabilitation, public works, and refurbishment of community facilities. All construction skills are taught, emphasized, including painting, roofing, carpentry, plumbing, electrical, and landscaping. Youths typically work in crews of 8 to 10, and may switch crews.

The program attempted to place participants in the Painters and Carpenters unions but, in contrast to VICI's experience, the unions were not very responsive. The NWECC program uses pay incentives, with pay levels of \$2.90, \$3.20, and \$3.60.

The program is staffed by non-union supervisors who have construction-related experience. Supervisors are PSE employees who must be replaced when their CETA time expires.

The New Jersey State Employment Service screens program applicants; those lacking commitment are screened out. As of April 1979, approximately 280 youths had been enrolled. About 100 were out-of-school youths, and many participated only during the summer. There were 31 current enrollments in April. About two-thirds of the youths were white; about one-fifth was Hispanic; and approximately

13 percent were black. About one-quarter were females. Youths were aged 16-19, and all were economically disadvantaged.

Although the NWECC program goals and its focus on community improvement resemble the VICI program in Newark, there are several important differences, notably the ethnic group composition and the enrollment of in-school youths.

#### 4. Philadelphia

Three comparison programs were selected in Philadelphia, all formula-funded YCCIP programs. Information was obtained through interviews and from RBS' site visit.

Simmons Youth Development Corporation. The Simmons Youth Development Guild is a non-profit agency operating educational, vocational, and social-cultural programs for disadvantaged youths, including construction-related training programs.

The Simmons YCCIP program began in January 1978 and seeks to place participants in construction-related trades. The program emphasizes carpentry and electrical work; plumbing is also taught. Projects include home repair and rehabilitation for senior citizens. Program staff include administrative personnel and four crew leaders. In addition to CETA funding, the project receives money from the Urban Coalition.

As of March 1979, there were 19 participants, 18 working in construction-related positions, the other in a clerical position. Participants were 17-19 years old, and only one (in the clerical job) was female. All were black and economically disadvantaged. All were high school dropouts, but about three-quarters of them planned to return to some form of schooling.

Community Action Group and Youth for Change. The Community Action Group formula-funded YCCIP program aims for placement in construction trades. Projects include building rehabilitation, and home repair for senior citizens. In addition to learning general construction skills, youth are taught how to use power tools, purchase materials, and salvage old materials. Staffing includes administrative personnel and three retired craftsme*n* who serve as supervisors and instructors. Participants are organized into three work teams. The agency also provides psychological and career counseling to participants.

In March 1979, there were 23 participants, and three positions were clerical. Youths were 16-19 years old, economically disadvantaged, and were either high school dropouts or had finished school. Participants were required to spend approximately three or four hours per week on an educational program.

Mantua Youth Painting Project. The Mantua project is a formula-funded YCCIP program which receives additional support from the United Way. The program began in January 1978, and focuses on

community improvement projects such as home repair and window box construction. The program teaches painting and carpentry and emphasizes placement in construction-related trades. As of December 1978, the program enrolled 16 youths, aged 16-19, black, out of school, and economically disadvantaged.

##### 5. The South Bronx

Five alternative training programs were selected in New York, a HUD demonstration project and four formula-funded YCCIP projects. Information on the HUD project was obtained from project documentation, staff interviews, and direct observation made during a site visit by CPPV staff. Information on the YCCIP program was obtained through interviews with the five New York City YCCIP contract offices and descriptions prepared by the prime sponsor. The four programs were selected among 43 YCCIP programs operating in New York City because of their similarity to VICI.

People's Development Corporation (PDC). The Youth Training and Incentive Program (YTIP) run by the PDC began in January 1978, funded by HUD (\$500,000) and the New York State Division for Youth. The program employs 60 neighborhood youths, age 16-19, to work on neighborhood improvement projects in the South Bronx. Projects include rehabilitation, public works, refurbishment of community facilities, and apartment repair in community-managed apartments. Skills taught include painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical skills, demolition, weatherization, landscaping, and community management. YTIP seeks to place participants in union apprenticeships or as helpers to construction workers, plumbers, and electricians.

YTIP also has counseling and education components, including basic adult education, pre-GED, and GED training for three hours per week or more. Job-related skills are emphasized here. An Audio-Visual Unit was established to document YTIP activities, and some participants study primarily photography. Project staff include a project director, an administrative assistant, a counselor, a job developer, and work supervisors (some union journeymen).

Youths are paid \$3.25 per hour (as of May 1979). The program originally utilized incentives, but later these were dropped due to budget problems. Participants receive bonuses for completing GEDs. Their average age is 18. About one third are females, 60 percent are black, 40 percent are Hispanic, and all are disadvantaged. About one third are graduates of the Alfred E. Smith Vocational High School. Another third were referrals from the New York Department of Youths (mostly court cases).

Banana Kelley Community Improvement Association. The Banana Kelley program is a formula-funded YCCIP project operating in the South Bronx, funded by the City for approximately \$137,000. The project began in April 1978. It focuses on home repair and rehabilitation, energy conservation and weatherization, and the refurbishment of

community facilities. Activities include painting, roofing, carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical work, and landscaping. Participants pursue short-term projects, such as a community garden, block and apartment clean-ups, and apartment rehabilitation. The program seeks to place participants in construction-related trades, and is attempting to set up community businesses, such as a cabinet shop and home repair services. The program provides no support services, but makes referrals to other agencies.

Staff include a project director, a vocational coordinator, and a union and non-union supervisor. Banana Kelley enrolls 12 participants, aged 16-19. Ten are male, all are black or Hispanic, and all are disadvantaged. Participants are paid \$2.90 per hour. The program has close ties with the People's Development Corporation (HUD-YCCIP program).

Opportunities Industrialization Center of New York (OIC). The OIC program is a formula-funded YCCIP project operating in the Bushwick section of Brooklyn. The program attempts to train housing rehabilitation aides and to place them in construction-related trades. Participants receive theoretical and practical training in electrical maintenance, carpentry, painting, roofing maintenance, concrete and masonry, oil burner/heating, plumbing and pipe fitting, and reading blueprints. Work experience is acquired through rehabilitating and reconditioning run-down apartment buildings, low-income houses, and public structures, and through renovating vacant public lots. Participants are supervised by skilled, licensed technicians. The OIC program provides skill-related basic education instruction, designed to complement the vocational training component, give GED training, and prepare participants for the labor market. Participants are paid \$2.95 per hour.

The OIC YCCIP program has approximately 40 participants. Most are 18 or 19 years old. All but seven are males. At two-thirds are black, a quarter are Hispanic, and approximately ten percent are white. All are disadvantaged.

Prospect Heights Neighborhood Corporation. The Prospect Heights Program is a YCCIP project funded for approximately \$100,000. Goals are to train unemployed community youths as housing repair and maintenance aides and to refurbish an old school building. The program attempts to provide participants with good work habits and with a variety of skills, such as alternative energy technology, waste recycling, painting, weatherization, carpentry, plumbing, and electrical skills. The program provides placement services through the New York Urban Coalition and aims at placement in construction-related trades.

Twelve low-income youths, aged 16-19, are enrolled. Two are female; all are black. Participants are paid minimum wages.

University Settlement Society of New York. University Settlement is a formula-funded YCCIP program, funded for \$100,000 during the last fiscal year. The program goal is to train building repair and

maintenance aides through the renovation of the Society's seven-story building. Participants are trained in replastering and repainting, resurfacing of floors, weatherization, and plumbing repair. The project hopes to place youths in construction-related trades. Participants receive educational and vocational counseling from the US professional staff. The program enrolls 12 participants. No detailed information on participants is currently available. The prime sponsor indicated that a "careful selection" process was used to determine enrollment.

## V. WORK VALUATION

The purpose of the work valuation is to demonstrate that an employment training program, such as VICI, can and does create valuable tangible byproducts such as the improvements and repairs to houses occupied (generally) by low-income families in urban areas. These improvements and repairs have a "market" value, which can be represented as their cost if performed by a building contractor or other professional craftsmen. The work valuation assesses this market value and compares it with program expenditures.

This comparison permits us to make several quantitative statements about each VICI site. One such statement is the simple demonstration that one dollar of expenditure creates a tangible and measurable value in home improvements and repairs. This return can be called a program "benefit," and it can also be viewed as an offset to the cost of training, so that training costs are reduced by the amount of the "work value" created by the youths. Second, a set of statements can be made about the types of work skills taught and performed with respect to the amount of work value they create. For example, do some skills produce a higher market value than others in return for the cost of teaching them?

The methodology and data collection procedures used in this analysis are based on an ongoing, job-by-job accounting system. A job is defined as work, or activities, done at an individual location or address, such as a home or apartment. One site may be working on over one thousand such jobs, while other sites may work on one hundred or less. This system of evaluation differs from the usual procedure of periodic or end-of-the-project sampling of results. The job-by-job accounting system provides a very satisfactory data set for economic and statistical analysis, and the evaluator can have substantial confidence in the analytical results. In addition, it allows some ongoing monitoring of activities at each site. At present, this monitoring capability is developed for use on a quarterly evaluation basis. Currently, CPPV is discussing with DOL the possibility of refining the management potential of this estimation method.

Thus, the results of the work valuation reported here are twofold. First, there are the quantitative statements that can be made about the value or return on training expenditures. The second result is the evolution of a monitoring and evaluation tool which can be replicated or adapted to other applications. The latter is quite distinct from the training objectives of the VICI demonstration.

This chapter updates and expands the work valuation data with information reported through December 1979 and, in some cases, through mid-March, 1980. In addition, the formulas used for the work valuation procedures are revised and explained. The following sections discuss the nature and purpose of the work valuation task, and present the mathematical formulations and indicators for estimating work value. Section C reports and compares numerical results through June 30, 1979 and through December 31, 1979 or mid-March 1980, and a final section formulates a means of evaluating the performance of a VICI project.

## A. DATA COLLECTION

Table V.1 lists the five types of forms used to collect data for the work valuation. These forms include: (1) A form for estimated large job costs and value, completed when the job is started (VICI Form VII); (2) two versions of a final job cost report, completed when a job is finished (VICI Form VIII for jobs initially reported on VICI Form VII, and VICI Form VI for "small" jobs, where this is the only reporting form used); (3) the VICI Quarterly Fiscal Report, which describes the overall project costs using a simple chart of accounts format; and (4) a report from the independent consultants on the job value, Crawford & Company.

The principal types of data collected are:

1. Expenditures (total and job-by-job) for youth labor, crew chiefs, materials and supplies, etc. (see Table V.1, rows a-e).
2. Estimates of what a private contractor would charge for the job being done by the VICI crews (Table V.1, row f).
3. Identifying data for each job (Table V.1, rows g-i).
4. An independent judgment about the quality of the VICI crews' work (Table V.1, row j).

Items 1, 2, and 3 are prepared by each VICI site for each job, using VICI Form VI or VICI Forms VII and VIII. Crawford & Co. provide an additional estimate for data item 2, on a sampling basis, and also give a second opinion on the quality of work performed (data item 4).

Table V.2 shows how data collection and processing proceeds. Data collection originates at the project site, where one of two alternative forms is used to report on each job. For small jobs, demanding only a few working days, a simple reporting form (Form VI - VICI Job Reporting Form: Short Form) is filled out when the job is completed. It is sent to CPPV's Data Editing Unit, which reviews the form for accuracy, and forwards it to RBS, who process and analyze the data and prepare reports. Larger jobs require two data reports. The first report (Form VII - VICI Cost Estimate Form) provides some cost estimates for a job that is beginning. Upon completion of this job, a revised cost report (Form VIII - Materials and Equipment Cost Form) is completed and forwarded to CPPV. This two-form procedure provides data to anticipate and monitor work in progress and is useful for jobs lasting several months.

Forms VI, VII, and VIII, each include some items estimating private contractor charges for a job in progress. The estimates are checked by Crawford and Co., who report directly to RBS.

The fifth data form is a quarterly fiscal report providing an overall total for expenditures for the project. This permits the estimation of expenditures which cannot be directly attributed to a particular job, so that a type of "overhead" expenditure can be calculated. Total expenditures given by the job-by-job reports are compared with the quarterly

data. Expenditures not attributable to a job become an expense which must be allocated to the job cost estimates. The mathematical formulas described below illustrate how the five sets of data are used.

#### B. FORMULATING WORK VALUE

A simple formulation of the work value is:

$$\frac{\text{Value of VICI work}}{\text{Total of estimated private contractor bids. X Found on Forms VI, VII or VIII}} = \frac{\text{Adjustment (concordance) of VICI value estimates. Based on Crawford & Co. reports}}{(a)}$$

Here, value is equated with what a private contractor would bid (charge) for the job. This simple estimate of value can be used to make further evaluations of VICI work. For example, it can be used to estimate work value created by the project, per dollar of total expenditure on the project, thus:

$$\frac{\text{Work value created per dollar of expenditure}}{\text{Total expenditures to date. Found in Quarterly Fiscal Report}} = \frac{\text{Total of estimated private contractor bids. X Found on Forms VI, VII or VIII}}{\text{Adjustment of VICI value estimates. Based on Crawford & Co. reports}} \quad (b)$$

This second formula gives the ratio of the total "value of VICI work" to the total expenditures for the VICI project. As an example of how these equations are estimated, consider Atlanta through June 30, 1979, where the calculations are as follows:

Calculation of formula (a):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Total value of VICI work}}{\text{(13 jobs reported)}} &= \frac{\text{Total value on VICI Form VIII (13 jobs)}}{X} \quad \text{Adjustment factor from Crawford \& Co. reports (5 jobs inspected)} \\ &= (\$82,696) \quad X \quad 1.059 \\ &= \underline{\$87,575} \end{aligned}$$

**Calculation of formula (b):**

<u>Work value created</u>	<u>per</u>	<u>dollar of expenditure</u>	<u>Value from formula (a)</u>
			Reported expenditure to date from Quarterly Report
			\$ 87,575
			\$366,842
			<u>\$ 0.239</u>

The low "efficiency" indicator in the example is apparently due to substantial start-up costs in a period when no job-related work was performed. As the Atlanta project progresses, start-up costs could be allocated to all jobs completed, as in normal business accounting, which would automatically raise the efficiency indicator.<sup>1</sup> The alternative, followed in the present report, is to use "with and without" indicator ratios. A "with" indicator, that includes start-up costs and overhead items, is given in formula (b). The "without" indicator, which ignores start-up costs and overhead expenses, is:

<u>Work value created</u>	<u>per</u>	<u>dollar of direct job expenses</u>	<u>Value from formula (a)</u>	(c)
			Total of estimated or actual job-related expenses. Reported on VICI Forms VI, VII, and VIII.	

<sup>1</sup> Schemes to allocate "fixed" or "sunk" costs, such as start-up costs, are typically required for (a) regulated rate setting, such as public utility rate setting, and (b) for income tax calculations. A typical allocation scheme, applicable to VICI, would be (1) to project the total dollar volume of jobs that will be completed (using a cost basis); next, (2) to project the start-up and overhead costs for the entire period; then, (3) calculate the ratio of start-up and overhead costs to projected total job cost (put-in-place); and (4) apply this "pro-rated" ratio or allocation as an add-on to the cost of each job or the total of interim costs. For example, while the 9-month total of start-up and overhead costs may equal \$350,000 the projected total for 18 months may be only \$500,000; then if the projected total job-related costs are \$700,000, the ratio is  $5 \div 7 = \$0.7143$ ; this means that an interim actual total of direct cost job of \$300,000 would have an additional \$214,290 of projected start-up and overhead costs added on, rather than the \$350,000 actual total of start-up and overhead costs accrued at the 9th month. The allocation technique would raise the numerical indicator in formula (b).

For example, using the Atlanta data through June 30, 1979,

<u>Work value created</u>	=	\$ 87,575
<u>per</u>		\$140,478
<u>dollar of direct</u>		
<u>job expense</u>	=	<u>\$ 0.623</u>

In this case, every \$1.00 of direct, job-related costs (youth labor, crew-chief time, materials and supplies) results in the creation of \$ 0.623 in work value, where work value is equated with a private contractor's bid to do the same job. This \$ 0.623 value ratio was, again, the lowest found for the five sites with sufficient data.

The difference between the \$140,478 of direct, job-related expenses and the \$366,842 of total expenditure represents the sum of start-up costs and overhead expenditures--\$226,364, based on data reported through June 30. Each of these reported values is provisional, representing only estimates of the correct numbers. At the end of the project, an accurate accounting of all jobs and expenditures will be possible, and those numerical values will be the best basis for a work evaluation of the VICI demonstration.

The two ratio indicators of equations (b) and (c) are aggregate indicators of the work value. In the March 1979 Interim Report, value-added indicators were described. These show the amount of work value that remains if all non-youth labor costs are deducted. Value-added indicators are calculated thus:

<u>Value added by</u>	=	<u>Value created</u>	-	All direct job-
<u>youth labor</u>		(formula a)		related costs except youth labor

Using the Atlanta data:

<u>Value added by</u>	=	\$87,575	-	\$62,549
<u>youth labor</u>		<u>\$25,026</u>		

"Value added by youth labor" produces a comparison ratio when it is divided by the total of direct job-related youth labor expenditures (typically, excluding training time, sick leave, etc.), thus:

<u>Value added</u>	=	<u>formula (d)</u>	
<u>per</u>			
<u>dollar of direct</u>		<u>Direct, job-related</u>	
<u>youth labor</u>		<u>youth labor costs</u>	(e)

Using the Atlanta data:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Value added}}{\text{per}} &= \$25,026 \\ \frac{\text{dollar of}}{\text{youth labor}} &= \$77,929 \\ &= \$0.321 \end{aligned}$$

The numerical value from formula (e), a value-added indicator of \$0.321 per dollar of youth labor, does not include overhead and start-up costs. These costs can be used to formulate a further ratio indicator:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Start-up and}}{\text{overhead costs}} &= \frac{\text{Start-up and overhead costs}}{\text{Direct, job-related youth}} \\ \frac{\text{per}}{\text{dollar of direct}} &= \frac{\text{labor costs}}{\text{youth labor}} \end{aligned} \quad (f)$$

Using the Atlanta data:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Start-up and}}{\text{overhead costs}} &= \$226,364 \\ \frac{\text{per}}{\text{dollar of direct}} &= \$77,929 \\ &= \$2.905 \end{aligned}$$

The numerical value of \$2.905 per dollar of direct youth labor represents the penalty of allocating all start-up costs to a few jobs. It will decrease as more work is done.

The value-added indicator, formula (d), is useful for evaluating whether certain crafts or types of jobs seem to produce a better work value than others. Subtracting the formula (e) number causes the value-added indicator to fall to zero or less for four of the five sites (see Section C).

Two new formulas have been developed since the October, 1979 report. The first is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{Ratio of direct job}}{\text{costs to total expen-}} &= \frac{\text{Total of direct job costs reported to date}}{\text{Reported Total Expenditures to Date}} \quad (g) \\ \text{ditures to date} &= \frac{140,476}{366,842} \\ &= 0.383 \end{aligned}$$

This ratio is a measure of efficiency. It measures the amount of total expenditure that is directly related to home repairs and construction. Since VICI emphasize on-the-job-training, a substantial proportion of total expenditures should be directly job-related.

The second formula is:

<u>Ratio of start-up and overhead costs to direct job costs</u>	=	<u>Difference between total expenditures and direct job costs</u>
		<u>Direct job costs</u>
	=	<u><math>\frac{366,842 - 140,478}{140,478}</math></u>
		(h)
	=	<u>1.611</u>

This formula is a variation of formula (g), and is also an efficiency measure. Optimally, this ratio should be less than 1.0 for a long-term work training program.

Table V.3 summarizes the formulas given above. Results of calculations using these indicators are reported in Section C.

## C. RESULTS

### 1. Numerical Results Through June 30, 1979 and through December 31, 1979

The data was analyzed on both a site-by-site and a combined basis. Table V.4 includes data through December 31, 1979 for all eight sites. The inclusion of three additional sites since the last Interim Report has lowered the simple ratio of work value to total expenditure from 60 percent to about 42 percent. The reason for this is that the formerly excluded sites were not completely exemplary in reporting and, apparently, were not efficient managers of their resources.

Table V.5 presents the numerical values for the aggregate and value-added indicators, and reports the total number of jobs included in the calculations. The formula (c) ratio indicator, "value created per dollar of direct job expenses," varies from 0.618 to 1.510. When overhead and start-up costs are included, using formula (b), the range drops to 0.178 to 0.756. Of course, these indicators take no account of program benefits such as the increased probability of employment and increased future earnings.

As part of their on-site assessments of job value, Crawford & Co. evaluated the quality of the work done relative to local contractor norms. Crawford & Co.'s judgements for 42 jobs are listed in Table V.6, which shows that 87 percent of the ratings are "average" or "above average." Moreover, favorable ratings appear to be increasing as the project matures.

Table V.7 measures timeliness of job completion. Smaller jobs took less time to complete, as would be expected. Shortages in materials or weather problems accounted for most of the delays in what should have been brief jobs.

More detailed evaluation can be made about the relative values produced by each site, each type of job, and each type of craft. The procedure used for this is a simple one-way analysis of variance, a technique was used on a sample of 275 jobs. Three tables of the formula (e) indicator value added per dollar of direct youth labor, were prepared (see Tables V.8a-V.8c). In each table, the value-added ratios differ significantly.

The numbers in the tables do not include the concordance adjustment, nor are any reports on Form VI included, (so Newark data are missing). These tables will be refined in future analyses, but the improvements have been deferred because of some still-unanswered questions about the usefulness of the formula (e) indicators vis-a-vis the formula (b) or formula (c) indicators.

Finally, Table V.9 shows the numbers and types of jobs completed and in progress. Two versions of this table are given: the first shows the percentage of job types per site and throughout VICI, based on a sample of 791 jobs. The second includes all jobs reported through mid-March 1980.

In summary, job performance, as measured in Tables V.4 and 5, is perhaps not exceptional, but, on the other hand, is providing a fair return on each dollar spent. As the program proceeds and matures, improvements can be expected in those sites with lower value ratios. However, not all sites should be expected to be outstanding; there will inevitably be variations in performance among sites, due to many factors.

## 2. Development of the Work Valuation System

The numerical analysis described above is only part of the evaluation task. The second part is to develop and refine a system of work valuation monitoring and evaluation reporting which can be used by other youth employment programs. The system was outlined in Tables V.1-V.3. It consists of a set of data collection forms (Table V.1), a process for data collection and handling (Table V.2), and a set of analytical equations and indicators (Table V.3). The system is currently working, and it provided the results described above. However, its principal use to date has been for making interim evaluations. Its potential for ongoing monitoring and management has not yet been developed, for two reasons:

1. Data collection, processing, and analysis is done on a quarterly basis and does not produce timely reports or quick feedback either to VICI project officers or to VICI site management. Converting the reporting to a monthly basis would increase the costs; but without timely reporting, much of the usefulness of these reports for quick identification and correction of problems may be lost.

2. The potential users of the analytical reports may not understand the concepts, equations, and indicators, and, hence, may not be able to use the reports for monitoring or management purposes. Some investment in training may be necessary if the system is to be extended to other projects.

The work valuation system is a good and useful evaluation tool; the methodology can be replicated; the procedures are straightforward; and the results are accurate and verifiable. However, the system does require some analytical sophistication and willingness to learn on the part of users. For large applications, a subcontractor would probably be needed to handle the computing, though small projects, consisting of, say, one hundred jobs or less, could use the system manually.

As the system has developed, a number of refinements have been made in it:

1. Items and formats of the data collection forms (Table V.1) were changed frequently in the first months, due to certain ambiguities in the forms and the need to train users.
2. Data collection and handling seem to be working smoothly (Table V.2), but some sites are very slow in forwarding completed forms, resulting in a lack of data. A possible improvement in this process could be more frequent reporting of the type of results shown in Tables V.3 and V.5, but this would raise costs.
3. The data analysis formulas (Table V.3) are still evolving. The following sections describes some refinements and further improvements are possible.
4. Delays in data reporting from sites have led to the use of projection formulas which fill in the missing data. These formulas were used in this and in preceding reports, and are still undergoing refinement.
5. Staff turnover at VICI sites results in a frequent need to train new staff in using the work value forms. This problem is handled by CPPV.

#### D. CONCLUSION: HOW GOOD CAN A VICI PROJECT BE?

Evaluation of a VICI project should be based on realistic expectations and standards of performance. That is, a set of maximum values for performance indicators must first be established; a VICI program can then be measured against these standards. For instance, one might ask: What are realistic numerical values for the ratios shown in Table V.5? What is the best value for each ratio? The comparative data shown in the updated Table V.5 provide one estimate of the best value of each of five ratios. Another approach would be to establish, on empirical and/or theoretical grounds, the "best" values of the work value ratios (indicators). In this section, we discuss the question of efficiency, using comparative data from eight sites, and consider empirical and theoretical interpretations of the indicators' range of values.

##### 1. Reformulating the Efficiency Equation

In terms of work valuation, the overall economic efficiency of a project is defined in terms of a simple output-to-input ratio (see Table V.3, formula (b)), thus:

$$\text{Project's overall economic efficiency indicator} = \frac{\text{Concorded work value created}}{\text{Total of direct and indirect expenditures for this project}}$$

This formula expresses the value of the work created during a VICI project; it does not include any other direct benefit (such as the employment effects on trainees) or secondary benefits (such as the effect of VICI expenditures on the local economy).

Based on this formula, estimates of work value ratio for the eight VICI projects range from a low of 0.178 to a high of 0.756 (see Table V.5, update). This wide range from minimum to maximum value has prompted a reformulation of the overall efficiency equation, as follows:

$$\text{Overall economic efficiency indicator} = \frac{\text{Job-related efficiency indicator}}{\text{Management/Allocation efficiency indicator}}$$

These three efficiency indicators can be expressed as:

$$\frac{\text{Concorded work value}}{\text{Total of expenditures}} = \frac{\text{Concorded Work value}}{\text{Direct job costs}} \times \frac{\text{Management/Allocation efficiency indicator}}{\text{Management/Allocation efficiency indicator}}$$

These values are found in Table V.3 as:  $(\text{formula b}) = (\text{formula c}) \times (\text{formula h})$ .

As an example, consider the Atlanta data shown in Table V.10. Data on number of jobs, concorded work value, direct job-related costs, and total VICI site expenditures are given for each quarter of 1979. The totals rise steadily over each quarter, as do the three efficiency indicators. This trend probably reflects the project's increasing maturity over time. Note, however, that the rate of increase differs for each indicator. Three reasons for this disparity are:

1. The job-related efficiency indicator rises from 0.583 to 0.673, a small change. This ratio measures the value of the work done against the actual cost of doing the work. Improvements over time would indicate increasing productivity of the youth crews. The reported information used here is based on estimates, however, and does not represent a final accounting, so these values are provisional. However, they may be representative for this project.

Two factors explain the changes in the job-related efficiency indicator. The first is the hypothesis of increasing productivity over time. The second may be stated thus: different types of jobs (carpentry, painting, small repairs, etc.) appear to have different job-related efficiency values for the youth crews:

- A youth crew, working primarily on painting public housing apartments (as in the Newark site) can be very productive compared with professional painters. This is because the youths use the same tools and techniques, and achieve nearly the same speed in painting, but their wages are much lower than those of professionals. In these cases, the job-related efficiency ratio may exceed 1.0; that is, the youth crews are more productive, per dollar spent, than the professionals.
- In contrast, where the work is particularly complex and requires knowledge and experience, it is unlikely that the youth crews' productivity will rival that of professionals. Some sites undertake these more complex jobs (e.g., larger home repair projects); hence, expectations of those sites' productivity and of the job-related economic efficiency indicators should be lowered. A ratio of 0.5 or less would perhaps be appropriate for such jobs, especially where inexperienced crews are involved.

These factors may, however, cancel out one another. A site may work on simple jobs until the crews are experienced and then tackle complex jobs in order to provide them with more

training. Thus, the effects described in the first example would be offset by those of the second example, and the job-related efficiency indicator will not increase dramatically.

2. The management/allocation efficiency indicator for Atlanta rises from 0.22 to 0.41 over the four quarters. The 0.41 ratio is about equal to the median value for the eight sites. Its ratio measures the direct, job-related costs versus total expenditures. A project should show an improving ratio over time, as startup costs are spread over a larger basis. This site already shows an improvement in this ratio, and the final ratio may be even better.
3. The overall economic efficiency ratio is the product of the two more specific indicators. This indicator more than doubles over the four quarters due to a small increase in job-related efficiency and a larger increase in management/allocation efficiency.

A preliminary indication of the overall efficiency of the VICI programs can be based on the equation of the three indicators. The overall economic efficiency is constrained, or limited, by the two specific efficiencies: the job-related efficiency and the management/allocation efficiency.

## 2. Comparative Efficiency Ratios for Eight Sites

Table V.11 gives numerical values for the work value indicators for each site, using the most recent data available. The column showing job-related efficiency displays a range of 0.618 to 1.510 (reflecting program maturity and complexity factors). Possibly, some of the lower ratios could be improved, and some additional on-site evaluation will be performed. The differences in concordance factors among sites are important here. However, the range in numerical values found here seems reasonable, and the high values could be duplicated by other sites by changing the types of jobs.

The management/allocation efficiency column of Table V.11 shows a range of 0.209 to 0.658. The lower values represent some start-up and reporting problems, but the highest value is found for a project which has been exemplary in reporting and attention to productivity. It would appear that a numerical value of 0.65 to perhaps 0.75 is optimal for this ratio in a VICI project. This means that between 65 and 75 percent of all expenses are directly related to jobs and can be identified as direct costs. A different type of project--perhaps one of a shorter duration, focusing only on training--would have a much lower efficiency ratio of this type.

The overall economic efficiency ratios shown in the extreme right-hand column of Table V.11 are the product of the ratios discussed above. The numerical values range from 0.178 to 0.756. The lower values are due to

low management/allocation efficiency ratios. Optimal values for this ratio would result from a job-related efficiency ratio of 1.0 or greater and/or a management/allocation efficiency ratio of 0.65 or greater, for a combined product of 0.65 for the overall economic efficiency ratio. Only two VICI projects performed so well, Milwaukee and Newark. Overall efficiency may be improved at other sites through management efforts and a reconstruction of missing reports.

### 3. Answering the Basic Question


Possible and expected numerical values for the three indicators have been suggested in this section. Values for job-related efficiency of 1.0 or more, management/allocation efficiency of 0.65 or more, and overall economic efficiency of 0.65 are perhaps reasonable from an empirical and statistical perspective and can be actually attained, as is apparent from Table V.11. Hence, some specific expectations about project performance can be established. However, further analysis of the reasons for variations among project sites will help establish whether these suggested indicator values represent reasonable expectations.

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Table V.1. Types of Data Collected and Forms Used

Types of Data	VICI SITE Prepared			Quarterly Fiscal Report	Crawford and Company Reports		
	Job-by-Job Accounting/Reporting Forms						
	Form VI (Final)	Form VII (Estimate)	Form VII (Final)				
<u>Expenditures:</u>							
a. Administrative Items Personnel, Office Space	-	-	-	Yes	-		
b. Services & Training Items	-	-	-	Yes	-		
c. Youth Labor	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-		
d. Crew Chiefs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-		
e. Job related, non- personnel items	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-		
<u>Bid Estimates:</u>							
f. Private Contractor Bid Estimates	Yes	Yes	Revised values		Yes		
<u>Identification:</u>							
g. Job Number	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes		
h. Job Description	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes		
i. Dates When Work was Done	Yes	-	Yes	-	-		
<u>Other Data:</u>							
j. Judgements About the Quality of Work	-	-	-	-	Yes		

Table V-2. Flow of Data



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See Appendix B

Table V-3. Data, Formulas and Indicators

<u>Part I. Data</u>		
a. Total Value of Jobs in Progress or Completed, Forms VI, VII and VIII	=	\$ 82,696
b. Concordance ratio between VICI value estimates and Crawford Values	=	1.059
c. Total expenditure to date, Quarterly fiscal report	=	\$366,842
d. Total of Estimated or Actual Job related expenses, reported on Forms VI, VII and VIII	=	\$140,478
e. Total of Job Related expenses <u>less</u> Youth Labor Costs	=	\$ 62,549
f. Total of Job Related Youth Labor Costs	=	\$ 77,929
g. Startup and overhead Costs <sup>m</sup> difference between c and d.	=	\$226,364

<u>Part II. Formulas and Indicators</u>		
formula a: Value of VICI work	= a * b	= 82,696 * 1,059 = \$87,575
formula b: Value created per dollar of expenditures	= (a * b) ÷ c	= \$ 0.239
formula c: Value created per dollar of direct job expenses	= (a * b) ÷ d	= \$ 0.623
formula d: Value added by Youth Labor	= (a * b) - e	= \$25,026
formula e: Value added per dollar of direct youth labor	= (a * b) - e) ÷ f	= \$ 0.321
formula f: Startup and overhead costs per dollar of direct youth labor	= g ÷ f	= \$ 2.905
formula g: Net value created by Youth Labor	= e - f	= \$ 2.584
formula h: Ratio of direct costs to total expenditure	= d ÷ c	= \$ 0.383
formula i: Ratio of startup and overhead costs to direct job costs	= g ÷ d	= \$ 1.611

**Table V.4. The Aggregated Data Totals through December 31, 1979  
for Most Sites**

Site and Reporting Period (1)	Reported Expenditures to End of Period (2)	Reported Jobs In Progress or Completed (3)	<u>Aggregated Job Data</u>		<u>Components of Expenditures</u>		
			Direct Cost of Jobs in Progress or Completed (Estimated) (4)	Concorded Value of Jobs (Estimated) (5)	Costs of Youth Labor in Jobs (6)	Other Job Related Costs (7)	Costs Not Charged to Jobs (8)
Atlanta (December 31, 1979)	\$ 777,556	31	\$ 315,221	\$ 212,127	\$ 154,076	\$ 161,145	\$ 462,335
Broward (December 31, 1979)	684,972	310	418,562	409,577	210,875	207,687	266,410
Chicago (Projected)	1,417,226	5	619,219	450,618	245,892	373,327	798,007
Milwaukee (December 31, 1979)	784,363	163	515,756	521,739	232,272	283,484	268,607
Newark (December 31, 1979)	783,114	426	392,264	592,136	187,379	204,885	390,850
New Haven (December 31, 1979)	792,374	86	326,803	251,305	151,215	175,588	465,571
Philadelphia (September 30, 1979)	702,528	40	147,122	155,271	27,894	119,228	555,406
South Bronx (September 30, 1979)	431,101	29	124,076	76,695	69,055	55,021	307,025
<b>Totals</b>	<b>6,373,234</b>	<b>1,090</b>	<b>2,859,023</b>	<b>2,669,468</b>	<b>1,278,658</b>	<b>1,580,365</b>	<b>3,514,211</b>

**Table V.5. Summary Table on Work Value Ratios, Indicators With and Without Overhead Included, through December 1979**

Site and Reporting Period	Reported Jobs	<u>Aggregate Indicators</u>		<u>Value Added Indicators</u>		
		Ratio: (Concorded Value) to VICI Job Cost w/o O/H Form c	Ratio: (Concorded Value) to Total of VICI Costs to Date Form b	Dollar Value Added Per \$ of Youth Labor, No Overhead Form e	Overhead Per \$ of Youth Labor in Jobs Form f	Dollar Value Added with Overhead Included Form 3-form f (7)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Atlanta (December 31, 1979)	31	0.673	0.273	\$0.331	\$3.000	\$-2.67
Broward (December 31, 1979)	310	0.979	0.598	\$0.957	\$1.263	\$-0.31
Chicago (Projected)	5	0.728	0.318	\$0.314	\$3.245	\$-2.93
Milwaukee (December 31, 1979)	163	1.012	0.665	\$1.025	\$1.156	\$-0.13
Newark (December 31, 1979)	426	1.510	0.756	\$2.128	\$2.09	\$+0.04
New Haven (December 31, 1979)	86	0.769	0.317	\$0.500	\$3.079	\$-2.58
Philadelphia (September 30, 1979)	40	1.055	0.221	\$1.292	\$19.91	\$-18.62
South Bronx (September 30, 1979)	29	0.618	0.178	\$0.314	\$4.446	\$-4.13
Totals (Weighted Averages)		0.934	0.419	\$0.852	\$2.748	\$-1.90

Table V-6. Independent Estimators Ratings of Job Quality  
Based on a Sample of 42 Jobs

Judgement	Rating (Based on Average Work of a Professional Contractor)					Total Count on Ratings
	Far Below Average	Below Average	Average	Above Average	Far Above Average	
Appearance of the Final Product	1	4	16	11	0	32
Preparation of Work Surfaces and Cleanup	1	6	18	9	0	34
Quality of Materials Used	0	0	32	5	0	37
Quality of Workmanship of Job	2	14	16	10	0	42
Total	4	14	92	35	0	145
(%)	2.7%	9.7%	63.4%	24.1%	0%	99.9%

Table V.7. Completion Time by Job Type<sup>1</sup>

Type of Job	Time to Complete							Total
	1 week or less	1-4 Weeks	5-8 Weeks	2-3 Mths.	4-5 Mths.	6 Mths. or Less		
Small Home Repairs	40	25	2	1	2	-	-	70
Large Home Repairs	4	17	9	5	3	1	-	39
Rehab/Major Repairs Unoccupied Dwellings	-	10	1	4	-	-	-	15
Weatherization	12	2	-	-	-	-	-	14
Painting	321	99	4	-	-	-	-	424
Rehab pf Vacant Shell	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Major Renovation Large Public Building	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	3
Maintainance/Other	10	10	-	-	-	-	-	20
Total	387	165	17	11	5	1	-	586

Key: Small Home Repairs: Estimated materials cost less than \$500.00

Large Home Repairs: Estimated materials cost between 500 and 1000

Rehabilitation: Major repairs on occupied dwellings cost over 1000

Painting: Estimated (apartments in public housing, major large buildings)

<sup>1</sup>Data based on five sites reporting completed jobs only through June 1979.

TABLE V.8a  
VALUE-ADDED RATIO, BY SITE (formula e)

Site	Count on Jobs	Mean Value of Ratios for each job	Standard error of mean Estimate
Atlanta	13	0.2632**	0.0533
Broward	128	3.2817	0.1062
Chicago	3	0.7097	0.0181
Milwaukee	75	1.3953	0.1414
New Haven	52	0.7314	0.0981
Philadelphia	4	1.2006	0.1627
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>2.0836*</b>	<b>0.0955</b>

"The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance is 61.468.

\*\*This numerical value of 0.2632 for Atlanta differs from the numerical value of 0.239 found in Table VI-5. These two values are not calculated using the same, or even similar, formulas. Formula (b) was used in Table VI-5 whereas a variation of formula (e) is used in this table. The difference in formulas are these factors:

- (1) the concordance adjustment has not been included in this table,
- (2) overhead and start-up costs have not been included in this table,
- (3) the values in this table are derived from an unweighted summation of the individual ratios, whereas the Table VI-5 approach uses an implicit weighting of ratios.

The text comments that the use of formula (b) or (c) indicators should be used as alternatives to the formula (e) indicator. The formula (e) model was used in the March Interim Report.

Notes:

- (1) These means are based on formula (e) but the concordance adjustment has not been applied. Since the sites seem to overstate the private contractor bids, these value-added ratios are an overstatement of the true value.
- (2) Overhead and start-up costs have not been included.
- (3) As the text discusses, the use of the formula (b) or (c) indicators should be studied as an alternative to the formula (e) indicator. The formula (e) model was used in the March Interim Report.
- (4) These are unweighted means, i.e., the overall mean is derived from the product of the mean by category multiplied by the number of jobs per category.

**Table V.8B. Value Added Ratio by Type of Job (Formula (e) Used)**

Type of Job	Count on Jobs	Mean Value of Ratios for each job	Standard error of Mean Estimate
Small home repairs	57	2.4268	0.2609
Major home repairs	76	1.7378	0.1523
Rehabilitation	33	1.6323	0.2610
Weatherizing	13	0.8557	0.2416
Painting	75	2.5195	0.1698
Rehabilitation of Shells	5	0.8903	0.1781
Major-Public Buildings	11	2.8113	0.3905
Maintenance	4	3.1526	0.5006
Other	0	0.0	0
Total	274	2.0888*	0.0957

\* The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance is 4.595.

Notes: Same as for Table V.8A.

Table V.8C. Value Added Ratio by Craft (Formula (e) Used)

Type of Craft	Count on Jobs	Mean Value of Ratios for each job	Standard error of Mean Estimate
Carpentry	109	1.5453	0.1549
Masonry	24	3.0989	0.2021
Roofing	0	0	0
Painting	114	2.1131	0.1354
Plumbing	11	3.7270	0.5064
Electrical	16	2.9441	0.2803
Other	1	1.1818	0
Total	275	2.0836*	0.0955

\* The "F" statistic for the comparison of between and within group variance is 9.036.

Notes: Same as for Table V. 8a

Table V.9. Percentage of Job Types Completed and in Progress

Site	Atlanta	Broward	Chicago	Milwaukee	Newark	New Haven	Phila.	
Date of Start-up	1/79	10/78	10/78	10/78	10/78	10/78	10/78	Total
<u>Type of Job</u>								
Small Home Repair	-	22.6	-	37.0	-	-	-	11.3
Large Home Repair	20.0	14.3	-	58.3	-	15.1	75.0	14.8
Rehab/Major Repairs to Occupied Dwellings	80.0	11.5	-	1.9	-	15.1	-	6.7
Weatherization	-	-	-	-	-	24.7	-	29.0
Painting	-	41.5	-	1.9	89.4	40.9	-	53.5
Rehab: Vacant Shell	-	-	100	-	-	2.2	25.0	0.9
Renovation: Public Buildings	-	6.5	-	0.9	2.0	2.2	-	3.2
Maintenance	-	3.2	-	-	13.5	-	-	6.8
Total %*	100	100	100	99.9	99.9	100.2	100	100
Total No. of Jobs	15	217	3	108	347	93	8	791

\*Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Table V.9 (Update). Number of Jobs Completed or Started

<u>Site and Reporting Period</u>	<u>Job Reports in Hand</u>	<u>Projected Direct Job Costs</u>	<u>Projected (Concorded) Work Value</u>
Atlanta (mid-March 1980)	40	\$406,736	\$273,713
Broward (mid-March 1980)	318	429,363	420,146
Chicago	5	No change from Table V-4	
Milwaukee (mid-March 1980)	198	635,580	655,119
Newark (mid-March 1980)	501	448,513	695,635
New Haven (mid-March 1980)	91	346,336	265,598
Philadelphia	40	No change from Table V-4	
South Bronx	29	No change from Table V-4	

Table V.10. Illustration of the Reformulated Indicators for Atlanta

Period	Number of Jobs	Data			Indicators		
		Concorded Work Value	Direct Job Related Costs	Total VICI Site Expenditures	Job Related Efficiency	Management/ Allocation Efficiency	Overall Efficiency
		(a)	(b)	(c)	(a ÷ b)	(b ÷ c)	$\frac{a}{b} : \frac{b}{c} = \frac{a}{c}$
March 30, 1979	7	24,818	42,579	193,829	0.583	0.220	0.128
June 30, 1979	14	94,318	151,284	391,516	0.623	0.386	0.241
Sept. 30, 1979	22	151,870	234,010	567,805	0.649	0.412	0.267
Dec. 31, 1979	31	212,127	315,221	777,556	0.673	0.405	0.273

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Table V.11. Reformulation of the Work Value Indicators

Site	Data			Indicators		
	Concorded Work Value	Direct Job Related Costs	Total VICI SITE Expenditures	Job Related Efficiency	Management/ Allocation Efficiency	Overall Economic Efficiency
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a ÷ b)	(b ÷ c)	$\left( \frac{a}{b} \cdot \frac{b}{c} = \frac{a}{c} \right)$
Atlanta	212,127	315,221	777,556	0.673	0.405	0.273
Broward	409,577	418,562	684,972	0.979	0.611	0.598
Chicago	450,618	619,219	1,417,226	0.728	0.437	0.318
Milwaukee	521,739	515,756	784,363	1.012	0.658	0.665
Newark	592,136	392,264	783,114	1.510	0.501	0.756
New Haven	251,305	326,803	792,374	0.769	0.412	0.317
Philadelphia	155,271	147,122	702,528	1.055	0.209	0.221
South Bronx	76,695	124,076	431,101	0.618	0.288	0.178

Data Source

Table V.4  
Col. 5      Col. 4

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Col. 2

Calculated using formulas, also found in Table V.5.

## I. The Origins of the Demonstration

Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) is a demonstration program funded by the Office of Youth Programs, U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The demonstration was created as part of a Knowledge Development Plan which was to guide the expenditure of discretionary funds appropriated by Congress for the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977. The VICI demonstration was to replicate an exemplary youth program model in a variety of settings. OYP selected the newly created Corporation for Public/Private Ventures, Inc. as an "intermediate unit" to design and manage the demonstration and the research that would accompany it. CPPV chose to replicate a model program based on the essential features of the Emergency Home Repair Program of Portland, Oregon, under which previously unemployed young people repair the homes of low income and elderly people. Each of the eight CETA prime sponsors involved in the demonstration was to operate a program for 18 months with a capacity of 60 youth, who could be enrolled for no more than 12 months each; thus, over the course of the program, each site was expected to enroll a minimum of 120 youth. The demonstration sites began operating their programs one at a time, from September 1978 through February 1979.

The VICI demonstration thus had several elements. It was testing a program model based on the Emergency Home Repair

Program in a variety of settings. Even more fundamentally, it was testing a concept--the idea of replicating a program model under a variety of conditions. And it was also testing a mechanism--CPPV--as an intermediate unit to develop and manage the operation of a governmental employment and training program. Thus, CPPV was to be both a testor of models and a model to be tested.

This interim report is part of the research effort that is accompanying the VICI demonstration. This report will attempt to record and analyze the process by which the demonstration was conceived and mounted. When the first VICI programs began to recruit young people in September 1978, this step was, in fact, the result and outgrowth of efforts that were set in motion in early 1977. To understand the nature of the VICI demonstration and the context in which it was to take place, one must examine the emergence of the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 and the efforts being undertaken at the Ford Foundation and the Department of Labor as the outlines of the impending youth legislation were becoming clear.

#### A. The Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977

Youth unemployment has been a serious and steadily worsening problem in the United States throughout the post-World War Two period. During the 1950's and early 1960's, national attention was focused on the rising unemployment rates among youth. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 established such programs as the Neighborhood Youth Corps and the Job Corps to provide work experience and training for disadvantaged and unemployed young

people. But as the nation confronted two recession in the first half of the 1970's, resources were shifted away from youth towards efforts to aid unemployed adults, who were often heads of households and primary wage earners

In the mid-1970's, however, interest in youth unemployment grew as the jobless rate among teenagers, particularly minority teenagers, reached levels of 40 percent or more. Roger Wilkins wrote in The New York Times that:

Urban affairs experts agree that one of the most important problems facing American cities is the unemployment and perhaps the unemployability, of large numbers of poor youngsters, many of them members of minority groups.

And Forbes Magazine noted, "The hardest knot in the whole unemployment tangle consists of just short of 400,000 minority group 16-to-19-year-olds, most of them black."\*

During the 1976 Presidential campaign, candidate Jimmy Carter made youth unemployment a major campaign theme, and early in his administration he announced major plans to combat youth unemployment. These were presented in conjunction with a massive economic stimulus package he submitted to the Congress.

A few months later the President signed into law the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (PL-95-93). An initial \$1 billion appropriation for this legislation had been provided by the Economic Stimulus Appropriations Act (PL 95-29), approved May 13, 1977, in anticipation of the youth legislation.

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\*See, Roger Wilkins, "A New Approach to Job Problems of City Youth," New York Times, January 16, 1978, p. A23; and "The Jobless Teens," Forbes (February 6, 1978), p. 62.

YEDPA, which was signed by the President on August 5, authorized four programs:

- \* The Young Adult Conservation Corps, which provides year-round programs employing youth in public parks, forests, and recreation areas. Modeled after the Depression-era CCC, this program would be administered by the Departments of Agriculture and Interior under an inter-agency agreement with DOL. It had a first-year budget of \$233 million, and it was the only YEDPA program assured of three-year funding rather than a single-year appropriation.
- \* The Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects (Entitlement), which would test the results of guaranteeing a job and/or training to all economically disadvantaged 16-to-19-year-olds residing in selected areas who agreed to enter or remain in school during the period of entitlement. Some \$115 million was budgeted for the first year of the program.
- \* Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Projects (YCCIP), which was also budgeted at \$115 million. This program would hire young people to work on community improvement projects, ranging from housing rehabilitation to energy conservation.
- \* Youth Employment and Training Programs, which extended the wide range of existing programs to enhance the job prospects of youth through career information, work experience, and other activities. Some 22 percent of the YETP funds were earmarked for in-school programs to forge closer ties between school officials and employment and training officials.

The responsibility for administering YEDPA was placed in the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Administration. It created a new Office of Youth Programs (OYP) to administer the new initiatives as well as existing DOL youth programs, such as the Job Corps, and the Summer Program for Economically Disadvantaged Youth (SPEDY). As director of the new Office of Youth Programs, DOL chose Robert Taggart, formerly executive director of the National Manpower Policy Task Force.

The vast majority of the funds appropriated for YEDPA were to be allocated by formula among the 445 "prime sponsors"

established under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. However, the Act also provided the Secretary of Labor with discretionary authority over 21 percent of the YCCIP funds, 13 percent of the YETP funds, and all of the funds for Entitlement Projects. A substantial portion of these discretionary funds were to be used to support a range of demonstrations, experiments, and evaluations. Section 348(a)(1) of the Act specified that:

The Secretary of Labor is authorized, either directly or by way of contract or other arrangement, with prime sponsors, public agencies and private organizations to carry out innovative and experimental programs to test new approaches for dealing with the unemployment problems of youth and to enable eligible participants to prepare for, enhance their prospects for, or secure employment in occupations through which they may reasonably be expected to advance to productive working lives.

YEDPA was, after all, a "Demonstration Projects Act." It not only sought to stimulate the economy and ameliorate unemployment but also to encourage research and experimentation as a means of developing the knowledge needed to formulate more effective long-term national policies and programs to aid young people in moving into the labor force.

To assure productive and coordinated use of the YEDPA funds, DOL officials formulated a Knowledge Development Plan to design, organize, and guide the discretionary allocations. With some \$100 million in discretionary funds, the DOL clearly needed a well-developed plan not only for intellectual and administrative purposes, but also to provide a framework within which the political pressure for access to these funds could be contained. The Knowledge Development Plan listed a set of goals and

objectives and went on to specify ten demonstration projects and eight special studies which were designed to help answer the questions that DOL officials believed were important to the design of effective youth employment policies.

The Knowledge Development Plan proposed three demonstrations projects under the YCCIP program. One would explore the value of utilizing neighborhood-based Community Development Corporations for planning and running community improvement projects. This demonstration would use funds transferred from DOL to the Department of Housing and Urban Development and then to various community development corporations. A second demonstration would "explore the feasibility of federal inter-agency work projects," by developing arrangements through which other federal agencies would be linked to community improvement youth projects.

The third demonstration, which would become the VICI project, was described in the Knowledge Development Plan as:

a special effort to replicate in 5 - 10 communities around the country a selected Community Improvement Program model drawn from a review of both appropriate past programs and designs of projects financed through the formula allocation for Community Improvement.

A crucial element in this case was that:

This program replication demonstration project will be undertaken by a nonprofit corporation, established under private foundation auspices, staffed with individuals with particular experience and expertise in the area of community conservation and improvement work.

The Knowledge Development Plan identified three "underlying objectives of this demonstration project." They were:

- (a) to demonstrate and test the feasibility and effectiveness of a replicating methodology

itself (i.e., how and under what conditions can the program model be adequately replicated in various communities);

- (b) to develop and refine a "work valuation" methodology which may eventually be incorporated into the formula-funded Community Improvement type efforts;
- (c) to compare the post-program experience of youth participating in the replicated program . . . with those for a comparable group of young people of similar backgrounds who have participated in other manpower programs . . . in the same localities.

While the project which would become the VICI demonstration was outlined in the Knowledge Development Plan released in the fall of 1977 following the passage of the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act, the groundwork for the VICI demonstration and the organization which would operate it was being laid well before the Knowledge Development Plan appeared.

#### B. The Creation of CPPV

As the new Carter Administration began displaying increasing interest in youth unemployment in early 1977, these developments were being closely watched by staff members of the Ford Foundation in New York. Ford, the nation's largest philanthropic foundation, had for many years been interested in youth unemployment. Mitchell Sviridoff, the vice president for national affairs, had an abiding personal interest in issues of work and employment. In early 1977 he became increasingly concerned that the federal government was moving toward what he saw as a repetition of the 1960's, when massive sums of money were thrown into social programs with little sense of how to deal effectively with problems.

In February 1977, Sviridoff asked Michael Bailin to survey existing youth employment programs and to identify exemplary programs. Bailin, a young lawyer who had been an officer of Franconia College and a consultant to several New York City municipal agencies, was soon joined in this project by Hilary Feldstein, a long-time Ford Foundation consultant. Soon, Sviridoff would ask Graham Finney to head the effort. Finney, an occasional Ford consultant, had previously been a Deputy Superintendent of Schools in Philadelphia and Commissioner of the Addiction Services Agency in New York City.

This team consulted with some 27 national organizations as well as a variety of state and local organizations, and it talked to numerous knowledgeable individuals. The result was the development of an inventory of over 150 youth programs. Over two-thirds of these were contacted by telephone, and over 30 sites were visited, chiefly by Bailin.

During the summer of 1977, however, Sviridoff began to talk with Robert Taggart, who was then head of a youth employment task, about the youth employment legislation that was being developed by the Administration. The Department of Labor was also developing a Knowledge Development Plan and preparing to mount several demonstration programs. Sviridoff and Taggart began focusing on the use of intermediary units to mount demonstration projects, using Ford Foundation funds to help finance the launching of such demonstrations.

Amid these talks, the nature of the project Finney was heading began to change. The emphasis on uncovering innovative youth programs began to be eclipsed by increasing interest in

designing a mechanism which might mount demonstration programs.

By the late summer of 1977, there was an emerging consensus on the use of intermediary nonprofit corporations to operate some of the demonstrations that were to be mounted under the YEDPA legislation. While Sviridoff talked to Taggart about the role of Ford Foundation funds in helping to create these nonprofit corporations in August or September, Sviridoff also began inquiring into Finney's interest in heading such a corporation.

Sviridoff's interest in furthering the use of intermediary units was an outgrowth of his long-standing views about effective utilization of scarce public resources. Since becoming Ford Foundation vice president of national affairs in the late 1960's, he had made large grants to support institutional approaches to social issues which combined the energy and resources of both the public and private sectors. Thus, one major Ford Foundation program had been support of community development corporations. Another major program of the National Affairs Division had been the creation of the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) as an intermediary unit which would design and manage a demonstration of "supported work" on behalf of the Department of Labor and other federal agencies.

Graham Finney shared much of Sviridoff's outlook. He had written the original Ford Foundation paper proposing the creation of MDRC to operate the national supported work demonstration. And he had recently been managing partner of the Philadelphia Partnership, which sought to bring together leaders from the city's public and private sectors in joint efforts at ameliorating local problems.

Thus, in September 1977, the Ford Foundation released an information paper which had Finney prepared called "Public-Private Partnerships to Address the Employment Problems of Youth." This paper spelled out precisely what a new intermediate unit might look like and what role it might fill in helping to achieve the objectives of YEDPA.

The nascent Office of Youth Programs was clearly receptive to talk of intermediary units. Taggart had an intellectual interest in testing alternative mechanisms for mounting programs and delivering services. Moreover, OYP had been created de novo to administer a giant program which had to immediately begin dispensing money to help stimulate the economy and ameliorate conditions at the same time it was to pursue longer term goals of knowledge development. As Harriet Michel, OYP's director of youth employment programs, told a March 28, 1978 CPPV board meeting, OYP was under heavy pressure to "get the money out on the street," yet it had a very small staff. About 40 staff people would be in charge of programs under YEDPA, and only a few of them would be available to deal with discretionary funds. Many of them were new to Washington and the bureaucratic maze that characterized the Department of Labor. Thus, OYP had administrative as well as intellectual reasons to support such alternatives as intermediate units. And the prospect of receiving foundation funds, permitting OYP to husband its own limited resources, made this mechanism even more attractive.

Because Sviridoff's goals coincided with those of Taggart, the two gradually agreed to work together. In an October 11, 1977 letter to Sviridoff, Taggart said:

The Office of Youth Programs is delighted that the Ford Foundation is willing to devote its energies and resources to the challenging experimental and demonstration efforts mandated by the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act.

Taggart's letter went on to note that OYP's Knowledge Development Plan and the Ford Foundation's information paper on "Public-Private Partnership to Address the Employment Problems of Youth" both described ways in which "intermediate organizations" supported by foundation resources could provide managerial and evaluation assistance to the government in undertaking innovative projects and replicating the results. Taggart said that "four special subject areas had been identified where such organizations will be utilized":

1. Providing management monitoring and research guidance for the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects;
2. Serving as a selection, support and evaluation mechanism for innovative in-school projects;
3. Replicating high quality and innovative Community Conservation and Improvement Projects in a number of localities; and
4. Developing a range of private sector initiatives for youth and carefully testing their effectiveness.

Taggart's letter said arrangements had been made for MDRC to provide assistance in the first area, but he indicated he would like the Ford Foundation's help with the latter three. Taggart noted, "For the exemplary in-school projects intermediary, we would hope that the Ford Foundation could join with nonprofit groups to provide needed support and would cooperate in getting this off the ground." (Ultimately, a new entity called Youth-work would be created with Field Foundation support to operate the in-school demonstration, as it became clear that leaders of

the American Federation of Teachers would be wary of any organization operating in the schools which was closely linked to the Ford Foundation. The teachers' union and the Ford Foundation had been at odds since the Foundation's role in supporting the controversial school decentralization experiment in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville section of New York City.)

In contrast to the limited Ford Foundation role proposed for in-school projects, Taggart wrote:

The community improvement replication and the private sector initiatives intermediaries would be solely Ford Foundation ventures or else the Foundation would take the lead in finding other sources of support in developing these organizations.

Given the urgency of the unemployment situation, Taggart said, "It is important to get the community improvements project underway rapidly," so he indicated that DOL:

would like to move ahead immediately to establish a nonprofit Youth Employment Demonstration Corporation which would implement the community improvement efforts as soon as possible. When this planning is completed, hopefully within 2 or 3 months, a decision could be made whether to initiate a new organization to manage the private sector initiatives project or to continue it under the Youth Employment Demonstration Corporation.

By the end of October, what Finney calls a gentleman's agreement was reached between Taggart and Sviridoff to the effect that Ford Foundation funds would be used to launch a new intermediary unit, which Graham Finney would head and which would operate the YCCIP and private sector initiatives demonstration. Armed with a commitment for the two demonstrations, Sviridoff could go to the Ford Foundation board to obtain start-up funds. An internal account was created November 1, 1977, to support the staff until a nonprofit corporation could be established.

The new entity was to be located in Philadelphia, at Finney's insistence.

Finney hoped that if this new "gadget," as he called the intermediate unit, demonstrated ability in handling the demonstration, it could go on to undertake other tasks. The name he chose, the Corporation for Public and Private Ventures (CPPV), not only suggested an interest beyond employment and training programs, but also a focus on an area--the intersection of the public and private sectors--rather than any substantive field like employment and training.

Despite clear signs of aspirations going beyond the demonstrations, Finney approached the new enterprise conservatively. He says he felt there was still much uncertainty, and he believed DOL funding was not completely nailed down. Thus, the new organization rented very modest quarters in center city Philadelphia, but the space provided options for significant expansion. On November 1, Michael Bailin, who had done the field work in examining exemplary youth programs, formally joined the new organization and would become its head of operations. Richard de Lone, who had been associated with Finney at the Philadelphia School system and the New York City Addiction Services Administration, became the head of planning and research. Two members of the support staff were also recruited, and by mid-December CPPV had been incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under the laws of Pennsylvania. Julia Robinson, director of the Philadelphia Neighborhood Housing Services Program, had agreed to join CPPV in January 1978 to head the VICI demonstration, and the process of recruiting field staff

had begun. As 1977 came to an end, a board of directors also was being recruited.

### C. Designing the Demonstration

As the new Corporation for Public/Private Ventures was establishing itself, it was also developing plans for the proposed YCCIP demonstration. It had to formulate the design of the program which was to be replicated, the criteria for the selection of sites, and the processes under which the programs would be launched.

In the fall of 1977, CPPV had a mechanism without a message: it was to replicate a model program, but it lacked a model. However, the Ford Foundation study of youth programs which Finney and Bailin conducted in the spring of 1977 provided CPPV with a broad background in existing youth employment programs. In developing a model program for replication, according to an early CPPV work plan, the program had to meet the following criteria:

1. A community conservation and improvement focus, meaning that the work performed by the youth would result in tangible improvements in the community.
2. Year-around operation.
3. Substantive tasks for the youth, providing a basis for the development of valid skills training and producing products of lasting value to the community.
4. Skilled supervisors and a supervisory-participant ratio low enough to permit skills training.
5. Existence for at least a year with demonstrated ability to recruit and retain a complement of 40 or more young people and demonstrated ability to complete work satisfactorily.

6. Built-in linkages to unions, employers, city government agencies, and to employment and training and educational opportunities.
7. Compatibility with the objectives of YEDPA and the DOL knowledge development plan.

Largely on the basis of the screening and field work Bailin had undertaken as a consultant to the Ford Foundation, CPPV identified three programs as approximating its criteria: Emergency Home Repair, Portland, Oregon; World of Work, Rochester, New York; and Maverick Service Corp., Hartford, Connecticut.

All three programs had been visited twice by CPPV officers. While none of the three was a perfect fit in every dimension required by the demonstration, the model selected for replication was most closely based on the EHR program in Portland. Thus, the model tended to be known at CPPV as "the augmented Portland model."

The Portland EHR program offered both in-school and out-of-school youth between the ages of 16 and 21 work experience and skill training, while providing emergency repairs to the homes of the poor, the elderly, and handicapped persons in Portland. Participating youth were paid the minimum wage and could stay in the program for up to one year. Union journeymen provided supervision and training. Seven journeymen, representing four trades--carpentry, painting, cement work, and drywall work--supervised six work teams of up to six youth each. While enrolled in the program, youth either remained in school or pursued a GED. In addition, those demonstrating satisfactory performance received credit toward apprenticeship training.

Salaries of the journeymen instructors and participating youth

were provided from CETA funds, while materials were paid for by the Portland Development Commission out of its Community Development Block Grant.

The original concept of the program was jointly developed in 1971 by officials of the city's Youth Services Division, the director of training for Portland's Associated General Contractors, and the Portland Development Commission. The program was administered by the Portland public school system. There was no single charismatic personality or agency which stood out as a guiding force of the program. Rather, a major distinctive characteristic was the deep involvement of a variety of actors representing trade unions and contractors, as well as the schools, city agencies on youth and aging, and the local Family Court.

CPPV believed that the program's great strength was its system of comprehensive institutional linkages which facilitated smooth operation of the program and built in post-program placement opportunities by bringing together key institutions in a new set of working relationships. As an early CPPV work plan recognized:

The relatively small, homogeneous character of the city no doubt helped achieve the degree of collaboration necessary to create and operate a text-book model of inter-agency coordination and cooperation.

But the success of the program did not simply grow out of any special traits of Portland's population. The work plan noted that, "First, the glue which holds the institutional linkages together is the simple fact that, above and beyond goodwill, the EHR program provides something for each institution involved." CPPV added, "Conversely, the program is not a threat

to the interests of any group." Thus, despite special qualities of Portland, CPPV added, "It is CPPV's assessment that such cooperation can be replicated if careful attention is paid to process and design. . . ."

The major weakness of the Portland model for a YCCIP replication was its focus on in-school youth, since disadvantaged out-of-school youth were to be the focus of the demonstration.

Thus, while endorsing the basic elements of the Portland model, CPPV went on to propose several modifications. Most fundamentally the CPPV model would focus on training youth for jobs rather than simply providing work experience, and the target population for the demonstration would be modified to focus on out-of-school rather than in-school youth. Moreover, from the Hartford and Rochester models, CPPV would borrow provisions for incentives for good performance and strict rules to assist in acclimating participants to the requirements of the working world.

CPPV also proposed to include two planned variations as an experimental aspect of the demonstration. One variation proposed was to have an education component in some programs but not in others. OYP replaced this with variations in the range of work undertaken under the rubric of community improvement; however, the other planned variation would be in the supervisor-participant ratios. Half the sites were to have a ratio of 12:1, a close approximation of the Rochester ratio, and the other half would have a more closely supervised 6:1 ratio. These variations would permit research on the importance of

supervisory ratios in affecting the merits of both the training provided and the community improvements produced.

Thus, the model to be replicated is generally referred to as "the augmented Portland model." Interestingly enough, the program chosen to be the centerpiece of CPPV's first demonstration was never visited by Graham Finney. Bailin went to Portland twice, and in the fall of 1977 de Lone also visited the Emergency Home Repair program, however.

In addition to developing the program model for replication, CPPV staff members were also outlining the research program that would accompany the demonstration. The major knowledge goals of the demonstration, as listed in CPPV's revised work plan, were:

- \* to determine whether a carefully replicated "model" program produces greater impact per program dollar than discretionary programs generated by other delivery systems (e.g., HUD CDC model). Impact is defined to include both the value of work performed to the community and the contribution of program participation to the subsequent labor-force and/or educational experience of youth;
- \* to test the impact of variations in nature of work performed and supervisory ratio on both the value of work performed and participant outcomes;
- \* to identify programmatic features which help disadvantaged and jobless youth successfully enter the employment stream. . . .
- \* to increase understanding of the process of replication itself and of the utility of "intermediate units" in that process.

In pursuit of these knowledge goals, CPPV divided the research into three major tasks:

- a. A comparison of the effectiveness of replicated community conservation and improvement projects with the effectiveness of other YCCIP's. . . .

- b. Statistical analysis of determinants of (intra-demonstration) success in "transitioning" youth to subsequent employment, training or education. This analysis will attempt to illuminate what works for whom under what circumstances. . . .
- c. A documentary analysis of the process of replication itself.

Early in the spring of 1978, CPPV hired John M. Kelley to head the VICI research. CPPV also engaged two outside research contractors, RBS to undertake the quantitative research, and Harvey Shapiro and Hank Blakely to conduct the documentary analysis.

#### D. Defining CPPV's Relationship with DOL

In addition to developing a model and a process to guide the VICI demonstration, early on CPPV also had to work out its relationship with the Department of Labor and the CETA system. At the outset, at least some CPPV staff members believed their "intermediate unit" would operate independently of the CETA system and that it would mount its demonstration subject to regular OYP review of major decisions but without frequent intervention by OYP. OYP's formal expectations are unclear: The Knowledge Development Plan, for example, discusses the programs to be mounted by nonprofit corporations, but it doesn't indicate what relationships these corporations would have to DOL.

In any case, CPPV began developing work plans which called for it to select program operators subject to OYP approval and to contract directly with them. Gradually, however, OYP began to link the VICI demonstration more closely to the CETA system. Following a November 29, 1977, planning meeting, for example,

Taggart wrote to Finney that:

The work plan needs to clarify the role of the prime sponsor in this process. It is important that the prime sponsor not only be notified of interested prospective organizations but also be involved from the outset in the consultation and negotiations that take place. The success of the programs locally will depend to a large extent on the quality of the working relationships that is developed between these two parties.

By the end of 1977, OYP had made it clear that it wished the demonstration to be operated through the CETA prime sponsor system rather than independently of it. In contrast to the national supported work demonstration, in which MDRC contracted directly with local program operators, CPPV was to enter into contracts with local prime sponsors, which would either operate VICI programs themselves or delegate the operation to a subcontractor.

OYP officials argue that it might be appropriate to operate apart from the CETA system if a demonstration were to be developing new concepts and, as Joe Seiler of OYP says, "starting from ground zero." Indeed, CPPV's private sector initiatives demonstration, like the supported work demonstration, was to be mounted independently of the CETA system. But Seiler says the VICI demonstration was testing replication of a program, and if the demonstration offered positive results, the logical consequences would include further replication across the country. Since that process would have to occur within the CETA system, OYP officials concluded that it would be inappropriate to test a model being replicated outside the CETA system.

In addition, OYP officials note that they were under pressure from CETA prime sponsors and DOL regional offices not

to go around the system again. The delegation of the Entitlement Projects selection process to MDRC had stirred fairly intensive criticism of OYP in the field.

However, CPPV officers were somewhat surprised at being linked to the CETA system. As Michael Bailin notes, for better or worse, "Going through the prime sponsors made it a different kind of demonstration." He adds that, "My idea of an intermediary unit was that it would be more independent," and beyond the change in concept, he adds, "This set a precedent for DOL setting future terms. We gave on the big issues, although we couldn't really fight."

The decision to operate the demonstration through the prime sponsors carried much in its train. It meant, for example, that the regional offices of DOL would have a role in the demonstration. This was acknowledged in the winter of 1977-78 as CPPV updated its work plans. The initial work plan simply said:

Although CPPV will have no formal relationship with regional offices of DOL during the planning or operation of this demonstration, regional offices have a potentially important role to play in helping disseminate and further replicate successful programs and they will be kept fully informed throughout.

But a revised work plan added a section "3.3a Involvement of DOL Regional Offices." This retained the sentence just cited but added that, "It is important that they be kept fully informed throughout the life of the demonstration." Moreover, it said, "CPPV expects to seek the advice and counsel of regional offices at key junctures throughout the life of the demonstration."

However, the regional offices gradually began to assume an even more specific, and important, role. After several

changes of plans, DOL determined that the application package for prospective VICI sites would be routed to the prime sponsors through the DOL regional offices rather than through the DOL national office. Moreover, originally CPPV and OYP talked in terms of letting contracts for the VICI project from the national DOL office, thus assuring standardization in their treatment. However, DOL decided early in the spring of 1978 that contracts would have to be processed through the DOL regional offices. This would make the regional offices the contractors with prime sponsors, and the regional grant officers would have legal responsibilities for various aspects of the contract. CPPV staff met with DOL's Office of Field Operations to standardize the regional office processes and a telex was sent out by OFO, outlining the roles of CPPV, national DOL, and regional DOL offices. The regional offices would not play a major part in the review of proposals, but a variety of questions about the substance of the VICI projects would later be raised by regional DOL officials who had differing interpretations of their rights and obligations vis a vis the VICI programs in their region. The delegation of contract responsibility to the regional offices reflected several factors. A labor dispute within DOL's Washington contracts office made it expedient to move the process of arranging contracts elsewhere. Moreover, there was the traditional pressure from the regional offices for a stronger role in activities occurring within their territory.

But the results of this series of decisions at DOL was to significantly alter the role of CPPV, at least in the eyes of its officers. Instead of operating apart from the ongoing

employment and training system, it was becoming a part of it.

At the March 28, 1978 board meeting of CPPV, Harriet Michel rather pointedly said that the original role of the intermediate organizations was "grandiose" in terms of its freedom to act outside the CETA system. According to the minutes of that meeting, she said that since all programs could not be run from the national office, it had been decided that intermediate organizations like CPPV should be used to augment the national office. This approach was not viewed as a way to diminish the CETA system but to illustrate ways to improve total DOL operations, she said.

From the fall of 1977 to the spring of 1978, as the autonomy of CPPV slowly seemed to be eroding, CPPV's staff members were informally divided into two groups. One group, led by Michael Bailin, wanted to resist what they saw as encroachments on CPPV's prerogatives. Others, including Finney and de Lone, tended to be more willing to accept compromises and sought to negotiate the best arrangements that could be obtained. But both sides recognized that decisions regarding CPPV could ultimately be made unilaterally by OYP. OYP was a new office with a staff made up of several newcomers to the Department of Labor, but gradually it seemed inclined to absorb CPPV and VICI into the ongoing DOL ways of doing business. This was symbolized in the eyes of CPPV officers by the problems they perceived in explaining to CPPV's DOL project officer that the organization should not, in fact, be treated as just another staff arm or delegate agency of DOL. DOL was not as eager to accept that view as CPPV was to offer it.

## E. Site Selection and Notification

A major set of issues that emerged early in 1978 revolved around the number of sites, the procedure for selecting them, and the duration of the demonstration. CPPV originally envisioned 10 to 12 sites, each operating a program for 18 months. It intended to invite applications from as many sites as it wished to have in the demonstration, and if some of them were unable to develop a satisfactory program, then a second wave of invitations would be sent out.

Early in 1978, however, OYP officials proposed to CPPV that they fund 18 sites and cut the duration of the demonstration to 12 months--with an eye toward refunding it for an additional year once it was operating. CPPV perceived the effort to increase the number of sites as OYP's response to the Entitlement Projects selection process, which left DOL facing a number of angry and disappointed losers. CPPV refused to limit the demonstration to 12 months because Finney said this was too brief a period to mount and conduct a program. But CPPV reluctantly agreed to send application packages to more than 12 sites. While the 18-month demonstration period was retained, in early 1978 CPPV began developing plans to invite 18 sites--this later dropped to 15--and to recommend 12 of them for funding. In the wake of the bitter Entitlement competition, this transformed site selection into a competitive process in the eyes of some sites, and to some extent it altered CPPV's relationship with the applicants. Instead of helping them meet absolute standards, some applicants would feel CPPV was judging them against one another.

In the fall of 1977 CPPV began to develop a list of potential sites for VICI programs. OYP had advised CPPV to develop a list for OYP approval that focused on central cities, where the problems of minority youth unemployment were most acute, rather than on rural or suburban areas. Each of the cities on CPPV's list was to have high levels of unemployment and poverty, and, taken as a whole, the list was to offer geographical, social, and economic diversity.

Near the end of 1977, CPPV provided OYP with a list of 50 cities--ten in each of five population categories. In reviewing the list, OYP officials say they recognized they would have to justify their choices not only in terms of need but also in response to other pressures. They were, for example, operating in the wake of the bitter Entitlement allocation process, and DOL wanted to offer some solace to the losers and refrain from giving more to the winners. OYP decision-making was also influenced by external concern over three sites: The White House expressed an interest in the South Bronx, where President Carter had promised aid, and Northeastern Ohio, where a major steel plant was to be shut down. In addition, the Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training wanted Central Harlem to be included among the sites.

In early 1978 there was a period of extensive juggling of sites and a half dozen lists of 25 cities were developed. But in February a fairly definitive list of 25 potential sites was sent to DOL regional administrators for comments. The regional offices were essentially being asked to eliminate prime sponsors in their areas which lacked the managerial skills to mount a

demonstration effectively. Five of the 25 sites were eliminated by the regional offices, and another five were eliminated at DOL in Washington. Taggart says, "I carried the list to [Assistant Secretary Ernest] Green and asked him 'which ones do you want to go with' and in a 15-minute conversation he checked off the list." The result was a list of 15 sites, which together represented a broad mix of characteristics and had successfully weathered not only tests of need but also managerial skills and political realities.\*

While the list of sites was being honed, CPPV was also developing an application package to send to the prime sponsors who would be selected. CPPV sent its first draft application package to DOL in late December 1977, but it was not until late March that this package would finally be approved. The process for inviting applicants also changed significantly, reflecting the changing relationship of CPPV to DOL. Initially CPPV wanted to send the application packages directly to potential program operators. But DOL first decided that CPPV should send this material to prime sponsors and then that DOL would send the applications to the primes, while CPPV itself wouldn't communicate directly with prime sponsors or potential program operators. Ultimately, the invitation to apply for funding under the VICI

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\*The 14 prime sponsors invited to apply were those serving Atlanta, Georgia; Broward County, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Newark, New Jersey; New Haven, Connecticut; New York, New York; Northeast Ohio; Oakland, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; St. Louis, Missouri; and Washington, D.C. The New York City prime sponsor was invited to apply for two grants, one for Central Harlem and one for the South Bronx. Thus, it should be emphasized there were to be 15 sites and 14 prime sponsors involved.

demonstration was sent to the 14 prime sponsors via the DOL regional letters in a memorandum from Assistant Secretary Ernest Green dated March 28, 1978. Green noted that the demonstration's basic aim "is knowledge development for improving youth programs and policy," and he added:

To help achieve this goal, we have contracted with the Corporation for Public/Private Ventures (CPPV) to provide special resources to design, guide, and research this demonstration.

The memorandum also directed those with further questions to contact Julia Robinson at CPPV.

#### F. The Process of Developing and Reviewing Proposals

The 14 prime sponsors who received Green's March 28 memorandum inviting them to participate in the demonstration were also invited to a workshop to be held in Philadelphia on April 19th and 20th. The workshop, conducted by CPPV, was to explain the VICI program's goals and guidelines in some detail and launch the invitees on the process of developing proposals. The Philadelphia workshop featured presentations by CPPV staff members and individuals involved in Portland's Emergency Home Repair program. During the day-and-a-half workshops, the plenary sessions and small group meetings sought to acquaint local officials with both the program to be replicated and the process that was to be followed in preparing and submitting a proposal. Discussions ranged from broader aspects of the Portland program and the VICI demonstration to the details of labor regulations, participant medical examinations, and myriad other subjects. The workshop also sought to explain the outlines of the research

accompanying the demonstration, and an underlying objective of the workshop was to make it clear that CPPV was responsible for mounting the demonstration under a mandate from DOL.

Audience reaction was generally favorable at the workshop. Many agreed the meeting was well organized and sought to clarify potential questions, but there was nonetheless some uncertainty as to the role of CPPV and the relative importance of research vs the provision of service in the VICI program. Many participants were somewhat overwhelmed by the volume of information to be digested. A discordant note was sounded by a staff member of a DOL regional office who raised a number of questions about the demonstration. Moreover, some participants were a bit troubled by CPPV's inability to provide on-the-spot answers to all questions raised. These led some prime sponsors to conclude CPPV was uncertain about aspects of its program while others believed it simply showed that CPPV was caught up in changing priorities at OYP.

There were two important changes that occurred around the time of the workshop. The day the workshop began, OYP refused to receive and approve proposals one at a time, as CPPV expected. Instead, OYP insisted that it must receive all proposals before making its choices. Some felt this gave the selection process even more of a competitive air.

Another change occurred shortly after the workshop. The application package listed two alternative supervisory ratios as one of the planned variations in the demonstration, and at the workshop the 15 sites drew straws which gave some as 12:1 ratio and others a 6:1 ratio. The latter was obviously more

desirable since it provided funds for a more tightly managed demonstration. Many of the would-be participants were wary of the 12:1 ratio. Milwaukee, for example, made it clear at the Philadelphia workshop that it would not participate if it drew a 12:1 ratio; however, it drew a 6:1 ratio.

After the Philadelphia workshop, CPPV officials met with leaders of the international building trades unions in Washington, who said that if their local unions asked if they should participate in programs with a 12:1 supervisory ratio, the international leaders would advise them not to do so. Shortly afterwards, the Broward County prime sponsor called CPPV to inform the staff that all of the trade unions contacted had refused to participate because of the 12:1 ratio. Thus, there was growing concern at CPPV about the ability to mount a demonstration with the 12:1 ratio.

On May 1, 1978, CPPV called OYP to explain these problems, and on May 3, Harriet Michel wrote to CPPV to state that DOL had decided to settle for a 6:1 ratio for all accepted programs to avoid potential problems with the unions. The letter stated that additional funds necessitated by the increased number of supervisors would be met by DOL and that CPPV should inform the prime sponsors of the change in supervisory ratios.

In retrospect, Joe Seiler of OYP says he erred in agreeing to change the supervisory ratios. As a result of this decision, he says, CPPV would be managing programs with a 6:1 supervisory ratio, while other YCCIP programs with which VICI was to be compared, would be required to have a 12:1 ratio. "So right now we've got something that is technically not a model under YCCIP

regulations," he says. Seiler believes CPPV should have been told either to retain the planned variations or to require all sites to have a 12:1 ratio. He says of CPPV, "I don't think they touched all the bases before deciding it couldn't be done," and at OYP, he adds, "We let time become the crucial variable." CPPV staff members say they had fully appraised the situation and had good reason to be concerned before they approached OYP seeking a change in the supervisory ratios. Moreover, they note that VICI's supervisory ratio is only one of a number of aspects of the program in which YCCIP regulations have been waived.

In any case, shortly after the decision to operate all sites with a 6:1 ratio, according to Finney, Taggart told him that the higher costs involved might make it necessary to reduce the number of sites from 12 to 11. Nothing definite was decided, but at the May 24, 1978 CPPV board meeting, there was a long discussion following Finney's report on this matter. Some board members saw it as a major problem, involving CPPV's credibility with the prime sponsors, since CPPV had assured them that 12 of the 15 would be selected. The board agreed that a meeting should be set up between Taggart and representatives of CPPV to discuss this specific problem and look at the overall working relationship between CPPV and DOL.

Meanwhile, armed with the information provided at the workshop and with answers provided to specific questions, in late April the 15 sites set out to develop their proposals. A CPPV field representative was assigned to each site to answer questions and to provide technical assistance by telephone or during field visits. The watchword of this process, to "not drag the

sites over the finish-line," hints at the often subtle--and classic--conflicts involved in the distinction between assistance and direct intervention. Generally, CPPV assistance took the form of making sure that planners and organizations were fully aware of the VICI goals and criteria, encouraging local planners, and acquainting them with locally available resources which were not immediately obvious. CPPV offered itself as a resource to any organization or individual involved in the planning and development effort.

All proposals were due at CPPV's office in Philadelphia on May 19, 1978. And once they were received, CPPV began its own group review process. Teams were assigned to read and evaluate each proposal according to the criteria listed in the application package. During the first few days in June, the CPPV field representative assigned to each site, together with another CPPV staff member, visited the site to probe more deeply into the claims made in the proposal.

While the CPPV field representatives tended to develop a certain allegiance to "their" sites, CPPV's analysis and evaluation of proposals were conducted on a highly objective basis through the use of review teams and collective decision-making. A general concensus was developed regarding not only the strengths and weaknesses of individual sites but also the rank order of the proposals received.

On June 8, 1978, CPPV recommended to OYP that it approve three sites: Broward County, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and New Haven, Connecticut. During June CPPV informed the other prime sponsors of the deficiencies it perceived in the original

proposals, and it provided technical assistance to those revising their proposals. On June 30, as scheduled, CPPV offered its recommendations on the remaining sites. It offered an unqualified recommendation for approval to Atlanta, Miami, and New York City (South Bronx). It also offered a conditional recommendation for approval of Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City (Central Harlem), Newark, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. It did not recommend approval of Northeastern Ohio; Oakland, California; and St. Louis, Missouri.

On August 10, 1978, CPPV again wrote to OYP offering a "resolution of issues" on the five sites that had received only conditional approval and had made additional modifications of their proposal during the month of July. Chicago, Newark, and Philadelphia had resolved the conditions troubling CPPV and were recommended for approval. Los Angeles had not resolved the issues. New York City (Central Harlem) had not resolved one of the three issues, CPPV said, though it made no explicit recommendation.

Broward, Milwaukee, New Haven, Atlanta, and South Bronx were approved by DOL in June and July, and in August DOL approved Chicago, Newark, and Philadelphia. It would also approve Central Harlem, despite CPPV's doubts. Thus, the 15 potential sites would yield a demonstration consisting of eight sites plus Central Harlem, which would operate a program with DOL funding but not under the aegis of CPPV. In order to understand more fully what occurred during the site selection process, we shall examine each of the 15 sites separately.

## II. The Proposal Development Process at the Local Sites

### A. Atlanta, Georgia

Atlanta is the 29th largest city in the United States, and it is the central city of the 18th largest SMSA. The city has a population of nearly 400,000 persons, approximately 55 percent of whom are black. About 43,000 persons are in the 16 - 19 age bracket, and about 16 percent of the population lives below the poverty level.

There has been a significant shift in the ethnic power base in Atlanta in recent years, reflecting the growing proportions of blacks in the city's population. A decade ago virtually all power was concentrated in the hands of a few influential white leaders. In 1973, however, recognizing the changing demographic profile of the city, some members of the white power structure decided to back Maynard Jackson, then vice mayor, for the top job.

When Jackson was elected as the city's first black mayor, he was seen by many as a key ingredient in a new coalition of middle class blacks and business leaders seeking to continue Atlanta's rapid economic growth. During his first term, Jackson was often at odds with the white business community, but more recently relations have improved and he is steadily coming to be perceived as an ally of the business community as well as a friend of the tax-conscious middle class.

Jackson has aptly described Atlanta's people as "ideologically liberal and fiscally conservative." A major reason for this has been Atlanta's six black universities, which have helped create and anchor a solid black middle class in the city. The business community is also very influential in Atlanta, and it is usually represented by Central Atlanta Progress, an organization which speaks for the major corporations and downtown business interests in the city.

Atlanta is the economic center of the southeastern portion of the U.S. It is a transportation and distribution hub as well as a major financial and service center. Some 1,800 manufacturers in the area provide employment for about 20 percent of the area's labor force. While the city had experienced rapid economic growth, symbolized in the redevelopment of its downtown, behind the architecturally innovative skyline, there is an everyday city plagued with familiar problems of crime, racial friction, and unemployment. Black unemployment has been a major problem in the city, which has long been a magnet for unskilled blacks from rural areas. Moreover, the tremendous building boom of the early 1970's set off a speculative wave that eventually led to major real estate failures and repercussions throughout the local economy. New construction has only recently resumed, and there is optimism accompanying the development of a \$2.1 billion dollar rapid transit system scheduled for completion in 1980.

Since the boom years of the 1960's, Atlanta has experienced relatively tranquil labor relations. While organized labor has not achieved the kind of foothold in Atlanta that

it enjoys in northern industrial cities, most major firms have long been unionized, particularly large corporate employers such as Lockheed, Ford, and General Motors. Public employment has been a trouble spot in the labor picture, however. Mayor Jackson has been at odds with the city's employees on several occasions, most notably when the sanitation workers went on strike in 1977.

Atlanta CETA Senior Planner John Gilman first heard of the VICI program through the Employment and Training Council of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, a source which he describes as being "faster and better than DOL." Gilman immediately organized a series of meetings with city housing officials and union personnel as a means of establishing working relationships and defining the nature of the prospective program. Gilman remained the principal drafter of Atlanta's proposal, while working with a team that included key staff members from several Atlanta Urban League training projects.

Early on city officials decided to focus the program on providing emergency home repair and bringing homes in violation of the building code up to standard. John Andersen, who had been head of the city's Housing Code Inspection Unit, saw the VICI program as the "first ray of hope" for significant improvement in the city's housing stock. His department had been involved in a rehabilitation effort known as HR-1, and he viewed VICI as "HR-2"--a program to take some of "the pressure of scarce funds and materials off of HR-1."

The VICI program was also welcomed by the Housing Appeals Board, which functioned as a kind of citizen's court of last

resort for obtaining housing improvements. As a result of an earlier series of public hearings on residential code violations, the City Council had declared that the Board would have the authority either to force compliance when violators were able to afford it, or to make grants up to a maximum of \$4,000 to destitute homeowners. However, a lack of funds forced the Appeals Board to develop a large backlog of people eligible for these grants. Thus, the Board saw VICI as a means of directly addressing the needs of poor homeowners. It also pushed hard for the selection of a site in the southeastern portion of the city.

The selection of a local management agency was delayed because Atlanta regulations required the city to conduct an advertised bidding procedure for contracting out work of the kind to be performed by the VICI project. However, by late May CETA had selected the Atlanta Urban League to serve as LMA. The Urban League had operated a number of employment and training programs in Atlanta, gaining familiarity with CETA and DOL requirements. Moreover, the Labor Education Advancement Project (LEAP) had given the Urban League experience in working closely with trade unions, while the Preparation for Employment Program (PREP) was similar in concept to VICI in several respects. PREP was part of the national supported work demonstration, funded by DOL and operated by MDRC, another intermediate unit.

The Atlanta Urban League had been selected from a field of six bidders which included the Economic Opportunity Assn., the local AFL-CIO Human Resources Development Institute, and the

Associated General Contractors. The Urban League was the only bidder which directly contacted the Portland EHR program for further information.

When the program planners turned to developing the union linkages, they found that the Carpenters Union had seen many of its members emigrate to other parts of the country in the wake of Atlanta's 1974-75 construction downturn. Amid a gradual rise in commercial and residential construction, the Carpenters saw the program in terms of its impact on their decimated ranks. The Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 72 was also enlisted, along with the North Georgia Building and Construction Trades Council, and the local HRDI.

The VICI project was seen as similar to a design which two HRDI officials had developed a year earlier but never implemented. However, HRDI personnel had some initial misgivings which preceded their decision to seek to become the LMA. These misgivings increased after the Urban League was selected to run the program. Atlanta labor officials had been leery of both community organizations and the city prime sponsor. They were concerned about allegations of scandal in both kinds of institutions, and they felt the labor movement had been threatened by both the CETA system and CBO's. Nonetheless, HRDI had a ten-year history of working with the Atlanta Urban League, and the labor participation was soon firm.

Since Atlanta's CETA program and its city housing agency are both lodged within the city Department of Community and Human Development, there were good lines of communications which enabled the VICI program to obtain community development block

grant monies as well as CETA Title VI funds for two counselors for the program. Roy Norman, Director of the Office of Grants, Planning and Management of the Department of Community and Human Development, says he was interested in the VICI program's potential for reducing the city's backlog of files on code violations.

Other elements of the proposal which Atlanta submitted to CPPV on May 19, 1978, include using the Georgia Employment Service for youth referral and the Urban League and the participating trade unions for post-program placement. The Carpenters Union was to provide training related instruction, and if participants didn't have a high school diploma, they would be required to enroll in G.E.D. preparation classes offered by the Atlanta Board of Education. The city's Bureau of Buildings was to be the Work Providing Agency, and a broad-based advisory committee was to meet bi-monthly to coordinate activities.

The Atlanta proposal was recommended for approval by CPPV on June 29, 1978, and shortly afterwards DOL announced that it would be funded. One factor which delayed Atlanta's start-up was the sudden and unexplained disappearance of the senior planner. His apparently traumatic leave-taking virtually paralyzed the implementation of the proposal for a critical period of time, and necessitated re-establishment of the Atlanta-CPPV relationship.

While preparing to launch the program, there were several issues which emerged. The Atlanta Urban League was upset by what they saw as CPPV's "unreasonable" refusal to permit

an unitemized ten percent overhead charge. PREP director Donald Woods felt it was impossible to allocate every penny of overhead expense to a specific project or activity. Indeed, the Urban League felt caught between two intermediate units, CPPV and MDRC, each of which wanted to provide funding to support a specific PREP project without supporting PREP's administrative overhead. Urban League officials were also suspicious of the unions, feeling they were not really in sympathy with the goals of the project and were participating only because they were being "handed jobs on a silver platter," as one Urban League official put it.

The unions, however, were developing a number of additional concerns beyond their original reservations about working with the Urban League and the CETA program. There was, for example, concern over such issues as trainee transportation and the security of materials and tools left overnight at project sites. There was also a good deal of union frustration over what they saw as bureaucratic delays by the city and a general inflexibility in the program. While George Caudelle, business manager of the North Georgia Building and Construction Trades Council, insisted he supported the program, he thought the potential problems were "monstrous," and he questioned the need for the program in Atlanta amid an upturn in construction in the city. He was also concerned about the structure of the program and the involvement of so many institutions because he believed "one head is better than two." He also doubted that the program could meet its goal of bringing 200 homes up to standard.

## B. Broward County, Florida

Broward County, which is the chief component of the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood SMSA in southeastern Florida, covers approximately 1,216 square miles. Fort Lauderdale and Hollywood, the county's two major cities, contain some 280,000 people or 35 percent of the county's population. Broward's population is nearly 90 percent white. The 15- to 19-year-old cohort make up slightly more than seven percent of the total population. Spanish-speaking residents account for less than three percent of the population. Though blacks are less than ten percent of the population, recent estimates indicate that they constituted nearly 36 percent of the county's family's living below the poverty line and 25 percent of the unrelated individuals living below the poverty level.

The twelfth Congressional district, consisting chiefly of Broward County, is slightly more than 54 percent urban. The median voting age is 47. Until the late 1960's, the area's political orientation was solidly conservative, but it has become increasingly liberal.

The civilian labor force is approximately 351,000 persons, of whom 12 percent are non-white. The area's employment is distributed as follows:

Construction	12%
Manufacturing	11%
Transportation	6%
Wholesale/retail trade	28%
Real estate, finance, insurance	7%
Services	31%

Since 1975, the area's construction industry has suffered a decline in the wake of the 1972-73 real estate glut. However, official estimates of employment growth in construction are considerably more optimistic than they have been in years.

There are predictions of increases on the order of 23 percent.

The Broward Employment and Training Administration (BETA), the county prime sponsor, is a significant factor in the local economy. BETA professes to have adopted a deliberately national focus in all of its operations. This orientation has been developed as a means of ensuring the agency's viability and keeping it abreast of new trends and developments.

Communications between BETA and national and regional offices of DOL appear to be very solid. BETA director Robert "Skip" Johnston has been careful to establish a fairly close network relationship with other primes in the region and some across the country. Additionally, BETA's solid reputation as a program operator and Johnston's frequent role as an expert witness at Congressional hearings appear to have given this prime greater than usual access to the thinking at national DOL. Whether or not BETA has actually established a special working relationship with the Office of Youth Programs, BETA staff believe they have, and they are convinced there has been special communications between OYP's director and BETA.

According to BETA staff members, the Broward site first learned of the VICI project as a result of a chance conversation with Robert Taggart during his visit early in 1978. Following up on an indication that the program was to be based on Portland's EHR project, Ray Popkin--a planning analyst on BETA's

Planning, Research, and Development staff--immediately initiated a series of inquiries around the country. Popkin's two most significant requests for information were made directly to CPPV and EHR. It appears BETA enjoyed a slight lead in proposal preparation time, although the benefits, if any, of this lead are not clear.

BETA executive director Johnston's initial concept of the program was that replication should be absolute. However, his staff was able to convince him that replication should concentrate on results rather than process.

From the outset Popkin had lead responsibility for the development of the concepts and the proposal. His first thought was to utilize the local Public Housing Authority as the sole work-providing agency, he recalls, but the PHA felt that it couldn't provide enough work. He then attempted to split the work-provision role between Fort Lauderdale's Public Housing Authority and that of Dania, a nearby city with a population of about 11,000. This divided approach to the project, and its implicit administrative difficulties, motivated renewed discussions between PHA and BETA, with the result that the Housing Authority eventually agreed to provide all of the required work sites and projects.

PHA Director William Lindsey initially objected to the project, he says, because it sounded like just another summer youth program that would only raise hopes and fade away before they were realized. However, Lindsey was becoming increasingly frustrated at what he terms the "categorical mentality" of most Broward County programs and agencies, and at their refusal to

see the need for an integrated approach to social development. He says he became a VICI supporter when he realized that the program would not only help to eliminate some significant gaps in several of his existing programs, but that it would have pay-offs in employment, general improvements in youth skills, housing improvement, and greater minority memberships in the unions.

The plan placed heaviest emphasis on the painting trades as the principal focus for instruction and work. It was felt that at least some exposure to such trades as carpentry, brick-laying and masonry, and others would be gained by association. Popkin explains BETA's selection of painting as the primary trade on several grounds. First, entrance requirements for the painters unions are less stringent than for other unions and thus better suited to VICI's target population. Second, he states, many people have an erroneous and limited view of the painting trade. It actually involves a number of aspects which stimulate wide-ranging skill progressions. Third, there is virtually no market for failed construction and carpentry trainees, while painters are always employable whether or not they pass through a program.

Popkin and BETA convened a preliminary meeting with local business agents of the Building Construction and Trades Council, the Labor Council of the AFL-CIO, and the Roofers Union, to discuss their potential roles in the VICI project. At the same time, Popkin sent materials explaining the VICI project and BETA's emerging concept for its implementation in Broward County to a wide range of local government agencies, labor unions,

community development organizations, and other county housing authorities in an attempt to elicit the widest possible support and comment.

The union linkage presented problems. Organized labor had been perhaps the only significant failure in Director Johnston's efforts to develop and maintain close contacts with vital county sectors. It is generally recognized by most of those interviewed that Johnston and several key officials of the local unions had almost diametrically opposed perspectives and as a result communicated poorly.

The unions were particularly concerned about the 12-to-1 supervisor/trainee ratio which BETA drew in the CPPV lottery. One described the programs as "just twelve kids hanging around one old lady's apartment." Moreover, one official of an electrician's union checked with the Portland IBEW and reported back that most of the Oregon trainees had gone non-union after their program.

In addition, several labor leaders had racist viewpoints which fueled opposition to the entire program. And nearly all had a deep mistrust of federal programs, particularly those concerned with labor--and especially CETA. There was also a great deal of enmity resulting from continuous federal prosecution of local union officials and the "harassment" of the unions themselves. Finally, there were many fears concerning the introduction of a new work force in a declining labor market.

There were, on the other hand, several countervailing realities:

First, labor is weak in the South in general--and in Florida in particular (perhaps a reason why the very politically oriented Johnston did not feel highly motivated to establish a solid communication with the unions).

Second, most of the current union members were accustomed to life under previous trade booms, and were having trouble adjusting to new--and lower--economic realities. This fact compromised rank and file unity to some degree.

Third, the unions were convinced that federal authorities would ultimately compel where they could not persuade, so that stringent regulations concerning minority union membership were just around the corner. Exacerbating that fear was the fact that unions in many places were experiencing creeping "open-shopism" and a declining membership in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

Fourth, BETA staff was becoming increasingly concerned about its failure to establish a meaningful communication with the unions, and had been casting about for some structural method of easing tensions and friction.

Opposition to the VICI program was lessened partly as a result of these inherent pressures to cooperate in a project of this sort, and through the efforts of BETA and union staffs. In particular, Margaret Croxton--well known to local labor leaders--and Bob Neff of the AFL-CIO, were instrumental in convincing the unions to participate or, at least, give their blessings. Croxton assured them that the trainees would not be influenced in anti-union ways, but that the unions would be responsible for their own recruitment.

The unions came to recognize the fact that the program would meet several of their most vital needs, while at the same time allowing them to get to know the trainees under actual working conditions. Additionally, the rehab-nature of the project was a significant factor in the reduction of opposition from contractors and the unions.

As noted earlier, the principal responsibility for developing the linkages was exercised by Ray Popkin, a middle level planner who was very effective in guiding the development effort so as to avoid the pitfalls threatening a cooperative effort of this kind. Popkin was responsible for formulating and delivering most of the arguments that won the PHA and the unions over to the project.

But underlying Popkin's efforts was the fact that BETA's nearly \$60 million annual funding is very large in relation to its economy. Moreover, "Skip" Johnston had spent a good deal of his professional life in southeastern Florida, and he had both a great deal of experience with local problems and a superior network of contracts throughout the area's more important public and private sector institutions.

Many of Johnston's contacts were institutionalized in the Special Planning Group (SPG) founded by Johnston, Commissioner Moss, and various heads of other County service organizations. The SPG takes a quiet pride in its image as a group of "movers"--experts and professionals who have both the clout to make significant changes in the system. The SPG grew out of its founders' early recognition that centralization of planning

and services was the only answer to the increasingly pervasive problems each organization faced.

There is a substantial unanimity among SPG members concerning local issues and needs and their remedies. The SPG's main source of strength, however, is the tremendous leverage gained from its economic clout. The principal member organizations and the amounts of funding they control are as follows:

• Health Rehabilitation Services (HRS 10)	\$ 97 million
• BETA	57 million
• United Way	10 million
• Sched System	<u>400 million</u>
	\$564 million (plus)

That economic clout, combined with the fact that the organizations--through their boards, staffs, or membership--have access to virtually every other significant organization and individual within the county--and beyond--has been a significant factor contributing to the developmental successes of BETA staff.

The proposal BETA submitted to CPPV on May 19 was well received in Philadelphia, and Broward was one of three sites that CPPV recommended that OYP approve on June 8, 1978. At the end of the planning process, Popkin had several concerns about the program. First, he was afraid that the research and data gathering would turn out to be far more expensive than the ten percent administrative allocation envisioned. Second, he was concerned about the delays in creating the research council promised at CPPV's April Workshop. Third, he was very concerned with the fact that CPPV "despite an overall excellent

**performance to date" would be handicapped by its lack of staff members with CETA and DOL experience, particularly in the areas of Davis-Bacon regulations and other realities of training program operations.**

### C. Chicago, Illinois

Chicago, the nation's second largest city, has a population of more than three million, of which a majority are black. Approximately 30 percent of the city's 1.4 million workers are engaged in manufacturing occupations, but the city is also an important financial and transportation center and has a diversified economic base.

In recent years the city has experienced the familiar out-migration of affluent families and jobs to the suburbs. But Chicago has coped with change better than many cities. It has an AA rating from Moody's Investors Services, a moderate debt level, and a reputation for relatively effective delivery of city services.

For more than two decades the city was governed by Richard J. Daley, who headed a political machine which was able to contain the problems arising out of Chicago's changing population and economy. Daley was able to mount remarkably ambitious projects with little opposition, and the central business district expanded, even as areas just beyond the celebrated Loop declined. Following Daley's death, the appointment and subsequent election of Mayor Michael Bilandic created much concern about the ability to maintain the coalition that Daley had built.

Some three years after Daley's death, however, the coalition seems to be holding. Chicago's politics continue to rest on the organization's ability to embrace and absorb its antagonists. In Chicago no group or interest gets everything it

wants, but each gets something, and all have a stake in the existing system. Any interest which has enough power--economic, social, or political--is brought into a circle very near the heart of the city's power elite. This technique has not only served to ensure the continued existence of that elite but also helped make it sensitive to interests which might normally be far removed from its own. The Chicago style of resource allocation is closed-mouthed and secretive; only when the arrangements are completed are the announcements made.

Much of the Chicago style was to permeate the development of the VICI proposal in Chicago, particularly since Chicago's prime sponsor, the Mayor's Office of Manpower (MOM) and its director, Samuel C. Bernstein, are particularly adept at this style. If jobs are the currency of modern urban politics, then MOM, which allocates the city's CETA funds, is something of a political exchequer in Chicago.

MOM held its first official working session on the VICI project in late April of 1978. But prior to this meeting, there had been several ground-breaking discussions between MOM staff members and Chicago United, a powerful local business coalition especially active in employment and training issues which was to play a major role in developing the VICI project in Chicago.

The groundwork for Chicago United was laid in the late 1960's, when John W. Gardner urged Chicago's black and white leaders to form a local unit of the Urban Coalition which he headed. Mayor Daley strongly opposed the idea. However, the

heads of such local companies as Commonwealth Edison, Sears Roebuck, and the First National Bank of Chicago, recognizing that confrontation wouldn't work with Daley, quietly formed an organization which they called "The Group"--a coalition of 20 of the city's largest corporations and leading black and white business leaders. The organization was formalized as Chicago United in 1973, and since then it has worked quietly behind the scenes, focusing on jobs and also working on housing, transportation, education, and other issues. Because of its economic and political clout, Chicago United was a major influence on decision-making at MOM, the CMA's, and the unions.

The VICI project was almost precisely the vehicle that Chicago United had been searching for. It had grown increasingly dissatisfied with such federal programs as CETA Title II Public Service Employment because the organization had concluded these were deadend solutions which were not sufficiently comprehensive. Thus, Chicago United had helped develop an employment program similar to VICI which had been mounted in the Lawndale section of Chicago. Chicago United hoped to replicate and expand the program, which had developed linkages to educational institutions, community-based organizations, and city agencies.

The only linkage that VICI required which was missing from the Lawndale program was the involvement of union journeymen as supervisors. Chicago United was particularly interested in gaining the cooperation of the carpenters union. But this union was very concerned about being associated with failures

or with the poor quality work that had emerged from other projects. Union leaders were also concerned about the quality of the trainees and the training methods they had seen in similar projects. However, William Higginson, special assistant to the president of Chicago United, and Phillip Viso, assistant superintendent of schools, were able to reassure the carpenters and other unions as to the quality of the VICI project being developed. Another inducement to the unions was their expectation that VICI represented a new trend in public programs, and they wished to influence that trend early on.

Once MOM and Chicago United had obtained participation agreements from the Board of Education, the Carpenter's Union, and various community-based organizations, in early May there was a formal decision to designate the Department of Human Services as the local management agency for the project. MOM had no experience in program operation and always chose to delegate responsibility for CETA programs to other agencies. Some suggest the involvement of DHS facilitated the provision of Community Development Block Grant monies for VICI materials and supplies. DHS Commissioner Cecil Partee was co-chairman of the Community Development and Housing Coordinating Committee along with Lewis Hill, Commissioner of the Department of Planning, City and Community Development. That committee was responsible for disbursing the city's Community Development Block grants. Moreover, Hill's department was made the work-providing agency for the VICI program. However, some observers argue that CD's involvement was secured through the efforts of Chicago United, and that the prime was reluctant to contract with DHS.

As all these pieces were falling into place, there was some initial confusion concerning the number of sites and delegate agencies. A basic canon of public resource allocation in Chicago is that no group must appear to be getting very much more than another for very long. Thus, Chicago's instinctive reaction to the VICI project's requirements of a limited target area was to view it as a threat to political stability. City officials selected two target areas for the program, Lawndale and Pilsen, and they delegated all managerial responsibilities (except for payroll and participant counselling) to groups active in the two target areas: the Lawndale People's Planning and Action Conference (LPPAC) and the 18th Street Development Corporation (formerly the Pilsen Neighborhood Council). However, as a means of reducing administrative complexity, CPPV insisted that one of the delegate organizations be designated as the lead organization, and LPPAC was chosen.

At the upper levels of DHS, there was concern about being left out of the initial planning of the VICI program, despite DHS's role as LMA. A DHS official notes, for example, that there had been a pre-selection of sites, and when DHS asked that even more be added, MOM appeared to agree and later reneged (at CPPV's insistence). DHS was also irritated over its apparently subordinate role vis a vis Chicago United.

The various pieces were combined in a proposal submitted to CPPV on May 19 in which youth would rehabilitation EJDs or abandoned properties. Title to the properties would initially be conveyed to the delegate agencies, then sold with the profits

reinvested in the program. The two delegate agencies would also provide youth referral, along with the Chicago Board of Education. The Board would also provide the educational linkage through its Industrial Skills Center, as well as post-program placement. The carpenters and painters unions would provide journeymen as well as help with placement. The Chicago Alliance of Business Manpower Services would also provide post-program placement help. Like Chicago United, this was another business organization to which MOM delegated extensive influence, and which operated all of the CETA OJT projects in Chicago.

At the end of June, CPPV offered conditional approval of the Chicago proposal. It sought clarification of the relationship of the LMA to a proposed steering committee composed of three representatives of the Lawndale Peoples Planning and Action Conference, the 18th Street Development Corp., and the Department of Human Services. A memorandum of understanding on this matter was drawn up for CPPV in July, and the program went forward.

The Chicago VICI program involves a complex web of relationships among a number of organizations. Both Chicago United's Higginson and MOM planner David Brunson found it mildly ironic that CPPV could object to DHS's involvement on the grounds that it constituted an extra layer of management, since they said that CPPV could be accused of precisely the same offense.

Indeed, there were so many operational levels in the Chicago program that it was not surprising that most of those involved construed it as a service project rather than a research and demonstration effort.

It appears that none of the key organizations and individuals involved in developing the Chicago proposal emerged with any great affection for CPPV, although their criticisms were sometimes tempered with recognition of the difficulty of CPPV's role. Chicago United's Higginson complained that CPPV staff members generally appeared "CETA-ignorant." And nearly everyone was particularly angry about CPPV's testing of the elements in the proposal. Staff members at DHS and MOM viewed it as insulting, while at Chicago United there was concern that too much probing might disturb efforts to forge certain linkages, such as those with the Carpenters' Union. Some complained CPPV seemed more concerned with linkages than project output. While DHS's Todhunter confessed to becoming increasingly irked by what he called CPPV's "truth squad tactics," he also admitted that CPPV's techniques forced Chicago planners to think more deeply about their design and ultimately to design a better project. Others also agreed that CPPV had played a beneficial role in enhancing communications among the institutions involved in developing the proposal.

In addition to finding CPPV's requests for information overly burdensome, many of those interviewed also disliked what one called the "commando research methods" and complained about the researchers' insensitivity to operational goals and to the welfare of the trainees. The need for over-recruitment to provide a control group drew particular special concern.

However, many of those who criticized CPPV also acknowledged that it was often what one called "DOL's whipping boy," and

they sympathized with what they were sure were cases of CPPV being blamed for DOL reversals on guidelines and policies. Indeed, several of those interviewed felt CPPV had been instrumental to Chicago's success, and there was particular praise for CPPV field representative Lane L. Smith, who was described as a facilitator, clarifier of issues, task-master, and pace-setter.

There was much criticism of the VICI concept in Chicago. Beyond the familiar feeling that their city was very different from Portland, there was a vigorous, although not altogether cogent, argument about the multiplier effect of VICI forcing the city to spend large additional sums in order to meet the journey man wage rates in the city and to carry out full-scale "gut-level" property rehabilitation instead of "mere cosmetic repairs." As the project approached the operational stage, there was also growing concern about it becoming more bureaucratic and less flexible and exciting.

D. Los Angeles, California

Los Angeles is the nation's third largest city, with a population of nearly three million, according to the 1970 census. Its residents are a polyglot mixture of whites, blacks, Mexican-Americans, and Orientals. As one of the few major American cities to develop after the introduction of the automobile, Los Angeles has become the quintessential "spread city." Its 464 square miles of territory make it far larger in area than any other major American city, and its dispersed, low-rise profile is quite different from the older major cities of the East and Midwest.

The ETA letter inviting the Los Angeles prime sponsor to apply for a VICI program came to the planning unit of the Training and Job Development Division of the City of Los Angeles Department of Community Development (CD). Under Los Angeles' unique administrative arrangement, the Community Development Department handled Titles I and III of CETA, while the city's Personnel Department had administrative jurisdiction over Titles II and VI.

When the planning unit received notification of the VICI competition, staff members were ambivalent. The unit was below desired staffing levels and busy with other projects, "so we were reluctant to go after this," recalls Reynold Blight, supervisor of the unit. Moreover, they were not impressed with the overall program design, considering it similar to

other YCCIP programs, expensive, and difficult to replicate on a large scale. It was seen as unique "only in requiring trade union participation instead of just having it as voluntary," notes Irving Ostrov of the planning unit staff. The planning unit had been having "troubles" with local unions, so staff members felt this program would only cause more difficulties. The local Building and Construction Trades Council was one of the CD Department's contractors which had been cut back recently, so relations were not good. Planners were also concerned about their ability to identify a VICI sub-contractor since the CPPV timetable offered little time for a formal RFP or selection process.

But, Blight says, politically, they knew they would have to seek these funds--or any others--held out to them. In examining the development of Los Angeles' YCCIP programs, VICI planners noted that the City Council had recommended contracting with The East Los Angeles Community Union (TELACU) if any additional YCCIP funds were made available to the city, so they felt justified in selecting TELACU to be the local management agency for the VICI program. TELACU, created in 1968 with the help of the United Auto Workers union, had been operating a number of economic and social development programs in the largely Hispanic East Los Angeles area. Aided by large grants from the Ford Foundation and other sources, it had developed into a large-scale program operator with a highly professional and entrepreneurial staff.

So, planning unit personnel decided to respond to the VICI invitation in conjunction with TELACU. They began a

series of meetings with city housing and youth program agencies to identify needs and resources. They concluded that they could obtain HUD bloc grant funds to provide materials for refurbishing residences.

But they quickly encountered problems in developing a proposal because the planners felt they lacked necessary technical information. The problem, according to planning unit staff members, was that CPPV's Philadelphia briefing was regarded as a "freebie," within the CD Department--a pleasant trip to East Coast. So it was given to high officials of the department. "But we needed to have a technician there as well, and we ended up with things not being clear," a planner complains. In any case, the planners quickly ran into two major and intractable problems: the LMA and the budget.

After settling on TELACU, the planners elected to target the program in three of Los Angeles' six labor market planning areas. The choice of three was made on political grounds: YCCIP had already brought \$2.9 million to the city, so if VICI brought another million, a 33 percent increase, it would be politically impossible to spend the money in a single area. Since they needed to target funds to meet CPPV criteria, yet spread them to meet local political demands, the planners elected to recruit youth from three of the six labor market areas and target the community improvements on three small census tracts, one within each of the three labor market areas. The areas to be improved, the Boyle Heights, Echo Park, and Exposition Park areas, had a combined population of 24,000 and contained 1,100 unsound housing units. All three sites could draw

on HUD bloc grant "Handyman" funds for materials, and all three contained community facilities as well as residences in need of refurbishment.

When the proposal went to the Los Angeles City Council for approval, however, this targeting quickly encountered problems. TELACU was identified with East Los Angeles and the Mexican-American community, but one of the target areas, the Exposition Park area south and west of LA's downtown business district, was close to South Central Los Angeles, the focus of the city's black community. The City Council members representing the South Central area were concerned about TELACU coming into their area, according to council staff members. and they proposed that another, indigenous, organization be added.

The powerful Watts Labor Community Action Committee was not interested in becoming involved, since it already had its own youth programs, so planning unit officials say the only other South Central organization large enough to apply was Community Care and Development Services (CCDS), and it agreed to submit a proposal. CCDS was a private nonprofit human services agency established in 1966 by the Los Angeles Council of Churches. It had obtained local CETA funds to operate several youth programs, including a \$383,000 Title III YCCIP program. City Council members endorsed a plan to have CCDS operate a VICI program in the Exposition Park area, while TELACU would operate the programs at the other two sites, but CPPV strongly opposed having two LMA's because it would be an unwieldy management structure.

Meanwhile, the Los Angeles planner had obtained an agreement from the building and construction trades unions to co-operate with the program, and the other elements of the proposal had also been worked out. The proposal Los Angeles forwarded to CPPV on May 19 was budgeted at \$1, 170,000, slightly above the levels in the CPPV guidelines. The proposal was aimed at 18 and 19 year olds, and it featured two LMA's and three target areas in which the youth would repair 600 homes and a number of community facilities. There were formal linkages to the Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, and the education linkage was that the youth would be eligible for counseling and referral if they wished to return to school, obtain a G.E.D., or enroll in other forms of education. The participants could also be eligible for academic credit for work performed within the VICI project. The planners saw the education link as "a weak part." "There was nothing new in it," one planner said, adding, "We didn't push to develop new formal linkages with the schools since they're already obligated to help kids who come in. And if you've got 12 kids, the schools will send a teacher for a G.E.D. class."

CPPV recommended approval of the Los Angeles proposal on the condition that it reduce the project budget to \$949,274 and designate a single local management agency. The Department of Labor set a deadline of August 11, 1978, for receipt of CPPV's further recommendations.

The Los Angeles planners were fully cognizant of the problems, but they found one problem only got worse and the

other proved unsolvable. In the proposal initially submitted, the trade union journeymen were to have been paid \$15,000 a year, but when the building trade unions began to examine the VICI program more closely, they demanded that supervisors receive full journeyman wages, which in Los Angeles amounted to over \$10 an hour, plus fringe benefits that added 40 to 65 percent to the basic wage. The unions also decided that they would not accept the proposed \$3,00 an hour wage for program participants and eventually insisted they be paid a rate equal to half the journeyman wage, or about \$5.32 an hour. The union leaders noted that CETA had set a precedent in Los Angeles by establishing a preapprenticeship program in which participants were paid union scale apprentice wages, and they insisted that the prime sponsor continue at that level.

Planning unit staff members say that in Los Angeles the building trades are in a relatively strong position so that the journeyman rate is generally the going rate, but the planners recognized that the union wage demands would make the VICI program far more costly than permitted under CPPV guidelines. Unsuccessful in their efforts to get local unions to moderate their wage demands, CD department staff members urged DOL and CPPV to intervene with the international headquarters of the unions involved. Blight also pursued other alternatives to hold down costs. He proposed to CPPV that instead of using union journeymen for all supervisory positions, the journeymen would be used as "consultants" or "trainers" while lower cost PSE participants would serve as first-line supervisors. Blight also

proposed hiring journeymen under Title VI and supplementing their wages with VICI funds, but DOL officials said this was contrary to existing regulations. Unable to find a way of lowering the program's costs, the planners then attempted to raise supplemental funds. Initial conversations with OYP gave Blight some hope of additional funding, he recalls, but no funds were located. Ultimately, he says, there was a feeling that it would be inappropriate to fund one part of a demonstration in special manner, Blight believes. Thus, as Los Angeles sought to revise its proposal, the budget rose from \$1.1 million to \$1.7 million due to higher wage costs.

As for the question of the two LMA's, it was politically impossible to resolve the issue since the City Councilmen involved were unable to agree. The final Council motion proposed creation of a new single LMA which would be a joint venture created by TELACU and CCDS. This was seen as a way of appeasing CPPV, though few believed such a joint venture could paper over rivalry between the two parent organizations and the different constituencies they represented.

While the CD Department planning unit was unable to resolve the issues, during CPPV's June 23 site review, Los Angeles Deputy Mayor Grace Davis called Julia Robinson in Philadelphia and asked for information. Moreover, at a meeting with CPPV field representatives, she indicated a willingness to help reach a settlement. During July, Julia Robinson of CPPV twice placed calls to Davis in the hopes of "picking up the pieces," she says, but on neither occasion did Davis return the calls.

On July 28, Robinson wrote Davis, informing her of the impending deadline and the need to resolve the issues. But as one of the planners noted, "Basically it just sort of expired."

Could the two major issues which scuttled the proposal have been avoided? It's clear CPPV's field representative, who was relying on the CD Department for information, was caught largely unaware by the problems which emerged. In a May 16 memo, Will Maddox wrote, "At this point all is well and the unions have given an initial blessing to the program," and a day later he wrote, "I don't foresee any problems."

There is reason to think the problem of the two LMA's could have been avoided. Neither the CD Department planners nor the CPPV staff recognized the potential problems raised by involving TELACU in the Exposition Park area until the City Council raised the issue. Yet black-Hispanic rivalries are hardly unknown in Los Angeles, and TELACU and East Los Angeles are as closely identified with the city's Mexican-Americans as WLCAC and South Central are with its blacks. A TELACU official says, "The top administrators of the CD Department didn't do their homework in testing the political climate."

There is less reason to think the union problems could have been resolved or avoided. CPPV officials say they were told by the CD Department that the unions "owed" them one and had given their blessings to the VICI program. But Blight insists, "It was clear to me from the outset that the budgets were not workable here." He argues that the Portland model and the budget guidelines could not be fitted to Los Angeles. When

the Portland model was launched, he says, there were many building trades union members out of work, so the unions may have been more agreeable and more anxious to obtain the supervisory jobs. The Los Angeles building trades, however, already had some YCCIP funding, and they were too large to regard ten VICI supervisor jobs as a significant incentive to participate. Rather, they were concerned that the program would swell the ranks of non-union workers in the building trades. These unions, which had already had several disagreements with the Community Development Department, were not eager to accept compromises, particularly since, according to planning unit staff members, CPPV staff members had told the unions there would be no program in Los Angeles unless they participated. In addition, planning unit staff members complain CPPV was not attentive to their efforts to find alternatives, nor was it clear on what else could or should be done in lieu of meeting the union wage demands.

The passage of Proposition 13 on June 6 only heightened the unions' intransigence. Proposition 13, which put a limit on the property taxes the state could levy, seemed to promise significant cutbacks in government services and extensive paring of government staffs. It had a polarizing effect on the unions, making them even more adamant, Blight says. They would no longer discuss the kinds of compromises they had made in participating in YCCIP programs mounted prior to Proposition 13.

While Blight says the planning unit may have "underestimated our problems with the trade unions," he also argues

that the VICI guidelines on wages "were just not appropriate for the Los Angeles area. The program could not be fitted."

E. Miami, Florida

Dade County, Florida, the nation's 21st largest metropolitan area, contains 27 municipalities and a large unincorporated mass, but the area is best known for the cities of Miami and Miami Beach. Tourism has long been an economic mainstay of the area and real estate speculation a favored pursuit, but while both have declined in recent years, Miami has become an important center for trade between the U.S. and Latin America.

The County's conduct of employment and training programs has been seriously compromised by instances of fraud and mismanagement. At the close of 1976, a new Dade County Manager conducted a review of county CETA operations which disclosed a number of administrative weaknesses prompting him to seek the resignation of the CETA director in the fall of 1977. That resignation was publicly criticized by the DOL regional office in Atlanta because the county program was "far from the worst in Florida," as well as because the County Manager's authority to discharge a CETA director was arguable.

Meanwhile, the South Florida CETA consortium, composed of the CETA programs of Dade, Monroe, and Hialeah Counties and the cities of Miami and Miami Beach, was also under scrutiny by the national office of DOL, the Dade County Organized Crime Bureau, a separate grand jury investigation, and two newspapers. These inquiries produced four key conclusions:

1. There were serious administrative deficiencies in the Consortium's management.

2. There was widespread misrepresentation by both CETA employees and clients as to their eligibility and backgrounds.
3. There were clear instances of fraud and criminal violations by CETA sub-grantees in municipal and county jurisdictions.
4. There were serious allegations of political interference and excessive patronage in CETA employment throughout the area.

Amid these allegations, the announcement of the VICI program was received by the South Florida CETA Consortium and directed to Miami's Department of Citizen Services. Immediately several of that Department's key technical personnel met to develop a concept and a strategy for developing the proposal and implementing a program. They decided that a technical specialist would be made responsible for each separate phase of the overall plan. Department of Citizen Services staff members say their initial focus was on linkages. They sought to calculate what each of the various potential linkages could get out of the program, what additional "sweeteners" and guarantees would have to be made in order to secure the cooperation of all sectors, and how each organization would fit into the master plan.

The result of these initial deliberations was a decision to place primary emphasis on securing the cooperation of the labor unions, since they were thought to be "the toughest nut to crack," according to Department of Citizen Services staff members. However, they found the unions were generally enthusiastic about the program, although they were particularly insistent that they have control over the selection of journeymen, the entry level of the trainees, and the criteria for

"graduation" from the program. Thus, the planners were able to secure the cooperation of local unions representing the masons, carpenters, electricians, and plumbers, as well as the AFL-CIO's Human Resource Development Institute.

Much of this cooperative spirit was influenced by the social and economic context in which Florida unions have had to operate. Particularly in Miami, the construction and building trades unions have had a very transient membership. At the same time, there has been a long waiting list of largely unskilled applicants for apprenticeship positions. Moreover, Florida's unions have been affected by the general decline in what they see as the quality as well as numbers of members, and this has meant a lessening of their political influence. Accordingly, the opportunity VICI seemed to present an opportunity to add qualified new members, provide work for current members, and improve the unions' public image.

Having lined up the trade union linkages, the VICI planners then turned to the educational linkage. They arranged for VICI participants to enroll in classes offered by the public schools' Vocational and Adult Education Division, as well as to utilize resources of HRDI and Florida International University's Labor Study Institute. Meanwhile, the city agreed to enact special legislation, waiving several provisions and permits ordinarily required for rehabilitation projects, and those permits and inspections which were required would be provided free of charge.

According to the proposal which the South Florida CETA Consortium submitted to CPPV on May 19, the work providing

agency would be Dade County's Department of Housing and Urban Development. It would identify houses in need of emergency repairs in two areas within the Miami Model City area. The target population, recruited from the same area, would be 16 to 19 year old, out-of-school, unemployed youth. Referrals would be made by the North Central Manpower Office of Dade County, and post-program placement would be provided by HRDI and the Department of Citizen Services. The program would have an advisory council which would not only include representatives of the primary linkages but also residents of the target area.

By all accounts an almost military precision and a highly coordinated effort enabled the Miami development team to bring most of the key elements of the plan together in a relatively short period of time. The proposal was well received in Philadelphia, and there seemed to be good prospects for unconditional approval and funding. And, indeed, on June 8, CPPV offered its recommendation for approval to OYP, but the program was rejected by DOL, based on negative reports from the DOL regional office in Atlanta.

The reasons for the rejection have to do with the ongoing investigation of the prime sponsor's integrity and managerial capabilities. Because of the problems that had been uncovered and the questions that were being raised, DOL regional officials considered it inappropriate to "reward" the prime sponsor with additional discretionary funding, despite the region's earlier expressions of support for the prime sponsor.

This decision was accepted with equanimity at CPPV. The staff recognized that broader considerations could justifiably countervene its recommendations, but there was some questioning of why DOL waited so long into the site selection process before removing Miami from consideration. Interviews with those who helped to draft the Miami proposal were characterized by resentment over the failure of their efforts, resentment directed at both DOL and the Consortium. The planners were galled because they felt the rejection had nothing to do with the capabilities of the proposed LMA, the Office of Citizen Services. The Miami planners generally expressed positive responses to CPPV, however, describing it as more flexible and fair than DOL and more willing to be helpful.

F. Milwaukee County, Wisconsin

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Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is at the center of the nation's 23rd largest SMSA, with a population of more than one million people. The City of Milwaukee, which contains much of the territory and the majority of the people of Milwaukee County, is bisected by the Milwaukee River. The communities which meet at the river are very different in social and economic terms.

The city's South Side, which together with some suburban areas, comprises Wisconsin's Fourth Congressional District, is largely Polish and German. Two percent of the population is Spanish speaking, and blacks are not sufficiently numerous to constitute a statistically significant presence. Some 24 percent of the families have annual incomes above \$15,000, while only five percent are below the \$3,000 level.

On the north side of the Milwaukee River, however, lies the Fifth Congressional District. Blacks are the largest ethnic group in this area, composing 21 percent of the population. The blacks in this area represent 82 percent of the entire state's black population. In this area 19 percent of the families have annual incomes above \$15,000; nine percent are below the \$3,000 level.

The City of Milwaukee has long had a distinctive political style which has been at odds with the rest of this heavily rural and small town state. In the first quarter of this century,

when Wisconsin was a bastion of Progressives and Republicans, Milwaukee elected a string of socialist mayors and Congressmen. A strong but pragmatic style of liberalism has survived in Milwaukee. In the mid-1960's, there was a degree of social turbulence, particularly surrounding the open housing battles led by Father James Groppi. But the formal and informal pattern of segregating housing by racial and ethnic groups has continued.

The County's labor force totals nearly 500,000. Manufacturing employment currently stands at about 32 percent of total employment, but it has been declining steadily over the past few decades, while the service sector and employment in trade have increased. Construction employment within the central city has declined by a quarter in the last few decades.

Control of all employment and training programs is vested in the office of County Executive, which has delegated the role of the prime sponsor to the office of Economic Resources Development.

The Milwaukee County prime was first notified of the VICI project on April 10, 1978, and Senior Planner Charles Perry was given principal responsibility for development of the proposal. Perry responded by immediately establishing a top-level task force, consisting of chief executive officers of such organizations as the Community Development Agency (CDA), the Milwaukee Building and Construction Trades Council, the Milwaukee Carpenters District Council, the local OCI chapter, the City Transportation Division, the Milwaukee Area Technical College (MATC), the City Building Inspection Department, the

Department of City Development, and the City Office of Human Resources Development. The Task Force was made responsible for developing key facets of the overall concept, developing and reviewing sections of the draft proposal, and for assisting in development of linkages and support.

At the same time, Perry established a proposal development team consisting of an economic developer, a statistician, a labor expert, and two experts (in delegate agencies and work referral) drawn from external agencies.

The prime sponsor and the Task Force next made a determined effort to obtain the participation, support, and blessings of the various unions.

From the point when he first heard of the VICI program, Perry says he was immediately sure that Milwaukee could do it. He felt that the level of cooperation and linkage among Milwaukee's public and private sectors certainly equalled that of Portland.

Perry saw major payoffs in the program to the trainees, while he viewed the neighborhood improvement as just an incidental nicety. He also saw an opportunity for the prime sponsor to develop cooperative relationships with organizations which they did not know well--such as the labor unions. Interestingly, however, the operational benefits do not seem to have provided the principal motivation for the high energy and dedication evidenced by Perry and his staff. Perry says that he and the other team members felt from the beginning that the prime could have only "minimal impact" on Milwaukee's youth employment problem. He says that their high esprit was the direct result

of their respect for their director--May Ellen Powers--and for her dedication and drive.

The Community Development Agency became involved because of VICI's direct relevance to the agency's experience and needs. The agency had been funding a number of service projects similar to VICI and, as a result, had identified a large inventory ("endless") of houses in need of rehabilitation. CDA Director Burkee was personally concerned with the City's 40% black teenage unemployment rate and felt that VICI might both alleviate that problem and possibly help to create a "new crop" of minority contractors as a spin-off product. In addition, Burkee had always believed that hands-on experience was the best training method. He was also impressed with the distinctly practical ("non-cosmetic") nature of the Task Force.

The choice of OCI as local management agency was not difficult. The only other possible contender was the Social Development Commission--a 20 million dollar community-based super-organization with an approximately 300-person staff, and offices all over the city. However, the Task Force as a body gave little formal consideration to SDC because of allegations of corruption surrounding the organization, even though many of the Task Force members felt the allegations were untrue and the organization was sound and effective.

There was initial opposition from the labor unions because of previous failures of similar programs and fears that the program would ultimately help to displace their current membership. But this was offset by a number of internal and external

factors: First, the quality of individuals entering the trades was declining--in terms of maturity and work-ethic orientation, and the unions were becoming increasingly worried about it. Second, the unions came to see the project as a means of eventually building a bigger and better membership, and thus gaining greater organizational and political leverage. Third, the program seemed to signal a new form of government intervention just off the horizon, and that, coupled with the fact of increasing social pressure to accept more women and minorities, made participation in the program appear to be an increasingly politic action. Fourth, the program didn't appear to be at all bad when examined closely, union leaders said. Moreover, the unions--particularly the Building and Trades Council--had already established good working or social relationships with many members of the Task Force, and were thus reassured.

Finally, the Building and Trades Council had the basic concept of such a program "working on a back burner," but had been hesitant to undertake the administrative burden.

OIC and Big Step, a joint creation of the OCI, the Building and Trades Council, and the Urban League, were particularly concerned with stabilizing and holding together the city's neighborhoods, as well as with the welfare of their trainees. They saw VICI as a means of accomplishing those two objectives, while simultaneously enhancing their organizational viability. Moreover, OIC viewed the project as a "laboratory" for testing possible in-house spin-off programs to deal with construction and training in administration and market-valuation techniques.

In addition, the program gives OIC and other community organizations a chance to establish a good working relationship with the traditionally conservative unions. Some have suggested that Big Step's participation would be more cosmetic than real as this skills training delegate of OIC sought to establish itself.

The Milwaukee Area Technical College (MATC)--the primary educational linkage for the project--was attracted to the program because it wished to become more involved in minority issues and programs.

In the proposal that the Milwaukee County prime sponsor submitted to CPPV on May 19, the City of Milwaukee's Building Inspection Department would be the work providing agency, while there would be several referral sources, including the Wisconsin Job Service, the Milwaukee Public Schools, and the Social Development Commission, as well as OIC and Big Step. Big Step and OIC would handle post-program placement in apprenticeship programs or fulltime employment, respectively.

The Milwaukee proposal was one of three that was recommended for approval to OYP on June 8, 1978.

Pre-existing relationships among primary actors are definitely a key to Milwaukee's success in minimizing misdirected efforts and wasted time in developing its plans. As noted earlier, communications among the unions, county government, and city agencies were very good, particularly considering the differing perspective and priorities of the city and the county.

Milwaukee County is unique in that the responsibility for both economic development and human resource development is

centered in separate halves of the same agency and is located within the office of the powerful County Executive. Moreover, the prime sponsor also had good communications and a good relationship with the DOL regional office in Chicago and an excellent reputation at the national level.

The only evidence of significant concern for the project's national implications has been expressions of interest by local labor leaders in the potential impact on national unions.

Add to the pre-established relationships the early establishment of a proposal development team and the high degree of participation allowed members of the Task Force, and there is little reason for surprise at the fact that the program developed smoothly and generated much excitement.

"Success" for the VICI project is defined according to the organizational perspectives of the various entities involved in the program. For the prime, it's a smooth-running program--one which meets the primary objectives and goals and which satisfies the Task Force. For Building and Trades Elliot, it's a program which is accepted by both the community and the union membership. For OIC, a more quantitative definition: 400 houses finished, and a 50 to 60% rate of participant placement. OIC is also concerned that the program hold trainees to real-world standards of performance, attitude, and behavior.

Criticism and concern are mild--hardly in evidence at all. The prime and the OIC at the time of the interviews were worried about DOL's delay in funding and the subsequent effect on

the trainees and on their operational schedules. Nearly everyone was complimentary to CPPV, with the primary opinion being that it seemed, as Perry put it, a "distiller of variety." Everyone interviewed at the prime also cited the proposal development process as a useful learning experience. There is some concern over the supervisory ratios; most (especially labor) feel that 6 to 1 is high but manageable.

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G. Newark, New Jersey

Since the civil disorders which rocked this city in the summer of 1967, Newark has often been invoked as an exemplar of urban pathologies. Newark's population, estimated at 400,000, has been declining since 1960. In two decades the city population has turned from 83 percent white to 67 percent black, and in recent years there has been an influx of Puerto Ricans as well as Cubans and Portuguese. One out of three residents was receiving some form of public assistance in 1978, and since 1973 Newark's unemployment rate has fluctuated between 10 and 20 percent, always well above the national level. Although the demand for labor has exhibited some strength in the Newark area, Newark's unskilled labor force has suffered from structural unemployment, particularly the youth population which has been growing amidst overall population declines.

Like several other prime sponsors, the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training (MOET) in Newark was informed by its DOL federal representative that it would be receiving an invitation to apply for a VICI program. When that invitation was received at MOET, it was sent to Dr. JoAnne Coble Foster, the MOET Youth Coordinator and head of the Office of Youth Services. "We're anxious to take advantage of whatever money there is," Coble Foster says, "so we immediately committed ourselves to apply."

Newark planners waited for the CPPV briefing in Philadelphia to provide the information they felt they needed, but

Coble Foster recalls she returned from that briefing somewhat confused. "There were questions unanswered, CPPV was feeling its way, they were not very concrete on things, only nebulous and ambiguous," she recalls. Consequently, one of her first actions after the meeting was to see that a letter was sent over the signature of MOET Director Harry Wheeler to the DOL regional office in New York, seeking clarification of the relationships that were supposed to exist among MOET, CPPV, and DOL's national and regional offices. MOET sought to determine if it could develop a VICI program without working with CPPV.

After receiving some clarification from DOL and CPPV, however, Newark CETA planners turned to developing a proposal. Harry Wheeler, an influential figure in Newark's government, supported the proposal. It was immediately clear that it should be targeted on Newark's Central Ward, the area that was the most depressed as measured by unemployment, crime, or physical deterioration. And it was clear the city would run this program, as it did most employment programs; there was no consideration of sub-contractors, Coble Foster says. Planners decided the city Department of Public Works (DPW) would be the local management agency, along with MOET, and also the work providing agency. DPW had previously provided work sites for 500 youth in MOET's Summer Program for Economically Disadvantaged Youth and had managed a Title III community improvement project and a MOET-funded Painters Pre-Apprentice Training Program for CETA participants. Thus, there was a well established relationship between DPW and MOET. MOET and DPW planners decided to

have VICI participants work on two kinds of community improvements: "accessing" for the handicapped, and refurbishment of occupied and abandoned housing.

VICI planners ran into major problems when they sought to develop linkages with trade unions. "We worked on that the most--the other linkages were fairly easy," Sheila Oliver of the MOET Office of Youth Services notes. The local building trades unions had a number of unemployed apprentices and were concerned about adding still more. When VICI planners contacted union representatives about becoming involved with the program, the unions raised a number of questions, including the wages to be paid participants. Unable to obtain any commitments, Newark planners turned to CPPV field representative Robert J. Robinson. Robinson, a CPPV consultant who was executive director of the Negro Trade Union Leadership Council headquartered in Philadelphia, helped MOET obtain something of a commitment to support the program from the Newark building trades council head, "but it didn't pan out, it didn't happen," Coble Foster says.

The exception to this union reticence was the painters union. Through the intervention of Peter Yablonsky, president emeritus, the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council 10, agreed to cooperate with the demonstration. Of this linkage Coble Foster notes, "They're always involved." The painters union had participated in several MOET projects and ots officers, particular Yablonsky, had served on various advisory bodies. Yablonsky had a warm relationship with MOET and the city government.

The VICI planners were unable to develop any other union relationships other than with the painters, however, so the proposal they developed called for identifying and hiring as supervisors journeymen who belonged to the various building trades unions and who were employed by the city. (They were represented in labor negotiations with the city by the building trades since the city had no municipal employees union.) The planners also proposed to use the Recruitment and Training Program (RTP), together with MOET's own Comprehensive Employment and Training Delivery System (CETDS) for recruitment and intake. And the educational linkage was to be the Newark Skills Center, funded by the city CETA program, which was to provide G.E.D. instruction for all who entered the VICI program.

When this proposal was submitted to CPPV on May 19, however, CPPV responded by calling for a major redesign of the program, together with requesting additional detail and specificity.

CPPV told the Newark prime sponsor that if it could get the building trade unions to agree that they wouldn't oppose the program and the participation of their journeymen, then they could go ahead with their plan to use municipal employees who were also members of building trades unions as supervisors. After the planners found that they couldn't obtain trade union approval for this plan, however, they decided to work only with the painters union. Using only painters as supervisors, however, would require paring down the work proposed to focus on painting. This would also change the educational linkage

needed, since the painters union didn't require a high school diploma or G.E.D. for admission to apprenticeship. Instead, the VICI program would offer three hours of classes two evenings a week at the Essex County Vocational School to provide the same training given painting union apprentices.

In addition to seeking this major revision in the program, CPPV was also concerned that Newark planners had dispersed control over the program too widely, leaving a central administrative apparatus that was too thin and too weak, so they urged Newark planners to beef up and centralize some control over the various aspects of the program. In addition, Sheila Oliver of MOET recalls, "We were required to expand and be more specific on a number of items." For example, planners were called on to spell out more clearly how the work flow would be developed and coordinated at DPW.

Thus, the Newark proposal was significantly revised during the month of June, and a very different proposal emerged. It retained both RTP and CETDS as recruiting sources, but the role of CETDS was enhanced. Work was to consist of painting the interiors and exteriors of housing units provided by the Newark Redevelopment and Housing Authority and the DPW Division of Surplus Property, which managed housing abandoned by its owners. There was a total of 2,952 housing units in need of painting within the Central Ward, and the program proposed to paint 1,244 interior and exterior units as well as 300 public areas--hallways, laundry rooms, etc. The maximum material expenditure was to be \$100 per unit.

The work would be supervised by ten journeymen painters and closely monitored by the Apprentice Coordinator of District Council 10 of the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades. The Apprentice Coordinator also supervised apprentice recruitment and placement for District Council 10 and monitored MOET's existing CETA-funded Pre-Apprenticeship Painting Program. District Council 10 would also provide classroom instruction for participants two evenings a week at the Essex County Vocational School, and it agreed to give preferential treatment to those who performed well in the VICI program if they sought union apprenticeships.

The City of Newark pledged to support the program with \$108,000 for materials and supplies. In addition, DPW was to provide \$63,600 of in-kind contributions for furniture, meeting space, drivers, and other items.

In a June 30 letter to Robert Taggart, CPPV recommended the Newark proposal for approval, conditional upon clarification of the labor linkage and substantiation of the \$108,000 of city funds; and after satisfying these concerns, on August 10, CPPV recommended Newark for approval. OYP formally approved Newark on August 23.

Meanwhile, meetings were held in August between Newark and the regional office of DOL to discuss research design and annual plan preparation. The annual plan was completed and submitted to OYP and the DOL regional office, and at the end of August questions were raised by the regional office regarding female participation rates in the program and non-positive termination projections.

In October the program was operating with 53 youth. Remaining slots were kept vacant because of difficulties in recruiting sufficient Hispanic youth to meet the goals established for the program.

Newark planners gave CPPV high marks for helping them develop and refine their proposal. "It was a good experience for us," Coble Foster says, adding that her staff was inexperienced so VICI "was a useful learning experience." She and others at MOET credit CPPV with forcing the planners to think through the inner workings of the program they envisioned and to flesh out all the details. For their part, CPPV staff members were originally somewhat concerned about whether the Newark program had a management structure with enough leadership and authority to give direction to the program.

## H. New Haven, Connecticut

New Haven had a population of 138,000, according to the 1970 census. Some 23,000 of its residents were living below the poverty line, including 16,925 of the city's 36,000 black residents and 3,266 of its 4,900 Hispanics. The city's unemployment rate stood at 9.7 percent in mid-1977. New Haven's labor market was primarily oriented toward service occupations, with Yale University the largest source of employment, but there were also a number of good-sized manufacturing plants. A 1976 survey of large employers in South Central Connecticut showed 155 firms employing 100 or more people, with six of the ten largest located within the city limits of New Haven.

New Haven's municipal government had acquired a national reputation for its efforts to redevelop the city's downtown and to rejuvenate the commercial-industrial complex at its harbor. In an analysis prepared in connection with a review of New Haven's entitlement proposal, MDRC staff members noted, "The prime sponsor's staff seems to be knowledgeable about CETA programs in general and have had experience with large youth programs during their summer work programs."

When New Haven's prime sponsor, the Employment and Training Administration, received an invitation to apply for a VICI program, ETA Youth Planner Lou D'Antonio recalls, "There was no question we would apply. The philosophy here is don't let even ten dollars go by." The amount of money which VICI could

bring to New Haven--nearly a million dollars over 18 months--would represent a sizable increment in the city's youth programs, which had been budgeted at less than four million dollars per year.

Given the brief period for preparing a proposal, New Haven CETA planners immediately concluded they would need additional help, so they once again called on Thomas Peterson, a classroom instructor in an ETA training program, and Sally Connelly, an education coordinator and program assistant in the ETA Out-of-school work experience unit. Both had been conscripted earlier for marathon drafting efforts in connection with the city's unsuccessful Entitlement application.

Peterson and D'Antonio attended the CPPV briefing in Philadelphia, and Peterson says they returned to New Haven "with a clear view" of the program. Upon their return, two teams were created. One was a planning team which would consist of the trade union representatives and other linkages, and the second team was a working team to do the nuts and bolts of drafting a proposal. This latter group consisted of Peterson and Connelly, plus D'Antonio; James Begina, ETA's director of planning and management; and a member of the ETA budget staff. Peterson coordinated the overall effort.

They were able to proceed with assurance not only because this team had recently gone through a proposal writing process for Entitlement, but also because in developing the substance of their proposal, they were replicating something besides the Portland model. D'Antonio notes that the planners saw the VICI

program "as an expansion, not a departure from other programs. It's an expanded version of YCCIP with added trade union ties. And since 1975 we've had a construction and building trades activity as part of our Title I out-of-school youth programs. So this was an expanded version of that too." Thus, D'Antonio says, "We used Title I as a reference," and Sally Connelly, who had been supervising that program, would help draft the VICI proposal.

From the outset the planners knew ETA would operate the program itself, as was its custom, so there was no need to consider local management agencies. And because the planners already had experience with New Haven's trade unions, Peterson recalls, "We knew you can forget about plumbing and masonry, etc. These unions aren't cooperative." Instead, they quickly concluded that they had to solicit the carpentry and painting unions. New Haven's ETA had recently worked with Painters Local 186 and Carpenters Local 24 on a Title VI project and on other programs as well. So they approached these unions, offering the carrot of ten journeymen jobs, and received a positive response after a period of discussion.

The planners then turned to education, and once again, the planners recall, "it was easy." They called on existing well developed linkages with the City Board of Education to arrange for the enrollment of VICI participants in adult education and G.E.D. classes offered by the Board of Education or OIC as well as for the awarding of academic credits for work experience.

The new linkages that had to be forged were with the work providing agencies. James Begina recalls, "The only real

problem we had was wondering do we have enough work." In a city of New Haven's size, no single municipal agency could provide enough work to sustain the program, and even two or three might be hard-put to keep 60 people busy. So the planners chose to rely on six work providing agencies, believing that this large number would provide more than enough work as well as better opportunities for offering skills progression and development.

The work providing agencies selected were the New Haven Redevelopment Agency and its Neighborhood Preservation Unit, the Housing Authority, the Human Resources Administration, Neighborhood Housing, Inc., and the Regional Rehabilitation Institute. The work would consist of weatherization and refurbishment of private residences, public housing, and public facilities.

When the VICI planners initially approached these six agencies, they met with some skepticism, but New Haven's community development funds had been cut in half following the 1977 amendments to the U.S. Housing and Community Development Act, so these agencies were receptive to new alternatives. ETA planners say the agencies found it politically attractive to be able to become involved in community improvements, "So this part went surprisingly easy," Connelly says.

The proposed program would obtain referrals from local high schools, community-based organizations, welfare agencies, and the participating carpenters and painters unions. The target area for the program was to be six New Haven neighborhoods, which collectively contained 35 percent of the city's

land area, 48 percent of its youth age 16 through 19, and 68 percent of all poverty level residents.

While putting together the pieces of their proposal, New Haven planners were in frequent contact with CPPV field representative Jerry Kolker and other CPPV staff members. Thus, when Kolker made his May 4 field visit to New Haven, the discussions centered on details and procedures rather than broad questions of demonstration design.

The proposal New Haven's ETA submitted on May 19 was well received in Philadelphia. Shortly after reading it, Kolker said, "New Haven is a joy; it's the best proposal of all." There were several areas of concern, of course. CPPV felt there were too many work providing agencies, and its staff worried about the program's ability to monitor and schedule amid so many agencies. But CPPV accepted New Haven's argument that it needed this number of agencies to provide abundant and varied work. At CPPV's urging, New Haven agreed to increase the size of the program's administrative staff to cope with the number of agencies involved and to change the administrative budget considerably. New Haven also broadened the mixture of skills to be taught. CPPV also raised questions about the fringe benefit level, which was budgeted at 29 percent of basic wages instead of the 20 percent considered appropriate by CPPV. And there was concern about the lack of commitment by the unions to provide apprenticeships. Generally, though, concerns were assuaged with minor revisions or explanations, and Kolker recalls that CPPV staff members "were straining in review sessions to find things to say."

Thus, with only minor revisions, New Haven's proposal was quickly approved by CPPV, and on June 8 it was recommended for approval by OYP, well in advance of most other cities. After DOL approval was granted, in July New Haven's ETA developed an annual plan for submission to DOL, and as the summer progressed, they began receiving referrals of journeymen for the program's supervisory jobs. In August meetings were held between CPPV staff, DOL national and regional office staff, and New Haven's ETA for briefings on the VICI project. Questions were raised by the Boston regional office of DOL regarding the respective monitoring roles of CPPV and DOL, as well as such issues as female participation and post-termination projections. Additional meetings were also held in August to finalize the research design to be used in New Haven.

As the fall of 1978 arrived, there was confidence at CPPV that New Haven was well primed to mount its demonstration program. There was some concern as to whether or not the large number of actors involved could be managed successfully, but the betting at CPPV was that New Haven's program operators had the skills to make it work.

While CPPV staff regarded New Haven's ETA as well stocked with skilled professionals, at the end of the proposal development process, New Haven officials also spoke highly of CPPV. James Begina says New Haven was annoyed with the series of proposal competitions and "was a little turned off by the Entitlement process." But he credits CPPV with being non-political and "clearly spelling out the hoops." ETA staff

members generally say they found CPPV helpful, cooperative, and less "mysterious" than MDRC during the Entitlement process.

The ease with which New Haven jumped through CPPV's "hoops" and satisfactorily replicated the Portland model may reflect the fact that New Haven had two models of its own to employ in directing its efforts. In preparing the VICI application, it was not only able to call upon the team that had recently prepared its Entitlement application, but it also relied on the process of preparing that application to guide its efforts to develop a VICI proposal. And it also had the experience in designing and seeking linkages for its YCCIP program to guide ETA planners in shaping the substance of the VICI proposal. Another factor New Haven planners found helpful was the fact that New Haven, like Portland, was a smaller city, where linkages could be established because many of the actors already knew one another personally or professionally, and where all concerned were to be found within walking distance of one another.

## I. NEW YORK CITY (CENTRAL HARLEM)

New York City is the nation's largest city, and by virtue of its size and cultural impact, it generally has been a leader in experiencing social problems and proposing solutions. By the mid-1970's, the city's preeminence seemed to be threatened in many fields, and its economy was in a continuing slide, putting the city government at the edge of bankruptcy. The Carter Administration had singled out the South Bronx as a symbol of urban decay, and it was to be a centerpiece of whatever urban initiatives the administration would mount.

In 1975 New York City's population was put at 7,567,800. The population was 59 percent white, 25 percent non-white, and 16 percent Hispanic. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported on August 1, 1977, that there were 507,000 New Yorkers between the ages of 16 and 19. Minority teenage unemployment estimates were generally unavailable for New York City, but joblessness among youth was widely regarded as a major problem in the poor black and Hispanic communities that existed in four of the city's five boroughs; only Staten Island was largely middle class.

BLS statistics showed an overall loss of 600,000 jobs in New York City in the decade ending in 1978. White collar and professional jobs were growing in several fields; the massive losses in jobs came in manufacturing and other low-skill areas that had traditionally provided employment to newcomers and minorities.

The city's political system was often unable to cope with this economic decline. Though New York was widely regarded as one of the most liberal cities in the country, there was a conservatism about its local government which prevented responses to the new economic conditions. New York City politics were characterized by a balkanization of power, with interested groups exerting significant influence over narrow spheres of policy.

The city's political and social life were also characterized by an often surprising fierceness. The political system in New York seemed to make it far easier to stop something from occurring than to get it done.

The city's CETA prime sponsor, the Department of Employment, was headed by Stanley Brezenoff. Before he was appointed Commissioner of Employment, he had been a program officer at the Ford Foundation who had been involved in the creation of MDRC as an intermediary unit, and he had participated in early discussions that led the way to the development of CPPV.

The Central Harlem site was different from others with which CPPV was involved, not only because it, along with the South Bronx, were the only sites where specific portions of the city or county were specified by OYP, but also because a local management agency was recommended to the New York prime sponsor. CPPV officials say they were told by the Office of Youth Programs that the Ministerial Interfaith Association was to be the LMA at the Central Harlem proposal, because Assistant Secretary of Labor Ernest Green wanted it.

The Ministerial Interfaith Association (MIA) was founded in 1964 by Reverend William James and other Harlem clergymen to deal with social problems in Harlem. MIA has provided housing information and relocation services, operated a Neighborhood Youth Corps, CETA Title I work experience program, and other programs. Because the clergymen who formed MIA are widely influential in this black community, MIA has been deeply involved in the development and direction of such institutions as the Opportunities Industrialization Center, the Harlem Urban Development Corporation, and other organizations.

According to Rev. James, MIA's involvement in VICI resulted from a visit he and others made to the offices of DOL on February 17, 1978. In meetings with Harriet Michel and others, Rev. James expressed a desire for a program focused on 18 to 27-year-olds and emphasizing education. "We asked to do a demonstration of this in Harlem," Rev. James recalls, "and they agreed we would send in a proposal of this sort, but they said 'meanwhile we've already got a YCCIP program,' and they said do a program for 16-to-19-year-olds and on our own we should do some follow-ups."

Following Rev. James's visit to Washington, MIA was invited by the prime sponsor to attend the CPPV workshop in Philadelphia, and it called on the Harlem Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) to help develop a VICI proposal. Jackie Pope and others with technical skills at HUDC worked up a program in conjunction with Rev. James, who was board chairman of MIA. Robert Cowan, the executive director of MIA, was ill during much of this period and played a limited role.

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CPPV began to raise questions about the proposal as soon as it began to take shape. The CPPV field representative for the site, Gerald Kolker, was a former New York City employment and training official, but he had not had any first-hand experience with MIA, and he was unable to find out anything significant about MIA other than that it had a good fiscal record. (New York City has tended to emphasize fiscal monitoring of employment programs rather than any substantive evaluations.) However, the CPPV field representative received indications from HUDC staff members that there were problems with the proposal.

Following his initial May 5, 1978 visit to Central Harlem, Kolker wrote a memorandum to Julia Robinson, in which he noted:

I am concerned in the short run about whether the proposal will be in decent form by May 19th and I am concerned in the long run whether MIA has the managerial capacity to effectively run the program. Conversely, I am reasonably impressed with HUDC and feel that their history in home repair augers well for a project such as ours. I would not be adverse to HUDC being the direct program operator in this case, but of course that is not a decision that we make here in Philadelphia.

Following this May 5th field visit, the CPPV field representative also told the New York prime sponsor that he was worried about the proposal being ready by the May 19th deadline, and he suggested the Department of Employment assume a larger role.

Kolker's dealings with MIA during the proposal development stage also led him to conclude that the organization lacked the management skills to operate the VICI program successfully.

But Rev. James's view is that:

There was negativism all the way. Everytime there would be something else left out. We convinced them on education, then on recruitment, and so finally we got it all in and they said MIA had no experience in the building trades, and we said we've got HUDC and they said HUDC isn't MIA. We concluded that they just didn't want us to have it any way.

In any case, CPPV's opposition increased still further when MIA proposed that Joseph Bacote, Jr. be the director of the VICI project. To CPPV Bacote embodied precisely what was wrong with MIA and its concept of the program. For the previous half dozen years Bacote had been a counselor at Bronx Community College. He had no experience as a leader or manager, no experience operating employment and training programs, and no background in the kind of building trades and construction activities that VICI would entail.

CPPV regarded the selection of a program director so early in the proposal development process as another sign that MIA believed its approval for funding was a sure thing. However, because the interval between approval and start-up was so short, a number of sites had identified potential program directors at approximately the same time as Central Harlem. MIA's director-designate was one of a number of Harlem young people Rev. James had helped send to college. Bacote was not only a member of Rev. James's Metropolitan Community United Methodist Church in Harlem, he was also chairman of the church's Council on Ministries, on which Rev. James also served, and a member of the William M. James Scholarship Fund Committee, which raised funds and awarded scholarships in honor of Rev. James.

The proposal submitted by the New York Department of Employment for Central Harlem on May 19 would have MIA operate a

program targeted on 16-to-19-year-olds living in the Central Harlem area. The targeted area was the subject of some confusion, but work site locations were centered on West 131 and 132 Streets. The work would consist of refurbishment of brownstones occupied primarily by low-income or elderly homeowners. The Interfaith Committee Against Poverty would refer youths to the demonstration program, while HUDC would be the work providing agency, identifying the buildings on which the VICI crews would work. The Metropolitan Church-GED program would be a mandatory requirement for all VICI participants. The Citywide Building Trades Council, plus locals of the plumbers, roofers, and carpenters and joiners agreed to cooperate by supplying journeymen, assisting in the design of the training, and serving on an advisory council. MIA would handle post-program placement. Optional features included wages increases after a month of field work and night school plus the use of supervisor's and teacher's evaluations as a basis for obtaining raises. Wage increases would depend on both field work and GED attendance and progress.

CPPV staff members were not impressed with the proposal they received, however. In a May 30, 1978 letter to the prime sponsor in New York, CPPV indicated:

The proposal from Central Harlem is deficient in virtually all of the areas raised by the application process. Some items were totally ignored, and others were responded to in a manner that is not acceptable....

For example, the letter said the proposal

needs a much more detailed description of work to be done and how it will be done. Progression and evaluation of progress are also inadequate. Two

nine month cycles as indicated in prior discussions is not satisfactory. We would refer you to the application guidelines to fully understand the number of areas that were not even addressed in this section; such as time tables, staff phasing, orientation schedules, etc., etc.

Similarly, on the issue of linkages, CPPV wrote:

A timetable is not included, the structure of maintaining these linkages is not included, information on who is going to be responsible for the linkage is inadequate and the one letter from Mr. White of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America is not sufficient to create an authentic labor linkage.

CPPV's May 30, 1978 letter concluded by indicating that the organization was

ready, willing and able to provide New York City with the necessary technical assistance to make this a viable proposal. However, in all candor, one must say that the proposal submitted is inadequate in so many areas that it will take a concerted effort by many people to bring this proposal up to a standard where it can be comfortably recommended to the Department of Labor.

The prime sponsor replied with a letter voicing confidence in MIA and its ability to revise the proposal to meet CPPV's standards.

The Central Harlem proposal was revised during June, but in its June 30, 1978 memorandum to OYP, CPPV placed the Central Harlem proposal in the conditionally approved category, and it identified three conditions needing resolution:

1. Conformity of youth wages and administrative costs to the application guidelines;
2. Further evidence that the proposed youth referral agency could meet the program requirements;
3. Much stronger evidence that the management agency for the project has experience in the administration of a complex construction related program.

Following this memorandum to OYP, CPPV sent a detailed letter to the New York City prime sponsor on July 17, explaining the three conditions. From that date until August 8, when an addendum to the original proposal was submitted, there were frequent communications among the various parties involved. In early August, representatives of MIA, Harlem Urban Development Corporation, and the prime sponsor made a conference call to Harriet Michel to contend that CPPV was being unreasonable and to propose alternatives for shoring up the alleged weaknesses in the LMA's expertise. On August 3, 1978, Julia Robinson and Jerry Kolker met with MIA in New York and were told of a proposed new management structure, which included a black contractor who would serve as an advisor to the project management and an associate director who would be someone with a background in construction. However, Robinson told MIA she was concerned the advisor would "never be there," and the additional people would simply blur managerial responsibilities.

Moreover, at the August 3 meeting, Robinson recalls, "It was clear to me they wanted to run an education project, which is what they're good at and have a background in." Rev. James essentially agrees. He and others at MIA insist that work experience alone is inadequate to meet the needs of Harlem teenagers. A major emphasis on education and counseling was indispensable in developing a program that would have a lasting impact, he insists.

After the lengthy meeting on August 3 between CPPV and MIA representatives, it was clear they would be unable to reach

agreement on the issues dividing them, and both sides agree the meeting marked the end of negotiations between the two organizations.

Afterwards, MIA submitted an addendum to its original proposal, which dealt with the conditions raised by CPPV. In an August 10, 1978 memorandum to OYP, CPPV communicated MIA's three additions, and CPPV's response to them.

The original proposal's administrative costs were above the ten percent level permitted by DOL and the youth wages were below the DOL minimum of 58.6 percent. The addendum effectively resolved this issue by using HUDC funds for administrative purposes. The budget could then be rewritten so that the administrative costs and participant wages and fringe benefits fell within the DOL guidelines.

The second issue was the youth referral agency, and it was also resolved. CPPV had complained the referral activities to be undertaken by the Interfaith Committee Against Poverty were not spelled out sufficiently and were too broadly targeted geographically. MIA agreed to use RTP staff to train ICAP in selection procedures. Thus, the August 10 CPPV memorandum said:

The inclusion of RTP in the selection and referral process is of great value to the project. The issue of city wide recruitment has not been addressed in the addendum but is a matter that is amenable to prompt solution.

The third issue was the crucial one, however; this was the question of whether or not MIA had the skills to operate a program such as VICI. In response to CPPV's concerns, the prime sponsor submitted a revised project management structure which featured three new elements:

1. The hiring of an associate director with construction related experience. This associate director would devote 75 percent of his time to the VICI project. (The remaining 25 percent of his time would be used to monitor a nearby HUDC construction project.) This associate director would be on the staff of RTP and his salary would be paid from a prior grant from HUDC to RTP.
2. The establishment of a four-member Project Management Board, three of whose members would have direct construction-related experience. This board would have a direct policy-making and management role in the project, and the project director and associate director would report to the board at regular bi-weekly meetings.
3. The assignment by HUDC of its Spruce-Up program construction manager to devote 25 percent of his time to monitoring the proposed project.

In response to this revised management structure, CPPV wrote in its August 10, 1978 memorandum to OYP, "after reading the addendum and evaluating the August 3rd site visit, the issue of central management has been addressed but remains unresolved...." CPPV argued that the proposed Project Management Board could not provide the kind of day-to-day management the project needed. Thus, CPPV said, "we conclude that no matter how expert the Project Management Board, such a structure is no substitute for a full time staff and sound organizational structure." As for the proposed assistant director and HUDC monitor, CPPV contended this was unsatisfactory, because:

Since two key positions are occupied by person who are not full time employees and are paid by a different organization than MIA, their availability and accountability are in question. It is our judgement that this type of organizational structure is not adequate for the VICI project.

However, the August 10, 1978 cover letter from Finney to Taggart accompanying the CPPV memorandum on Central Harlem did not explicitly recommend refusing to approve Central Harlem.

The letter simply noted that three deficiencies had been cited in the original assessment, and one of them had not been resolved to CPPV's satisfaction. Finney's letter, which also discussed other sites, said, "I trust that the attached information is sufficient to guide your final decision regarding these remaining sites." Central Harlem was the only case where CPPV did not offer a definite formal recommendation to OYP.

In the wake of Finney's letter, OYP asked the New York City Department of Employment to respond to the concerns raised by the end of August. The prime sponsor wrote to DOL, indicating that it had full confidence in MIA and the program it designed. Shortly afterwards, Central Harlem became the only VICI program that would be approved for funding without a positive recommendation from CPPV. According to Taggart and Seiler of OYP, this was simply a case where reasonable men and women differed; OYP did not share CPPV's lack of confidence in MIA, nor did it harbor the same doubts about the management structure. OYP officials emphasize the issue was settled on the merits of the proposal and not on the basis of politics.

At CPPV's September 21, 1978 board meeting, which was held in Washington, Taggart and Seiler were in attendance. Seiler told the board OYP had reviewed CPPV's recommendation and had determined that Central Harlem should be funded. If CPPV did not agree, he noted that OYP was prepared to have the Central Harlem program monitored by an outside group. Taggart also raised that possibility in his remarks, according to the minutes of that meeting. Finney recommended that the board vote not to

include Central Harlem in the demonstration and agree to have it monitored by someone else. According to the minutes, he said that the finding of deficiencies would make it hard for CPPV to work with MIA. The board then unanimously voted "that the central Harlem project not be included in the demonstration for which CPPV is responsible."

Following this decision by the CPPV board, OYP chose Boone, Young & Associates, a New York consulting firm, to monitor the Harlem project. An October 16, 1978 letter from Harriet Michel, director, Office of Community Youth Employment Programs, to Finney noted that OYP was "directing CPPV to enter into a subcontract with Boone, Young as soon as possible" to permit the firm to assume the responsibilities that CPPV would have exercised vis a vis the MIA program. Michel's letter noted:

By this action, we are not holding CPPV responsible for the performance of the Central Harlem VICI project. We are expecting CPPV to (a) provide the funds to Boone, Young, (b) cooperate with them by providing copies of the MIS forms and instructions, project monitoring and assessment plans, research design parameters, work value measurement methodology instruction and forms, etc., and (c) oversee Boone, Young's performance of the subcontract's work statement. Boone, Young will conduct and report on the same work items for its VICI project as CPPV will for the other eight projects.

Michel then stipulated an amount which CPPV would have to provide to Boone, Young as payment for this subcontract. Finney attempted to return the funds to OYP and let it deal with Boone, Young. But OYP refused to free CPPV of responsibilities for monitoring Boone, Young, preferring not to have funds returned to it at the end of a fiscal year.

The Central Harlem proposal development process remains the most complex and bitter component of the VICI site selection process. In its wake there are not only lingering differences of opinion but differences as to the nature of the facts.

All of those involved agree that from the outset MIA had been designated as the local management agency for a Central Harlem site. Early on CPPV had doubts about MIA and discussed the desirability of having another LMA, with HUDC mentioned most frequently. OYP officials insist they told CPPV that Ernest Green had indicated that he wanted Central Harlem in the demonstration, but he was willing to have another LMA if necessary. CPPV's federal representative, Pamela Clark, insists, "We told them early on" that CPPV didn't have to accept MIA, and Robert Taggart is adamant on this point: "It is a question of fact as to whether there was pressure to stay with MIA. There was no pressure to stay with MIA." Seiler suggests that a CPPV staff perception may have "led people astray." But CPPV staff members note that only the prime sponsor, not CPPV, could choose an LMA, and the New York City Department of Employment showed no interest in replacing MIA.

Since CPPV staff members believed they did not have the option of obtaining another LMA, their only recourse was to try to shape an acceptable proposal.

Moreover, CPPV found the Harlem organization had a vastly different perception of what the program should be. While this required prolonged negotiating as CPPV sought to reorient the program from education and counseling to work experience and

training, those negotiations convinced CPPV staff members that MIA lacked both the general managerial sophistication and the specific construction-related background to run a VICI program. The elaborate advisory board and the two part-time associates only emphasized the essential weaknesses at the center of the proposed management structure, in the eyes of CPPV.

It is difficult to obtain objective and disinterested opinions on the managerial strengths of MIA. Its executive director was absent during much of the proposal development process. Rev. James is a vigorous leader, but as MIA board chairman he would not have a day-to-day role in the VICI program. While MIA was more of a forum of clergymen than an operating organization, it had run CETA and neighborhood youth corps programs on a scale similar to VICI.

However, the nature of MIA suggested that the success of a program it managed would depend heavily on the person directly responsible for running it, and MIA's proposed director had no experience in administration and management. Although he correctly notes that it was the union journeymen-supervisors and not the program director who would need to know how to drive nails, nonetheless he had no background in programs similar to VICI.

While individuals could differ about how good was good enough to run a VICI program or how much construction knowledge was really necessary and relevant for a program director, MIA has concluded that its problems resulted from biases held by CPPV. Since CPPV's primary contact with Central Harlem, Gerald Kolker, previously worked in New York City's manpower system,

Rev. James suggests that Kolker's previous experience may have colored his view, but Kolker insists he had no previous dealings with, or knowledge of, MIA. Joseph Bacote raises the possibility that race entered the considerations, since Kolker is white. However, in addition to Kolker, Julia Robinson, who is black, was directly involved in meetings with MIA in New York, and she and others at CPPV fully shared Kolker's views on MIA.

Another possibility raised by MIA is that CPPV sought to keep out MIA simply because CPPV believed it was being foisted on the demonstration by the Department of Labor. CPPV staff members insist they evaluated MIA solely on the merits, but one foundation observer noted in a memorandum about the Central Harlem situation, "I still feel there's just a touch of 'I want to defend my security and guard my independence' attitude in CPPV's posture."

Perhaps having "just a touch" of this attitude, combined with MIA's at least arguable weaknesses and significantly different goals for the program, were sufficient to set CPPV and MIA at odds, and once differences arose, they quickly degenerated to a point where it would have been impossible for CPPV and MIA to work together fruitfully. For its own reasons, however, OYP chose to retain Central Harlem rather than accept the findings of CPPV.

J. New York City (South Bronx)

After President Jimmy Carter made his celebrated visit to the South Bronx in 1977, that beleaguered section of New York City became a symbol of urban decay, and it would also become a test of the Administration's achievements on urban issues. New York City officials first learned they would be invited to apply for a VICI program for the South Bronx from Jack Watson of the White House staff. VICI was part of a list of items that the city learned it could seek from the federal government for the South Bronx.

Donald Menzi, director of the city's Manpower Planning Council, first brought the VICI idea to the Parks Department. But when there was no progress after a week, he contacted Lloyd Kaplan, a member of the Mayor's staff who was working on the South Bronx. Kaplan asked Allan Bell, an analyst in the city's Office of Management and Budget, to develop the proposal, and Bell would prove to be the leader of this effort.

Because it dealt with the South Bronx, Bell says, he started his efforts "with the clear idea that if we put it together right, it would be funded." A recent recipient of an M.A. degree from M.I.T., Bell felt familiar with developments in the employment and training field and with the idea of replication. He quickly turned to several aspects of the proposal, since, he says, the timetable required quick decision-making.

A major concern in financially hard-pressed New York City would be the source of materials money for the VICI project.

Bell's first thought was the city's community development block grant, but New York allocates these funds through a year-long highly politicized process which would not fit the CPPV timetable. Bell concluded that weatherization funds were a likely alternative, so the city approached the Community Services Administration, knowing not only that it had a weatherization program but also that it was seeking ways to get involved in the South Bronx, Bell says.

The limits on materials funds and the nature of regulations regarding the payment of prevailing wages on construction work in New York suggested to Bell that the program would have to focus on refurbishing one- to three-family houses, not the multiple dwellings that characterized parts of the South Bronx, so this helped narrow the search for target areas.

Meanwhile, Bell was looking for a local management agency. The time constraints meant that the proposed LMA had to be an existing organization, with a fiscal staff, and with a record with the City Department of Employment. "These three requirements limited the number of potentials, plus we had to deal with the political situation," Bell says. Essentially any LMA had to be acceptable to Deputy Mayor Herman Badillo, a former Bronx borough president and the city's leading Hispanic politician. This narrowed the search to two groups: The South Bronx Community Housing Corp. and Operation Open City.

"I was disposed to Bronx Housing," Bell says, adding, "I went to them first." But this organization essentially wanted to use the VICI funds to rehabilitate buildings it owned, which

contained more than eight units. "They were just not very interested," Bell says. So he turned to Operation Open City, a citywide organization headquartered in Harlem. It was considered competent, Bell says, but "they were not very creative." When he contacted them, however, he found they were not only interested, they also were already the city's major weatherization contractor and were receiving CSA funding. Moreover, they already had Department of Employment contracts, and they had a field office in the South Bronx. In short, Bell says, "They were all set up to do it, so we went with Open City."

Moise Williams, Operation Open City's director of training, and some of her colleagues joined Bell in drafting the proposal. However, Donald Menzi was instrumental in putting together a number of elements, including the involvement of RTP in recruitment and the formation of educational linkages with a vocational high school and Hostos Community College. Operation Open City handled initial trade union contacts, but ultimately Menzi worked these relationships with Charles Fanning, a representative of the building trades council who was on Menzi's Manpower Planning Council. Menzi obtained agreements from most unions to work at 75 percent of union scale.

The target areas chosen were the Aldus Green/Longwood and Concourse East sections of the South Bronx. Both were part of the city's preliminary South Bronx plan and contained one- to three-family residences occupied by low income and elderly home owners. Buildings in these areas would meet DOL requirements regarding wages and CSA requirements for receiving weatherization funds.

The work providing agencies would be the Association for the Improvement of the Brownstone Community and the Bronx Residents to Attain Sponsorship in Housing (BRASH). The two would identify buildings to be weatherized, make initial contacts with tenants, designate the scope of work to be done, and conduct an evaluation of the work after it was completed. The two work providing agencies would also be the principal sources of youth referrals, while RTP would screen applicants and have principal responsibility for post-program placement. Bell notes that:

I pushed for the involvement of these two neighborhood organizations to do the recruitment of youth and to help fill out applications and certify the work done. Open City was opposed to this check on their work.

The education linkage was with nearby Alfred E. Smith Vocational High School, which would refer its graduates to the program and which would allow VICI enrollees who had completed six months in VICI to enter the school's work-study program. The high school would also provide GED classes, as would Hostos Community College. The labor linkages included ties to local unions representing carpenters, roofers, and plumbers. They agreed to provide journeymen as supervisors and to offer special consideration to selected VICI participants wishing to enter appropriate training programs. Optional features included wage incentives for youth who remained in the program, and part-time work for selected youth who returned to school after six months.

While the substance of the proposal developed smoothly enough, as Moise Williams notes, "The major problem was money."

Open City was constantly insisting the program could not be mounted for the amounts specified by CPPV. Despite wresting a number of budget cuts, Bell says, the field visit of CPPV was crucial. "I wanted CPPV to tell Open City they must cut more, and the major value of the field visit was that they played it very well; they were firm and convincing."

In a memorandum describing CPPV's May 24 field visit to the South Bronx, Gerald Kolker noted that Operation Open City staff suggested additional funds were necessary. According to Kolker's memo:

I explained to them that the money was not negotiable, that the negotiations had already taken place at the Department of Labor and that while I could understand them thinking that this was like a traditional RFP where one asks for considerably more money than one needs and then negotiates downward, in this case the figure was a fixed figure.

When Open City balked, Kolker's memorandum says, he told them:

I didn't see any organization pulling out of a one million dollar contract for monies to come to the South Bronx and that the political fallout of them refusing to be part of it would be devastating to them in terms of other monies they get from the Department of Employment, City of New York.

Kolker offered a number of suggestions on how the budget might be cut. He proposed leasing vehicles rather than buying them for the 18-month program and lowering the project director's salary from the proposed \$25,000 per year. Despite this, Operation Open City insisted they would still need additional funds from the Department of Employment. They asked Kolker to meet with Commissioner Stanley Brezenoff to request more funds, but Kolker said that would be inappropriate for him. Instead, he informed Donald Menzi of the situation, and Menzi arranged a

special Saturday meeting with Brezenoff at which the Commissioner agreed to provide several Title VI slots to help absorb some of the supervisory costs. The City also agreed to pay for insurance, a significant expense in New York, while CSA eventually pledged some \$200,000 for materials.

Thus, a satisfactory budget was developed, and the South Bronx proposal was among those recommended for approval to OYP on June 30th. It was approved shortly afterwards, and in July Operation Open City began interviewing a director, receiving referrals for journeymen, and preparing an annual plan.

However, in early October, the City cut off funding to Operation Open City because of "a number of possible fiscal irregularities." According to the October 10, 1978 editions of the New York Post, the City's Community Development Agency, which had provided Operation Open City with \$1.34 million in fiscal 1978, found such irregularities as unauthorized salary increases and consultant fees and funds paid without vouchers. John Bess III, chairman of Operation Open City, said the City's actions were "politically motivated," but the City's announcement prompted federal agencies to withhold payments to Open City until the questions were resolved. This meant CPPV's plans were thrown into suspension for two months. Eventually the chairman of the Open City board resigned while the executive director and fiscal officer were fired. On November 8, 1978, Operation Open City submitted a plan for reorganization to the Community Development Agency, and once the problems with the City were resolved, CPPV and Open City were to spend the last

month of 1978 picking up the pieces, reviving interest in the program, and preparing for intake. When youth finally went to work in this program in the first quarter of 1979, the South Bronx would be the last of the VICI sites to become operational.

As was the case at several other proposed VICI sites, the major problem and the major delay resulted from forces totally extraneous to the demonstration. In this case, there was a delay of at least two months in the fall of 1978 because of fiscal questions raised in connection with another project.

However, the process of designing a program and drafting a proposal proceeded fairly smoothly in the South Bronx. There were several reasons for this. One was the priority the city gave to the South Bronx. This helped get the Office of Management and Budget involved, and Bell says of that agency, "We happen to have access to people--I can get to the Deputy Mayor--that's a tradition of the budget office here." Moreover, the Commissioner of Employment gave the proposal sufficient priority to warrant providing additional CETA slots to resolve the budget problems. Other city officials say he was motivated by a desire to bring money into the South Bronx, but also, says one, "It was clear Brezenoff wanted to make a good impression with Finney."

Another helpful element in easing the drafting process was Operation Open City's experience with weatherization. In designing the VICI program, Williams says, "We were trying to slim down weatherization and run it to fit the needs of youth. The program was closely patterned after the program we already

had in place, so there shouldn't be flaws in it. We've had experience with everything in it except 16 and 17 year olds."

The other expediting element, according to Bell, was the role played by CPPV. "CPPV had a different style than DOL," Bell says, adding, "They were interested in the demonstration and after something. They could play the heavy, especially in budget negotiations, and they were out of the political process. With DOL you always feel you can go the political route." An additional benefit, he says, was that CPPV field representative had experience in New York City.

The program that emerged closely resembled the Operation Open City weatherization program, and Williams says her organization had worked with both schools and unions on other occasions, "but we never brought them both together, so this is new." Bell's view of the program he essentially designed is that "It's good training and useful housing programs. This is where I see the strengths, not in the linkages." He believes the linkages forged by VICI would not have occurred otherwise, but he's not certain how real they will turn out to be. "Portland evolved over time. You can't forge linkages like that right away in New York. Portland lacks the polarization of New York," he says.

## K. Northeast Ohio

The Northeast Ohio Employment and Training Consortium serves several counties in the area around Youngstown, Ohio. This area, which has been described as "the Ruhr of North America," has fallen on hard times in recent years, reflecting the difficulties and consolidation in the American steel industry.

When the Consortium received its invitation to participate in the VICI demonstration, it submitted a letter of intent to apply for a grant and it sent three staff members to Philadelphia for the April workshop. These staff members, headed by David Dallessandro, the Deputy Director for Planning, proceeded to develop a brief project design that indicated potential work sites in three of the four political jurisdictions. Design problems began to crop up almost immediately. The educational linkage was weak. The ability to provide local matching funds for materials and supplies was limited. The transportation and logistical problems involved with projects in two or more political jurisdictions were never adequately resolved. During a technical assistance field trip, it became apparent to CPPV that very little work was being done to solve these problems and lay the groundwork for an effective program.

Soon after this trip the reason for the health-hearted planning effort became clear. The local building and construction trades council was vetoing any involvement by its membership

in the VICI project. The local unions were completely disenchanted with CETA and its application in the Youngstown metropolitan area. They complained that CETA PSE projects had reduced the net growth of unionized municipal work forces and used funds that should have been devoted to public works that would employ local union craftsmen. The Western Reserve Building and Construction Trades Council viewed the VICI application as an ideal vehicle for registering their complaints. The President of the Council quite candidly explained his actions to the Executive Director entirely in terms of the symbolic nature of their resistance to VICI.

Moreover, with union unemployment in the Youngstown area running far above the national levels, the unions were not really interested in flooding the labor market with more trained youth. It is not clear whether the union membership was aware that in registering this protest the union leadership was in effect rejecting ten full-time 18-month jobs.

The Prime Sponsor's executive director was reluctant to get too heavy-handed with the union leadership for fear of jeopardizing future cooperation from the unions on the new CETA Title VII funding. CPPV proposed to the Executive Director that VICI supporters from National HRDI be asked to intervene with the recalcitrant local union. The Executive Director agreed, provided that this intervention was not traceable to him. National HRDI staff, when approached on this subject, described the Youngstown area locals as perhaps the nation's most militant opponents of CETA-funded employment projects.

Based upon their assessment of this situation, they regarded any action on their part as futile.

Another dimension of the NOETC proposal development process was provided by the Youngstown mayor. NOETC is directed by a four-person executive committee consisting of one commissioner from each of the counties and the Mayor of Youngstown. The mayor was adamant that NOETC receive a VICI demonstration award. Regardless of union stance, he argued, the Executive Director should be able to "get on a plane to Washington or Philadelphia" and bring in the grant. CPPV's insistence that the unions be firmly behind the demonstration also carried no weight with the Mayor. Indeed, he indicated that failure to bring in the VICI grant would be taken as evidence that the executive director had, at the least, not tried hard enough.

This required the executive director to choose between expending a great deal of valuable staff time to develop each of the linkages comprising a viable VICI proposal, all the while realizing that the unions were dooming his application or submitting only a pro forma proposal, which CPPV's review would quickly disclose to the executive committee.

He eventually chose to submit a terse proposal that minimally conformed to the application format, and little more. During its review CPPV cited the application for several major weaknesses. NOETC chose not to pursue its application further. Shortly afterwards, the friction between the Mayor and the executive director led to the executive director's resignation.

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L. Oakland, California

Oakland, California, the principal city of the East Bay area across the bay from San Francisco, had an estimated population of 324,000 in 1978, or 10.38 percent less than the 361,561 people recorded in the 1970 census. Its youth population has been growing, however, with the number of 16- to 19-year-olds nearly doubling from 10,210 in 1970 to 20,280 in 1978. Overall, minorities composed 53.8 percent of the city's population, but minority youth represented 68.3 percent of all youths age 16 to 19. About 60 percent of the 16- to 19-year-olds were black and 14 percent were listed as Hispanic, according to the California Employment Development Department figures. Estimates for 1978 indicated that 52,450 people, or 16.2 percent of Oakland's population, would have incomes below the poverty level. Blacks composed about 53 percent of this group, and Hispanics composed 11 percent. Unemployment in the San Francisco-Oakland SMSA was averaging nearly ten percent from 1975 through 1977, and the City of Oakland had been experiencing a steep long-term decline in industrial and commercial employment.

As in several other cities, Oakland officials first learned they would be invited to apply for a VICI program from their DOL federal representative. When the official ETA invitation arrived at Oakland's Office of Economic Development and Employment Training (OEDET), the prime sponsor, OEDET director of planning Robert Bloom notes, the planners had just completed a frenetic Entitlement effort, "so the attitude here was one

of fatigue." The planning staff felt "inundated" with requests to prepare proposals for a variety of competitive grants programs.

Beyond the dismay at the proposal sweepstakes, Bloom says, the planners also had initial concerns about the design of the VICI demonstration and its appropriateness for Oakland. OEDET staff members regarded their organization as "a very placement-oriented CETA," and they felt it would be difficult to place VICI participants in Oakland's hard-pressed construction sector. They were also concerned about their ability to obtain trade union involvement or to find funds for supplies. Moreover, in the spring of 1978, there was something called the Jarvis-Gann initiative, which would go on the California ballot in June 1978 as Proposition 13, and which raised the spectre of sharp cuts in spending for social services. Finally, OEDET was caught up in some internal struggles reflecting the arrival of a new mayor in Oakland's city hall. Given all this, Bloom says, "There was a real question if we would apply."

However, Bloom felt, "There wasn't enough good enough information in advance for a prime to make a yes or no decision," so he attended the CPPV conference in Philadelphia. He came away feeling the conference was well structured, his questions had largely been answered, and the program was worth pursuing. Back in Oakland, Bloom commenced drafting a proposal together with Margaret Rogers, the Youth Division Supervisor who would soon become Director of the Employment and Training Department, and other planners.

The planners quickly made two significant departures from what they saw as the typical VICI model. Bloom says they believed repairing houses in Oakland would present grave problems in obtaining funds for materials. The city's community development funds were dispensed on a loan basis, so VICI's ability to obtain materials would depend on the ability of homeowners to obtain loans to purchase materials. This could make it difficult to insure a continuous flow of work. Consequently, the planners turned from home repair to the refurbishment of public facilities--parks, playgrounds, etc. Here, they believed funds would be available for painting, weatherization, and other kinds of improvements.

The turn to public facilities helped prompt a decision to develop linkages with the municipal employees union rather than the local building trades unions, since municipal workers were directly involved in working on the facilities that VICI participants would be rehabilitating. But there was another, more fundamental reason to turn away from the building trades unions. Bloom says he was convinced that "trade union support could only be minimal given the condition of the building trades in this area." Unemployment had been high since 1975, Bloom noted, and the building trades unions in the East Bay area would have great problems in absorbing the number of youth involved in the VICI into apprenticeship programs. Moreover, California law prohibited these unions from granting pre-apprenticeship credit or giving any preference to VICI participants. Thus, even though the local building trades unions were under pressure to train minorities, Bloom believed the

program would ultimately result in the youths getting jobs outside the unions, and "This would just get us in bad with the unions," Bloom says. In electing to work on city facilities and employ members of the municipal employees union as journeymen supervisors, Oakland planners believed they were still fulfilling the mandate to "replicate" the program model, particularly because they were developing a number of "linkages." However, as early as the April 19, 1978 workshop in Philadelphia, CPPV was suggesting to Oakland planners that the union linkage proposed would not be acceptable.

The program they devised called for targeting on 18 and 19 year olds. As with most Oakland CETA programs, VICI would be operated by the city. The work providing agency would be Oakland's Office of General Services, which was responsible for the upkeep of municipal facilities. It would select city facilities which the youths would paint or refurbish or resurface. The proposed target area was the "flatlands," an area that included all seven of Oakland's community development districts and covered about half the city's area. Oakland traditionally had not targeted funds narrowly but rather divided them among councilmanic districts, and VICI would continue that practice. The program would obtain supervisors from, and operate under the supervision of, the United Public Employees Local No. 390, AFL-CIO, which represented city employees.

However, the building trades unions would have some connection with the program through the involvement of the Bay Area Construction Opportunities Program (BACOP), which provided

information and training to young people interested in construction trades. BACOP had been operated since 1968 by the Bay Area buildings trades unions with DOL funding. BACOP would also provide youth referrals to the program, in conjunction with the city's OEDET. And BACOF would provide an education linkage by offering tutorial and pre-apprenticeship training for participants and program-graduates. The Oakland United School District's Adult Education Department would also provide the option of enrolling in their courses. The city generally opposed servicing drop-outs with special programs, preferring to re-enroll them in school. BACOP would also participate in post-program placement, together with the state employment service.

During the drafting process, Margaret Rogers remained generally opposed to the demonstration, while Bloom supported it, and the May 10 site visit of CPPV field representative Will Maddox was regarded as crucial in determining whether or not Oakland would submit a proposal. Although Maddox indicated CPPV would not accept the target areas or union linkage Oakland envisioned, Oakland officials concluded they faced no insurmountable problems, so Rogers gave her approval, and the drafting continued. The major remaining concern was Proposition 13, an imponderable whose fate wouldn't be known until after the May 19th deadline for the submission of proposals. While Oakland was proceeding, Maddox was growing concerned after his field visit. In a May 17 memo, he noted, "The trip to Oakland was at best disappointing. Oakland," he wrote, "has yet to make a concerted commitment toward proposal development."

OEDET sent its proposal to the City Council for approval on May 16, and two days later it left Oakland for Philadelphia. "We knew we would submit in fairly rough form, since time was short," Bloom says. But after their submission, Oakland planners were told by CPPV that, as Bloom recalls, "the proposal was totally unacceptable." Among the issues raised by CPPV, according to Will Maddox, was the involvement of the municipal employees union instead of the building trades, the failure to target the program on a narrow area, and the intention to integrate the VICI demonstration with the Office of General Services Facilities Renewal Project, so that the identity of the demonstration would be blurred.

Maddox was scheduled to visit Oakland on June 2, and shortly before that date, he called Bloom to discuss CPPV's critique of the proposal. At that point Oakland officials cancelled his scheduled visit. "The whole program hung on the structure we proposed, and since they opposed that, there was nothing there, so we said let's hold off on the site visit," an OEDET staff member says.

Shortly afterwards, Proposition 13 was approved by California voters, and then, Bloom says, "We went to the City Council and said we should withdraw and everybody approved." Maddox was informed informally, and then CPPV was notified officially that Oakland was withdrawing its VICI proposal. The proximate cause was Proposition 13. "It reduced our capability to provide supplies from general funds," Margaret Rogers notes. Sharp cuts in municipal services were expected

to result from passage of this important, but at that time little-understood initiative, and OEDET officials did not believe they could obtain resources to sustain the launching of a new program.

Oakland officials did not make any effort to find ways of mounting the demonstration in the face of Proposition 13. Oakland's tepid enthusiasm for VICI from the outset, weakened still further by an inability to find a formula that immediately met CPPV's standards, simply left the planners unwilling to continue making any efforts on behalf of this demonstration. They never entered into serious negotiations with CPPV on any aspects of their plans, unlike other cities which sought to wrest compromises to suit their local needs. While there is no denying the roadblocks raised by Proposition 13 and by CPPV's preliminary opposition to the structure Oakland proposed, city officials never vigorously pursued VICI.

In retrospect, OEDET staff members explain this lack of enthusiasm as a combination of their response to the Portland model, demonstrations, and CPPV. Rogers says they felt the proposed program was not innovative, but simply a mild revision of other YCCIP programs, and, "Basically it wasn't a performance-oriented project; it would just give kids some work, without future jobs." Oakland's CETA was more "performance oriented," she says, and moreover the city differed in atmosphere from Portland in important ways. Oakland was less friendly, so linkages would be more difficult to develop and maintain in a meaningful way. Bloom believed, as was noted, that the program would only get OEDET "in bad" with local unions.

Nor was Oakland keen on mounting a demonstration project. In this financially hard-pressed city, Bloom says, "Demonstrations raise expectations, and then there is no follow up." VICI was seen as too costly for the city to envision continuing with its own resources, and yet, Bloom says, "The community doesn't understand demonstrations; they feel there is inconsistency in programs." There was also a concern that any failures in the demonstration would be blamed on the city administration, while "Philadelphia would get the glory."

Finally, CPPV was faulted for not being sufficiently helpful. One OEDET staff member notes, "CPPV was not inept, they were just not knowledgeable about CETA. None of them ever worked at a prime. They don't see the problems of putting five or six agencies together on a project." Moreover, this OEDET staff member believes CPPV was "whipsawed" by DOL and would have been better off, "getting things straight before coming out to see us."

In short, Oakland was a somewhat reluctant participant from the outset, and the passage of Proposition 13 provided the straw that broke any resolve to obtain the demonstration.

## M. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, with a population of nearly 1.8 million, is the fourth largest city in the nation. Some 685,000 people, or 40 percent of its population, are non-whites. Non-whites constitute 36 percent of the labor force and 72 percent of the city's public aid recipients, although non-whites compose only 50 percent of the total disadvantaged population.

Contemporary Philadelphia is a highly heterogeneous city. Sometimes described as "200 small towns looking for a city," it is a city of neighborhoods filled with residents who are strongly attached to their part of the city. The city's efforts to cope with its heterogeneity have often made it a battleground for different interest groups.

Philadelphia has experienced the classic problems of the nation's older big cities: a movement of the affluent to the suburbs, rising crime rates, deteriorating housing stock, and a secular decline in employment. The city's employment is distributed as follows:

Services	24%
Government	20%
Manufacturing	20%
Wholesale/retail	19%
Construction	2%

However, between 1972 and 1975, the city lost 42,500 blue collar jobs, a decline of 9.1 percent. In response to the movement of jobs to the suburbs or to other regions, Philadelphia's public and private sectors have often joined together to undertake innovative cooperative efforts to find solutions to economic

problems. The Philadelphia Garment Board, for example, linked business, labor, and government in an attempt to protect the local garment industry from a further loss of jobs. The Philadelphia Partnership, headed by Graham Finney, was a broader effort to provide this kind of linkage between the public and private sectors.

Philadelphia's leadership structure is characterized by a large number of competing public and private institutions who are involved in deciding public policy. The active constituencies of many of these institutions have been shrinking, and their leaders have been losing touch with many of those they seek to represent. But Philadelphia is very much a pluralistic city in which no single institution or group has a monopoly position in civic and political affairs. Rather there are a large number of diverse institutions which provide avenues of pressure and influence on the city's public affairs. The relative lack of wide participation in many of these groups has convinced many, however, that the pluralism of Philadelphia is a pluralism of competing elites.

Despite Graham Finney's close ties to Philadelphia leaders, neither he nor others at CPPV treated the city any differently than the other sites that were involved in the proposal development and site selection process.

Anthony Neri, a senior planner with the Area Manpower Planning Council (AMPC), the local prime sponsor, was given principal responsibility for the overall development of the VICI proposal. The prime sponsor turned for assistance to the

Greater Philadelphia Federation of Settlement Houses (GPFS), a non-profit coalition of a dozen community settlement houses funded by the United Way. CPFS seemed the obvious choice for LMA for several reasons. First, the organization was currently operating a Housing Improvement Project (HIP) which was similar in many respects to VICI. Second, in developing that project, GPFS's Housing Program Coordinator, Ellie Spaeth, had established good rapport with the construction unions as well as a reputation for diligence and integrity. Third, GPFS was one of the few local organizations which dealt with a broad range of people on a citywide basis.

However, GPFS's initial reaction to the VICI project was negative. Spaeth says they saw it as "another one doomed to failure." They disliked the supervisory ratio and considered the budget for supervisors too small. However, after GPFS considered VICI's potential benefits for the city's housing stock and unemployed youth and recognized the similarities between VICI and the existing HIP program, Spaeth says the Federation decided to enter the competition. Comments made by AMPC staff members suggest that the prime sponsor would not have pursued the VICI proposal if GPFS had refused to serve as LMA.

Ellie Spaeth assumed the roles of proposal writer and union liaison. In the latter capacity, however, she enlisted the aid of Joseph Stearn, Deputy Director of the City Office of Community Development. That Office was increasingly interested in identifying new, and it was hoped, minority and nonprofit contractors for the 75 to 80 contracting jobs it generated each year. By coincidence, therefore, Joe Stearn had

been pushing for some kind of emergency home repair program, such as an expansion of the HIP project, just as the VICI invitation arrived. His immediate reaction to the project was not enthusiastic, since he objected to the 12:1 supervisory ratio. He had negative experiences with high training ratios in previous programs. The subsequent change to a 6:1 ratio convinced him to participate. Stearn was well known and trusted by local unions since his family had been active in the labor movement. When he and Spaeth approached union officials, however, they initially encountered opposition to the program. Why train the sons when the fathers are out of work, they were asked. And why train more competitors for jobs? Why encourage new apprentices who will demand still more preferential treatment? Despite early reservations, the view which came to prevail among union leaders was that the program would give unions a chance to improve their image. At worst, it would be only minimally successful and provide no threat. And, with 4,000 carpenters out of work, as one union official noted, "Ten jobs was ten jobs."

Spaeth and Stearn were able to secure the support and co-operation of most of the construction and building trades unions except the plumbers, who thought that even a 6:1 ratio was too high. (The supervisory ratio for plumbers on the HIP project was one-to-one.) However, through a bit of subterfuge, Stearn managed to secure the participation of plumbers without the formal acquiescence of the plumbers union. Since there were plumbers under contract to the HIP project, Stearn suggested that HIP simply serve as a plumbing subcontractor to the VICI

project. Privately Stearn was sure that the experience would prove acceptable to the plumbers union--even at the 6:1 ratio--so they would eventually agree to participate on a formal basis.

In developing the proposal, Spaeth also encountered a mild problem with Henry Fornara, business representative of the Building and Construction Trades Council, regarding that body's involvement in the project. She believed she had reached an understanding with him regarding the Council's involvement in the project, but after the proposal was submitted, Fornara objected to being committed without his approval. He later muted his objections after Spaeth apologized and explained she had proceeded on a mistaken impression.

The selection of a target area presented another problem because of the nature of GPFS. The Federation was built on the assumption that each constituent settlement house would receive a roughly equal return on its investment in the umbrella organization. CPPV's insistence on targeting the work directly threatened that principle. But eventually, the planners agreed that the project would consist of emergency home repair and housing rehabilitation to be performed in four settlement-house areas in South and lower Northwest Philadelphia.

The proposal AMPC submitted to CPPV on May 19th formally designated the Franklin Foundation, a GPFS affiliate which operated GPFS housing programs, as the LMA. The target population would be 16 to 19 year old, out-of-school, unemployed youth living in the four target areas. The state Bureau of Employment Security would join the four settlement houses in

providing referrals to the program. The city office of Community Development would be responsible for providing emergency home repair sites, while the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation would provide properties for more extensive rehabilitation.

The city school system and community college would provide an educational linkage by making available GED programs to VICI trainees. Post-program placement was to be provided by the Bureau of Employment Security and the Negro Trade Union Leadership Council. The proposal also featured an advisory committee to meet monthly and an incentive wage system to reward trainees for good performance.

On June 29th, CPPV forwarded to OYP a conditional recommendation for approval. CPPV's approval required that:

- (1) an unjustified \$10,000 budget item, affecting the proposed organization and pattern of responsibility within the management agency is adjusted and clarified; and (2) the support of the plumbers union is obtained.

Following an August 3 site visit, CPPV offered its unconditional approval of the Philadelphia proposal. In its August 10, 1978 memorandum to OYP, CPPV noted that the Philadelphia VICI management agency had removed the \$10,000 budget item for a management consultant and assigned these functions to the project director, putting the budget in conformance with VICI guidelines in all respects.

However, despite substantial efforts, the planners were unsuccessful in securing the cooperation of the Plumbers Union, so the LMA won CPPV's approval to drop the plumbing work crews

from the project. Plumbing requirements of property to be renovated would be met by subcontracting with HIP for plumbing services. Thus Stearn's strategem was approved.

As the Philadelphia VICI project was preparing to begin operations, there was concern among its planners about the extent to which Philadelphia differed from Portland as a context for the program. There were also signs of some minor friction between GPFS and the prime sponsor because of what the Federation regarded as overcaution at AMPC in dealing with CPPV and DOL.

There were also a number of criticisms from the prime sponsor and GPFS which were directed at CPPV. Both felt they had faced a number of delays and changes in guidelines and deadlines, and they blamed CPPV for these. At one point the GPFS board even refused to participate further until it received a definite commitment on timing and funding from DOL. As Spaeth says, there was a feeling that they were "being walked on with cleats" by CPPV. Beyond what they saw as CPPV's apparent inconsistency, Spaeth and Neri also concluded that CPPV was more interested in the integrity of the project design than with the output of the project.

The most serious complaint raised was that CPPV's insistence on convening a meeting of union leaders during an early site review was responsible for arousing the suspicions of the plumbers union and causing their refusal to participate. Spaeth also objected to what she viewed as CPPV's "insulting lack of trust" which she found somewhat humiliating. There was

also a good deal of criticism of CPPV's lack of knowledge about labor and training issues, and its general insensitivity to the needs of program operators. Both GPFS and AMPC were critical of CPPV's first field representative on the grounds that she was uncertain as to program goals and inexperienced with labor projects and project management. In response, CPPV notes that many of the criticisms regarding program changes do not take account of the fact that the changes were brought about by OYP. Moreover, CPPV staff members say that the Philadelphia planners' confusion regarding the program's goals was the result of a reluctance (on the part of the prime and the LMA) to accept CPPV's role.

There was much confusion about CPPV's role; most of those interviewed thought it was a profit-making DOL subcontractor, and no one recalled even hearing the term "intermediate unit." More generally, both Neri and Spaeth were troubled by the growing number of middlemen and monitors to which program operators were being made accountable.

On the other hand, both the prime sponsor and the LMA agreed that CPPV's professionalism and energetic participation would probably result in a project that was more productive than most training programs. There was also a strong feeling that CPPV held them to higher standards than others they had dealt with in developing programs.

N. St. Louis, Missouri

Between 1970 and 1976, St. Louis lost 16.5 percent of its population, the second largest percentage decline of any major city. The movement was an intensified version of a familiar pattern: the affluent fleeing the city, leaving behind a population increasingly composed of minorities and the poor. St. Louis has the third largest black population of any northern city, and racial tension has been a major concern, although the city has had less racial violence than many other large urban centers.

St. Louis is a highly unionized city: the ratio of union members to the labor force is third highest among the nation's big cities. But the business community, led by executives of such firms as Ralston-Purina, Monsanto, Anheuser-Busch, the May Company, and McDonnell-Douglas, exercises much influence in city affairs. The area's large and diversified manufacturing sector, which has steadily shifted from labor intensive to more capital-intensive modes, has experienced a steady decline in employment for a number of years, although an increase in non-manufacturing jobs has mitigated the impact of this decline somewhat.

Faced with a continuing loss of population and employment, the business community has been attempting to attract industry to the city. However, the St. Louis area has continued to lose the industry that must provide jobs for the remaining population. And much of the middle ring of the metropolitan

area, the part between downtown and the prosperous suburbs, has become a true wasteland, the home of what threatens to become a permanent underclass living amid poverty, unemployment, and crime.

When the St. Louis Agency on Training and Employment (SLATE) first received word of the VICI project, like several other prime sponsors, it saw the program as a triple-barreled Godsend, addressing not only the city's housing and employment needs, but also--once they understood the program--offering an opportunity to cement SLATE's relationship with the unions.

The primary responsibility for development of the proposal was assigned to SLATE's Technical Assistance Division and to Donald Terrell, a technical assistant with limited experience. It seems clear that Terrill was thrust into the project too quickly and with too little support from elsewhere in the organization. However, for reasons not entirely clear, SLATE had recently undergone a substantial turnover in staff, during which several white staff members and planners had resigned and taken with them a great deal of project information and local data. Moreover, the SLATE director recently appointed by the Mayor was a newcomer to the organization. Thus, SLATE's planning resources were decidedly limited as Terrell turned to the VICI project.

As a result, the project fell heir to several fatal errors very early in the developmental process. Neither Terrell (nor, it seems, his director) were able to form a concise picture of certain of the VICI guidelines and requirements. They were particularly unclear as to the "active union participation" element,

and the requirements for the LMA relationship.

As a result, the agency essentially marked time in the period between notice of the program and the April 19th and 20th conference. The major effort in this period involved contact with the Community Development Agency, and the Adult Basic Education facility of the Board of Education. These were linkages which presented no problems, since SLATE already had a good existing relationship with both. In essence, then, SLATE took the easier path and deferred the tougher problems until later.

Upon later examination, however, even the supposedly "easy" linkages proved to be weak--consisting of little more than perfunctory contact and a hasty explanation of the basic goals of the program.

Developing linkages to labor was expected to be difficult because SLATE's relations with the labor movement had been tenuous at best. Many CETA staff members believed the unions were racist preserves, while a number of union leaders saw CETA as inefficient, meddlesome, and potentially threatening. When SLATE began to seek active union involvement (as opposed to the "union blessings" SLATE originally thought sufficient), another major error was committed. The primary effort to develop a labor linkage was directed at the Building and Trades Council, and there was only a perfunctory effort to go through the local Human Resources Development Institute. However, St. Louis' HRDI had a great deal of influence over local labor attitudes. This oversight apparently offended the HRDI representative and

effectively cut off any possibility of support from that quarter, yet the executive secretary of the Building and Trades Council was proving difficult to reach, let alone involve.

Once it became clear that there would be problems in securing union participation, SLATE sought to substitute its proposed local management agency for the union component. The proposed LMA was the Missouri-Kansas Minority Contractors Association (Mo-Kan). SLATE director Charles Bussey was particularly interested in involving Mo-Kan, which had already participated in other CETA projects, because one of the Mayor's chief projects and political promises had been to increase the role of minority contractors, and Bussey was an ally of the mayor likely to be particularly responsive to that priority. SLATE argued that most of Mo-Kan's constituents were union members, and its involvement was, therefore, "as good as a union." When CPPV objected, SLATE dropped this plan and renewed its efforts to secure union involvement.

However, by the time SLATE's director had met personally with the Building and Trades Council's executive secretary and the Council had agreed to participate, it was too late. The proposal deadline was at hand, and SLATE had too few essentials in place to be a serious contender for funding.

Thus, SLATE submitted a somewhat truncated proposal to CPPV on May 19, 1978, which called for 18 and 19-year-old, out-of-school youth to be employed in bringing houses up to code standards in the Mid-Town Redevelopment Area. Community Development Block Grant funds had been targeted for this area

and could be made available to VICI. Ten of the 60 youth were to be selected for training as estimators. The Missouri-Kansas Minority Contractors Association would be the LMA and would provide post-program placement, while the city Community Development Agency would be the work providing agency, developing work sites and assigning work orders. The Board of Education's Adult Basic Education program would provide the educational linkage, while a local group called Project 70,001 would be the youth referral agency. However, the proposal did not indicate any participation by organized labor, and moreover, no budget for the program was submitted. Thus, CPPV did not recommend St. Louis for approval, and OYP concurred.

More than any other site, St. Louis was very much of a one-man show. As noted, Terrell appears to have had very little guidance or assistance in developing the project. And what help was provided appears to have been either misguided or belated. Some of SLATE's oversights are difficult to explain. Why, for example, did it fail to contact the Human Resources Development Institute more quickly? And why did it not secure the Building and Trades Council's involvement sooner, particularly since SLATE director Bussey was personally acquainted with the head of both organizations?

In analyzing SLATE's problems, it's clear the agency--and Terrill in particular--was very leery of unions. Moreover, Terrell persists in speaking of union leaders as being far above his own rank and station in life. A more aggressive approach might have yielded better results, even after the false

start. In addition, whether the result of overwork or simple mismanagement, SLATE personnel do not appear too reliable. (This local view was borne out when CPPV's process documentor flew to St. Louis for a scheduled meeting only to find that Terrell failed to come to his office that day and had not informed anyone else of his appointment.) There is evidence of high staff turnover at SLATE. Moreover, by several accounts, SLATE failed to make timely or proper use of CPPV's technical assistance.

SLATE personnel are quick to accept the lion's share of the blame for their failure. And staffers are full of praise for the CPPV field representative's help and guidance--particularly in urging the director to become more involved in the union participation effort. Indeed, the project appears to have had some beneficial residual effects: the unions and SLATE are about to work together on a YCCIP project very similar to the VICI design; and the staff feels more confident and knowledgeable about the practical aspects of project design, logistics, and implementation of linkages.

O. Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C., the nation's twelfth largest city, is a one-industry town: some 45.4 percent of its 580,000 workers are employed by government--37.9 percent by the federal government and 7.5 percent by the city. While the number of government agencies and tax-exempt organizations means that 55.5 percent of the land in the District is not taxable, the importance of government as an employer has meant stable employment in recessions and a general long-term increase in jobs.

Washington's stable, recession-proof economic base has made the metropolitan area one of the nation's most affluent areas. The District's per capita income is \$7,742, which is above the national average, though far below the level of surrounding suburbs. But by the mid-1970's the flight out of Washington to the suburbs had slowed. The number of major crimes in the District had declined by a third since 1970, and the real estate market was booming.

However, in the late 1970's about 15 percent of the population received some form of welfare, and unemployment among minorities, who form 70 percent of the District's population, was high. An estimated 50 percent of all black teenagers in the District were jobless. The job categories which were expanding in the District were specialized white collar fields poorly suited to the needs of the unemployed, and the types of jobs requiring only minimal skills, in such fields as retailing,

wholesaling, and service industries, were expanding in the suburbs outside the District.

Developments in the District have been heavily influenced by the business community, particularly two business groups, the Washington Board of Trade and the Federal City Council. The District's political development has been slow and power has rarely been allowed to concentrate in the hands of the blacks who form a majority of the District's population. Washington has only recently begun to develop any tradition of neighborhood and community bases for political and social action.

Since the District was granted Home Rule in 1973 and held its first municipal election in 1974, however, a new political style has been created, and a new and powerful black political elite has begun to emerge. The new elite arose from three sources: those already in power under the old appointed Mayor-City Council system; those with prior organizational experience and constituencies, such as clergymen; and the growing number of largely black technocrats and social developers.

Since the granting of Home Rule, there has been only a gradual abatement in the original feeling that those who worked so hard for the city's emancipation deserved a place at the head of the new political table. That attitude, coupled with an automatic tendency to view criticism as racism, explains why the District has experienced severe administrative problems and a crisis in its civil service system. In recent years the District government has lost millions of dollars from federal agencies because of an inability to effectively manage its

activities. And the inability of the city's prime sponsor, the Department of Manpower, to pull together its personnel and resources in a manner sufficient to develop an acceptable VICI proposal would provide yet another example of the problems in running this newly self-governing city.

The development of Washington's unsuccessful VICI proposal is obscured by several factors. Chief among these is the fact that several of the individuals who were key participants in the process are no longer in their former positions; and the fact that those who remain are somewhat embarrassed by the city's failure to mount a winning effort, and are therefore not entirely forthcoming as to their roles and opinions. However, the picture that emerges from the interviews is as follows:

When the D.C. prime sponsor received CPPV's application package, responsibility for developing the proposal was assigned to Harriel Williams, Manpower Specialist for the city's Office of Manpower Training Programs, and Reverend Carleton Veazey, who serves as both Staff Director of the Manpower Advisory Planning Commission and as a staff member of the Department of Manpower.

Assigning the application to two separate offices and individuals apparently introduced a note of conflict and confusion from which the effort never recovered. By several accounts there was a degree of strain between Williams and Veazey, as well as between their respective offices, complicating the communications between them. Moreover, several of those interviewed

described Veazey as a manifestly incompetent administrator.

Indeed, that view is widely held among the city's employment and training specialists.

The lack of communication and the basic misconception, errors, and delays which were occurring reached such alarming proportions that Doris Woods, director of what was at that time the Office of Program Planning and Development (since re-organized into the Office of Employability Development), stepped in--with no official authority or mandate to do so--and assumed control of the project. After first firing one or two staff persons, and officially citing Veazey for incompetence, Woods began to direct development of the project along more rational lines sometime in early May.

However, the project files which she inherited were scanty. And she says notes on planning and design were often erroneous and always confusing. As a result, she never fully understood several key VICI concepts and goals. In addition, Woods also inherited some embarrassing organizational encumbrances. Primarily, there had been an early decision to select the National Black Veteran's Organization as the Local Management Agency for VICI. Woods and many other local labor experts were opposed to that selection on the grounds that the NBVO was administratively weak and otherwise generally unsuitable as an LMA. Moreover, the Veteran's organization was implacably hostile to labor unions--largely on the grounds of union racism--and thus could expect very little cooperation from organized labor. Rejecting NBVO and two other hopefuls--OIC and the

United Planning Organization, Woods managed to steer the LMA role to the D.C. Department of Housing and Community Development's Property Management Administration (PMA), located within the PMA's Resident Services Division.

The Department of Housing and Community Development had felt all along that implementation of the project most logically belonged with them. Housing and Development was, from the beginning, opposed to the NBVO. Not--they say, because of envy, but because "NBVO would bring nothing except their name" to the project, and because DCHD could not stomach the idea of allocating their own CD funds "merely to buy NBVO new staff and facilities." Furthermore, DCHD wanted the project because it would help to offset administrative costs. Similarly, DCHD objected to the \$50,000 administrative allotment going to the prime, on the grounds that it should go to the LMA--in its capacity as project implementor. (Within the Department of Manpower, Doris Woods felt the same way--and strove to get those funds allocated to the DCHD.)

According to staff members of the Department of Manpower and the Department of Housing and Community Development, local unions were not especially enthusiastic about VICI. Originally there was great reluctance to participate in any project in which NBVO had even a small role, much less primary responsibility. Moreover, Washington unions have exhibited a sense of helplessness amidst the city's powerful business interests, as well as a constant suspicion of imminent betrayal, so they were extremely wary of the VICI project. The size of the project

was not regarded as sufficient to warrant union aid in removing obstacles such as the need to meet local union wage scales.

Nonetheless, the planners eventually succeeded in obtaining commitments of cooperation from the Washington Building and Construction Trades Council as well as locals of the Carpenters, Plasterers, Cement Masons, and Road, Highway and Heavy Construction Laborers' unions. The proposal DOM submitted to CPPV on May 19th called for youth to be recruited from six public housing projects in the Anacostia area of the District. The youth would provide rehabilitation, maintenance, and energy conservation services to the housing projects from which they were recruited. The Division of Adult and Continuing Education of the District public school system provided the educational linkage, while DOM would provide youth referrals and post-program placement.

CPPV raised a number of questions about the original proposal, and the Department of Manpower submitted a new one on June 23. On June 29, 1978, CPPV offered a conditional recommendation for approval to OYP. CPPV noted that, "Present inadequacies are felt to stem from a second start-up application process and not from insurmountable structural problems." Before offering unqualified approval, CPPV noted that it needed satisfactory confirmation that all required linkages were in place as well as remedy of several inadequacies in the proposal. It also awaited completion of a DOL regional assessment of the June 23rd proposal. The DOL regional office said that the Washington prime sponsor would be unable to monitor a VICI

subcontractor effectively, and at the regional office's behest, Washington was dropped from consideration.

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Most District interviewees were neutral on the subject of CPPV's general effect on the project. There was some fairly specific criticism of CPPV's first field representative--largely on the grounds of hesitancy, and an alleged lack of experience and "transferrable" understanding of the project's goals and structure. Woods, in particular, complains that she was unable to form a coherent sense of the project, based on the field rep's information.

More intense--though understated--criticism was directed at national and regional DOL. It was reported that one regional official had told DOM that they obviously couldn't handle the efforts they had underway already. Further, DOM and DCHD are convinced that they lost out not because of their proposal or a lack of administrative capability, but because the District was in the midst of a fury of allegations of corruption and mismanagement in the CETA program.

However, one DOM official admitted that the fault was more basic and closer to home than that. This individual explained that the proposal would have been meaningless once the project got underway, and that "they would have found a way to screw it up before long."

This interviewee also raised a number of philosophical and conceptual disagreements with the VICI program. Several officials at DCHD opposed the emphasis on unions. One commented that the decline in union power didn't necessarily mean that

minority membership or participation would increase. And, that even if it did, minorities would only--once again--be following, rather than leading; in effect, "moving into the deserted slums, rather than a new house." Others felt that union apprenticeships were not the answer, that minorities and women needed to concentrate on high-paying jobs, with a higher concentration of white collar employment. Ted Greer of the Property Management Administration argued that, if unions were necessary, the AFL-CIO was not. He felt that the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) would have served at least as well, and better, considering the District's chief occupations. Doris Woods criticized the project's research design as "insufficient" --although she admitted that her opinion might be based on a still incomplete perception of the project goals. Greer was officially tolerant of, but personally uncomfortable with, the research aspect. He admitted to a bias in form of the service orientation, but he said, "if you're going to use meaningless vocational-technical assessment techniques (progress charts, etc.), then why not use vocational-technical training methods, too? Why not do it all or mostly in the classroom?"

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## P. An Overview of the Proposal Development Process

The proposal development and site selection process that CPPV guided from mid-April through the end of August 1978 started with 15 sites and ended up with nine, one of which would be operating a program outside the demonstration. Six sites were eliminated: Northeast Ohio and St. Louis were not able to complete workable proposals. Oakland dropped out in the wake of Proposition 13. Los Angeles was unable to develop an acceptable budget or management structure. And Washington and Miami were eliminated as a result of questions raised by the regional DOL offices about these prime sponsors. A seventh site, Central Harlem, ended up in a completely unanticipated special category, having been approved by OYP yet severed from the demonstration under an agreement reached by OYP and CPPV.

Thus, the VICI demonstration would consist of eight sites, six of which ran along the eastern seaboard, with two in the Midwest. Though this national demonstration ended up highly limited geographically, its components still offered considerable diversity in other respects. The sites offered a mix of economic and social qualities. They included cities with the classic problems of older Northeastern and Midwestern cities, as well as two Sunbelt sites, Atlanta and Broward County. There was also diversity in the activities planned by the programs and the institutions linked to VICI.

The central concept guiding the development of the proposals and the selection of sites was the focus on replication.

The sites were not directed to establish programs meeting exact specifications, as has frequently been the case with federally funded activities. Nor were the localities simply given money to be used within broad guidelines, a hallmark of the "new federalism." Instead, as the background paper issued by OYP as part of the VICI application package noted, this was to be a "planned replication by CETA prime sponsors." The paper explained:

Replication is the close reproduction of a model, but it is not xeroxing. The successful transfer of EHR in different and diverse jurisdictions must be based on the clear distinction between essential characteristics of the model and incidental features of a particular program manifestation. The basic principles, processes, roles, and functions which underlie the model are its essence while the concrete particulars of a program are the incidentals. For example, an essential aspect of EHR is union involvement, but it is only incidental that the lead role is played by the Carpenter's Local in Portland.

The background paper added that:

The process of replication must adhere to the essential principles integral to program success and yet be flexible and sensitive to the incidentals and perogatives [sic] of diverse communities.

The background paper then went on to list the required program elements for VICI, some optional features, and two planned variations. The program features included:

#### Required Program Elements Include:

1. Participants 16-19 years old who are unemployed, underemployed, economically disadvantaged and confronted by severe difficulties in obtaining access to jobs.
2. Work projects which provide both needed physical community improvements and varied work and training for participants. The work projects must be completable within the life of the demonstration; and

the work must be of a kind which would not be routinely done in the absence of the program.

3. Project participants recruited from the areas where youth work activity will take place.
4. Well defined work crews led by skilled supervisors and a supervisor-participant ratio small enough to permit skills training.
5. Linkages of public and private agencies with clear assignment of (and agreement to) roles and responsibilities to include:
  - (a) A local management agency with the experience and capacity to conduct and manage the program.
  - (b) A youth referral agency with demonstrated access to and experience in working with youth who are the target population for this program.
  - (c) A work providing agency with the demonstrated capacity to provide a suitable inventory of projects and work orders in a timely and continuous fashion.
  - (d) Labor unions and trade organizations cooperating in the referral of journeymen instructors and provision of apprenticeship training credit for youth who work in the program.
  - (e) Educational institutions which can provide youth participants with opportunities to receive a G.E.D. or enroll in other forms of continuing education.
6. Provision for obtaining licensing approval and/or permits to undertake physical improvements work, inspection of completed work, and valuation of work performed.
7. Provisions for post program training, education or employment.
8. A commitment to provide the necessary data and information to meet the research requirements of the demonstration.
9. Local funding to supplement the amount provided by DOL, particularly for building materials and supplies.

Optional Program Features could include:

1. The pattern of agencies and organizations to participate in the program and the combination of tasks they perform.
2. Establishment of a coordinating committee, made up of representatives of all participating agencies, to plan and guide the program at the local level.
3. Payment of incentive wages to participants (strongly encouraged).
4. Part-time work for selected youth who return to school after six months of full time program enrollment.
5. Program additions to the basic model, if local funds are available to finance them.

Planned Variations of the Model

For research purposes some variations in the model, given the required elements in all sites, offer opportunities for further knowledge development. Two such variations, nature of work and supervisory ratios, are planned for the replication of this demonstration.

1, 3: Participants

Nearly half the sites elected to limit participation to 18 and 19 year olds, and the remaining sites also planned to concentrate on the older, more employable portion of the eligible age group while officially remaining open to 16 and 17 year olds. Most sites felt 16 and 17 year olds were too young to be dealt with in this kind of work experience and training program. The programs planned to recruit trainees from limited target areas which were generally coterminous with, or inclusive of, the areas in which the community improvement work would be done. The recruitment areas were sometimes broader than the work areas because of a need to have access to a sufficiently large population pool.

## 2, 4: Work and Work Sites

All of the localities planned to use well defined work crews led by skilled journeymen supervisors working under a 6:1 supervisory ratio. At one point Los Angeles suggested using CETA Title II workers as supervisors rather than union journeymen, but this unacceptable alternative was raised only as a means of solving budget problems in the proposal. Ten of the sites chose to focus the work efforts on private homes, and the rest included public facilities. Nearly all sites chose more than one activity. Most planned rehabilitation and emergency home repair, but painting, weatherization, and sundry other activities were prominent at six sites. And one site, St. Louis, proposed to train participants to become construction estimators.

Two-thirds of the sites elected to carry out their work in two or more areas. All of the proposed work areas were clearly in need of refurbishment, but political considerations helped determine the boundaries or breadth of the target areas in some localities.

## 5: Linkages

This was regarded by many as the heart of the VICI program. It was the element which made Portland interesting to many, and it was the factor which many believed would shape the success or failure of the VICI programs. The 15 sites followed a variety of different routes in working on linkages. Five sites elected to serve as their own Local Management Agency, while

six chose private organizations and four selected public agencies to serve as LMA's. In three cases the youth referral linkage was to be a public agency, while five chose private organizations, and four sites decided to work primarily with the local employment service. Four sites chose to handle youth referral themselves or to let the LMA perform that task. Two sites selected a mixture of public and private referral organizations. Nine of the sites utilized public agencies as their chief work providing agency; the rest chose private organizations. All developed linkages providing for either a return to regular public schools or access to special GED classes.

The greatest effort and concern surrounded efforts to develop linkages with trade unions. Ten sites developed linkages to more than one trade union, and seven also forged linkages with labor umbrella groups, such as the local Building and Trades Council or the Human Resources Development Institute. The unions most frequently involved were the Carpenters and Painters and Plasterers. The unions which agreed to work with the VICI program tended to shape the kind of work to be undertaken by the program, rather than vice versa. Thus, in Newark and Fort Lauderdale, for example, the choice of the painting as a primary activity was made because the painters' unions were less demanding in educational requirements and more sympathetic to the program. In Chicago and the South Bronx, decisions about union linkages were shaped by local politics.

Overall, the union linkages were the most difficult to forge, and some remained uncertain, but once agreements were

reached, planners and VICI field representatives tended to have a good deal of confidence in the substance of these linkages. While some unions were reluctant to make commitments in writing, they had given strong pledges; and moreover, because the unions were referring journeymen to the program, this seemed to imply an automatic ongoing linkage. In examining the other linkages, there was often a feeling that the educational linkages in particular would turn out to offer less than what was promised in the proposal.

In most localities, the linkages which were the easiest to firm up and held the greatest promise of being maintained were those in which there was already an existing relationship. Conversely, new linkages were difficult to establish and were often considered suspect by many of those involved in planning them.

#### 7: Post-program Placement

Eight sites chose to undertake much of the placement work themselves or to delegate the task to the LMA. Two chose private agencies other than their LMA, four elected to have the local employment service carry out this task, and five assigned at least some degree of placement responsibility to the participating unions or labor councils.

#### 8: Commitment to Research

The details of the research program were being developed at the same time as the proposals, so all of the sites essentially made pro forma commitments to cooperate with the research

effort. Later, as specific research requirements were promulgated, there would be some minor grumbling. But the bulk of this was the traditional carping by program operators about researchers who didn't care about the feelings of the participants or the burdens of the program managers.

#### 9: Local Funding

All of the successful applicants obtained local funding to supplement the DOL funds. These funds, which were to be used largely for materials and supplies, were often provided from Community Development Block grants earmarked for the work areas. Among the other sources tapped was CSA, which had a special interest in Operation Open City's South Bronx weatherization program. The inability to find sources of local funds helped to scuttle both California proposals.

#### Optional Program Features

CPPV listed several optional program features in the VICI application package, and encouraged applicants to consider adding others. But the only ones of significance offered in the proposals were those on CPPV's list. Among the most common options proposed was the payment of incentive wage increases to program participants. Another common option was the establishment of a coordinating committee or advisory group made up of all the participating agencies. Several proposals also provided for part-time work for selected youth who returned to school after six months of fulltime enrollment in VICI. Chicago also proposed to provide training for the journeymen supervisors.

### Planned Variations

OYP had blocked CPPV's original desire to have variations in the educational component of VICI, and the application package noted that for research purposes, variations in the nature of the work and in the supervisory ratios were planned "to offer opportunities for further knowledge development." However, the planned variation in supervisory ratios was eliminated in May, following complaints about the 12:1 alternative. Thus, the only planned variation left was in the nature of the work being undertaken. Since each site developed its work plan in the light of its own situation, the variations which emerged were not planned so much as a by-product of local officials' assessing their own needs and abilities.

Overall, this attempt at replication was clearly understood by almost all of those involved. The proposals they developed did not stray far from the essential features of the Portland model. While replication permitted the localities to adapt the program model to local needs, those needs were often political or administrative as well as substantive. The differences in the nature of the work to be undertaken or the educational or trade union linkage not only reflected local economic and sociological factors, but also personal and professional alliances and networks, friendships, and enmities.

There were significant differences in the environment or context in which the various prime sponsors developed their programs and the attitudes they brought to their efforts. The CETA programs in several proposed sites were already under

fire from a variety of critics. Washington, D.C. had lost millions of CETA dollars as a result of incompetence or inaction and it was under attack for corruption as well as mismanagement. The Miami prime sponsor was also involved in a massive investigation into allegations of scandal and corruption. In such cities as Fort Lauderdale, New Haven, and Milwaukee, the prime sponsors had developed and maintained solid relationships with a broad range of urban actors. However, primes in several other sites were at least mildly estranged from other public and private institutions. In St. Louis, Northeast Ohio, and Los Angeles, the prime sponsors' relationship with the labor movement had deteriorated to a point where meaningful interaction was in grave doubt.

Union leaders in Oakland, Fort Lauderdale, and several other cities feared that the program would create even more apprentices or would-be trade members at a time when unemployment was high, so these young people would end up undercutting the unions' position and membership. Thus, one union leader saw participation in VICI as "fattening frogs for snakes." More fundamentally, some union leaders were becoming increasingly wary of involvement with CETA programs amid a growing concern in the American labor movement that CETA programs, by accident or design, might become inimical to the interests of organized labor.

The initial response to the VICI program included a good deal of grumbling at several sites. A number of sites felt the timetable was too rushed and the "demonstration" contained

nothing new in terms of the substance of the program or the mode of organization, although most agreed the formal requiring of linkages was an innovation. The larger cities complained that the budget was unrealistic, and they said they were being "shoe-horned" into the Portland model financially, if not substantively.

Despite specific doubts, however, most sites exhibited some degree of enthusiasm for the program. Nearly all saw it as an attractive source of additional funds. The VICI budget represented a sizable increase in New Haven's youth budget, but even in a New York or Chicago, a million dollars was not to be taken lightly; there were expectations of consequences if those developing the proposal "blew it." Many prime sponsors also saw VICI as an opportunity to improve their relations with other local institutions. Milwaukee wanted closer ties to unions. Fort Lauderdale looked upon the program as a vehicle for knitting together formerly disparate programs and goals, while Chicago planners used it in local efforts to maintain the system of political control and resource allocation.

In nearly every city, the driving force behind the development of the proposal was one or two middle-level members of the staff of the prime sponsor or the proposed LMA. The recent work on the somewhat similar Entitlement proposal writing process seemed to have left several sites with a proposing writing ready reserve, a team with some experience in working together in developing a proposal and some knowledge of the people and attitudes likely to be found at relevant local institutions and agencies.

One factor apparently central to success was attitude. There was quite a difference between the extremely positive attitude of cities like Milwaukee and New Haven and the overly diffident approach of a St. Louis or Washington's sense of overwhelming obstacles, or Oakland's half-heartedness. It is no coincidence that the most enthusiastic sites turned in what were regarded as the best proposals. Fort Lauderdale, Miami, New Haven, and Milwaukee each approached development of their proposals with tactical precision. All four cities appear to have carefully reviewed the application package, considered their options and political strategies, correctly prioritized their tasks, and then moved in the most direct manner toward their goals.

At the other extreme, such sites as Washington, D.C. and St. Louis appear to have had great difficulty in understanding the program goals, matching those goals to their own needs, and formulating an appropriate process. Moreover, others, including Chicago and Central Harlem, were newhat hampered by programmatic concepts differing from those of CPPV.

The degree of political support mustered by those developing the proposals had an impact on the speed with which the proposals were developed and the quality of the work. The clear backing of local officials in the South Bronx and Milwaukee could be contrasted with St. Louis or Washington where the municipal leadership never indicated any support for the program. In Chicago and Fort Lauderdale, the support of a local power-elite was a central factor in the successful development of

the proposal. Conversely, the Los Angeles proposal was severely hampered when it became 'caught between the political aspirations of the city's black and Hispanic communities.

Generally, neither CPPV nor the localities were troubled by CPPV's dual role as a source of assistance in the development of proposals and the evaluator of those proposals. Most of the sites had positive things to say about the technical assistance they received from CPPV, although several complained about either the skills of the field representative or their lack of knowledge about the local situation. CPPV was less effective than it might have been had its staff capabilities included a greater understanding of the CETA system and more knowledge of the individual cities in which the proposals were being developed.

A number of prime sponsors attempted to circumvent CPPV and made pleas for special consideration to DOL. However, CPPV was generally upheld, and it emerged from the site selection process with a reputation for meaning what it said. Several local sites noted that there were fewer "negotiable" issues with CPPV than with DOL.

### III. Concluding Thoughts: The Story So Far

As was noted at the outset, there are three critical aspects to the VICI demonstration: the program model, the process of replication, and the use of CPPV as a mechanism for mounting and managing this replication.

The program model being utilized was developed on the basis of visits to Portland's Emergency Home Repair program, and it was augmented with a few features of other programs. There are, as will be noted, some who see certain special qualities to Portland which limit the replicability of the youth programs undertaken there, but CPPV's choice of the program that became the foundation for the VICI model is not easy to fault. The examination of exemplary youth programs which Finney and Bailin undertook for the Ford Foundation in early 1977 provided CPPV with a basis for making a reasonable judgement.

The concept of replicating a specific youth program or program model was clear to most of those who became involved. No one interviewed failed to understand the need to reproduce essential features rather than incidental details, and there would be few occasions when the proposals CPPV received were accused of deviating too sharply from the model. One reason why replication proceeded smoothly, however, was that those involved believed the model to be replicated was similar to other YCCIP programs. In addition to the Portland model, those drafting the proposals also had local models which they were consciously replicating, or even Xeroxing. The ability to replicate a

familiar local program made the program development process swift and sure in several sites without leading to program features that were unfaithful to the Portland model.

While few planners had difficulty envisioning program elements that would replicate the Portland model, there were two major complaints or problems about replicating CPPV's model. One was the budget. The larger cities felt the VICI budget guidelines were unworkable. Los Angeles never found a way to meet the proposed budget, and the South Bronx made it only because of an infusion of CSA funds and a bit of juggling of CETA slots to shift some of the VICI overhead out of the budget.

The other replication issue surrounded the linkages. A major feature of the Portland model to be replicated was the set of linkages to such institutions as the schools, unions, and employers. However, a number of localities insisted these linkages were not simply a function of the design of the EHR program but rather an outgrowth of the friendly ethos of a smaller city like Portland. Others insisted linkages could not be created by fiat but rather had to emerge organically over an extended period of time. Thus, there was much concern that no designing or planning could create meaningful linkages, particularly in the polarized, politically charged atmosphere of some of the nation's largest cities.

CPPV argued that the linkages did not emerge in Portland because of any particular local attitude or ethos but because the linkages were designed to advance the interests of each institution involved. A similar harnessing of diverse self-interests could, in fact, be designed in other contexts, CPPV

argued. In Portland, however, the provision of ten journeymen jobs was a major inducement to unions, in a period of high unemployment; so was the opportunity to meet affirmative action pressures by becoming involved in the program. Elsewhere ten jobs were still an attraction, but in bigger cities these stakes were not an overwhelming inducement, particularly in the face of concerns about union security. In the biggest cities, it was argued by some planners, even the potential affirmative action payoff provided by VICI was too small relative to the issues and animosities that might keep institutions at odds. All of the successful sites managed to create linkages for their proposals, but there was a good deal less certainty as to whether they would work out in practice.

CPPV, as has been noted, was not only developing and testing a model, the organization was also a model being developed and tested. During the period in which it was designing and launching the VICI demonstration, it was also settling into a relationship with the Department of Labor and other elements of the nation's employment and training system.

The relationship that CPPV developed with DOL has turned out to be quite different from what some people at CPPV envisioned. CPPV has emerged as an entity that is in large measure a part of the nation's manpower service delivery system. At the outset, some CPPV staff members expected their new intermediate unit to function rather autonomously, subject to OYP review at specific points. Thus, they were unprepared for the kind of almost day-to-day involvement with DOL which emerged.

OYP saw it differently. It decided that it would not be appropriate to mount this kind of exercise in replication outside the CETA system, particularly since OYP was encountering opposition to earlier efforts to circumvent the system. Thus, the VICI program became plugged into the CETA system. It was to deal with prime sponsors rather than local program operators, and once the prime sponsors entered the picture, the DOL regional offices supervising them were brought in as well. Once contracts were routed through the DOL regional offices, CPPV was to become heavily tied to an existing bureaucracy. As this linkage developed, CPPV encountered a degree of criticism from the sites to the effect that its staff lacked anyone with firsthand knowledge of the folkways of the CETA system. CPPV was slow to accept the need to deal with local prime sponsors and DOL regional offices, in part because OYP's concepts regarding the configuration of relationships between CPPV and the national delivery system continued to change, in the eyes of CPPV.

Despite an occasional feeling at CPPV that it was being swallowed up by the very system that created it to be a separate entity, CPPV has maintained a separate identity in the eyes of the localities it dealt with, and a distinctive character. It is seen as acting more swiftly than DOL and as holding more firmly to its standards and its positions. It is regarded as apolitical. But the sites have not reached a final judgement on whether or not appeals to political powers cannot sway DOL to impose its views on CPPV. Some localities have regarded

CPPV as occasionally indecisive, while others have believed CPPV was simply caught amid changing signals from DOL. But by early 1979, it seemed clear that CPPV had not only designed and set up a demonstration, it had also worked out a set of relationships with a variety of organizations. From the outset it was clear that an intermediate unit like CPPV was to stand in between other institutions. Just where CPPV was to stand in that in-between region was something that has had to be worked out, and after its first year of operation, CPPV appears to be operating closer to the existing employment and training system than some of its founders had envisioned.

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**PART IV.**

**THE LAUNCHING AND EARLY OPERATIONS  
OF THE  
VENTURES IN COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT DEMONSTRATION**

**Harvey D. Shapiro  
&  
Hank Blakely**

## INTRODUCTION

This interim report is part of an ongoing effort to record and analyze the forces that have shaped the development of the Ventures in Community Improvement demonstration. This ongoing process documentation effort is an integral part of the VICI demonstration's research component. An initial process documentation report was released in February, 1979. Entitled, "The Development of the Ventures in Community Improvement Demonstration," it covered the events which led to the creation of the demonstration as well as the process through which proposals to operate VICI programs were prepared by various localities and selected for funding. This report continues the exploration of many of the themes and events discussed in that initial report.

Ventures in Community Improvement (VICI) is a national research and demonstration project which seeks to test the effectiveness of a model youth employment program in several settings. The demonstration is financed by the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Youth Programs (OYP), while the Corporation for Public/Private Ventures (CPPV) has been given responsibility for designing, managing, and analyzing the operation of the demonstration.

As chronicled in the initial process documentation report, after the basic design elements of the VICI demonstration were settled, CETA prime sponsors in a number of cities were invited to submit proposals for operating a VICI program. In mid-1978, eight localities were selected for funding under

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the auspices of CPPV. The sites were Atlanta, Georgia; Broward County, Florida; Chicago, Illinois; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Newark, New Jersey; New Haven, Connecticut; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and the South Bronx in New York City. Each VICI program was to enroll up to 60 unemployed, out-of-school, economically disadvantaged youth between the ages of 16 and 19. They were to work five days a week under the supervision of union journeymen drawn from the construction and building trades. Although the work would vary among the sites, it was aimed at making tangible community improvements through such activities as refurbishing public facilities or repairing homes occupied by poor or elderly people from the same neighborhoods as the youth enrolled in the programs.

Using program elements drawn from the Emergency Home Repair Program in Portland, Oregon, the VICI model relied heavily on a set of linkages which tied the program to other institutions. Various local institutions had been chosen to recruit and refer youth to VICI. Educational institutions had agreed to provide certain educational services to VICI youth. Locals of unions in the building and construction trades had agreed to provide union journeymen to serve as instructors in the program and also to assist VICI youth to gain entrance to union apprenticeship programs and to job opportunities. Local organizations of various kinds agreed to identify or provide work projects to be undertaken by the youth. And the local CETA prime sponsor, or its designated local management agency had overall responsibility for

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operating the program and coordinating its linkages. As shown in Table 1, a variety of local organizations had agreed to serve as linkages. But while there were differences among the sites as to precisely which craft union or which youth referral agency would be involved with VICI, all sites shared the emphasis on linking the youth to other institutions so that this employment and training program would not operate in a vacuum. Rather it would give the enrollee access to various services that might improve his or her employability and also employ the youth in activities that would improve the area in which he or she lived.

The VICI demonstration was scheduled to run for 18 months. However, the starting point differs from site to site because of different local conditions and start-up problems. Broward, Chicago, Milwaukee, Newark and New Haven all started in October 1978, while Philadelphia began in December, and Atlanta and South Bronx officially were launched in January 1979. Thus, by March 1979, while South Bronx and Atlanta were just beginning to send youths out to work on repairing homes, Milwaukee and Newark and other sites were beginning to seek jobs for youth who were nearing the end of their stay in the program. And while five sites would complete their 18 months in May, 1980, Philadelphia was scheduled to run until August and Atlanta and South Bronx would run through September 1980.

This report will attempt to describe and analyze the forces and events that have shaped the development of the

VICI demonstration since the point in time when the proposals of the eight sites received final approval and the localities began preparations for launching their programs. Thus, this interim report begins at the point where the original process documentation report ended: roughly the beginning of September, 1978. This interim report then tracks developments affecting the demonstration for a one-year period ending in mid-September 1979.

The first section of this report offers a general overview of the unfolding of the demonstration. The next section provides a more detailed chronicle of the developments at each of the eight sites.

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## Part I: An Overview of the VICI Demonstration

### TRANSITION FROM PLANNING TO OPERATING

The transition from proposal to program, and from planning to operating, was not inordinately difficult for most VICI sites. Although time was short, most of the sites had begun identifying potential staff and resources following submission of their proposals, and when they learned they were to be funded, they were able to act quickly.

With the exception of New Haven, where the principal planners remained involved in the program, the movement toward implementation meant major changes in the VICI cast of characters. As operating people were brought in to make good on the proposals and promises developed by others, they raised important questions about CPPV and the proposals it had approved.

In Atlanta and Chicago, shifts in VICI actors meant that CPPV's role was rigorously questioned and even rejected. Thus, CPPV had to re-establish its legitimacy and its authority.

As the operating people tested the proposals they were handed, they encountered assorted start-up problems at each site, but no one argued that the proposals or major parts of them were inherently unworkable.

### REPLICATION

The only significant efforts to depart from the proposals centered on recruitment. A number of programs had difficulty in recruiting sufficient youth, particularly those from certain

certain groups, such as Hispanics or females. In response, to these problems, Atlanta, Broward County, and Newark proposed widening the recruitment target areas. This would broaden the pool of potential applicants, but it violated a fairly central principal of the program model. VICI sites were supposed to focus both recruitment and community improvement work on the same area so that the youth would be making improvements in their own neighborhoods. Nonetheless, bending to realities CPPV permitted Newark and Atlanta to expand the target area beyond the largely black Central Ward in order to recruit more Hispanic youth.

This kind of modification seems to have meant little to the validity of the program, because, in fact, the target areas in most cities were already broader than the areas with which the youth identified themselves. Thus, participants interviewed in Newark considered their neighborhood to be the housing project in which they lived or a few blocks around their home, not the entire Central Ward. And, in Newark and elsewhere, while the beneficiaries of the repair work commented favorably on the youth, they did not clearly identify them as neighborhood kids unless they were already personally acquainted with them.

Beyond the modification of the recruiting area, CPPV generally held firm in keeping sites to their proposals and thus replicating the program model. In Newark, for example, CPPV declined a request made the by Department of Public Works, one of the work providers, to undertake work outside the geographic area originally targeted.

## OPERATIONALIZING THE LINKAGES

A major test of the proposals came when each site sought to utilize the linkages that were supposed to have been established during the planning period. Generally, these linkages existed to a significant degree. The major exception was the South Bronx, where virtually none of the linkages amounted to anything. Elsewhere, the education linkage proved to be the weakest, but also the least effective. This had been predicted by CPPV staff members during the planning period.

The crucial linkage was the union linkage. It played a major role in making programs work, as in Newark, and it was closely tied to problems of other programs, such as South Bronx. The union linkage had an impact which extended from the selection of journeymen for employment in the program, through the placement of youth. Thus, a strong union linkage provided a variety of benefits, some of which were not anticipated in the planning stage, most notably the role played by union journeymen in the placement process.

CPPV knew that many of the linkages described in VICI proposals were not being created de novo, but this could cut two ways. A large measure of Milwaukee's success is operationalizing its linkages resulted from the pre-existing relationships among several key organizations, who were simply brought together again in VICI. Similarly, in Newark the close working relationship between the painters union and the prime sponsor was built upon a history of working together

on other programs.

#### RECRUITMENT, INTAKE AND ORIENTATION

Recruitment was an early and enduring concern at most sites. There were two kinds of problems: recruiting enough youth to operate the program and recruiting enough to meet CPPV's research needs. The latter problem, the issue of the major waiting list, will be discussed in the context of research.

Many of those involved in mounting the demonstration were surprised to find that initial recruitment efforts did not turn up as many youth as anticipated. In some cases, there were barely enough youth to mount the program and maintain a small pool of replacements. Moreover, there were shortfalls in the recruitment of Hispanics and women at many sites.

The problems in recruiting sufficient numbers of applicants have been attributed to everything from the state of the economy to the nature of the program, to the methods used. It seems clear that recruitment methods used for VICI were fairly standard for CETA youth programs. VICI's recruitment drive was neither better nor worse than other CETA recruitment efforts. The reasons why these methods did not turn up large numbers of youth for VICI, however, remain unclear and complex.

The shortfall in Hispanic recruiting could be attributed to the lack of Hispanics in the original target area in Newark. When the target area was expanded and a Spanish-speaking staff member was added, this problem eased.

The underenrollment of women, according to local VICI staff members, seemed to be a result of the nature of the work VICI entailed. While there are significant numbers of women seeking entry into the building trades, most tended to be older than the VICI target group. For a young woman, the decision to enter training for an unconventional job was still decidedly unconventional, and local VICI staff members believed this circumscribed the number of women applying.

Just as there was little innovative about VICI's recruiting efforts, its intake and orientation efforts were also typical of CETA youth programs, according to CPPV staff. Screening was fairly limited at some sites, and there seems to have been little "creaming" going on. Many journeymen professed amazement at certain deficiencies among the recruits. Chief among these was the participants' inability to read a ruler or perform simple arithmetic computations.

There was not much uniformity in orientation. Some programs, such as Broward County and Milwaukee, had very high dropout rates in the first few days. These were the sites which recruited widely and did not interview applicants intensively. So only after they entered the program did some the program did some youth discover it was not what they were interested in doing.

#### VICI AT WORK--PROGRAM OPERATIONS

There was a curious disjunction between the inner workings of VICI and the program's external relationships.

As the first part of this report documented, at many VICI sites dealings with local government agencies, trade unions, and others, were often turbulent and fiery. Yet surprisingly, perhaps, the administrative crises and major convulsions at many sites did not keep the youth from remaining busily engaged in learning skills and carrying out useful tasks.

There were many problems with individual youths at every site, to be sure. Chicago experienced a job action by a number of disgruntled youth, while in the South Bronx a crack-down on behavior led to 12 dismissals in a month. Nonetheless, the basic and sometimes startling fact was that at most sites, most of the time most of the youth were actively employed and producing tangible results as well as making visible improvements in their skills.

#### THE ROLE OF JOURNEYMAN

A key factor in the effective internal operations of VICI, and a surprisingly important element in many aspects of the program was the role played by union journeymen. They were the VICI staff members who supervised the training and dealt with the youth on a day-to-day basis. They also dealt with property owners and worked with the work providing agencies. Thus, the manner in which they did their jobs had an important impact on all aspects of the program. And they were a major positive force in VICI.

The job they were supposed to do turned out to be a very complex one. Indeed, many felt it was not one job but several and the demands made on journeymen seemed contradictory to some.

Journeymen saw no problems in expecting journeymen to act as teachers or trainers. While few of the journeymen had any formal training as teachers, teaching younger people is an integral part of the work in many trades. Apprentices, after all, receive most of their training on the job, at the elbows of journeymen. Thus, many journeymen had provided training as a matter of course in their jobs, and at least one VICI journeyman also had been a teacher in vocational schools. Moreover, those who became involved in VICI generally had an interest in teaching or young people which prompted them to see a job with VICI.

While having journeymen serve as instructors did not present any problems, expecting journeymen to provide training in the context of completing community improvements caused many journeymen to wonder about their mission. They were uncertain whether they were to emphasize producing improvements or providing training. The conflict between what they saw as alternative goals loomed large in the minds of many journeymen, and it was also reflected across their programs. In commenting on the conflict they felt, several journeymen said they believed they should have pride in their trade: they saw a value to be placed on a job well-done, on a good piece of carpentry. The journeymen not only valued doing a job well and properly, but also doing it on time and efficiently. The journeymen said journeymen had an obligation to pass along their skills, but only to those who showed a genuine interest and displayed promise. In their role as teachers, however,

the journeymen felt the emphasis was supposed to be on the youth: he or she was central and the work or task or job was only a means to an end. For a teacher, as long as the student learns, there need be little concern about the quality or pace of production.

The journeyman's ethos emphasized helping those with potential to master the craft while ignoring the rest. The teacher's ethos said spend time with the worse and hope the best will manager on their own. The journeyman's pride in his trade said reserve the hardest jobs for yourself so they will be done; the pedagogue said let the youth do everything so they could learn more. The journeyman worried about production; the teacher didn't.

Several of the journeymen interviewed said they were caught between two ideals, unsure of the extent to which they were to function as a journeyman plying his trade in an improvement project or an instructor in a training program. Should they strive to finish a job on schedule or could they take additional time until everyone had mastered the task? Should they work with everybody or just those who showed promise?

While many journeymen internalized these questions, at some sites the debate went beyond individuals. The journeymen held strongly to the tradesman's ideals and emphasized production and "real world" working conditions, while the office staff pushed for a more pedagogical, training-oriented approach. This split was not evident and complete in Newark, where it was permitted to fester because the program director

was a weak leader who identified himself with the journeymen.

But there was no easy resolution to this conflict in Newark or elsewhere. A middle ground had to be developed in which the journeymen could feel they were adhering to the standards of their trade yet tempering concerns for production and quality with a recognition of the needs of the youth. This balance was hard to define in principle and hard to find in practice, but at every site there was clear movement towards it.

After the first few weeks of the program, there would be fewer and fewer instances of the journeymen doing all the work with two or three favored youth while the others just watched. The initial focus on production would soon be diluted by a growing concern for the youth. The journeymen became increasingly interested in the individuals assigned to them and the youth responded well to this.

At most sites a close bond grew up between work crews and their journeymen. The journeymen took a genuine interest in "his crew," and this led many of them to take an active, unanticipated, and very useful role in helping them find jobs, as will be noted.

The role played by the journeymen turned out to be a critical and highly interesting part of the VICI demonstration. The problems they had in settling into their role could be obviated with additional preparation and training. Milwaukee developed workshops for the journeymen.

## WOMEN IN VICI

Another important aspect of VICI was to have been its commitment to recruit females and train them for building and construction jobs not traditionally held by women in great numbers. The program was making headway in this effort. But several sites were generally under the goals they set for recruiting women, and initially the dropout rate for females was higher than for males, although later there would be some signs of convergence. The dropouts were particularly troublesome to VICI managers because it was widely believed that VICI was sure to place any woman who stayed in the program.

VICI's problems with women were thought to reflect the untraditional nature of the work it offered. A 16 to 19 year old woman had to be well-motivated and fairly unconventional to be willing to enter the building trades at the VICI program's age group of 16 yo 19, VICI program staff members said. While a growing number of women have been entering the building trades, most have been in their mid to late 20's and frequently they had children to support. These women have seen first-hand the kind of work and wages available to them, and they were strongly motivated to stick with training that would lead them to a building trades job that they knew would pay them far more than they made before or could make elsewhere. By contrast, a 16 to 19 year old VICI enrollee had limited first-hand experience with low wage jobs and still had many illusions and aspirations. Thus, she lacked the kind of experience that often provided the

strong motivation needed to enter the building trades.

Those who were recruited experienced several kinds of problems that contributed to their dropout rate. One problem was kidding from the young men in the program. Much of this was the usual good natured banter that goes on among fellow workers or students of either gender, but much of it had a hard edge that bordered on harassment. Many of the young men were still too unsure of their identity and their sexuality to be comfortable with women entering what they considered a man's world and a man's job. Some women handled the verbal play well, and some didn't.

A second problem was the way journeymen dealt with females. Many journeymen were middle-aged men and would-be gentlemen of the old school. While they expressed support for women entering their trade, they questioned the depth of their commitment and wondered whether they merited the attention that could otherwise go to young men embarking on careers and lives as heads of households. Other journeymen had gentlemanly concerns about women doing the work. Some journeymen shied away from letting women climb ladders or lift heavy paint cans or do messy work. Instead, they tended to assign the women to more "artistic" jobs, like plastering or painting trimmings, while reserving the hard work for men. This treatment did not go unnoticed by the women.

A third problem was the primitive facilities at many work sites. Often the crews would be working at isolated, abandoned buildings with no bathrooms or locker rooms. The

The men, as one journeyman noted, "can take a pee off the back porch anytime they want." The women had to hope the work site was near a gas station or school or other place with a bathroom they could use. A separate and often decidedly makeshift changing room would have to be created for the women to change into their uniforms or overalls.

Finally, it appears that the women attracted to VICI sometimes led to their own undoing. The kind of 18 year old woman who was prepared to do the untraditional and who entered VICI sometimes turned out to be the kind of woman who, upon being criticized, just might walk off the program in a huff, journeymen said.

All of these problems were exacerbated by the dearth of relevant role models. There were many women around VICI, including secretaries, administrators, and even program directors in New Haven and Philadelphia. But there was only one female journeyman.

Nonetheless, by the fall of 1979, there were fewer significant differences between males and females in their length of stay in VICI or their dropout rates. This suggests that the programs had begun to learn how to deal with the problems faced by female enrollees in a non-traditional training program.

Despite the problems in recruiting and retaining women, there was a widely shared pride in "our girls" at most VICI sites. On a number of occasions, those ranked as best workers

or achieving the first placements were women, and even the most grizzled male chauvinist journeyman expressed a peculiar pride in helping to produce what might be the first female carpenter in that locality.

#### PLACEMENT

As each of the VICI sites completed its first few months of operation, in many cases with prodding from CPPV, it turned to preparation of a placement campaign. CPPV required each site to develop a placement strategy to be submitted by August, 1979, all but Chicago, Philadelphia and South Bronx had completed and implemented their plans. South Bronx's late start delayed the need for a placement plan, but essentially the delays there, and even more clearly in Chicago, represented a managerial failing. Milwaukee, New Haven and Newark, by contrast, were working hard on placement by mid-1979.

The placement campaign mounted by the VICI sites includes many standard techniques. For example, VICI job developers made telephone calls to major employers and screened help-wanted notices to generate information about job possibilities for VICI youth. But CPPV field representatives estimate that only about 10 percent of placements came via this route.

The bulk of the placements resulted from personal contacts made by VICI staff members. This meant staff members asked suppliers and vendors whether they needed workers or knew of any customers who did. It meant asking work providers and city agencies if they were aware of any job openings. And

above all, it meant that VICI's journeymen used their network of contacts to seek jobs for VICI participants.

The involvement of the journeymen in placement was not originally envisioned in the VICI program model, but it appeared to be a highly effective mechanism. By virtue of their work experience, they had a breadth of knowledge about local employment possibilities. And their efforts to place youth were well received; indeed the approval or recommendation of a journeyman carried a certain cachet that a job developer or program director couldn't muster. As one New Haven staff member said, "It's not some Vassar social work major saying 'Larry would make a good painter'; it's a painter saying 'I know one when I see one'."

Milwaukee and New Haven seemed to have honed the involvement of journeymen in placement. In Newark, the painters union's business agent and apprenticeship coordinator took a personal role in attempting to find jobs for VICI participants. In the South Bronx, where there was virtually no formal trade union linkage, the journeymen were still proving to be very helpful in placement. Indeed in all sites, the involvement of journeymen in placement as well as training was an unexpected but highly useful and instructive development.

#### RESEARCH

The research requirements of the VICI program were often a source of irritation at most VICI sites. Fundamentally,

this reflected the classic conflict found in demonstration programs between program operators who simply wished to provide services and researchers who need data to meet the research requirements which were also an integral part of the demonstration. The grumbling that accompanies the VICI research was generally no more shrill or enduring than that encountered in other demonstrations.

Both program operators and CPPV staff agreed that CPPV required more forms and data than many other demonstrations. Moreover, the data collected was treated differently than in some other DOL programs, local CI staff members said. CPPV took it seriously, and forms were not simply demanded but read. If deficiencies were evident, CPPV would require sites to improve their performance. Since several sites completed their forms accurately and on time without great difficulties, it was clearly feasible to meet CPPV's demands. Moreover, when CPPV provided each VICI site with an unexpected allocation of \$9,000; many of the sites used these funds to finance work on data collection.

However, a major concern at the sites was that data gathering had no meaning or return for them. They felt, as has been noted, like a "data plantation," which produced data yet never saw any feedback or results of the data gathering. Thus, there was no direct incentive to work on compiling data except to avoid the wrath of CPPV. CPPV tried to argue that if the forms were used properly, they would provide data that

would be useful to the local management. Thus, the Journeymen's Weekly Progress Report, for example, could serve as a management tool for the site, as well as a source of data for CPPV researchers. In fact, however, little of the data gathered for CPPV was put to use by local program staff. Thus, the range and depth of information sought by CPPV seemed double useless to local program managers for it provided no direct benefit to the sites and no research reports for the demonstration as a whole.

CPPV had intended to provide research results to the VICI sites, but its efforts were hampered by several factors. A dispute between the two major quantitative research subcontractors in the winter of 1978-79 regarding the allocation of additional contracts stopped the analysis of research data for a period of time. Moreover, one research subcontractors was several months late in developing an "enhancement package" to link data, so no monthly reports were possible until August 1979. Moreover, analysis of research data was hampered because individual sites were often slow in forwarding data yet budgetary constraints limited the number of computer runs that could be undertaken.

An issue that particularly troubled many sites was CPPV's efforts to produce a "major waiting list." For research purposes CPPV sought to recruit a large list of youth who might be compared with youth in the VICI program. New Haven was excused from this effort because of its small population base, and the seven other sites were told their participation

was not mandatory. Nonetheless, these sites regarded involvement as a requirement, and they were strongly opposed to it, according to VICI staff members interviewed.

The waiting list aroused resentment among program operators not only because it put an additional burden on them but also because they regarded it as harmful to the youth. They viewed the waiting list as a confusing device which seemed to hold out the promise of services that would not be delivered. They considered it a potential betrayal and disappointment for youth who already had enough problems, even though CPPV staff sought to modify the procedures so that youth would have opportunities for other training programs. Moreover, staff members at two sites expressed concern that this disincentive was having a negative impact on recruitment for other local CETA youth programs.

Ultimately, only Newark completed the full major waiting list although three other sites gathered enough names to use the list for research purposes. In the spring of 1979, CPPV told the sites to cease their efforts to compile the major waiting list, but CPPV's willingness to abandon the effort only strengthened the conviction of many program operators that the device was idle fiddling by researchers who had no sympathy for the psyches of youth or the problems of program operators.

CPPV had a research advisory committee which met once and then essentially broke into subcommittees permitting sites

to be represented in discussions of various research plans. CPPV also provided training in completion of its forms and modified several forms in response to suggestions or complaints from the sites. Nonetheless, it could not allay the feeling at many sites that the research component of the program was too broad and wide-ranging as well as useless to the program operators. The opposition to the research efforts was muted over time, largely because the program operators became resigned to the researcher needs, but it seemed likely to remain an enduring bone of contention in the demonstration. When research data began to be fed back to the sites, it seemed likely that these views might be altered, however, because some program operators expressed a strong competitive interest in developments at other sites.

#### CPPV'S ROLE

CPPV's role during the VICI planning period was controversial and sometimes confusing because DOL was also directly involved in the process. By the time the VICI programs were being launched, however, DOL had largely disappeared, and CPPV was the major source of direction and supervision. Because localities no longer encountered a variety of organizations claiming a role in monitoring VICI, they gave less thought to the precise nature and role of CPPV, even though they continued to be deeply involved with the organization. While DOL monitors might visit a training program only once a year and were often interested mainly in financial records, CPPV's field representatives

were regular visitors at each site, sometimes coming weekly, and seldom less often than every six weeks. They delved into every aspect of the program and offered extensive advice.

At first there was some resistance to CPPV's role, particularly in Atlanta and Chicago. But sites soon adapted to "the Philadelphias." Some did so with an air of resignation--it had to be, so they made the best of it, while others viewed CPPV in a more positive light. At several sites, VICI staff argued that CPPV was not functioning any differently than a federal or state monitor, it was just more active. They did not see anything unique in the nature of CPPV other than its ability to invest more time and money in supervision. That, however, is a significant difference from other monitoring agencies, although the merits of that difference might not be appreciated by program operators feeling burdened by outside scrutiny.

CPPV played a major role in enabling most of the eight VICI sites to begin operations within a shorter period of time once the OYP funding decisions had been announced, and CPPV's continuing involvement in overseeing VICI clearly improved the operations of the weaker programs. In sites such as New Haven, which generally experienced smooth sailing, CPPV staff members still provided a source of dispassionate analysis and advice. In troubled sites, such as Chicago, South Bronx, and Broward, CPPV helped resolve disputes that threatened the programs. CPPV could play this role because it existed

independent of competing local powers and interests, because it could threaten funding and close down a site, and because the advice its staff gave was generally perceived as wise. CPPV staff provided new and workable ideas at several sites.

Some sites turned this outside supervision to their own ends. At several sites program directors found it useful to tell other local organizations certain actions were required because "the Philadelphias are on our backs." Indeed, CPPV field representatives occasionally abetted such efforts: a field representative might provide a stern letter to a site knowing that it would be used by the local program director to urge another local agency to take action which the VICI site wanted.

The close involvement with the sites had some impact on CPPV's field staff. The CPPV VICI director believed there were at least occasional indications of field representatives becoming overly sympathetic to the plight of localities or identifying too closely with them.

In the early months of the program, at several sites, most notably New Haven, there was a feeling that CPPV was not communicating enough information to the sites. There were complaints that CPPV should facilitate the exchange of ideas among sites so that each site wouldn't have to reinvent the wheel regularly, or wait for its field representative to bring them blueprints for it. Much of this concern was dispelled by CPPV's mid-term conference in Philadelphia in late June.

This event permitted all of the sites to learn one another's problems and achievements. Indeed, the value of the conference to CPPV seemed to lie as much in its morale boosting effects as in the information gained by CPPV. While CPPV was already familiar with much of what was said, the sites took great delight in hearing what their counterparts elsewhere were doing. CPPV also responded to the communications gaps by creating a VICI newsletter in September, 1979.

#### OTHER EXOGENOUS FORCES

Although DOL had spawned CPFV, the two groups were occasionally at odds during the VICI planning period. Once the programs were operating, however, DOL and CPPV generally worked together harmoniously and acted in tandem on major issues. There were other outside forces that exerted their effect on VICI, however.

In the South Bronx, of course, the LMA's contretemps with the city government delayed implementation of the program for months and may have caused irreparable damage to the rhythm of the program. Moreover, the U.S. Community Services Administration's long delay in forwarding \$250,000 for supplies created serious financial problems. In Broward, HUD raised questions about the Davis-Bacon Act which endangered operations, and in Chicago blizzards and election returns both had an impact on VICI.

Because placement was just beginning it was too soon to determine how changes in the local economies would alter the

obtained by VICI, but an impact could be expected.

One thing that was clear after nearly a year of operation was that VICI's attempts to leverage its resources could cut two ways. Typically, CPPV could provide a million dollars to a site which then raised perhaps \$200,000 from HUD, CSA, or other sources. While CPPV got more than a million dollars worth of programming for its efforts, its leveraging also opened the programs to the influence of others. CPPV found, for example, that while HUD giveth it also taketh away, and CPPV's influence was sometimes challenged by others with a stake in VICI.

The working out of that phenomenon differed from site to site, however, as did so many other aspects of the VICI program, and, consequently, the next section of this report will examine developments as they occurred at each site.

PART II: The Sites

ATLANTA

In August of 1978, for reasons not entirely clear, the Atlanta CETA lost the services of its senior planner. His departure occurred at a critical pass in the development of the Atlanta VICI plan and had a serious and enduring effect on the project. The senior planner had been a very important component in the frail network of reinforcements holding the Atlanta VICI linkages together. He had functioned as an interface with several key organizations that might otherwise prefer not to work together. His sudden departure precipitated a deterioration in earlier understandings and agreements. The chief casualties were the relationships between CPPV and the CETA and between CETA and its LMA, the Atlanta Urban League.

Suddenly, the Atlanta CETA claimed that it was completely unaware of CPPV's role or authority in the development and implementation of VICI. That assertion completely undermined the monitoring structure and introduced one of the earliest and most serious of a long series of delays in the project.

At the same time, and possibly related to the CETA assertion, CPPV rejected the Atlanta VICI budget. CPPV took issue with Atlanta's continued push for the inclusion of an \$18,000 indirect cost item, and it found certain staffing and compensation policies unacceptable.

As a result of these and related issues, the Atlanta

process became a study in delay. By late October, VICI had succeeded in identifying -- not hiring -- only 32 participants. Many vital functions such as work site provision and staffing, either remained to be completed or had yet to begin. By late November, following the intervention of the Office of Youth Programs, the Atlanta CETA had accepted CPPV's role and had submitted a revised budget containing an indirect costs item, which CPPV accepted. However, only 17 participants had entered the program by that time, and the agency had been unable to produce a revised project timetable.

Substantive and procedural delays at the CETA level affected the performance of virtually every party to the project. In addition to the greatly slowed recruiting effort, the LMA was unable to finalize a subcontract with the Atlanta Associated Contractors, with whom the Urban League hoped to offset the delay in granting of \$100,000 in community development funds. Moreover, the delay in implementing the van-leasing arrangements ultimately resulted in a much higher transportation cost to the project.

A great deal of the energies of the LMA and the prime sponsor were expended in administrative battles with each other, and in blaming each other for the delays. Meanwhile, the recruitment problem worsened. Recruitment dropped to only six persons in December. The prime sponsor, citing the limited number of eligible candidates in the original target area, requested a revision and expansion of that area. By late

January, as the result of a new recruitment effort, the participant roster had reached a level of 60, only to fall to 52 at month's end. In February, the prime sponsor hired three persons to assist in the recruitment effort for the waiting list.

In the months after Atlanta's rather tentative launching of VICI, CPPV had concluded that the majority of the project's problems were traceable to the prime sponsor's failure to carry out its responsibilities, fueled by a decidedly uncooperative attitude on the part of one or two key CETA staff members.

An event which tends to support that conclusion and typify the state of affairs concerns the LMA's submission of a \$46,000 invoice which resulted in a dispute over one expenditure of \$32.00. There was a considerable delay in settling the dispute, during which the prime sponsor apparently refused to issue a check for the undisputed amount, thus seriously inconveniencing the LMA. The LMA regards that event as evidence of deliberate malice, while the prime sponsor dismisses it as a "managerial bottleneck" that has since been resolved.

The spirit of cooperation between these two parties underwent a sudden -- but brief -- uplift when Labor Secretary Ray Marshall and HUD Under Secretary Gino Baroni visited Atlanta on February 28, 1979. Shortly after the visit, however, the two organizations were embroiled in a dispute regarding CETA's provision of cash advances. By March, the project was seriously behind in recruitment for the waiting list and in completion of its work orders. The long and often-promised \$100,000 in community development funds was still delayed by a host of

procedural complexities.

Meanwhile, a new and potentially more threatening situation had, after a long gestation, finally matured. The primary union linkage in Atlanta was the Atlanta Residential Carpenters Union. However, in what appeared to be a coup on the part of the North Georgia Building and Construction Trades Council (BCTC), all of the carpenters hired by VICI were from the Commercial Carpenters Union. The residential carpenters -- who were not members of the BCTC and were not on good terms with it -- were furious and threatened to withdraw from participation in the project. This was doubly serious in view of the fact that 70% of the participants were being trained in carpentry, and all of their practical experience was being gained on residential properties. This dispute virtually paralyzed work progress and jeopardized VICI participants' prospects for being indentured into the residential carpenters union. The issue remained unresolved, despite limited intervention by the National Carpenters Union and the somewhat reluctant involvement of the CETA prime sponsor. The LMA's apparent slow progress on the work orders occasioned another dispute between the prime sponsor and the LMA. CETA complained that the work crews were slow and inefficient, while the LMA alleged the Bureau of Building's work orders were too extensive and often understated actual damage and estimates of effort required to repair them.

Another problem in this vein concerned the question of the projected number of houses to be completed during the life

of the project. CETA had originally proposed 100 houses. However, the Urban League termed that number "ridiculous" and reduced it to 54. At one point, the Bureau of Buildings said 25 was a more reasonable estimate. But an agreement on goals was postponed due to the prime sponsor's delay in meeting with the Bureau of Buildings. By June, CPPV was involved in urging all parties to develop a mutually acceptable work schedule, and, by August, a schedule for 35 to 40 completions was developed.

The Atlanta VICI program's primary problems could be traced to the nature of the linkage among its key organizations. CETA, the Urban League, the Bureau of Buildings and the union organizations had all struggled with each other on different issues long before this project. As a result, only a rather fragile entente cordiale existed between them as the VICI program was mounted. That coalition could not sustain intense stresses, and it frequently became contentious.

The prime sponsor's reluctance to respond adequately to the LMA's funding needs clearly contributed to the LMA's financial hardships. On the other hand, the LMA wasn't as responsible as it might have been. It failed to document accurately verbal understandings with the prime sponsor, and on at least one occasion it issued checks on the supposition that CETA funding was on the way.

The complexity of the city's mechanisms for work provision and funding presented another problem. Laws and policies designed to protect public funds and to stimulate public representation in the expenditure of those funds (i.e., the City

Council's deliberations before approving the CD funds) introduced delays not encountered in other cities.

However, in Atlanta, as in other VICI sites, despite the problems and disputes that swirled around the program's management, in the day-to-day interaction of youth and journeymen, there were consistent signs of improvement in participant skills and work habits. The work completed by the project seemed to be of a high level, and the relationships that developed between the journeymen and the youth were highly beneficial for the youth.

Donald Woods and others associated with the Atlanta Urban League regarded VICI's problems, particularly the debate over indirect costs, as crises but, at least in retrospect, CPPV staff members argue that the problems were not as potentially explosive as they appeared to VICI staff members. Indeed, some CPPV staff members argue that a certain level of tension between various actors may have helped sharpen and clarify goals and responsibilities, thus leading to a better program.

#### BROWARD COUNTY

By late October, the Broward County VICI project had selected 60 participants and had 33 more standing in reserve. The key administrative staff and journeymen had been in place since early October. In addition, the project had acquired the services of one CETA public service employee (PSE) enrollee to serve as a data collector, and another to serve as a materials purchaser and deliverer.

By November, the project had made arrangements for the delivery of a total of 50 hours of instruction to each student (donated by the Florida International University) in subjects related to unions and the world of work.

In a December report, CPPV noted that:

The Fort Lauderdale Housing Authority is providing more leadership and involvement than required by the submitted proposal. Its leadership is dedicated to training and improving housing conditions. The availability of their staff and economic resources has been a tremendous plus for the program.

Offsetting that fine start, however, were several problems that grew more serious daily. For one thing, the project's streetcorner recruitment strategy and limited screening policy resulted in a very high dropout rate -- one third in the first 45 days. Second, the area HUD office claimed the VICI project violated the Davis-Bacon Act, which required payment of local prevailing wages on federally financed construction work. HUD threatened to cut off funding to the Fort Lauderdale Housing Authority, the local VICI work providing agency, if it was not assured of compliance. Third, BETA (The Broward Employment and Training Administration), which served as the LMA, was finding recruitment ever more difficult and, in late November, it requested an expansion of its target area. Further, staff seemed to be turning over at an unusually high rate. Fifth, before the year was out, the prime and the work provider began to express the first of a series of complaints regarding each other's intent, capability and performance.

Some of the increasing strain between these two organi-

zations was relieved through a revision in the procedure for assigning work orders. In the original method, FLHA would refer work orders to the project's administrative staff, a somewhat circuitous routing. In the revised format, orders were sent directly to the journeymen for estimates and forwarded from them to the Project Operations Manager for assignment.

However, FLHA was raising increasingly serious complaints about the performance of VICI participants and staff. The Director of FLHA cited numerous tenant complaints and fears regarding participant behavior on the work site. BETA replied that the fears were unwarranted. Privately, at first, and less privately later, the Director of FLHA complained that BETA had a history of ineffective motivation of youth project participants and openly complained that BETA was an inappropriate vehicle for VICI.

In February, still unsatisfied as to VICI's compliance with the Davis-Bacon Act, the area HUD office cut the flow of modernization funds (approximately \$800,000) to FLHA, forcing FLHA to suspend partially its provision of work orders. This, in turn, forced BETA to begin a search for an auxillary work provider, and to subsist temporarily on one-family residential repair.

In March, FLHA withdrew completely from the project -- a serious blow, but one matched by equally traumatic internal changes within VICI. That same period saw the resignation of the VICI Director and the BETA Youth Programs Director. The VICI Operations Manager (himself tentatively considering

resignation) was elevated to the position of VICI Director, and the VICI secretary was promoted and subsequently removed. Thus, the program went into the month of April with an almost completely new cast of key characters, a broken linkage with a key organization and no clear ideas regarding the ultimate implementation of its mission.

In April, BETA entered into discussions with the Seminole Indian tribe regarding transplanting VICI to perform on the Seminole Hollywood reservation. After a good deal of work, and several sessions with CPPV staff, BETA and the Seminoles developed an at least minimally acceptable project proposal and schedule and convinced CPPV of their intent to renew the project.

However, FLHA suddenly changed its mind and decided that it wished to remain the work providing agency. Any concern or misgivings CPPV might have had about this eleventh hour reversal were laid aside when the Broward County Board of Commissioners rejected the Seminole proposal (for reasons having to do with an ongoing tax dispute with the tribe rather than the substance of the Seminole proposal). However, before FLHA's status as work provider could be officially reinstated, both CPPV and OYP insisted that the Davis-Bacon issue and the availability of funds be clarified and documented..

The effect of these disruptions was exacerbated in May by the departure of yet another VICI director and in June of another VICI secretary.

Nonetheless, by the end of May the thorny David-Bacon

issue had been resolved. CPPV had taken the lead in seeking a solution, but ultimately a chance meeting brought a solution; a visitor from DOL learned of the problem and prevailed on an Assistant Secretary of HUD to send a telegram ending the dispute. By June, it appeared that the antagonism between BETA and FLHA had subsided, and the project was beginning to work rather well, according to CPPV staff. HUD had not yet approved the allocation of modernization funds to FLHA, and work continued with funding from FLHA, but in relative terms, CPPV staff would soon regard the months of May through September as an "idyllic period" for the Broward program.

In late September, however, the relationship flew apart again in a surprisingly informal way. By chance, the FLHA director informed a mid-level VICI staff member of his decision to withdraw again from participation in the project. The FLHA director attributed this decision to a complete lack of funds, along with HUD's refusal to provide guarantees and its insistence on what he regarded as unnecessary refinements in architectural drawings. Thus, in September 1979, BETA had to locate a new work providing agency for the VICI program.

Not surprisingly, BETA staff members were bitter about their relationship with FLHA, but VICI staff members complained about the erratic and highly political styles displayed by the directors of both FLHA and BETA. VICI staff also complained about the nature of the work provided, arguing it was of variable quality and sometimes didn't permit suitable skills progression. VICI staff also said FLHA chronically garbled

orders for the materials supplied by the housing authority -- a problem rooted, others believe, in FLHA's lack of construction experience and serious understaffing.

FLHA, on the other hand, cited its dissatisfaction -- shared with HUD -- with the slow progress and the "rotten attitudes" of the participants. FLHA complaints extended to BETA's "mismanagement" and to the extremely high turnover rates among key VICI personnel and within the participant roster.

One former VICI staffer, while complaining that the FLHA was poorly managed, had some sympathy for its Director, theorizing that he and BETA were both victims of a racist and largely uncaring City Commission, concerned only with conserving public funds and holding taxes down.

Certainly, FLHA was rightly concerned about the puzzlingly high rates of departure among VICI staff, but in any comparison of organizational effectiveness between the prime and the FLHA, at least in terms of VICI, BECA would appear to be a sure winner, despite FLHA's insistence that it should have had complete control of the project from the start. For example, the Housing Authority Director has stated that certain FLHA accounting difficulties were traceable to his decision to obligate \$30,000 in non-VICI-related funds in a manner that was in direct violation of city purchasing directives. His "calculated risk" that subsequent HUD funding would replace the money was frowned upon by both the city and the area HUD, according to BETA and FLHA officials. Furthermore, several key VICI staff members claim

that FLHA's sudden withdrawal was their first inkling that there was a fiscal problem of that magnitude, and they contend that the FLHA Director had played the situation too close to his vest.

Much of the conflict that was a characteristic of the VICI program in Broward County can be traced to the nature of the county government. Each of the agencies involved in VICI had separate agendas and needs, and there was no strong executive branch in the county government with the power needed to achieve unity. Thus, conflicting organizational goals and personalities often could not be harmonized unless CPPV or other outside forces intervened.

By early September 1979, the Broward VICI program had identified a county community development organization as its new work providing agency. VICI staff was developing a new proposal and a new timetable to reflect the changed relationships. And staff members were also wondering what sort of relationship would emerge between the program and its new work provider.

#### CHICAGO

Chicago VICI's problems, like the Chicago program itself, were complex and circular. The myriad problems were political, managerial and occasionally even meteorological.

The beginnings of the Chicago project were auspicious: by mid-October, the Chicago Ventures Program had screened and started 18 participants at the Pilsen site. Between 20

and 30 more were ready to go to work as soon as final conveyance on three work sites took place. Ten journeymen had been hired and were being trained. Interior demolition and cleaning had started in November at a six-unit apartment building on the Pilsen site, and, as promised, the Mayor's Office of Manpower (MOM) executed a management subcontract with the Department of Human Services (DHS). A VICI steering committee was formed, consisting of representatives from the two VICI sites and the DHS.

However, even at this early stage, CPPV staff members expressed reservations about the Chicago program's ability to develop strong administrative techniques. Moreover, there was additional concern regarding the slow pace of both Pilsen's recruiting efforts and Lawndale's movement toward closure on the three work sites.

In the fall of 1978, a number of troubling administrative delays began to arise. The testing and screening linkage -- the Apprenticeship Information Center -- was unable to carry out its responsibility for GATB and BOLT testing, and a backlog began to develop. It totalled approximately 80 persons by late December. As expected, the VICI Project Coordinator resigned in mid-December, and DHS was alarmingly slow to fill this vital position. A counselor filled the position for several weeks despite CPPV's insistence that a new coordinator be appointed immediately.

The new Project Coordinator appointed in late January faced several fairly serious problems which had worsened during the one-month administrative gap. First, the process of col-

lecting, processing and transmitting data was seriously out of kilter. Second, the development of the major waiting list had reached a virtual standstill. Third, the project was very far behind in reaching its self-imposed quota of 30% female participants. Finally, there were significant logistical and administrative problems regarding the procurement of materials and supplies and the preparation fo vouchers and payrolls.

At first the change in VICI administration seemed to promise that attention would be focused on these problems. However, by February, despite much work on a revised management plan by the VICI advisory committee, and intense examination of the problems by DHS and CPPV staff, there had been no real turnaround in the bulk of VICI's difficulties. The waiting list remained in a holding pattern. Although staff efforts managed to bring three-quarters of the participant and job-cost data up to date, the information wasn't sent to CPPV.

The onset of winter brought two major surprises to the troubled program. Chicago experienced some of the worst blizzard in recent memory, disrupting operations of the program. Moreover, Jane Byrne upset Mayor Michael Bilandic in the March mayoral primary and was elected Mayor in April. Her upset victory over the regular Democratic organization and the ensuing replacement of its army of patronage workers with new cadre of city officials placed in jeopardy the somewhat fragile coalition of forces involved in Chicago's VICI program. The change in cast of characters also delayed attempts to resolve VICI's growing problems.

New problems -- and new permutations of old problems -- continued to arise. Because of a dispute concerning DHS's reluctance to allow cost overruns, the architectural service under contract to DHS's housing resource center refused to turn over its final drawings until it was paid for its work. And, at the Pilsen site, a complex set of problems led to three "job actions." These were instituted separately and sequentially by the three categories of project personnel: participants, administrative staff and journey persons. Chronically delayed payrolls and violation of work rules were the causes specifically cited for the actions, which included strikes and picketing, but steadily declining morale had created an atmosphere in which people were no longer willing to work together to solve problems.

Many of the problems were related to DHS's time-consuming procedures for payment. In an attempt to resolve these problems, DHS instituted a policy of non-audited prepayment of vouchers. Ultimately, the prepayment policy would prove to be more dangerous than the disease it was intended to cure; however, and it appeared to spark an immediate turnaround as cash began to flow more readily to the delegate agencies and subcontractors.

That improvement, together with CPPV's constant attention, brought some uplift in morale at the work sites. Moreover, CPPV seemed to have sparked a renewed interest on the part of the prime sponsor and DHS in correcting the project's management and administrative problems. By April much project data had been brought up to date and sent to CPPV, and, by May, 14

participants had been indentured into the carpenter's union apprenticeship program.

Indeed, CPPV staff perceived a significant improvement in program operations during the months of March, April and May. Much of this was due to creative responses to journeymen who had adapted the program to difficult circumstances of the preceding winter. When there was no heat or light at work sites, for example, they developed projects to be done in a classroom.

However, despite the apparent progress, the problems of data collection and management grew steadily worse. The VICI staff's effort to bring their reports up to date did not result in a permanent commitment to timeliness. Moreover, CPPV was raising increasingly serious objections to the inaccuracies and substantive deficiencies it found in the reports. CPPV maintained that the data problems were merely symptomatic of greater administrative and managerial ills. Moreover, by this point, the steering committee's earlier concensus had disintegrated and as conflicts occurred much of the cooperative spirit was gone.

By June, the program started deteriorating overall. Work site progress had slowed considerably due to new breakdowns in the supply, logistical and funding processes administered by the Lawndale Peoples Planning and Action Conference, the primary project operator. CPPV began to find instances of trainees sitting around with no work available. CPPV was finding it increasingly difficult to get any meaningful response

to its inquiries to DHS and the LPPAC. As a result, CPPV brought its concerns to the attention of DOL, and in July 1979 CPPV and DOL began a formal review of the Chicago project's problems. They officially requested DHS to submit a revised management plan to address the deficiencies they had identified.

In a meeting with the newly appointed DHS Commissioner and in a July letter requesting the new plan, CPPV raised four major concerns. First, the research data was typically late, inaccurate, unusable, or all three. And CPPV complained DHS did not appear at all committed to making corrections or explanations. Second, as of late July, the project had not developed a comprehensive strategy for participant placement (although the Chicago United Organization had earlier drafted a basic placement plan). Indeed, the youth indentured in May were slow to receive any placement services. Third, recruitment for the waiting list was very far behind schedule, and the female recruitment goal of one third of the participants was not being met. And, fourth, CPPV raised a broad complaint about project administration, work site operations, general organization and a lack of cooperation.

DHS responded by citing normal attrition and lack of continued candidate interest as factors in the waiting list recruitment problem. And, surprisingly, it issued a pointed disavowal of the one-third female goal and of any ultimate responsibility for participant placement. Moreover, DHS stated its belief that CPPV was a functionary without real

authority and refused to develop or submit a new management plan.

CPPV responded with an amplification of its original complaints and a series of document excerpts demonstrating that it did have the authority to request the revision. Further, it sought to make it clear that the project's continuation rested squarely on CPPV's and DOL's acceptance of that plan.

In August, amid steadily worsening management and morale problems, LPPAC responded to pressures by replacing its Project Director with a former lead journeyman from the Lawndale site. The key to this change was what at first seemed to be a \$50,000 discrepancy on LPPAC's books. The amount was later estimated to be closer to \$3,000 and to be the result of disputes concerning the allowability of certain categories of expenses. But the confusion clearly signaled the need for a radical restructuring of the project's administrative policies and hierarchy and dramatically undercut any basis for DHS's refusal to consider radical reform.

Although their interaction is complex, the roots of the Chicago project's problems are reasonably clear. At an early period in its development, and over a relatively short time, the project withstood a sweeping -- and nearly total -- change in key personnel most directly responsible for performance. The new people clearly felt little responsibility for previous understandings or linkages. Moreover, they did not share their predecessors' sense of the project's purposes and goals. And

And they were tremendously confused by (and resentful of) CPPV's role in the process. The weather only served to further the resulting administrative deterioration, or at least to provide a convenient rationale for failure.

Another problem was that the Chicago VICI structure was so complex and ponderous that deterioration -- or improvement -- was difficult to perceive. Communication within and between the various agencies and organizations involved in VICI were not of the highest quality. These "micro level linkages" are one key to Chicago's difficulties. Paradoxically, however, another key is the fact that, to some extent, the city is somewhat "over linked." It appeared that DHS and LPPAC's ties to each other were too extensive to allow for objective considerations of each other's strengths and weaknesses. It also appeared that the Lawndale administrators had not exercised much regard for the required separation of VICI's financial and personnel resources from their other projects. This severely hampered project operation under the former LPPAC Project Director, who, it seems clear, was required to share his time and his staff with other operations. There was a strong feeling among some key Chicago personnel that the level of commingling would be even higher if "LPPAC thought they could get away with it." Yet LPPAC was the only politically powerful community-based organization in Lawndale, so it was difficult for outsiders to contest it.

Chicago's powerful Mayor's Office of Manpower historically has had a close relationship with the regional and national

offices of DOL. Thus, the VICI program was one of the first instances where MOM was facing outside pressure to make changes or risk losing certain federal funds. It would not be clear, however, whether MOM, any more than LPPAC or other Chicago organizations, would be responsive to outside pressures.

By September 1979, the continued existence of the Chicago VICI project was in doubt. Both DOL and CPPV had rejected DHS's revised management plan and insisted on a new one. At that point, there were several indications that Chicago's prime sponsor and the LMA were becoming increasingly willing to simply drop the entire project.

#### MILWAUKEE

CPPV had high expectations for the Milwaukee proposal, and, true to its early promise, the Milwaukee VICI project has generally gone forward in a very smooth and straightforward manner. Disruptions have been minor and shortfalls have been few.

During the period between the completion of the planning stage and the implementation of the program, there were several minor administrative and personality skirmishes among staff members at OIC, which would be the LMA. These were thought to have been resolved by the appointment of a journeyman to the post of VICI project director. However, so that the director's strong construction background was not compromised by his lack of administrative experience, OIC appointed a co-director for management. This arrangement created more problems than it solved and

was later ended. Another important beginning step was the assignment of the first work crews to begin renovation of the OIC building; thus, the prospect of delays in work provision was circumvented by launching the program close to home.

By October, 18 participants divided into three work crews had begun five emergency home repair projects. Three journeymen had been hired, and three more were awaiting hiring pending recruitment of additional participants. The recruitment effort had not been as successful as the prime of the LMA had hoped. Original plans had called for a full complement of 60 persons by this time, but that figure was not reached until the following month.

In its first two months, the VICI project developed a number of highly effective management and monitoring procedures. Chief among these were specific processes for procurement, journeyman orientation and training, data collection and collation, and screening of applicants. In November, the project developed an effective mechanism for tracing the progress of each recruit through the recruitment and screening process.

In December, the project was running ahead of the projected rate of initiation of work orders, and the attrition waiting list had been completed. The major negative developments were a slowdown in recruitment for the major waiting list and a decrease in participant attendance -- both attributed to the onset of the particularly harsh winter.

In January, ten participants were enrolled in the apprenticeship tutorial and orientation program conducted by BIGSTEP. In

February, the project obtained a unique distinction when it received a license as a Home Improvement Contractor, granted by the Milwaukee Building Inspection Department.

In this period, the staff developed a fairly sophisticated systems model of the recruiting process as a means of rationalizing procedures with a major waiting list. The most significant problem encountered in this period was a higher-than-expected rate of participant attrition. By mid-April, there had been 44 terminations. Seven of these were for various forms of misconduct, and another seven for absenteeism. Nearly half of the participants negatively terminated and served less than ten working days in the program, and CPPV interpreted this to mean that the first two weeks served as a de facto screening process. By June, an improved screening process had some slight success in reducing negative terminations.

In May and June, the project began to bear down on the problem of placements. It also made an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to reconvene the Planning Task Force, the highly effective organization that had been instrumental in the development of the original Milwaukee VICI concept. The PTF was supposed to work on the development of a placement strategy. The next step included development of an assessment/preparation process for VICI graduates, and the institution of an information campaign to alert employers to the program's output.

Milwaukee's only significant problem was in the nature and quality of some of its linkages. When program operators sought to call upon the linkages outlined in Milwaukee's proposal, they found these linkages proved to be more apparent than real in

some cases. The relationship with the Milwaukee Area Training College, for example, seems to have been based on several misunderstandings. The somewhat free and flexible nature of the agreement as reflected in the initial proposal evaporated once a new MATC director took over. Suddenly, there was talk of costs, quotas and the like. According to VICI staff, OIC's initial intention to assume responsibility for intake recruitment and screening was never fully realized and in time was turned back to the VICI. In retrospect, it seems too many items were left as personal understandings rather than as organizational commitments, so when the planners left the scene and were replaced by program operators, the latter had to make numerous adjustments.

The relationship between VICI and BIGSTEP also underwent some deterioration. VICI staff neither appreciated nor welcomed BIGSTEP's role as a politically acceptable channel for the introduction of participants to the unions, while BIGSTEP's director resented this attitude.

#### NEWARK

When the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training (MOET), the Neward prime sponsor, learned that the proposed VICI program had been funded, it moved rapidly toward implementation. As October 1978 began, a program director, ten journeymen painters, and other staff members had been hired, and that month 93 youth were screened and designated as eligible for VICI. Fifty three

were placed in the program, and 40 were put on a waiting list. Participants painted seven one-bedroom apartments in public housing projects as well as assorted public facilities in October, using paint provided by the Newark Housing and Redevelopment Authority. Apprenticeship classes offered by the painters union began on October 3 at Exxex Vocational School, and attendance was mandatory for VICI enrollees. Thus, when MOET's director of the Office of Youth Services resigned on December 15, the program was in place.

While the program geared up quickly, however, several problems also emerged quickly. These included recruitment of Hispanics, difficulties in accurately completing CPPV forms, and divisions of opinion in the local VICI staff.

Initial recruitment efforts failed to turn up meaningful numbers of Hispanic youth. MOET began to prepare recruiting literature in Spanish, and it contacted local Hispanic organizations. But as Hispanic recruitment continued to lag in November, MOET concluded that the basic problem was too few Hispanic youths lived in the Central Ward, the recruiting target area. In December, Newark succeeded in getting CPPV and OYP approval to expand its target area.

In addition, when a new staff position of research coordinator was created to help Newark keep up with CPPV forms, VICI hired its first Hispanic staff member, who could then provide translation services and help attract more Hispanics to a program whose journeymen were largely white and whose office staff was largely black.

As a result of these efforts, there was some improvement in recruiting Hispanics, and by the end of January 1979, the program had 55 participants, including seven Hispanics and 12 females. The overwhelming majority of VICI participants in Newark were black, reflecting the Central Ward's population.

Newark also worked at recruiting enough young people to fill the "major waiting list" sought by CPPV for research purposes. Working with only three staff members, VICI developed a list of 210 youth prior to the March 30, 1979 deadline; it would be the only VICI site to complete the full list.

In addition to continuing to paint public housing projects, in early 1979 the work crews initiated work at abandoned and tax-delinquent residential buildings acquired by the city, such as a high-rise apartment building on Clinton Avenue. This property, managed by the city's Department of Public Works, provided for greater skill development because of the amount of preparatory work and repairs needed before painting could begin.

While the VICI program seemed to be operating smoothly and doing significant amounts of painting, shortly after it began a split developed in the staff and it widened sharply as winter arrived. There were two camps: the journeymen at the sork sites and the counseling and administrative staff in a downtown office building. The journeymen took a hardheaded practical view of thw world and insisted the youth must quickly adapt to the realities of the working world if they were to have any hope of entering it. The counselors argued that the youth were generally from troubled family situations and needed sup-

portive services and understanding rather than harsh treatment. The journeymen emphasized work and production; the counselors talked about counseling and empathy.

The split was allowed to widen because of the program director. He was a journeyman painter with little managerial or teaching experience. He tended to spend most of his time with the journeymen at the work sites rather than in the downtown office. He was far more interested in the problems of a particular painting assignment than in the work of the counselors or the overall direction of the program. He identified completely with the views of the journeymen and was most comfortable with them.

Thus, he was insensitive to the problems emerging or the role he might play in healing any divisions. Indeed, he virtually abrogated leadership of the program, amid much joking by the downtown staff. The program was administered by the lead journeymen in the field and the program assistant in the office.

By December, 1978, CPPV had recognized the split and met with the Newark VICI staff on January 10, to discuss the need for a cohesive staff effort. This and other meetings led to efforts to close the breach through increased communications. Bi-weekly staff meetings were scheduled to improve communications, and in April 1979 counselors devised a schedule for visiting participants on the work sites. Nonetheless, the divisions were never really healed, and there would be an enduring dichotomy in the Newark program along with a leadership

vacuum. The manager and his journeyman ran a painting program in various city properties, while the administrative staff carried out counseling and placement activities in a downtown office building. Each site went about its business fairly independently, with no signs of either rapprochement or polarization.

Despite this, the program ran smoothly for two reasons. One was the involvement of MOET's director. He made it clear that he cared about the success of the program, and he used his position to clear obstacles in its path. His staff was always in close contact with the program. The second important factor was the strong linkage to the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades (IBPAT), District Council No. 10. The union took its commitment seriously, and its business manager and apprentice coordinator worked closely with VICI. Indeed, the union's apprentice coordinator got to know virtually each youth in the program. The union even provided special programs with its own funds, such as a January 27, 1979 seminar on safety in the painting trade.

The VICI youth were required to attend the classes sponsored by the union for its apprentices twice a week from 6:30 to 9:30. However, these classes were suspended for the summer months, and the participation of VICI youth was not continued when classes resumed in the fall of 1979 because of disciplinary problems. The painters union was also deeply involved in placing youth. Says one VICI staff member, "The union is beautiful. This has to do with the person of John Ginder (the apprentice coordinator)." But the program benefitted from the relationship

between the union's leadership and Harry Wheeler, director of MOET. The two organizations had worked together on previous employment programs. Wheeler had agreed that the director of VICI would be a member of the painters union, and both took their VICI commitments seriously.

As the spring of 1979 arrived, the VICI program moved from interior to exterior work and gained public attention by painting outdoor swimming pools in the Central Ward. And as the program progressed, VICI staff turned to placement.

One large potential problem caught their eye early on. District Council No. 10 encompassed several counties in northern and central New Jersey, so its efforts to place youth could lead to jobs well outside of their home neighborhoods -- as far south, for example, as Trenton. Moreover, it was clear the economically declining area in which the youth lived was not likely to generate many jobs. Rather, the demand for painters would be outside the old central city of Newark, in surrounding parts of New Jersey. These were archetypical sprawling bedroom communities which lacked public transportation.

Thus, it seemed clear that to get to work the youth would have to be able to drive. In May, 1979, the VICI staff contacted the state Department of Motor Vehicles and the city Board of Education to discuss a drivers education course. In June, the staff began to develop its own drivers ed curriculum, and instructions began in September 1979. Thus, there was hope that many youth would obtain a drivers license. Clearly, many youth

also might need their own cars in order to take jobs far from home, but not surprisingly, finding a solution to this for youth earning VICI wages eluded the program staff.

The Newark VICI staff began to develop a placement strategy in the spring of 1979. By then CPPV staff had become quite concerned, since Newark's economy was continuing its long-term decline, and the city announced early in 1979 that it would lay off substantial numbers of employees at the city's Housing and Redevelopment Authority and Department of Public Works, both of which had been regarded as potential placement sites for VICI. In addition, although District Council No. 10 had been enjoying a prosperous period, Council staff members noted that new business seemed to be slow in developing in early 1979.

Nonetheless, the VICI staff moved aggressively on placement. In May, they initiated job development activity and pre-employment counseling for youth who had been in the program at least seven months. The prime sponsor was unable to complete its review of VICI placement plans because the prime was preoccupied with preparations for the summer youth employment program, but CPPV visited Newark twice in June to help with the placement strategy.

While the placement strategy was not formally approved by the prime sponsor until August, as summer began VICI staff began to make contacts with the business community and developed an exemplary record in placement. In June, the program placed six participants; five became apprentices while one registered

full-time in a trade school. In July, 17 participants were placed in either apprenticeships or painting-related jobs. During August, seven more youth were placed, including two youth who had been placed and laid off by their first employers. Thus, by Labor Day 1979, the Newark VICI program had placed 34 youth, making it the best VICI site in terms of placement rates, with the highest number of apprenticeship placements. (27).

In many respects, the Newark program was testament to the usefulness of linkages that underpinned the VICI program model. There were, to be sure, continuing problems in recruiting Hispanics and females. But as the August CPPV monthly report noted:

...the Newark demonstration fulfills its obligations and remains an exemplary demonstration. The Ventures Advisory Board, Prime Sponsor, International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council #10, and work providers work in close harmony to ensure that a high level of operation continues.

The program's relative success also reflected the commitment and scrutiny provided by the head of MOET. Harry Wheeler made sure the staff did its best, even in the face of a weak program director.

Few at CPPV would have expected much success in Newark after reading its original proposal. But intensive redrafting and rethinking by MOET at the behest of CPPV led to a more sound proposal, and the deep involvement of MOET and the painters union made it work. The questions to be answered over the longer term were whether this involvement would remain at a high level,

and whether it would be sufficient to overcome and surmount the problems presented by Newark's declining economy, the transportation difficulties and the limited capacity of the area to absorb youth who were training in only one trade, painting.

#### NEW HAVEN

New Haven's VICI program did not experience any abrupt transition as it moved from the planning stage to implementation in the fall of 1978 because the central actors did not change. One of the prime sponsor's two principle VICI planners was named director of the program, and the other main planner became the sponsor's liaison with the program as well as an informal advisor. Thus, there would be no need to explain the proposal to newcomers hired to operate the program, nor would there be an interregnum when no one was in control of it.

While the continuing involvement of Connelly and Peterson minimized transitional problems, New Haven's VICI program encountered many of the startup problems experienced elsewhere, most notably difficulties in recruiting participants and orchestrating the flow of resources.

In the fall of 1978, staff was hired and a recruitment drive began. "We did all the normal procedures," Tom Peterson said, "But there were less kids than we thought." By the end of October, only 32 trainees had begun work renovating low-income scatter-site housing, and by the end of November there were only 24 participants. In December, the program finally reached its

full complement of 60, but enrollment of females fell short of expectations. Recruitment would remain a continuing problem for the program.

So would coordination of the actors and resources. During the planning period, CPPV was concerned over the complexities of New Haven's plan to rely on six work providing agencies. Problems quickly emerged, although not for the reasons expected. Trade unions launched a strike against the Housing Authority to protest the use of temporary CETA PSE workers, and this led to litigation. As a result of the strike, no work was provided by the Housing Authority, which was to have been a major work provider. Instead, VICI had to rely more heavily on smaller agencies.

By the time the dispute was resolved in mid-1979, a good deal of work had been made available by the other work providers, so the VICI program did not initiate any work at Housing Authority sites. While the Housing Authority strike required a major effort to find enough work at first, the VICI program seemed to have adjusted. But then the inventory of suitable work sites dropped to critical levels in August, and the VICI staff had to put out an urgent call to the work providing agencies to help the program avoid running out of work sites by late September 1979.

The large cast of characters also contributed to other problems. A good deal of work was to be performed by subcontractors and often it was not completed on schedule, disrupting plans for VICI work crews. Moreover, two work sites had to be put on hold when minority subcontractors were unable to obtain

bonding. Late in August 1979, the intervention of the prime sponsor and the VICI advisory board finally succeeded in getting the bonding requirements waived for these two sites. Meanwhile, the program had been promised two vans by the prime sponsor, but only one would eventually be provided, leaving the program strapped for transportation. This resulted in irregularities in the delivery of materials to various sites. The work providers were also occasionally late in providing materials and supplies.

The program was able to surmount many of these problems and operate rather smoothly because of two factors: the co-operation of the linkages and the commitment of the staff.

Among the linkages, the trade unions helped with the early screening and hiring of journeymen, and their involvement extended through the program into placement efforts. The work providing agencies also were quite helpful because VICI seemed to be serving them in precisely the self-interested way that the program model envisioned. According to a staff member of Neighborhood Preservation, Inc., one of the work providers:

I had much apprehension because of our experience with summer work crews which never did very much. But I've been pleased with VICI because it's not burdensome and it makes me a hero to some people without doing anything.

The one linkage that had not provided much to the program, VICI staff members said, was the education linkage, but they did not see this as an important lapse at first. As they turned to placement, however, in mid-1979, they began to see the education

linkage as more important because the youth needed preparation for GED examinations.

The linkages were joined together in an advisory board whose monthly meetings, beginning in October 1978, were well attended and well regarded by those on it. "The meetings are good; they have a purpose," said a staff member of Neighborhood Housing, another of the work providers.

In general, the New Haven VICI program was highly regarded by those involved with it. A Neighborhood Preservation staff member said, for example, that "VICI compares well with regular contractors as far as finishing the job in the right period of time."

And the major factor in its success was generally thought to be its dedicated staff. "The management is on top of everything," a trade union official noted, while a Neighborhood Housing staff member said, "I think CETA stinks -- the people they send to us are no good. So why is this working when adult CETA isn't? The staff is always around; so that's the secret: good supervision." CPPV staff reached the same conclusion in its March 1979 monthly report. It said of New Haven, "The staff is enthusiastic, hard working, and committed to the job at hand. The results can be seen in the quality of the program."

The program director brought to the program a strong dedication and a personal interest in each participant. While her deep involvement in various aspects of the program violated administrative theories, it made for effective control. And the construction savvy she lacked at the outset was provided

by the assistant director, who formerly had supervised a large staff of journeymen as head of maintenance for the local Housing Authority. He brought not only dedication and strong construction skills but also a certain ambition that strengthened his commitment to make the program work. Other staff members were also highly regarded by CPPV.

However, the New Haven VICI staff had two significant concerns in their dealings with CPPV. At the outset, the research requirements seemed onerous. In particular, the assistant director felt the estimation tasks were taking too much of his time and effort, and he sought additional funds for help in this area. Moreover, New Haven staff members, more than those at other VICI sites, expressed a good deal of frustration at what they saw as CPPV's failure to communicate developments among the sites. Thus New Haven VICI staff members toyed with arranging their own meetings or starting their own Newsletter to facilitate the exchange of ideas among VICI sites. A good deal of New Haven's concern was assuaged by the June VICI conference convened by CPPV and by the VICI newsletter CPPV launched in September 1979.

While the VICI staff had some success in improving the orchestration of their disparate resources, they were unable to solve the continuing problems of recruitment. However, the New Haven CETA found a lack of eligible applicants for other New Haven CETA youth programs as well.

In the spring of 1979, it became clear that an extensive recruiting campaign would have to be started. And VICI staff

took aggressive action. They helped place an article on a VICI crew in a local newspaper. They prepared public service announcements for local radio and television stations, and a staff member arranged an appearance on a local television station to discuss VICI. Nonetheless, the low census and under-enrollment of females continued.

In June, New Haven began moving on placement. Several local contractors were contacted by project staff and two contractors made site visits. One of them hired two participants. One contractor was contacted by a staff member of a work providing agency and agreed to hire a carpentry participant. In July, the placement campaign continued, and a formal plan was developed at CPPV's request specifying in detail the activities, timeliness and goals that were to guide the placement campaign. There were six placements in July and in August, four participants found construction jobs while one left the program to enter college.

However, early on GATB testing policies had become an issue which would later hamper the placement efforts. In early 1979, eleven VICI participants were told they had been eliminated for consideration for carpentry apprenticeship positions as a result of GATB examinations taken during VICI intake. These youth learned they were neither eligible to retake the GATB nor able to obtain a waiver from it. VICI staff members and CPPV argued that results of GATB tests taken prior to completion of VICI should not be an impediment to participants, and in March the executive director of New Haven's CETA asked the Connecticut

Employment Service to waive the one-year waiting period for 'retaking the GATB in order to help the eleven applicants whose test scores had been too low. In addition, a special effort was made to assist these applicants to find jobs as well as to become prepared for the next application period for the apprenticeship program.

New Haven CETA officials met with the city's Department of Employment Services to resolve the GATB problems, but while the prime sponsor had received assurances from the state employment service in the spring that all eleven applicants would be retested, the local job service staff was unwilling to accept this decision. The prime sponsor's executive director continued to seek a solution at the state level.

After a year of operation, the New Haven VICI staff was bringing the same strong commitment to placement that had characterized their efforts at each previous stage of the program. The New Haven program was generally regarded by CPPV as one of the best VICI programs, and its quality was a testament to its committed management as well as its firm linkages. In contrast to CPPV's deep involvement in the day-to-day operations of some VICI sites, in New Haven CPPV served largely as a sounding board. The New Haven VICI staff called CPPV's attention to problems they had perceived and proposed actions to deal with those problems. The major question which remained to be answered in New Haven was whether the relatively small local labor market could absorb significant numbers of VICI graduates.

## PHILADELPHIA

By late October, the Philadelphia VICI program had recruited and referred for screening 20 participants and had hired or identified the majority of their staff and journeypersons. More important, the project began this phase of its operation with a specific and widely shared commitment to the installation of effective administration, monitoring and operation procedures. The major problems in this early operational period resulted from delays in securing adequate architectural services and in closing on the work sites.

Initially, there had been a mild tug-of-war between the LMA's delegate agency (the Greater Philadelphia Federation of Settlements) and the Philadelphia Housing Development Corporation as to which organization would provide the architectural services. The PHDC prevailed, but the arrangement did not proceed smoothly. GPFS had several complaints regarding the quality of the services. In addition, there were numerous delays in the execution of contracts between GPFS and PHDC, and the Office of Housing and Community Development. The PHCD contract with GPFS wasn't signed until February 1979, and PHDC continued working with GPFS under a memorandum of understanding into early March.

By February 1979, the VICI project had identified, secured and started operations on four work sites, and the project had launched weekly participant counseling/training sessions. Most aspects of the project -- administrative and management, logistics and supply, work crew relations and linkages with other organizations -- were positive. However, each organization involved

in the project harbored some reservations regarding various aspects of the project. The LMA itself was chafing under the research and recruitment requirements. Given GPFS's structure, compilation of the required data meant a sacrifice in either counseling or recruitment time. This problem was later mitigated somewhat by the hiring of a part-time employee to compile data for CPPV. But GPFS viewed the major waiting list -- which it construed as a requirement -- as a major burden.

Moreover, because of GPFS's status as a representative of 15 neighborhood settlement houses, it inevitably confronted demands from the settlement houses for equal treatment as well as for attention to particular constituent concerns, so GPFS was required to walk a very fine line in administering the project. That balance was unsettled early in the VICI design phase when DOI and CPPV insisted that the project's geographic scope be limited to an area containing only four settlement houses. The fact that these were primarily in black areas led to criticism regarding the de facto exclusion of white, as well as some jealousies on the parts of excluded neighborhoods.

There was also a strong feeling among key staff that the recruitment procedures acted as a negative incentive, sending away three to four times as many candidates as it absorbed, with the feeling that the odds were against their selection. GPFS and its affiliate, the Franklin Foundation, were convinced that the chief purpose of a project of this nature was -- or should have been -- the "opening of doors to kids who have had too many doors slammed in their faces." This view, combined with an inherent suspicion of the validity and predictive usefulness of testing and screening, led to an emphasis on what one GPFS staffer called "virtual self-

selection by the kids."

That inclination was further strengthened by the GPFS staff's conviction that DOL and CPPV ground rules specifically prohibited them from doing anything "even remotely resembling 'creaming.'" As a result, GPFS staff felt that its testing and screening was not as rigorous as it has been at other sites.

Recruiting was further constrained by attitudinal and administrative factors. Even as late as February, despite its embrace of such aspects of the program as randomized enrollment GPFS could not commit itself to the entire VICI concept. This occasioned some foot dragging. Furthermore, two of the four project area settlement houses were having difficulties meeting their recruitment goals -- largely, GPFS believes, as a result of a certain lack of commitment by one and a lack of qualified candidates in the area of the other. And, finally, there were a number of bureaucratic complications in working with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Employment Security. Due to a combination of all these factors, the waiting list recruitment was several weeks behind by March of 1979.

Philadelphia's VICI staff was also very concerned about what it saw as an abysmally low level of skills possessed by its enrollees. While other VICI sites anticipated sharp limits on their enrollees' skills, and some viewed this as a challenge, Philadelphia saw it as a burden and an imposition. In fact, a comparison of average test scores recorded upon entry into the VICI program showed that youth in Philadelphia were at least as skilled as those in other sites. Indeed, Philadelphia enrollees had, on average, higher test scores than the youth at several other sites.

The unions, according to VICI staff, though relatively tolerant of the project and its goals, were united in their preference

for a three-to-one supervisory ratio. In fact, it was not possible to find anyone who felt that six-to-one was reasonable. Staff members at both the sponsor and the LMA have become convinced that the unions will not repeat this or similar experiments at that ratio. Conversely, there is also a feeling that union acquiescence to the VICI design requirements has, in the words of one, "softened the beachhead for ratios higher than the unions would have previously stood still for."

In March, the project added roofing as a new training area. And in August, bricklaying was added. At the same time, CPPV's concern was shifting toward the development of a comprehensive placement strategy and skills progression within each trade's training. By this time, the LMA had developed a reasonably well-integrated network of support services, chiefly an educational needs assessment delivery process and expanded participant counseling. And by June, work was proceeding on the formulation of a comprehensive strategy for placement, but three months later the strategy still hadn't progressed past the outline stage.

A major concern expressed by the Philadelphia VICI staff was what they saw as a special intensity with which their program was monitored by CPPV staff members located only blocks away. Although CPPV staff members do not perceive any special relationship with the VICI program located in the same city as CPPV's offices, GPFS felt they were "over oversighted." In fact, there did appear to be unique ties between CPPV and the Philadelphia VICI program, but they were encouraged by both sides. Proximity simply led to more frequent formal and informal communications: CPPV could easily bring visitors to the local VICI program, but the program could easily raise questions with CPPV staff. While contacts were more numerous, there

does not appear to have been any detectable effect on VICI operations nor any skewing of research.

Despite a significant improvement in Philadelphia VICI's attitude toward CPPV as 1979 progressed,..there was still some residual resentment had come to be focused on DOL as well. The LMA's board was angry in a somewhat diffuse way about the need for such activities as recruitment for the major waiting list. But the board's perspective reduced the danger that it might hold the staff responsible for a failure to meet recruitment goals. GPFS was also concerned that CPPV was not turning data back to the program in the intervals or amounts promised. Thus, the LMA saw itself as a huge "data plantation" toiling endlessly to churn it out, yet receiving little benefits for its efforts.

Overall, Philadelphia's problems were much milder than those affecting many other VICI sites. Despite GPFS's status as a constituent organization, which imposed a very different political reality than that confronting other LMA's, and despite some largely bureaucratic delays among its network of linkages, and an ally negative attitude on the part of the LMA, the Philadelphia VICI project appears to have emerged as a success. The relationship among supervisors and work crews, after an initially rocky start, has settled into a pattern of very close and intense--sometimes alarmingly intense--identification with particular sites, journeymen and crews.

#### SOUTH BRONX

The South Bronx VICI program was the last program to get started, and it remained one of the most troubled sites throughout much of 1979. Its original problems can be traced to a con-

flict unrelated to VICI, which held up the starting date several months, but after the VICI program began, its management was unable to resolve many of the severe operational problems it encountered.

Soon after CPPV and OYP had approved the South Bronx proposal, it was put into a state of suspended animation because the New York City Community Development Administration (CDA) alleged that there were fiscal irregularities at Operation Open City (OOC), the proposed LMA. The city suspended payments to OOC pending results of an audit, and the DOL also suspended payments to OOC, which had been running a large weatherization program in New York.

After lengthy negotiations, the chairman of OOC's board resigned and the executive director and fiscal officer were fired. The executive successor subsequently appealed her firing, which delayed appointment of a successor, while CDA required OOC to submit a reorganization plan and to provide assurances that it would have procedures to prevent future fiscal irregularities. The prime sponsor then formally redesignated Operation Open City as the LMA for VICI, and OOC sought to pick up the pieces of the program.

Late in December 1978, OOC reassembled as many of the people, properties and ideas as were still available. In December, a number of staff members were hired and 36 youth were enrolled. Buildings to be worked on were identified in the two target areas, and a number of meetings were held to prepare for the mid-January starting date.

On January 26, 1979, a press conference and official opening ceremonies were held for the VICI project, but in January only

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40 youth were enrolled instead of the 60 projected, and no work projects had actually begun. Moreover, there seemed to be some problems concerning the \$250,000 which the U.S. Community Services Administration (CSA) had pledged to the program to pay for materials and supplies. In addition, in early 1979, the landlord cancelled the program's lease on a building conveniently located one block from OOC's Bronx office because of the delayed funding. Also, the chairman of the Apprenticeship and Manpower Committee of the New York Building and Construction Trades Council had become ill, delaying referral of journeymen for jobs. And the city never provided the scaffolding and trucks needed to do the work. Thus, VICI was forced to borrow OOC's truck and scaffold whenever possible. Moreover, OOC was acting very cautiously, particularly on expenditures, because of its recent contretemps with the city government.

At first, CPPV was sympathetic. It recognized the problems OOC had to overcome as it launched its program. Moreover, in its report for January 1979, CPPV staff noted, "It is anticipated because of the complexity of New York City government that there will be startup problems." As of February 23, there were only 36 participants and nine journeymen. In March, however, the program reached its full complement of 60 youth, and VICI work crews seemed to be working on two work sites.

On March 15, CPPV staff met with the prime sponsor and LMA to discuss the slow startup process. The prime sponsor agreed to streamline the process of certifying youth as eligible for VICI. But the program continued to experience problems, long after the startup period. These fell into several categories having to do with finances, linkages and management.

The \$250,000 promised in writing by CSA was not forthcoming. CSA budget cuts made it impossible for city officials to wrest the funds from Washington. OOC was hard pressed from the outset because it had counted on these funds for supplies. In April, CDA provided a \$100,000 loan to the program to be repaid out of the CSA funds, and later it agreed to provide more if necessary. CPPV tried several approaches to pry loose the funds, and eventually CSA and U.S. Department of Energy funds were expected to provide the full \$250,000, but the failure of CSA to honor its commitment provided a financial burden which hampered early operations. In addition, the new city Commissioner of Employment refused to provide the seven CETA slots for VICI staff that his predecessor had pledged.

A second major problem area was the failure of linkages to materialize once the program began. Early problems in recruitment reflected the failure of the referral mechanism involving the Alfred E. Smith Vocational High School to produce many youths. To ease the recruitment problem for the major waiting list, CPPV's additional allocation of \$9,000 was divided between the two community groups which had been referring properties to the program: BRASH and Neighborhood Engage. Their efforts turned up 93 youth before the major waiting list was closed in June 1979.

Counseling and education were supposed to be provided by Hostos Community College, but its counseling program failed to get funding for several months, and there was no counseling linkage.

The most crucial failure in the linkages was the trade union connection. When the program sought to implement the linkages listed in the proposal, union officials felt there was no commitment. While trade unions in New York City had often been

uncooperative with CETA programs, the problem with VICI seemed to be a lack of understanding of the role they supposedly were committed to play. Eventually, the head of the New York City Department of Employment called the head of the Building and Construction Trades Council who, in turn, told his union locals to cooperate with the program. This resulted in a meeting with CPPV staff and assistance in recruiting journeymen. But CPPV staff felt the unions didn't understand that they had a continuing commitment to the program. The union leaders felt they had done what they were obliged to do. Later, the plasterers union would take several apprentices, but this was the result of an agreement worked out well after the program began operating, rather than a part of the original proposal.

The failure of the linkages to develop was most visible in the efforts to develop a VICI Advisory Board. The initial meeting was scheduled for June 13. It was poorly attended, as were VICI Advisory Board meetings held on July 11 and July 25. As CPPV's June report noted, "At this point interest on behalf of most linkages appear to be limited." And in July it added, "Minimal interest has been shown by the demonstration's linkages."

The program's head sought to connect with the unions and to develop alternatives to other linkages. One might ask how the proposal passed CPPV's rigorous review with linkages that never materialized. CPPV staff said the long delay in starting the program caused commitments to be eroded as organizations found other calls on their resources. Moreover, CPPV recognized the trade union commitment was always somewhat shallow. By contrast, Hostos Community College expected to be deeply involved, but it failed to get the funding it anticipated.

Another fundamental problem in the South Bronx was poor manage-

ment. The drafting of the proposal and early VICI operations were directed by the head of OOC's weatherization program in the Bronx. A veteran of OOC from its volunteer days, she was generally a disorganized administrator unable to set priorities. In an effort to give VICI its own identity and full-time management, a program coordinator was hired in May 1978, while the head of the weatherization program continued to hold the title of Bronx director of OOC. However, the VICI coordinator was to report directly to the head of OOC, not to the Bronx director. This potentially difficult organizational arrangement was only exacerbated by rivalry between these two OOC staff members. The Bronx director tried to exercise some control over VICI's resources if not its operations, while the VICI coordinator guarded his program's staff turf carefully.

While the VICI coordinator, formerly a city employee, had to contend with a difficult situation in terms of personalities and organization, he also brought to VICI a managerial style which quickly proved unsuitable. While the first director's highly informal, unpremeditated manner led to disorganization, the VICI coordinator's formal, textbook management style, in which he removed himself from day-to-day operations, had the same results. He issued orders from his office, but he seldom knew what was going on in the program.

What was going on was often not good. The program had innumerable management problems. In April, a journeyman had to be terminated for drinking. In May, another staff member was fired due to a disagreement with the program coordinator. The development of rules and regulations for participants dragged on through June, July and August, awaiting the approval of the OOC board, and then, in a sudden crackdown on the youth, there were 12 dis-

missals in August for behavioral problems. The LMA's quarterly fiscal report for the period ending June 30, 1979, was due on July 31 but was not submitted until October -- and then had to be redone. The program seemed unable to certify homes at the pace it projected due to staffing problems, and in July it had an insufficient number of certified work orders. Work was often not done on time. And in its July report, CPPV staff said, "The demonstration has forwarding incomplete and inaccurate information via the Weekly Participant Progress forms."

The demonstration was regularly failing to meet its own goals for enrollment or work production, and CPPV noted in its July 1979 report:

The demonstration is showing an inability to prioritize and effectively utilize staff. Administratively, the program is extremely structured and limits the flow of information between the program coordinator and the journeyman staff.

Despite the problem, the VICI coordinator resisted suggestions made by CPPV until the OOC executive director intervened. In late August, when the VICI coordinator got into a dispute with a CPPV field representative making an unannounced visit, this was the climax of mounting problems. The VICI coordinator, whose original probationary period had been extended from mid-June to mid-September, was fired by OOC on the last day of his probationary period.

Surprisingly, perhaps, despite the problems of management and linkages, the youth participating in the program seemed to be busily and fruitfully engaged when sites were visited. They were idle more than at other sites because of logistical bottlenecks, but they seemed to regard the program as useful and seemed to be learning.

The departure of the VICI coordinator in mid-September opened the prospect for improved management, but the South Bronx VICI site presented the new management with major problems.

Whoever took on the job of managing this VICI program would have to resuscitate and revise linkages with the labor movement in New York. VICI management would also have to develop counseling relationships and beef up recruitment and referral mechanisms. And they would have to live with a system of financing materials and supplies based on funding from several demonstrably fickle sources.

Thus, as the choice of new management was being made, there were major questions as to whether that management could find ways to make the second half of the 18-month program significantly better than the rocky first half.

### PART III

#### SUMMARY

The transition of the VICI program from the planning stage to the actual operation of programs was characterized by a wide range of problems, some of which were common to most sites while others reflected particular local forces. By early 1979, all of the eight programs were operating, and although there were varied degrees of success, the internal workings of the programs -- the relationship between journeymen and youth -- was proving to be interesting and effective. There was little new in VICI as far as recruitment or intake of youth. The programs were designed to make innovative use of union journeymen as trainers, and beyond this useful planned innovation, the journeymen were also assuming a very important role as part of the program's placement efforts.

CPPV was exhibiting flexibility and effectiveness of an intermediary unit in its management of the demonstration. The quality of its technical assistance seemed high, and it was perceived as useful by many local program managers, but they questioned whether any entity investing the resources employed by CPPV could do an equally effective job.

As the demonstration progressed. CPPV focused increasingly on placement and on improving the performance of the programs as a second wave of youth began to be enrolled in it. CPPV also became more interested in ways of turning VICI into a more permanent institution as the demonstration period moved into the second half of its 18-month life span.